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T m  manwwipt authoritiea cnnaulted for this vol~lrne con- 
sist of ariginiu papers and corr~pondence of the uuke of 
WclIington, mnrshril Soult, lring Joseph, Mr. Stuart,* general 
Ori.aliam,t general Pelet,f general. Canipl1e11,g cnptain Cod- 
rington, 11 and colonel Cos,T togetlier with many private 
jonmls and letters of officers employed dtiring the m r ,  
Before the Appndix tlie rentlcr will find nn originnl note 
lq tha emperor NapoIeon, wliicIi 1 liad not seen when I 
published my first volume : It is referred t o  as confirmatory of 
iny arguments against Josephs retreat from Madrid. 
* Iion3. Stuqrt de Rothesay. + T d  Lynedvoh. : Pist aide-<le-nrriti t o  niurshni i i i ~ ú n a .  8 I~ieut.-gov. of I ~ 3 b m l h  
U Admira1 sir Edwad Codrinqtoa. 7 Governor of Almcih. 
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BOOK THE SIBTH. 
CHAPTER 1. 
WNEN sir Jehn ñIoore rnnrclied from Lisbon, the repncy 
established by air LTew Ddrymple nomindly govcmal ttEiat 
comtry; but the liatless habits engendered by the ancient 
~yRtcm of  misrule, tlic intrigue9 of tlie Oparto fnction, nnd the 
turbulencc of tlie people ~ o o n  produce13 aii alarming state of 
anarcliy. Private pcrsons usurped tlie functioas of gorern- 
ment, jiisticc n-as disqarcied, insubordination and murcler 
wcrr Iiiiiled as hdicatious of patriotisni ; ancl tliough wnr n-ns 
tlie uiiiversal cry, rnilihry preparations mme wliolty neglectd, 
for tlie nstioii in its foolish pridc bclicrcd tlie 
enerny Iirirl neitber streiigtli nor spirit for a second a:w& '' 
invrasion. mere m a Fmch faction in Lishn, 
the mrrchnnta wcre npprehensive, the regency unpopular, the 
gul~lic mind unsetkld. In Oporto, tlieviolcnec of ho1i people 
and soldiera nras miclr, that sir Harry h r a r d  sent tmo Eritisli 
tegimcnts tliero by sea to preserve tranquillity; md tIie seetIs 
of disorder were widcly mst and myirouting vig~rously~ liefore 
tlie English crrbinet thought fit to aocredit a responsible 
diplornntist nenr tlie govement ,  or give a permanent chief to 
tlie furces Ieft by Ifoore. Thc cou~entiun of Cintrn rrns 
knom in Enalmd in gpternber; the regency was established 
and the frontier fo r t~~ses  oceupied by Eritish troops in tLa 
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s m e  month; y& it WM not nntil the middle of Dcocmbc~ 
that Mr. ViKem and sir John CmdoBk, chargerl with *be con- 
duct of the political and milita7 affdm in PaFhiga1, rmhed 
Lisbon ; thus the important in tm!  between the departure of 
Junot md theii arrival was total1y neglected by the ernbinet. 
Si H2w Dalrymple wha hsd nominated the regency, sir 
Arthur WcllaIey, who to I o d  Iaowletlge and powcrful 
talents drIed the inffuence of o, victoriotw commnnder, 
Burrard, Spencer, aI1 were remo~ed fmm Portugal, when 
the presente of persona acquainted ~ 6 t h  the real state of 
affairs wfia essential to the well-being of the E t i sh  interests. 
TI& error was tlie offspring of pnnslon antl incapracity; for if 
the convention hntl been rightly nppminted, tlie ministera 
would llave redded chmour, and the general3 would nat have 
been withdrawn f m  the public ~eervic ahoaad +a meet 
groundlas charges at home, It m y  bs disputed whether 
Portugal m s  the fitte~t thentre for the first apemtiona of  tb 
Rritiali mmy; but wlien tlmt coiintry wns adunlly freed from 
tlie presenca of an enemy, wmlien tlie capital and the frontier 
fortresses were occupied by EngLsh troops, whcn Noore, 
learing his hospihls baggage antl q a z i o e s  there as in a 
place of m s ,  hnci marched to Spnin, the question was no 
longer la doubtful one. The ancient relations betwecn 
England and Portugal, tha greatnesri of the port o€ Lisbon, 
the warlike disposition of t l ~ e  Portupeso, and ths singulwly 
happy cireumtances that there was neither eonrt nor momrch 
to Iialanee the English influence, md that even the nomination 
of the regency wns tlie mrk of m Englifih general, offcred 
auch p n t  atlvantages as could nomlicre else be obhinetl. It 
vas a miserable policy that negtacted such an occasion, and 
mtaind sir Artbur TVellesley in England whie Portugal, 
like rt drunken man, at once wealc and twbulent, mas reelbg 
on the edge o€ a precipite. 
Sir JoIin GrntEock touclied at Coman on Iiis voyng~ to 
Liabon, Fifteen hnndred thonsand dollars liad jnst arriped 
fhm in tfie Lavinin frigate, but, Moore's f i ~ t  intwtion to  
retreat upon Portugal bcing then known, Cradock divided 
this aum, and camicrl awny cight hundred thousnnd dollars, 
depigniw to  leave n portion at Oporto, snd takc the r e m a i n d ~  
to Li~bon, that Moore rnight find monq  on mhntevcr Iine he 
retreatcd. From Coruña he proceeded to Oporto, wliere wir 
Rohert Wilson had succeeded in organizing under tlie title of 
tlie Lusihnian Legion &out tliirteen litlndrerl mm; this 
exceptd, nothing, civil or militrary, b~wipoke eitlier 
Appendix t. 
amangement or common sense. Wie bishop, intent ,* 
t o  racquire supreme d e ,  wns e n w d  ~ 5 t h  secret 
intrigucs, ~ t n d  fnctious designing persons were inñtigtating ths 
populace to violence, Wilson's h ~ o n  mas a project of the 
chevalier dn Soma, Portupese minister in London, who was 
one o€ the bisliop's fnctiun ; ond the legion wns rniaml, not to 
rqe l  tlie enemy tut to  support tliat party against tlie govern. 
ment. Wic men mere promised liigher pny, they mwe clad in 
unifoms difcring in ooloiir from tlie nntional troopa, nnd gave 
tlie regency, tvlio drencled ttlie macl~ininittions of tlie turhulent 
priest, grmt Jarm : it mris in tmtb a most anomnloiis force, 
nnd from ita pcculiar constitution prad~ictive of mucli eiiibm- 
msrnent. 
Cmdocl~ feft three liundred thousand dollars at Oporto, 
directcd tlie two Britisli httalions in tliaf neiglibourhood to 
rnarcli tto Almeid4 took on bond o ~mnl l  detncliment o€ 
Gepmag troops, and set mil for L l i o n .  1'Ic &ron& dvised 
Wilsoa to meve sucli of his legionwiee as were suficiently 
ognnixed, to Villa Real iu Tnts us 1iIoiites, i, 11iInce nppointetI 
by the repncy for the asscmbly of the forces in tbe north; 
and sir bbert,  eirerl of tlie folly and diagu~ted ~ G t h  the 
insolcnce nnd cxmqscs of tlic nil ing m04 did qiiit Oporto, b~tt 
liaviiig vrews of his own went to Almeidn instead of TTill& 
Real. Lisbon m little better than Oporto; tliere TUS no 
nrmngcment for prcscnt or fiiturc dcfci~ca; mri tlic poprilncc, 
alhit Iestj openly en couraged to eominit escesses, Lere quite 
uucontrolled Iiy the governnieut. The regency 
had a keencr drertd of domcstic Lnsumection tlinn t;Pendl* 
of tlie retuni of the Frencli; wlioae operations 
tliey reprded mith evm less anxiety than the bishop did, as 
bring furtlier remore4 tlian he WM from the immetliate 
thcntrc of ivnr ; tlieir extrtiorrlinnry iiicapncity nnd wuiit of 
vigilarice were evincecl by t l~a  folloming fnct. Snttaro and 
another peraon haring contra& t o  nupply tlie Britiah k ~ p g  
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a finer tlmn the PoPtug~~cst! ailvcr cmzrulo-nova, and m l r l  have 
rnaintniiied its valua notdhstanding this demee, if tlie slui 
tEius thromii npon it by the government lid not enaliled tlio 
money-cliangm to m its vnlue down for the moment. Tlie 
Eiiglish ñoldicrs nnrl ~nilors heing nll paid in tliese tloITnre nt 
four sliiElinga snd sixpence, wliicli ww the true value, were 
thus ~urldenly mulcted Sourpence in each by tlie artificial 
depreciation of tlie moment ; the men ettributed this to fraud 
in tlie ~liopkeepem, tlie retnil tmde of Lidion wm iotempterl, 
and quarsels between t rdesmen  nntl ~oldiers took place hourly. 
To cnlm this effervescence, a second decree WM promnlgated, 
tlirectiri~ tlie dollnr t o  bo remived at thc inint and in the 
pulilic offices rtt its real d u e  ; it tlien appeared tlie go-vern- 
mcnt could profit liy coining thc dollar into cruznrlo-iiovnn, a 
circumstanw ivhicli proved tlie wliole afiair ta le M unworthy 
ti-ick to  recmit tbe treasury. This I w e n e d  in October, 
and aa ctll the financia1 ~ffa i rs  n-ere ill manrgcd, and flie 
iegency destitute of vigour or capacity, tho tasen wore iinpaid, 
the l iad eash exhautetl, aed tlie treasury paper at a heavy 
dlscount when Cradock arrivecl. Upon tlie scroU thus 
unfold~l he could only r e d  confusion diinger nntl misfortiiue; 
and mch being the h i t a  of victory n-hat co~tld be expected 
from dimster? yet at this period, tlie middle of December, 
Bfoorc wras supposed to be in full retrent upon Portngal, M- 
lowed by the emperor with onc French m y ,  wliile another 
tiveatened Lisbon by the line of the Trigns. 
Of Rnglisli troolis there were, including tlie si&, nboiit ten 
tliousnnd, iI1 equipped nnd acattered; and the capital was 
crowded mith women and children, bagpge and non-comba- 
trtnts, beIongíng sa well to tlie army in Spnin ns to thnt in 
Portugal. In tlie river there were tbree Portuguese ellips of the 
line two frigates and eiglit smaller vessels o€ war; get none in 
a stntc for sctt, nnd the whole likely t.o fall into tlic linnds of the 
enemy; fur in the mirtst of tliis mnfusion t h  Englisli aclmiral, 
sir Cliarles Gotton, w ~ s  m l l e r l  without a successor being 
nppointed. Tlie lrenl nn(I energy of captain Halket, ttbe scnior 
officer on Uic shtion, more than compensnted for the depar- 
ture af tlie ndmiral as far S professional duties were con- 
cerned; Iiut he could nvt nid the general, in kis denlings with 
the regency, M vigorously a8 m officer of higher rank and 
fomnlly raccreditect W o c k  felt bls o m  difficalties, but 
with disinterester1 ~ e d  resolved to make thc reinforcing of 
Moore first m; he had, however, only eight Britisli and 
four U e r ~ a n  battalion~i of infantry, four tmops 
of dragoons, and thirty piecm o£ rartillery, of do€& YSS. 
whicli six mere hoorsed: there was also a bate& 
Iion of tlie 60th regiment, m p o s d  pBncipally of h n e h m e n  
recniited fram the prison shipa, but if, hnd been aent back from 
Spain h a u s e  tlie saldiem muld not h. tmgtetl nenr their 
countrymen. 0i thm thirteen battaliona, two were in 
Abmntes, one in Elvw, tliree at  Lamego on the Duero, one in 
Almeida, the rema* six at Lisbon ; three of the  four batr 
talions in the north mere immediately directed to join Moore 
by Glie ronte of SaIamxnca; of those in the south, two, accom- 
panied by a demi-brigde of ~artillerp, were sent to him from 
Abrantw, hy khe rond of Castello Branco and Ciudd Rodrigo: 
meanwhile Mr. Villieryt arríved, and Cradoek throagh llim 
addresd the regencp on the dangemus state of tha country. 
Be mid tliere was neither mtivity in the govergment nor 
entliusinsm a-mong the people; that the army, deficient in 
numbers, ski11 mmo iin discipline, wns scattered, neglected, n.n& 
in thh menacing state ef affain, the regency were 
f&: Es, Wlthout @m : he proposed, therefore, a general 
enrolment of al1 the people, and from the Brítish 
storee offered to mpply a, thousand rnuskets and ten thousand 
pikes. This offer of p i k e ~  appears to have been made in com- 
plinnce witli Mr. Villiers' wislies, and betrayed mere zeal than 
prudente. A general levy and arm% of the turbulent popn- 
law of a capital at such a conjancture, was more likely to 
lead h confusion and misehief t h  t o  my effeettial defence: 
the main objects pressing upon tlie general's attention wem 
homo~m so iiumcroria rind contradictory as to rertiler it difi- 
mB to nvoid erron. It irnportant to reinforce sir John 
Moere; but it wns equally necesssry to keep s force towartls 
tlie frontier on the line of tlie Tagurr; becauso 
Appendix SI, 
,, V o ~  1. the fonrth Frefich corps hd jnst pmsed thatriver 
st Almaraz, had defeated aalluzxo's army and 
menaced Badajoa, which was d ~ o u t  m mmunition cir p m  
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visions, and mormver the populaca were in commotion, sl@g 
the cliid pemons. 
~ l o c k ' s  instructions were to ernbark if pressed hy B 
superior force, to m y  off the Portngucse navg &nd s torq to 
destroy whrrt he conld not remove, and to xecelve on board al1 
tlic nativcs who might lie desiroirs of camping. But to emhnrk 
the wnrneri, children, baggage, and other encumlirances belonp 
ing t o  Jloore'a amy Iiefore the crisis ma9 also essentid; and it; 
w k  obvious that tlia Engli~h ministers liad prp. 
serilicrl tlie contradidory trasks of scnciing troop Apmdix f P l. t o  Spain and defencling Portugal; of exciting con- 
fidence rind yct opcnly prcparing to abandon the cmntry, 
Aud tlie populnce wera alreatly so much rnoveil by mrnoure of 
the intenrled emliarkation, it mas doubtfnl if even the Dritish. 
non-comlintants could get on board ; much less could the Por- 
tupetie sliips of wnr be 4 4  off, or the forts rlismiintl~l, 
mitliout a &muh whicti might be fatal to both parties It 
therefore iniperative to hold Lislion and tIie forta aC tbe 
mouth of t l ~ e  hnrbonr with atrong ganiaon$ and this 6 t h  the 
troops absorbed by Elvas anrl Almsidn r e d u d  tho figbing 
men in tlie field t o  insignificante. 
WclI knowing the iemper of tho popultcoe, fhe regency 
feared to arm tliem, and ivere not very eager to enfarce the 
Zevy; yet t o  hidc their weakness thep promised to send six 
tl~ousand troops to Alcantwa to  observe tbe march of the 
forirtli corps,--a p ~ o m i ~ e  tEiey nevw in'cencled annd were indeed 
uiiablo to perfarm. Forjm, suppmI to bc inirnical to  tlie 
Dritisli infiuenw, mundly ileclnrd tbey neitlier muld nor 
monld movc without m ~ V R U P A  of monq. an nid which 
Cradock recommedcd shodd ba given, but 1; h d  no poíver 
t o  grant it himself, Moore's lettera from Sala 
mmm now reaclied LLhn. 'Jley iatimated dL7g!s' 
that reverñm wcre be sxpoct~l, nnd Crnrlock, 
Jtliongh . l i reld to mainhin himself in Portugal wbile he 
muld witbout a breacli of his instmctions, felt st.rongl.ly that 
timely prcpnrntion for an emliarkntiort ahould be madc; espe- 
set in and rendered the departure of vesds from the Tapa  
~ e r y  m x z r h h  Jieanivliila tbe i n t cmI  date of PortugaI 
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was in no wise amended, or liIrely to nmend. The gevern- 
ment hatl jssued s decree, tha 23rd of December, for organiw 
ing the popalatiora of .Lisbon in skteen Iegions, but, influ- 
meed by feru, ortEered that but one battalioa of each sLouEd 
parade at a time for exerci~, aand fiose anly on SunrIays; 
nor were the legions at Liny time t o  maemble witliwt tlic 
order of tlie general mmmanillng tlie pmvince. A proposid 
t o  prepare the Portngaefie vessela for sea waa acceded to with- 
out any apgarent dissatisfaetion, hut the government secretly 
fomented the spirit of discontent and snspicion among the 
peeple. No efforts were matie to  improve the regular force, none 
to forward thc march of trooIk tri Alcanha: and so mllons 
wcre tlie repncj to thc riglits of humrinity, t,hnt 
'1 B number of French pri~oners, captured nt Yariou~ $+ 4, 5. - 
periocls by khe Portupese, and accum~rlated ak 
Lisbon, were alxolutely denied subsistente : C d d ,  after 
many fmitlese representations, was forced t o  chnrge LirnadE 
with fheir m p p l ~ ~  to the horror of sccing thcm starved 
to dwth. Pronaions also werc withlield from Fort Lm Lippej 
and Leite nnder the regenq's orders urged the Britisli troops 
to m u a t e  that fortresa. 
The march of reinforcementa for Mwre left only three 
hunrlred dragoons and seven bathlions wailable for the 
defcnm of Portugnl; four liattralions wcm in gnrrison; thc 
remainder were nnable to hke tlie field in default of muleg of 
whkh animal the countrg seemed bereft ; yet, as if in tlmision, 
bfr. Frere, the centrai junta, the junta of Badajog, and the 
regeng of Portugal, mre mith common nnd 
:&* dimcterietic foolishnw pressing Cradock to 
m c h  into tbo south of Spain, vhcm thcro wa0 
scarcely a iSpanish soldier in arme; and tlie movament, if it 
h d  been prudent or practicable, rvas against hi iwtructioas. 
Towards the end of Deoember, the mmmunication vit1i 
Moore was entkly stopped, aud the line of the T a y ,  
menrrcod by the fourth Frcnch corps, nquired imporhnce. 
Tfie troopa goiiig from Elvw to Spain were tlimefure directed 
to halt at Castdlo Bmco; general Richad Stewart, mho 
commanded tliem, being reinforced with two hndred cavalry, 
was orderd to watcli the roa& by Satvatierra and tlie two 
Idanhas, and protcct the flping bridge3  EL^ Abmntcs and Vi31~ 
Vellia from tlie enemy's inmirsions. At t l ~ e  m e  time a 
promise r a s  obtnined from tlie regency, tliat al1 the Porhi- 
guesc troops in tlie Arerntejo ~heuld be oolIected at Campo 
Mayor antl Portdegrc. CrnrIock fixed npon Xncavem for tlie 
concentration of llis main body, iutending to defend tlint 
point as lonp as he could with so fem troeps. Re l i o w ~ ~ e r  
knem t h 3  ~Urneik nlthoqh full of Bitish &ores and 
importnnt in cvcry way, wmns, with rcspcct to its o m  defcnoc, 
utterly neglected by tlie repncy, who regarded witli jmlousg 
eren tbe presenca of a Britisli force there; wherefore he sent 
brigadier d. Carneron, with instructions t o  collect tlie con- 
valwcents of RIoom's a r q ,  t o  unite them with Uie kwo 
batbliom di11 at Almeirla, and join the a m y  in Xpain : if tbat 
waa judged dangerous, Ire mas to  mturn to  Lishon. In eitlrer 
cwe, tlic dores nnd the siclr men lying nt AEmei~la were to  be 
direckl npon Oprto .  TEie pnucity of m~alry waFi now 
mverelp felt; i f  prevented tlie p e r a l  fmm ascertaining tlie 
strength anrl objects ef tlic cncmy'a parties, md tlic Porhi- 
p e s e  reports ~vcrere notorioud y contr~lidtory nnd fahe. Tlie 
14th dragovns had heen discmliarked since the 22nd qf 
December, and were destined for the army in Spain ; Iwt the 
mrnmissnry doubted if he could formad tllat smJ1. body erren 
by detraclments, sucli wna *e ponury oE tlie country or mtlier 
tIie Gfficnlty of drawing SortL its resources; and as mnny 
debts of Noore's army mere di11 niiliaid, ra mant of wnfidenm 
prmnted  tlie oonntry people from bringing jn mppipliw upon 
crerlit, 
In  flia midst of these difficulties rumoura of reverses in 
Spain became rife, and acquired importan@ when it mas 
l rnom thah foiir tliousand infantry and tmo tliousand mv.pbTry, 
tlic arlvanoed par13 ~f thjrty Uiousand Frencli troops, \v.vere 
actually at aterida, and meming  Dadajog, whicli mna desti- 
tute of. provhions, arms, and amunition. Had the Po&- 
gume forec becn msqcmbled at Alcantram, CradOCl~ monld have 
supporterl it wit11 tlie British Sriples  from Abraiites and 
CastelEo Bmnco; but not a man w& put in motion, and he, 
feeiing no confirlence either in the froops or promises of tlie 
rcgency, ~ ~ l ~ c d  ta concentrate lii own wmy near Lisbon, 
Stewart wns, tlierefore, direched to destroy tlie bridges o€ 
Villa Vellia and Abranteq and fa11 baclc to Soica~ern, Then 
the Llsbon populace, suppshg they were to be abandoncd 
without necessity, bbec~me violentiy moved; the regcng made 
no effort to preserve trrinquillity, and thc peoplc procecded 
from one excess to nnother, tintil it becnme evident tliat in n 
forced emlinrlcntion the Britigh would h ~ v e  to fifilit tlieir all ie~ 
m well lns tlieir enernie~~ It wns at tbis gloomy period, when 
ten marches mould l i m  brought the Frencli t a  Lisbon, wl~en 
a ~itamp of Napoleon's foot mould have extinguishd that 
spark of mar vhich aftermrds blazed over the Feninsula, that 
m r  John 3looro made his daring movement upoti SaIiWe, 
and Portugal, gasping in mortal apny, ktantly re- 
I i e v d  
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CHAPTER 11. 
IT was t h ~  advancetl p a r d  of the fourth corps which bad 
approaclied JIerida on i ts way t e  Badajos; bnt in the night 
of the 26th o! ZJecember, ian oficer c+ng the 
intclligence of Moore's rnavement reached hferida, $rd!:> 
and next morning the Frcnch b t i l y  re-crossed 
tlic T n p s  nnd rejoined tlieir main body, from wliich nnother 
pomerful detachment was immeiiiately direckd upon Mrtcentia. 
This rehgrade movement obviated the irnmediate danger to 
Lisban, and C d o c k  cndenvanred to p~tcify the peoplc, He 
ílirected Stemrt, who hnxl Iieen streng~liencd by two German 
battalions, t~ halt nt Santarem; hc esplained l ~ b  motives to 
the regenv, ~ n d  urged a more frmk and vigorona aystxm; 
liut lilre tlie Cspnnisli juntw, they promised everytliing, nnd 
performd nothing. Assenting verbrtlly to ai1 measureq they 
would never commit thernselves by writing, 
Iitiving tlie dcspicsililc intention of disclrriming m 
$ 6 .  
tliat whicli might prove disn,meable to tlie popu- 
lace, or even to  the Frencli. Cradock bad, however, no power 
beyond hw own pcrsonnl inflrienence to  cnforcc nttcntirin, no 
sucecssor to sir (;liarle3 Cokfon hd arrived, and lb. T i l l i m  
was wrrnting in decision and jirdggncnt. 
In the north, Carneroa, haPjng sent tbe ~Eck men md prrrt 
of thc storea from Almcida towarda Oporto, gnve zip tFiat 
fortress to Wilson, and marcl~ed mjth  two Britisli bsttalions 
and a detacliment of convalescents by the Tras os Xontes to 
join tlie army in Sprrin. On the 9 th, henring of tlie retreat to 
Cornii~, he mouId kave returned to Almeida, but Lapissg 
who had taken Zarnora, threlitened bis line of marcli, abere- 
upon Iie made for Lamego and advised Wilson to retire to the 
same place. Criloncl Blunt, Lisvinga convoy £01- &Soore% nnny, 
waa likewise furced to  talie the road to Oporto, on wliich al1 
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tho Bfitish storea and detncliments wero nom directed. Bot- 
witlistandhg tbe general dimay, WmTilson, d o  liad been reiil- 
forced by some Spanish troops, Partugue$e volunteers, and 
strnggling convaIeswnts of the British army, rejected Gameron's 
advice, and prcrceeded to practrse a11 the arts, of an able partizan, 
-tht is to sxy, he cnticed *he French to desert, spread false 
rcpods of his o l m  numbcrs, anrl by petty entcrpriscs md 
p e a k  activi ty, aruused a s p i d  of resistanoa thoughout tlis 
Ciudad Rodrigo country. Shis i d u x  of siclt men and stores 
at Oporto, and tlie prospect of general Carneron's arrival tliere, 
beame a s o m e  of uneacincss to Cradock. A sliifting-bar 
and sbod water rendered the harbonr a very bad one for vessels 
to cdar out; it mas aleo one very dangerous for vessela to 
lie off ut tliae senson, iuid if the enemy wfvnnced, ra Ioss of men 
nnd stores ivm t o  be anticipkd. Tlie depwbure 
S'r ". of sir Cbarleg Cotton had diminiahed tthe naval dock, 3x85. 
means, and for seventeen mccessive days, such 
wae the state of the wind, no vessel could Ieave tlie Tagiis; 
captnin Halkct indced, contrivetl at Iwt to send tonnnge to 
Oporto for two thousantl persone, and sir ISmueI H o d  de- 
spatchd some vessels from Ti'igo; but the weatlier long con- 
tiiiued unfavourable, the transporks conld not enter tlie hiirbour, 
and the encumbrancea, hourly increasing produced tlie most 
serion8 embmtlssments. 
hfoore liaving now reIinqnished his communicatians with 
Portugpl, Crrtrlock WM to  consider how Iie oould lrold that 
conritry, without risking the deatruction of liia troops. Por- 
tugal has no defensible frontier. Tbe rivers, generdly running 
ea9t and west, are fordable in most places, subjed to sndden 
&ea aud falla, offenng but weak lines o£ resistance, and, tlie 
Zezere excepted, presmt no obstacles to an enemy on the 
eastern fronticr. TIic mountaina rifforrl mnny fine nnd Borne 
imprepbIe positions; but ivitli the 1eng-t.h of fmntier md 
difficulty oof lateral communication~, i, gcnml defenrlk it 
against superior forces would be cnt off from the capital if he 
concentrated bis troops; and if  he extended theni. Lis line 
would be immediately broken. The powession of Lisbon con- 
stitutea the possession of Portugd soiith of thc Douro, and nn 
inferior army cnn only protect Lisbon by k~cping close t o  it. 
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Cradock adopt ed the French colonel Vincente's views for the 
ddcncc of Lialion. Witii seventeen biindrcd mcn, he occiipid 
tl~e lieigl~ts helrind the creelr of Samvem-lenving three thou- 
sand men in the forts and batteries at U S ~ Q ~ ;  nnd at the 
~equest of tbe  regency, who in rtlturn promised to  assemble 
tlie native troops nt Tliomnr, Abrnntes, and VilIn VeIIin, Iie 
o d e r d  Stemart to halt at Santarem. 
Tlint offiecr had two tIiousnnd seven liundrert troops, but 
tbey had been marclung for a month under incewant rain, 
tlieir dothes wero worn out, tlieir eqiiiprncnts 
Blr X Cm- 
mincd, ancl in common ivitli the rest of the a m y  dack N S ~ .  
they mantcd sltoes. Cnmeron mm nom on the 
Douro, Kemmis with tlie 40th regiment nt Elvn~ ,  anrE the amy, 
not excectliiig ten thoosnnd men mith tlie encnmbrances of 
fohy tliouannd, ocmrpied three points of s trinngI:le, mhcse 
sliortest side m moro tlian a Iliunrfred nnd fifty miles ! 
Crdock could nat present five thoussnd fit for action at any 
point of thc position, and tlie unccrtabty of remaning ie the 
country rentlcrcrl it impossilile to m n h  contrach, nnd drove 
Km to rt+ precarious codly retail sptern of supply. TeTet in this 
mornent of extreme weakness, 1Ir. Frere 16th indefatipble 
folly, sns urfiinfi liim to makc m diverainn in fipain liy tlie 
Taqs;  Mí. Villiers was ns earnest to send n force by sea 
to Vigo; xnd Crar1ocl~'s o m  instmctione prescribed tliree other 
01)jccts ns incompntilils witii eaeli otlier si tlicy wcrc with tlie 
prr!jccis of bir. Frerc md Nr. Yilliers! 1-Iis means were so 
scniity tIi.it ito dtain one of tliese ofijects was scnrecly possilde, 
yet 31r. Cnnniiig wrotc officially to hlr Yillicrs at this epockt, 
as jf s nii$:~iky anrl well-ft~rnislied army was in Portupl, and 
enforced ' the messity ofmtinuirig to mainta&z pswssim c$ 
Poracgnl m h?zy os comld be done &t?k tlieforce in.?rnls&cl¿o &v 
Jo7cn Cc?ldo&s m?liu7?d, ~ m l i a i w  c t h ~ ? y 8  lsIid mt t!# 
dejmce of Por&ttgaE a h ,  h t  the eniphjrn& of tlte m y ' g  
rnih7n.r~~ fm, and the dli.e~Bz'm zuJ~idc .rmdc¿ l id €hw created clm 
fuvou~ o f C?i% sol& of LTpai~~, z ~ a o  &ectip mE 10 .be d d o m d ,  
wqt in cmes qf tJ~e nzost e&venae mce~s1'ty.' The enemy's 
military forcc! 3t was tlirec hnndrctl tlioiistind men, and tbis 
desptcli was a pompoos ahsridity. Tlte miuiders nnd tlieir 
agents, I inuntd b- the phantoms of Spanish and Portupese 
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armieg mere ineapable of perceiving the balk and sutxstance o£ 
the French host ; tl~ejr system wris one of shifts md expedienta, 
evey week pnoduced a Trah project, aand minister aiid agent 
aliko folIowcd his own views without mferenw t o  any fixcd 
prineiplt?: the genemls wcre the onty persons not cmpowcred 
t o  asranga military opemtions! 
Cradock enipleyd so mmy officers to obtdn intelIigenee 
thae he soon head of Jfoore'a advanoe t e  hhaggn, and qa in  
endeavoured t o  sena lb a reinforcement by Almeida; yet 
finally the mant of mpplies induced h i i  to accede t o  lb. 
ViEliem' wi~hes~ nnd he sliipped six huiuizcirerl cavairy md thirteen 
hnndred infantrp for Vigo on thc 12th; ht ere 
Slr J. Qs- 
dock, B188, tllcy quitted the Taps, intelligence of the retreat 
t o  Coruña amived aud they were disembarkecl. 
At the same time admira! Berkelg m h e d  Lislion, and 
Cradock remived tlie first communierstion from the Englisli 
ministcm, by which i b  appemed they werc more intent to get 
pmsession of Cnciiz than to dcfend Portugal. Tlieir mxiety 
for tliis object hacl somcwhnt aubsidad aftcr the Iinttlo of 
Viiero, get revived with vig-our w l m  Moore, conteqplating 
a movement towards the soiith, suggcsted b d i s  apr a place of 
arms; m expedition mas irnmediatelp prepared t o  go therr, 
but the project; faiIed from the unstable perplexed nature of 
the cabinct pokicy and its unsuittiblc choicc of agcnts. 
It m still unknown in England that the supreme junta 
hnd fíed from Aranjueír, whcn sir Gcorgc Srnitli, 
Pnpenil d i o  Iiud mnducted Spencer's negotintion in 1808, 
1810. 
wm qpin sent to Cacln to tmt for tlie reception 
of w-n EngIish garrison; nnd four thousand men arnbarlíed 
mder general Sherbroolre, w8h orrlers to huch a t  Lisbon ; 
those orders were immediately afterwards clianged, and ha 
~vns to malte for Coruña, nntI thcn otlicr iastructions scnk 
him to Cadk, with Iiis force aupente t l  to five tliousniid. 
Ifr. Frere waa to demmd Lis admimion ns the only condition 
upon which A. Bntish force could be ernpluyd in Appendix B.  t h ~ t  part of Spain. T h e  disnstcra in tlie i iorthm 
p d a  incwased the mimsters' nnxietp to Lave C ~ Z ,  and 
dwreased their interest in Portugal, Cradock was Appendlx 
commandcd to obcy any requisition for troops 
m d e  by the Spanisli juutu. And so reckIess oE t he  real stnte 
of affaim mere tlie mlnisters, that Cradock, whms despatckea 
h d  been eb continua1 complsint of hia Pnabiliky to  procure 
horses for Iiis oiva artillcrg, m8 h c t c d  to f&h lthem for 
Sherbrookek. 
Sir Oeorge Xmith, hasty of temper, but zmlous md acote, 
found rtt C d i z  as elaemlrere, that dl persons were en&@ 
witli tlieories and intrigues; that notliiiig useful had h e n  
done for defcnce; that tlie rampartci liad scarcelp any guns 
morintccl, and tlint two miles in advrance of  the city an out, 
work had been commenccrl upon sucli ra sea10 t11eiC it could 
not possilily be finished in four montlis, and ivitli Spanish 
domess would takc as many ycars. For n solirl general 
defenee, Smith judged twenty ihouwnd good troops tu be 
rquisite, but ten thansantl wodd si~ffice for tlie city ; there 
mere, however, only five thousand militia and voliintecr~, nn(1 
not a replnr soldier under mms, nor nny witliin r e d .  The 
namber af guns, mounted and to be mounterI, exoeedd Tour 
hundred ; and to serve them there mere onIy tmo liunrfwd md 
fifty peasanta and voluuteers, wlio being enrolld and clotlied 
in uniforma were calleJ. artillery-men. KnoMng nothing of 
Maore's mnrch to SaE1ngun, Smith calcul~kd iipon tlie imme- 
diatc approach of thc Frencfi; wlierefore seeiiig tlic hclplcm 
stnte of Cadiz, and being assured tlie people woulil williugly 
d m i t  an English gnrrison, he wrote to Cradock for troops. 
Tlie It~ttter, little tliinlíing nt sucli a conjuncture 
the suprenie junta \vould be more jealous of their 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ; +  
allies tlian feiuful of tlieír enemies; judglng xlso 
from liis latcst instructions, thnt obedience to tliia rcq~iisition 
mouM be consonnnt to tlie ministers' mislies; ordered ICeiiiuiia 
t o  proccotl from Elvas with tlie fortieth regiment, by Seville, 
nnrE eru2ii~rkd tlirce tliotisnnd o£ the m o ~ t  efficient troops in 
Lisbon, placing tLem under general 3I~clcenzie, 
Tliey arriwd tlie 5th, but memmliie Fiere, yKk.npe'8, 
ignomt that Smitli, wlio hntl no instructions to 
cormspond aith him, liad denisnded military ~iossession of 
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Ceadie, opened a a m t e  negotiation witli tlie 
dppenrlix 7. 
centrd junta at Seville, proposing to have the 
troops reeeived pestg md he sent Mr. Xttiart to arranga 
this with the local authoritim. 
>Ir. Frere h d  meddled much with the p e r s o d  intrigues of 
the liwr, he was of too alendw a cnpacity t o  uplicild the 
dignity nnd jud influence of  n, grent p o ~ ~ c r  on aticli un occa- 
sion, nnd his flirnsy thrwl of negritintion Roon ~nnliped under 
tlie Iiasty touch of sir George fhnitli. Tlie aupreme junta, 
averse to everything interniptive of their shggish indolente, 
hd sent the marquis de Tillel, a member of their own body* 
t o  Cadk avomedIy t o  admit the troops, in real iq  t o  thmrt 
that measure, and Mackenzie'e arrivail with rtn object clifferent 
from tliat ~nnoirnced by $fr. Frcrc, m iastantly tnken advnn- 
tnge of to cliargo Englnnd wltb trcnchmy* 'Tha 
junta finding Frere so eatljly duperi, affected to 1810. 
believe him an ignorant tool, employad by the 
English cabinet feloniously to  get possession of tlie city, and 
ao representcd the matter; lsut t l ~ e  people of Cadiz tlnd of 
the neighhuring towns enrncstly desired to reccive t,he 
Rriti~li. miis wm eo well lrnown to $fr. Stuad ~ n d  flmith, 
thzt they would notn~itlistanding the relucbnce of the supreme 
junta, lirave brongl~t tlie affair to a good conclusion, h t  at 
this criticd period the fomer wws sent on a smet mision 
to Vienna by tlie  ay of Tricde, and the lnttcr dicrl: tliiia 
thc negoti~tion failerl for mtint of 8 hcnd to condnct it, 
Macl~enzic founrl tlie popillnw ignornnt nr incredulous o£ 
the disaster~i n the nortl~, and that tliey would neither equip 
their fleet nor permit tbe Englisli milors to do it for thern; 
yet he hemd their desire for the entrance of his troops 
publicly expressed, nnd tliought with Smith the matter ~asy 
of accomplishmrnt; hi~t  it ww now wholIg in Rlr. Frcrc's 
hand~, and of conrse fnileit. The stipreme junta Iiad proposed 
1". Thak the troops s11ouId Isnd at Port St. ITaq's, to  bo 
quartered tliere and in tlie neighbonring t o m ~  229 Thzt they 
should join Cuesta's srmy. 3'. That theg should go t o  Cata- 
lonia. 4". That they should be p~rceIled out in small divisions, 
to be attaehctl tn thc difcrcnt Spnnisli arrnica Nay> pretending 
ta hold tlia English s o l d i q  cheap, those self-su&ient mcn 
dairerl tlint, 4ey  ~ l ~ o u l d  prrison tlie ininor fortressesi on tlie 
coast., iin order to release an equal number of Spanirirda for the 
fidd l 
Frcre midied to accrpt the fimt of thcse propostila, but 
hfackenzie, Sinith, and: Stuart oppased it for many retlsons; 
not tlie least urgent of wltich was, tlirtt na thc troops conld not 
be re-embarked without saine nntinml dishonour, they mnst 
have mnrclioll towwd Cuesta, antl tlius linve been involvd hi 
the c a ~ n p a i p  nitliout obtaining tlieir sole obiect, .t&epsse.ssim 
of Cadk CM a ~ [C IJ  of arma. Frere tlien sugested a modifica- 
tion of the scconrl proposal, namrly, to lenve a sml l  garrigon 
in Cdiz, and join Cuesta witli tlie reniaiuder of the tmop~.  
At tFik time Sinith dicd, LStuart emliarlced for Trieste, and 
Mmkenxig relnctant to opposc Frem's wislies, con~cnted to 
march, if tlie necesruiry eqiiipmenta for l i s  force conld be pro- 
cured; but be olxervecl, tliat it \vas contrary fo his instmctions 
and the lrnown ~vislicci of tho Englisli government, nnd linhlo 
also in part t o  tlie sume olijectiuns as tlie first proposition. 
Tliis was on tlie lSh11 of  Pebrrin~, on the 22n4 z popular 
tumult commenced in Cntlix; for the supreme junta, desirous 
t o  prove tlie city required no Englisli pirrisori, liad ~ a i i t  kliere 
two regiments of Poles, Gerii~ans, and LSiviss, dcsertere or 
prisonerc, and the people, knoning tlie junta intended t o  
disarm the voliintccm of Cwliz, were justly offentled t h t  
de~rteru  sliould t e  triiskd in preferente to tliernselves. Thej 
stopped tlie couriers, opencd tlie despatcheq from Seville, and 
imprisoned the marpis  of VilleI, ~ v h o  mas obnoxious, because, 
wliile mild t o  pcmons siiñprcted of fitvoiiring tlie Prench Iie 
hnd, bnitnlly, punislid some ladies of rniik. Tlie populm 
first endmvourcd to kilE the staEc prisoners, nnd being pre- 
vented, cornmittctI othcr cxcesscs, and miirdercd RerctIiia, tlie 
collector of pul~lic reilts. During the tumult, whicFi Itisted trvo 
driys, tlie disernbarkation of tlie Englisli troops wm repentedly 
callcd for I>y tlie mrili, niid two Rriti~li  ufliccrs sent un filiorens 
medintors, ivcre receivccl witli eutliusimn nud olieyed with re- 
spect: a rnanifcst proof tliat sir Gcorge Smitit liad jndged 
nelI. 
Trnnquillity ~vris restored tlic 9.1t11, nrid ITackenzie, not 
baving receivetl from Frere nn nnsrvcr to his Ictter of tIie 18th, 
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cepted lettcr from Soult to the king, in mhich the invasion of 
Portugal was mentioned, and immediztely conclnding Mac- 
kcnzic'a troops wonld bc wnnterl for its defcnce, couneelled 
liim to ahantlon C d i z  arid return to Lisben; but the g e n e d ,  
TVho knew that a, successfuI defenw of Porhiga1 with &o feiv 
troop~ would be impomible, and that every precautiozi mas 
already taken for m embnrkation in +he last extremity, replid 
thnt tlic rla~iger oF Lisbon rcndered tha occupntion o€ Cwiia 
more important.' Tliis was n-rittca ths 2 6th of Febmary, and 
the 3rd of March another despatch carne from Mr. Prere. 
Csdiz, and tlie dnnger of Portugal seemed to bnve pasissed from 
tEic writcr'a mind. Entcring into n minuteIy inaccurate state- 
mmt of  the situntioa of the French and Xpnnish m i e s ,  he 
ob9crred, that as Boult bad failed in an attempt ta penekate 
Portugal by the Ninho, Q etila~ impossibb frm th pos2im nf 
i!?g S'nbh fwm, as&ted m tiwj wme hy lFse P&ywe, tiscst 
IM coulrl prneusre i m  hk phm. W herefoie, he urged Mackenzie 
t o  sail f& ZYGrngona to  8id Reding; and thia d d  =heme was 
anly fnistrated by a despatch f r o i  W o c k  recnl- Airnau. 
ling the kroops t a  Lillsbon. Tliiia endd n trrtns- NQ a. 
sction indimting an unsotki~l pulicy, slinllo~v 
combinations, and bar1 agents, on the part of tlia Engliali 
calnnet; an unwiee and nnworthy disposition in the mpreme 
jmttl. 
M~ckcnzio nttn'buted tlie jenlunonsy of tho junh to Frencli in- 
fluence, E. Frere to the abrupt proceedings of  ir George 
Smith; and to fear, lest the junta o€ Seville, who were aonti- 
ntiaE1y on the mtch to recover their ancienf pamer, ~hoiijd 
rgrescnt the aclmlssion of tEie British troops 8s a trensonn'lile 
proceeding on the part of the eiuprerne government. It is 
however obvions thc true cause wns thc fnlse position in d i ch  
the English ministem hrid orjgindly plnced thcmsclvea, by in- 
untlatiug Spain with m s  and money, witlioiit asserting a j i ta t  
influence and rnriking their assistslnce the price of good order 
ancl useful exertioa 
CRADOCE'B effort to aecure C d i z  p m ~ e d  liis zeal and moral 
courage. The ~bsence of his best troops expwed hirn t o  tlre 
galling peevishne~~ of the regency, nn(1 the p s r t  insuIts of 
tiie populnce, nnd he could not hope with the remnnnt to bold 
epen khe extremity o€ tlie roclr of Lisbon against tlie weakest 
invaGon; there was no native force, the government he could 
not truet, and he had before him the prospect o€ a f o d  em- 
barltation and tlie obEoqug which never frtila to foIlow disaster. 
Elvas and Almeida were evamiaterl, but the wintergales gealed 
the harbour of Oporto, and Lsmego was crowded with fifteen 
Iiundred siek; for the boapitnIs of Almeida and hlamanra had 
becn scnt thcre, escorts and stores were daily coming in, and 
tlio overfiowing of tha Douro would not Ict bonts dmcend to 
Oprto: ono iurge cmft hd been ovemet aud eighty persona, 
soldiers and othm, drowned. 
Carneron Eiearing of this eonfusion, changed bis mute and 
made for Iii~bon, where Le ami~ecl early jn F e b m y  with two 
thousand men, worn down Iiy a march of eight hundrerl miles 
undcr continiixl rains. Sir Robcrt WlIson h d  scnt liia giins 
to Abrnntea, Iiy *,he rod of Iclanlia, Novii; but partly from a 
8pirit of ndventiire, padly from an erroneous iden 
Apwdix 4m that Cradock wis11eCE l im  t o  deferid tlie frontier, 9 1. 
he remained with his infantry in the neiglibour- 
hood of Ciudad Hodrigo. His forw iiicreased by a Spanish 
dehchment u d e r  Carlos d'España, and by some volunteers, 
mas still weak, and l i s  operationa nccessarilp contined t o  a few 
trifliiig slíirinisliea; bnt liis irnnginntion ontotfipperl liis judp 
menh; when lie hnd only felt tlie advanced post of rt single 
division, he expressed bis wnwiction tliat the Prencli were 
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division, he expressed his conviction that the French ere
going to abandon Spain altogether. Cmdock entertuillcd no
mcli ftt1se expechtions; he las informed of tlie battle of 
Coruña and tlre death of Noore, and he knev too me11 the 
vigo11r nnd tnlent ot tliat genernl t o  doubt thnt lic h d  been 
appres~ecl by au ovenulielming force. He ltnew Z a ~ o a a  had 
fdlen, and twenty-five tliousand Prench troops mere t h s  free 
to act iu otlier qnarters,-tlint Soult 6 t h  at lmt tmenty 
thousand rnen w a ~  on tlie Ninho,-that Eomrtna mas incnpalite 
of mnlring nny Iicntl ;-tlint n French army wns npin iir ti10 
neighbourbood of Merida threatening Lisbon by the line of 
the !Cap-tliat al1 Portund mas in hopeless disorder, his 
a m  ernbttrrnsmcnts hourly incrminp, and the moment sas 
amived ~t+l.lien the snfcty ot his troopa miid bo his cliicf con- 
siderntion. 
Tlie felv dcspatclies icceived from EngIand led Iiim t o  mp. 
pose thc ministers desiped to abandon Portiigd; 
birt ns tlieir iritentions on tliot hend wcre ncver 
dearly mlilained, lie r e d v e d  t a  &ide by the 
literal iiikrpretation of liia first orders, and hold the countq 
as long A9 hc corrld without risking the Iogs of bis army. l.8 
put cvcry incumtirniioc at Lislion on board tlre tran~porh in 
tlie Tngm, disniantled tlie liattaries at the moutli of  tlie river, 
made prspxrations for mrrying away or dcstroying the military 
and navnl storea in tlie arsend, and renewed liis eflorts to 
cmbnrli thc siclr mrn and storcs nt Oporta, biit thc wmther 
fitially Sorced Iiiin to atternpt tlieir removal by land. 
After Carnetan's arrival, tlie British uiider arms, incInding 
conl.ulcwents and fift een liundred stragglers from Moore'il 
nrmy, were ahout eiglit tliou~aiicl rnen; niid when Appeadk P. 
tlie iorts and inagmines, an(l the traiiquillity of 
Lislion, wet-e provided for, only five tlioumnd, not in the best 
order, could be Firought into tlie field. Thig force conld not 
cover Lislion, and Cnirlock judgr:rl it unwiñe to tdce a po~ition 
iii arl~ance, from wlience he rniglit have to retreat tlirongli the 
midst of a turbulent and excited populetion, wliose many 
indicntions af ill-tcmper lcft no doubt of I~ostility under such 
cirmimstances. Ro thercfore resolved t o  ooncentrnte on a 
position at Pnssn D"rcos ncxr tlie rnouth of the 
Tngus, mlicre lie eould crniiark with Ienst dmger, 
.and offcr most resistance t o  superior numbem. 
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His arrangements seemed injudiciouslg conducted, Passn 
$Arcos miglit hwe been prepare4 and the bulk of the tmopa 
kept in ad~ance until t.he Iast moment; to show a bold front 
in war i~ easential, md Cradock did not fail to experienee the 
truth of the  m~xim,  The Lisbon poprilacc, confdcnt like 811 
Peninsulars in tlicir oivn prowws until the moment of attack, 
became expsliemted; and the regency from natural folly, 
insii~mrity, aad íear, countenrtnced if it did not instigate 
the people im internipt the Bntish navd and d h r y  autliori- 
ties. It had itself proposerl to dismantIe the batteries, yet nom, 
formally protested against the measme; and te 
A p ~ n ~ ' ~  embarrass the general enconraged the snbordf 
5. 
nates to make false and ridiculons e b a r p  qpinst 
the executive oficem, Neiklier the admira1 nor gcneral wem 
well si~pportcrlliy Afr. Villierfi, nnd the city bccame tt~rim~zltuoua; 
m o h  urmed ivith Englisli mmuskcts hnd pikes infeskd tho 
streetai and liigh-roda day tyd ni& and pi-etending to seek 
Frenclimen to kdl, agsaiIed a11 foreigncra and 
Appendix even Britbli ofacers in uniform. The p a r d s  nho P 6. interfered were insulted, conriera were rohtied o f  
tbeir dcspatehes, and the disorder beeame so b d  that h d o t k  
pl2ilanted nrtillery in tlie srpares expecting nn affrny. Li fine, 
Lisbon was now ns it had been wlieil Junot's army was em- 
EiitAring; and if the English h ~ d  qnitted Podngd they would 
have been wsailed with as much obloquy; for auch ever has 
and will be the fate of unanccessful dlies, 
Thi~  spirit ~ e b g  not eon6ned to Lisbon. In Oparto inault 
to the British was more opedy enconniged; the government 
of th multitude mas tliere more decidcd, nnd from the cities 
it ~pread to ihe villages, Tlie p~ople of h e  Alemtejo were 
remarkably apthetic, Iiut from tlie Mmho to the T a g s  tho 
munty was in horrible mnfusion; the ~oldiem, unpaid mtnd 
smttered without regara to military order, lived ak free 
qnartera; the peasmty assembling ín bands, tbe populace of 
the toms in mobs, intercepted the communications, appointecl 
or displneed the gcncrols at their plcaauie, anci rnassmed al1 
pemna whom they mspected; the ~mTn~TIiti0n rnipplietl by 
Endand ms masted by constnat firing in token o i  insubordi- 
nation; and M if the very genius of confuaion rnw abroad, 
British malinywe~P principally of Moorc's nmy, 
~ d d d  their niisconduct to increasa the general tpeaaix 4p 
distrag. One Raymuniio tw the l edng  instiga- 
tor at Oporto : coadjutor and creature of  t l~e  bishop, he mas a 
turbt~lent snd crucl fellow, rind Iiaving in tlie fimt inziirrec- 
tion olitwned rm momentrsry influence, hhna since been elevated 
by s. credulous English writer, into a patriotic hero, Be mas 
a morthleas comard, fitted for se& rillany, inca~able of a 
noble nction ; but suited to this stak of antcrchy, wliich cnused 
many of tlie upper classes to dwpnir of tkeir country's gafety 
by war, and incrensetl tlie nuinber o£ those ready to aocept a 
foreign prince ria tLeir aovereign, if with him theyoonld obtnin 
tmnquillity nnd sn ameliorated eonstitution. Hence, wlien 
the erIg-e of tlie enemy's smord abmarils  fe11 upen the sense- 
less multitude at Oporto, there vas a poiverhl French party in 
Portupl. Nevertlieless tlie bulk of the peopTe, ñtrions and 
disorrlerly birt imbwd with liatred of the Prench, were 
ready nt the m11 of honour, and Iiusceptible of discipline With- 
out any loss of energy, 
Mr. Villicm, fearing for the anfcty of the Rritieh ~ubjeck~ 
in Lhbon, urpd Crailock to ~nspend the Fasss d ' h o b  pro- 
ject, ad ,  as the enemy, contrary to  espectation, had no* 
cmsed the frontier, the geneml riooedcti. This nnscttld state 
of nhiw continued nntil March, wlien news carne that a 
Frencli flwt mas at sea, whereupon two Lineof-battle ships 
were sent to reinferce sir Thomm Duclrmorth, and the Tapa 
lintteries wcre npin m e r L  Meanwliile Soult made progrese 
i n  tLe nortli, the anarchp at Oporto continud, and the EngIish 
govemment certninlg desigued to abtandon Portugal if the 
Frcnch dva11(3ed. For thougl~ Crndock w a a  not t ~ l d  60, 
colonel Trant, an oficer well acquainted with Portugueria 
cnstom, hd nctudly embarked with instmctions to aid the 
rneasiira Suddenly $he cabinct cIlan@ ita poficy, induced 
partly by tlie Austriiin wnr, prrtly by the failure at Cndiz, 
partly by public opinion in Englmd; and this change was 
emmpnnied by a measure giving the first reasonable hope oF 
mccess. 
h nnme @ven by the soldien tu mcn wh6, andei pretence of sick- 
nese, slirink from tlie performance of thcir dutiw in t1ia field. 
Spontaneou~ly, or broiiglit tliereio 1~y negotintion, the 
regency offered tbe comrntuid of tlieir muy witli the title of 
marshd, t o  a Eritisli gcneml. The English cabinet, 
*wend'd'x, KO. 4. mcpting thia oRer, promised a m ,  smmunition, 
clothing, and a subsirly fer thc pyrnent of a ccr- 
tdn mimticr of regular soTdiers; thus obtaiiiirig 8 firm Iiold of 
tlie rniIitnry resourees of Fortiignl, and gaining, for the first 
time, a position in tha Peninsula suitable to the  f i p i t y  of 
England. The Portnpesk desiredto h a ~ e  .vesir Arthur WeIlea- 
ley, but he refused the offcr, and it is snid sir John 3Iurray, 
he mho aftwwuds failed at Taragona, sir John Doyle, and 
the marquis of Hmtings, sought for tlie office; pt ,  powerfitl 
prliomentrirg intercat prirewiling, hresfoiul was fiimlly cliosen, 
and received tlie loml niiilt of lieutentmnbgencrnl ; to tire p t  
dimntent of several oficcm of aitperior riinlc, who were dis- 
pIenaed that, without any visible claim to superioriky, he 
should be placed over tlieir hends. Inform~tion of this 
change was sent to Crdoclr, snd Sherbroolte WM ordered to 
repair to Liabon. The latter was near Cadiz when the orders 
overhok him, and liis ancl Mnelrenzie's divisions mived tnge- 
tlier in tlie Tngus on thc 12th of Mareh: thus tlie fate of 
Portugnl wna npin  fixed by Endand. But if Mi. Frere's 
plan liad been followd-if Mackenzia liad promdd to 
Taragona, and notliing but fouI meather preventd liim,-if 
&erbrciolre7s vayage bxd not been delged by s t o r m ~ ~ i f  sai1- 
ing from port ta port he h d ,  as mas probable, been eng+ 
in some otl ia  enterpiise-if Ticbr, olieying his orders, had 
marched t o  Abrante+if any of tliese events hnd hqpned,  
Crtldocl~ mnst lbnve nb~ndoncd Portugal : uncl then how infi- 
niteIy alisurd tlio pmccerIings of ttlio English r n i n i s k  would 
have appeaml, and how j i idy  thsir p e d e  c o m b i d i o m  
wouId h v e  oscited the scorn of Eiirope, 
Beresfod reached Lislion early in hfarch, and, arnfter some 
negotiation, was empovrered t o  appoint Dritish lificers to the 
c o m d  of regiment s; being to  act himseIf as he should judge 
fitting, to ameliorate tlie condition and discipline of tlie Por- 
tiipucsc foroes. Tlie military polity of Portugal, although 
fallcn into disusc, mns sevcrc, prccisc, nnd ndmimb1y cnlcu- 
lated to  drnw f o d  the wliole stsength of the nation; tha 
nrmy eould be cempIeted by cocrcion, tlie mililid wcw bonnd 
to assemble by regiments, aníI liabla to any scrvice withiii the 
fronticrs; tlie remaining male poguiation could be enrolIed 
under tlic name of or&mnpj numbered by battdione in 
tbcir diffcrcnt districts, and rlorcctl by severe pennlties to 
ossemble uiider the ordcrs of tlie laml mnuigistintes, eitIier to 
work, €o figlit, to e s c d  convoys, or genwally to i d  t1is opere& 
tions of tlie army. EeresEorcZ fixed bis quartee at 'Thornar, 
collected %Re Portupese troopg in masses, and recrist their 
syetcm on the model of tbe British nrniy, estnlilisliing, mitli 
stern Iiut ~vlrolesome ngour, a. reform wliicli in lirocess of 
time, raised out of chaos an obedient, weIl disciplined, and 
gdlant forcc, worthy of ra higli place among tlis best in 
Ruropc : for tho Portupese pcople, tl~or~gli enñily mislsd nnd 
excited to mili, nr0 oí a clocile or{lerly dispositioii, and very 
sensible of just and honourable conduct in tfieir officers. Thk 
however was not effected at once, ner ivitliout crossea ancl diffi- 
culties Iieing r a i d  by tiie Iiiglier orders nud by tIie pvern- 
ment-difficulties Bmc~forrl could not lime overconie, if'he 
had not been direeted, sustninod, and shielded by tIie master 
spirit ander whom he was destined to worlr. Tlie g i h q  
Britisli oficcm oornmanil wns ~t fiwt ptrsned vi th  cnution; 
but wlien i b  \vas supposed snfe, a1most rnIl militnry situntiom 
o£ importsnce \vere iieId hy Englishmen; and tliat witL 0 t h  
causes producsd intrigues, not confined t o  nntives, mliicli la 
afta- tinies scrioiisly nffected tlic cxistcnce of tlic Rritisli idu-  
ence, and cven tlie success of tlie wnr. 
Crdock's situation \as uow aUeGated; t110 certaiinty that 
Austria rould war on France hnd a mnrkerl inffiience on tbe 
regcncy ; nníI the nrrivtcl o€ Blicrbi,ooke'a nnd Mnclrenxie's 
divisiong incssnsing tlie Britisli force to Sourteen tlioucnnd 
men, rendered tlle populace more fi~utious of offering incults. 
Hence, riboiit the niirl(lle of llardi, he enmmped at Lumiar 
and Snccnvcm, leaving only trvo tlionsand mcn to  mnintnin 
traquillity in Liijbon. Tliers ~vns n cl iar i~  also in 0 t h  piirt.~. 
The Portupese reglnr troopa, ten or twelve thonstind men, 
were colIecterI by Ueresford Let~vcen tlie Tail.ps and hfonrtego; 
and bqond tlie BIondego coIonel Trnnt, origindlp aent out to 
prcpnrc thc evaetintion of Portugal, aascmbled 8 body of 
iitudents from the Coimbre university. Gen& Vittorirt hnd 
two regular bnttulions in Upper Reir&,-the bisliop wm pre- 
paring to dufend Oporto with a ferocious multitude-Silveira 
wns ie tha Traa os Montes with five tliousand men, and 
in full communicattion with &mana, who liad collected eight 
thousand at Monterey. Wilson wag on the Aggeda, watching 
Lapisse, and having a detrichmeiit 3 Bejar-a few Portuguese 
regiments were extended frorn Salvatierra t o  Almnta;ri,-a 
bonb bridge wna laid nt Abmtes, nird tliere were smull 
son8 tLere nnd nt Elvas. Biit al1 these na t i~e  forw united 
conld not have sustaincd tRo shock of t ~ n  tliousmd Prcnch 
for half an honr, and tlwe were fiFey khowand lian~ing on ths 
hnt ie r .  Gathering like clonda on the horizon, tliey tl~reat- 
ened many points, yet p v e  no cerhin intlicatiom of where 
the &rm would burst. Soult with about twenty thousand 
waa endeavoaring to  pm9 the Minho; Lapisse, although 
ncnacing Ciudnd XCodrigo, k q k  his principal masses at Srtlra- 
manm nnd Lecleama; and Victor concentrntcd his bctwcen tho 
Albn~cha find the Tietiirtiir hpiaao  mi& jdn eithcr Soult OT 
Victor; tbe latter cuuld march by PIaceatia against Ciudad 
U r i g o ,  the second attack Oporto; T'ictor, drawing hpifise 
fo him might penetrate by Alcantara; he might also a t k k  
Cuesta, and purrme him to Seville, ox hrn rhort to the nght 
and enter the AAIemtejo. 
Xn this unoertainty, Crdock, kecping fi-t Lamiar and b n -  
=m, waited for the enemy to develope Iiia plans, snd ende: - 
vouretl t o  pracure the necesszry equipments fur m bncti~e 
campaip He formed mapines ~at Cohbm and Abrante~, 
q e d  the regency to exertion, took measures to mise money, 
aníl despatched oñwrs to Bsrbasy t o  procure mules, Whiie 
thus engnged, he Iiesnl that Vidor had furocd the passage of tha 
T r p s  rat Almara& anil wns in pursnit of Cuesta on the road to 
Meida;-that Soult, having crmsed the Minho and ciefented 
- Romana snd Silveira, m s  within a few leapes of $orto;- 
that hpisse had mede a demonstration of assaulting Ciudad 
Rodrigo. T h e  junta of Oportu ~ebemently demanded aid 
from the regency, aand tbe Inttcr, though littlo 
girJohnw inclincd t o  tho liishop'a pariy, p r o p o ~ d  dtliat d* ms. 
Cradock, uniting a part of the British forces to 
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the Portugucsc troops uníler Berwford, shonld mwch tr, the 
wccorir of Oporlo. Rercsford wns ~vcrso to tmd tho Porhi- 
guese under hio inmediata conunand among h e  disorderly 
multitude of that citg; mished Crarlock to move the 
Britisb to Lciria, and from thence push on to Oporta or return, 
aecording to  events, 
It wsa doubtfiil, he szid, if Victor rind Soult intended to 
co-operate in a single plan, but supposing it so, it 
m essentid t o  drive back or overcome one before lo# 
thc otlier coiild come to his aid. Victor mns in 
pnrsuit of Cuesta, if he continited that purmit it mnst be to 
enter Beville or to cripple hia opponent previow t o  the 
inrasion of Portiipl; la eitlier case he ~vould be in the 
Mercne before he could bear of thc rnarcli from Leiria, sud 
a3 Cradock had dsily intellipnce of hia movcrnent~, there 
foulri br! time to relieve Oporto and retnrn to tlie defence 
of Lisbon. 3f SoaB depended on tlia m-operation of Tidar, 
he wonEd lirolably remain on the rigbt of the Dourn until the 
latter wns on the Taptr; Lapiase algo mould be contented 
far tlie present witll cnpturing Ciudad Rodrigo and Almcide, 
Tliis rer~wning did utit weigli witli Cdoc lc ,  Eie would not 
nsk being cut off from Lislion by one armg while he was 
engaged vrith another. Portugal, he replied, was  in a s h t e  of 
anarei~y iincompsbibible with firm resistanee and rapid move- 
ments,-the peamntry wcrc h~multuous, formidnbIe t o  overy- 
body tiut the enemy,-BeresforJ acknowlecfged the regulnr 
f o i w  were mutinous, cl~ooaing mhen and where ta res$ when 
to fight, ivlien h remain in quartexs, and altoptlier udt  to 
be trusted within tlie circle of the @orto miscliief. The 
British were tlic on'ty solid resource; but they were too few 
to divide, nnd mmt act in B body or not at nlI. Lkbon and 
011" were the enemy's nlijects ; wKch was it mogt desimble 
t o  protect 2-the forrner sas of incomparably grettter impor- 
tance than the 1atter;-the first wasi near, the second two 
hundred miles o&-and the army marr not yet equippd for an 
active cnrnpnign. Thc tmp wero iil-clothed tbnd wmtcd 
slioes-tlie nrtillery wns unhorsed-the cornrnifiwint possemed 
only fou~th pwt of the transport neCe83q for the convey- 
snce of provisions and ammunition-no adivity could imme- 
diately si~pply tlicse deficiencies-some of ille wticlea required 
were not to  be hetd in the countq, t o  abtain otliers the inter- 
ferenm of the regcncp was necessary, and al1 apptications to 
thnt qunrter liad been without any eflect. Was it wise then 
to commenct! densive operations ia the north Z T h e  t roop 
of Soult and Lnpisse together were estimated at thirty thon- 
sand men, of nrliich five tbousand were cavalryj the British 
a d d  onEy Iiring fifieen gunri and twelve thousnnd rnen of nll 
arms into the fidd: yct if thcy mnrchcd with t l ia avowed 
intcution of relieving Oporho tliey must aocomplisli it, or be 
clisliononred ! 
Eut wm it consistent with rewoa to mnrcli two liuntlred 
miles in uearch of a combat wliicli the very state of Oporto 
would render it almost impossible to gah, and for cn object 
prl~aps already lost ? Xqicion  ms alive eveqwhere; if 
Oporto las talren the army mnst come brick, that would b 
tlie signal for freah tnmult+for renewed mies that the 
country was to be abandoned; Ziibon woiild be in a state 
of insiirrection, and more formidable to tlie British t h n  the 
encmy. Xt lvna imposBblc t o  ~cclion upon Qcstak  kccping 
TTictor empl oyd, hc m person~lly inimicnl to tlic Englidi, 
~ u d  Iiis ohject wnw to gain time for tlie i n c m o  of 11is own 
force. Yictor s a s  appwently pursuing Cuesta, but hiFi parties 
batl appeared la tlie neiglitiourhood of Edajos; and only a 
weak garrison was in Elvas to irnpe.de bim in the Alerntejo : to 
cover Lisbon and the Taps mas tlie mfsest plan. In a favour- 
able position, at a prudent Sistmce from that capital, Iic could 
ñait for the reinfrircen~ents expected from Englanuid ; hc 
invited Bercsford to m i t a  witli him; a short timc would 
estnlilkh ~itiborclinrttion; and tlien tho wrtninty tlrat the 
capital muld not be approncl~ed exccpt in the faca of s 
rally formidable amy, would not only keep the encmy in 
check, bnt by compelling Iiim to collect in peater numbem, 
would operate as a diversion in favour of Spain. 
Beasoning tEius, Cradoclt did not owrlook the vaue of h ia  
wntml position; but the d icul ty  of obhiniog true inteDi- 
gcnce írom the nnti~ca, and Iiis want of csllvnlry, xcnde~cd 
it nnsafe ta divids his iarmy or to  push it fnr from Lishon. 
Beresfurd'a plan, founded on the supposition thab Crndock 
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conld engngc Soult at Oporte and y& quit him and rctnrn nt 
pleasure if Victor ndvnnced, wm Wlncioua; tlio ndvantages 
r e h d  on conjectural, the disadvantages aa positive data; it 
was conjectural tLat they could relieve Oprto, it was positive 
t h g  would wdangcr Lisbon. The proposition was homever 
not made upon partial. views, and was atlvantageoi~aly con- 
trasted with t h  projects of other meu, less qudified to advíse, 
mlio at tliis periotl pcstered Cmdock witli prejccts of a dif- 
ferent stamp, and only desemhg of notice as sliowing boa 
the rnania for grand operations, that malady of tlie time, wae 
stiil rriging. 'i'o use the Brjtisli a m y  mas the ohject of di 
tliesc ~irojcctom, yet tliere w s  a, rnnrvellous vzriety in tlieir 
plxils. Tlie regency desired the Portupege and Britisli troops 
to co-operate for &e relief of O p o h ,  ntitliout upco~ering 
Lisbon, wliicli mas impossible. Rermford wished the Englisli 
troops tn marcIi uloiic. Tl~e bishi~p, wlio was imliertuiiztc to 
have British troops under his e d e m  recnlled,WiIson tci Op~rto,  
and I t  a p p r e d  relisonahle tlirit the legion sliould defend tlie city 
in whiclx it wns mised; but Mr. Frere, miting fronz Seville, 
dcsircd sir ItoEiert to remiin mhew hc was, and tlic lntter, 
refusiag obsdieuco to tlie prelatita, accapted S1i:~iiish rnnlí. 
Tlie regency, ghd of tlie opportunity to morti$ the Gsliop, 
arprwed of liis poceedings and adoptd the Iegion as a 
nntional corps. 
Roninnn wns enrnest witli Cmdock Sor moncy> anrl demmded 
a tlious~~I British soldiers to aid tlie insurrcction 
at Vigo; but at the srme time Mr. Frcre and gCtF$. 
colonel DTrban, a corrcsponding officcr placed 
by Crndock nt Cucsta's lied-qiiarters, proliosetl otlier plans of 
highcr prctwsions. Zaragoza, said the latter, h.% fxlleii; nnd 
ten tlioiisrind French troolis being thus relcmed, are inarching 
townrds Toledo, tliis is tlie niomcnt to give n f:ttrtl blow to 
Tictor? It ia onc uf tliose criticiil occasions ttslt saldom recur 
!n war! In a dg or twve sir Robert Wilson will 
be on the Tietar ivitli two tliousand five liundred 
~~~~~~; 
mcn; iaii,ment his force p;itF~ a like numlier of 
Portiiprse, ivlia niay he rlmwn froni Subreira, II~i~lia, rid 
Balvatjerra; he dinll thns turn tlie riglit and rear of V~C~OT'B 
m y ;  and Lis movcmcnt cannot be intempted by t3ie French 
nom at S~lamanca and Alba, becauae the communication from 
tlience to tFie Tagus by the passes of Bañoa and Tornerecas itr 
mdcd up. TYliile sir &bert thus places fim thousand men 
in tIie renr of ITictor, Cuda sliall attack him in front, with 
tmclv~ tliouaand inhntry ~ n d  two tliousantl cavnlry ; n rnnttcf 
of easy execution, bemnse Cuesttn can tlirow a liantoon brklge 
nrer tlie Tuguu neor A l m m  in nn Iiour anrl n Iinlf; nnd tlie 
conde de Cartoajal, who is at Manzanares in La 7iIancl1a with 
ten tbousand infanty and two thou~and liorsg will keep 
Bebastiani in check. The hope iR great, the rlanger small; and 
i f  a few British troopa can be added to tlie forcc on t.he Tietar, 
tlie sriccess wilI be infnllible? There were, however, grave 
objections to  tlijs infallible plan. Cuesta new Almaraz, 
Cradockpw at Lisbon, Wilson wvns at Ciudad Rorlrigo; their 
line of corrcspondenc~ was abovc fonr hundrcir milm long, and 
it is not thcrefore cIear how tho combination mas t o  bc cKcctcd 
mitli tlmt raliitlity which wns saicl fo be essential to ths  mocess. 
Neitlies is it  evident how qerations, to be combined at such a 
dishnce and executed by soldien of different natione, cordd 
have been successful at all. Otl tise oae side, twenb tliousmd 
raw Portuguese and S p i s b  levies were to act on duuble 
extemal liries of opcration; on the other, twenty-five thou- 
mnd Frcnch vctcmnc wnitcd in a wntrrnl position, with tlieir 
front and Annks covcred b~ tlio T n p  ond thc Tichr: in snch 
a contest it is possitile to oonceivr! n [Iiffcrent result from that 
anticipnted by colonel D'Urbxn, who also forgot the twel~e 
tliousand men with the king in Madrid. 
lb. Frerds plans were not bs extensive. Sodt, he wmte 
Appendlx 8.  to Cradoclr, tired of the resistance he has met with, 
will probably desist from Lis ttmaccm~tcdile pro- 
jeet of &ering PmmgaE a& m p y i q  G~l lk ia  at tlze sume 
$;m.' Lct tlie Rritisli army tlierefom, rnnlre 8 punh to  drivo 
tltc cnemy out of Salamanca rind tlie neiglibouring towns, 
wliile the Aslurizns shall on tlieir side ttalre poasession of 
Leon and Astorga, and open the communicntion between the 
nortliem annd soutliern provinces. Bir. Frere bowever, fearing-, 
if tlik plan should not  be ndopted, the English general wodd 
he nt n Ioss for somc cntcrpiise, also recommcnrFed thnt the 
Eritiali army ahoulrl march to Alcuntarct, md t1ie fortieth 
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regimenk, which hitherto lia hnd retaind at Sevilie, contrary 
to C r a d d ~  wishes, s h 1 d  join it aG that piace; then said be, 
tlie whole operating by the northem bmk of tlre Tws in 
eoncert with Cuesta, ' may b a t  tha P V ~ L  cx.i of Fo'olBdo, m d  
crnwq&ly & of ~Uadrid.' But Soult never thonght of 
holding Gallicia, wbich was Ney'a province, and he &d mem 
to entcr Portugril, Nor mas he LikeIy to refrain mben the 
only army capable of opposing him was absndoning that 
kingdom to mnko a 'pwh' of foiir h n n d d  milw to drive 
hpi~fie out o€ SRI~manca! >lereover tlie Asturians mere 
watched by Bonnet's division on ane side, and by Tmpcrid 
ICellerman's on tbe other; aad the fiftli mrps was Mustermn, 
not, ag colonel D'Urbnn supposeri, anly ten tliou- 
sund ~trong and marchiig upon Tuledo, but fifteen tliousand 
strong and near Leon tand Astorg~ 
Upon the operatioiis by the line of the T a p ,  which mere 
t o  drive Johicph out of Madrid and attract $he nttcntion of al1 
the French corps, it is to  be ohaerved, thah Cradock was to 
employ t w e l ~ e  tliousand men, Cuesta fourteen thwsmd, and 
Cmtoajzl twclve tliousmd, in al1 tliirty-eight thousand. FJonlt 
had tnenty-three thousand, Lapisse nine th wsnnd, Victor 
twenty-fivo tbousand, Scbmtiani fiftcen tliou~and, hforticr a 
like numher, the king's guards and the garrison of Madrid 
more than twelve thousand, making a totd of nearly a hundrod 
thousnnd men ! Hence wliiie Mr. Frere antl ooIonel D'Urban, 
confiding in Soult'a inactivity, were tliuri plotting tlie rlestruo- 
tion of Tictor and Eebmtiani, the first maraha1 ritomed 
Oporto, the second, unconscious of liiu d q e r ,  defeakd 
Cuesta's army at Medeliin, and at the same moment Seha- 
timi roukd C'artoajitl at Ciudad Real. 
CHAPTRR IV*  
EIamsa ~hown tlie unhappy stak of Portugal and Spain, 
Soult's operations ahsll be resumed; for mbile tlie other 
rnadals were awing the prwinces werrun by Napoleon, or 
warring dom the remnants of the defeated amies,  his task 
was to complete a amprtign, in wliich, tmversing al1 the 
northern provinces, fighting in succession the nrmies of thrse 
different nntions, nnd cnduring every vicissitude of war he 
gave stern proof tliat lio W ~ S  an ahlc commander and of a 
liaughty resoIution in dver8it.y. 
It has been shom how tlie inhabitrints of Comk lionour- 
abiy mnintained their town until tlie fleet. conveying MOOE'B 
asmy was gone. They were Iess faithful to tlieis own cause. 
Cmuíí~. wa3 a regalar fortress, and m n y  weeks must h m  
ehpsd beforc a siifficient batkrhg traia could have been 
collcctcd by the French in that comer of tlie Penlnsula 
Ferro1 contained eight sail of tlie line nnd some smaller ships 
of mar; the fortifjcntions ivere reglar, witli nin abundmce of 
adillery and ammuuition, tlie @son seven or eight tliousend 
stroiig, consistiny: of soldiers, sailors, citizens, and a r m d  
coiintrymen, willing to fight; bnt the chiefg were treacherons, 
After a commotion in which the admiral, Obregon, ñ-as 
arrested, bis successor, Melgarejo, surrendenwl npon somewhtlt 
Iietter terms tlinn tliose granted to Coruiírt, and tbus in ten 
dnys mere rcduccd two mg~lnr  fortresscs, mhich mith more 
res~l~liition miglit have occupisd thirty tliousand men for 
ser~eml inontlia. 
Wiile di11 in front of Ftrrol rnamhal SwIt had receivd 
the follon6ng imperial d ~ p n t c h ,  prescribing the i m m d a t e  
invasioa of Portugal hy the north. 
'Beforei his departure from Valladolid tlie emperor, fore- 
~eeing the embarkation of the English army, drea up instmc- 
tions far the u1tirnQt.e operationa of the duke of Elchingen and 
yourself. TVhen tlie Engtish army sliall be embarked yon wiil 
marcli upon OporGo witli you~ four divisons, thiat is to say, 
tbe divisions of JkIerle, Mermet, DeIabode, and Hendelet, the 
dmgoons of Lorge, and La Houasaye, and Franceschi's Ilsht 
cavalry, with the exception of two regimenta which his majesty 
dcsirca gou to turn over to the duke of Elchingen, in ordcr to 
make up his cavairy to  four regirnena Your ' wqm c%am&,' 
seventeen regiments of i n h n t ~  and ten +e$ments of cava l~ ,  
is destined for Portugal, in combination with a mo~ement tlle 
dukc of Belluno is going t o  cffcch. Ucneral Loiaon, soma 
enpineem ataff and commissariat ofiwm, and thirteen Portu- 
p e s e ,  J1 of mhom belongd to the armj formerly in Portugal 
uuder the d~~liike of Abrantes, wiI1 join you, anc? you can tmns- 
mit gour orclera for them to Lugo. This is the 21st o£ 
~anu&, it is guppocied you cannot -be at Oporto befure the 
6th of Felwuary, at Lisbon before the 16th Thus, when 
you ahall be near Lisbon, the 'ewyi,~ d m ' d  of the dulce of 
Belluno, composed of hia o m  three .divisionq of tha h i s i o n  
&val, and oi  ten or twelve mgiment-8 of cavdry, forming a 
body of tbirty tliousand men, will be ítt M&&, makc a 
dro& divers&n in yonr favour; and he can push tlie head of 
a column upon Lisbon iE you find any grent ohtacles tri 
your entrance, wliich it is however praumed wili not be 
the case. 
O e n e d  Lapissc'~ diviaion of infanQ1 at this mament in 
Salamanca, and general hlaupet it's brigade of cavdry, d l ,  
when you shall be at Opai%o, receive the duke of Iatria7s 
orden to  march npon Ciudad Itodrigo and ndbrantes, wliere 
tKq dkiaion mi11 ap in  be undcr tho mmrnmd of the dulce of 
Belluno, who ivilI ssnd it instmctions to join him at 3ferida: 
1 Iet you knom thk that you may be aware of tlie march of 
Lapisse, on yow left flank, tw far as Abrantes. Such are the 
l& arders nm chargml t o  give you in the n m e  of the 
emperor : you 1611 liave t o  report to the king and tu receivo 
bis o~lers  for gour ulterior operatiom. Tlie emperor has 
uniimited confidente in your tdents for the fine expeclition be 
has chnrged ym with. AY~EXAWDIEE, 
Priiice of Neufcl~tel~ &c.' 
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Napoleon likewise designe& wben Lkbon feli, that Victur 
shonld invade Andalusia upon the same line m Dupont ; asd 
like Dupont he wss to be assisted with n, division of the sisoond 
corps, mhich, uoeisbg the Gundinnn, was to  march on Seville. 
Ney, rrcinfnrcd by two reginients of cavnlry and stragglers, 
had twenty t?iousand men, nud was to maintaia Wlicia, con- 
fine the Asiturimts witliin theix own frontim line, aud keep 
open the comnnimtion with Soult. Thm, nomina1ly eighty 
tlious~ncl, in reality dxty theusancl men, were disposed for the 
conqueat of ltisbon; and in such a manner that forty thoasand 
couId afterwards p u r  down upon Beville and Cadix when 
neitlier Portugal nor Anddusia were mpable of rcsistnncc., 
Wow thin migl~ty preparntion failed uhrrll new be showa 
Soult's pose  numlier wm fow-fieven thousand ; buE Bonnet's 
ImpeFial division remained nlways at St. Ander, eight thou- 
Mustermh sand mere- detached for tk service of %he general 
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commanications, and the remainder liad, sin= tbe, 
9 thof Xovember, been fighting and rnarching ineessmt1yamong 
barren and snowy mountaim : henca, stragglem were numeroas, 
snd twelve thoumnd mcn were in hospitnl. The force actunlly 
under m u  did not exmd henty-fi~e thoumd rnen, wom 
down wkh fatigue, barefooterl, and lAithout ammu- 
8. 
JWPIId nition; they liad outstripped thek combsarlat, 
Opcrations of the military Ghest was not come up, the draft 
tlie 2nd wrps, 
~ISS. animals were rduced in numbw md attenmted 
by fatigue, the p d a p  were shaken, the 
artillery park stiU in Ghe rear; the sixtb c o p  had not pagsed 
Lago, and two divisions mere q u i r c d  fo hold Corutia md 
Ferrol. Literallp to obey the empemr's &era was m s e - .  
q11entIy impossible, bnt Boult,, talJng quartm at St. Jago 
~ompostelltn, proceeded to re-orgmke hk armym Re fabricatea 
ammunitim from the loose powder found in C o d a ;  obtained 
hoes partly by requisition, p t l y  from the Spanish magadnes, 
filled as they were with dores aupplid by England ; he refitted 
hia nrtillery, rallid most of his stragglers, and in six days mris 
&y to rnsrch, though bis men were stiIl suffering. 9 n  the 
1 st  of Februnry nineteen thousand infnntry, four thau~and 
cavaly, and fifty-eight gune were in movement ; but to nnder- 
stand his campltign the &te of üaUicia must be described. 
Wben Ermnntt crosmd Bfoore's line of mnrch his troops 
mere disorganized; be plunged with hia cavalry into the deep 
valiqa af the Syl and tlie Minho, but his artillery and infantry 
mere cut up by France~chi's (tamlq, md those who wcaped 
wnndered in seltrcli of food and shelter in tlia mouutains. 
Ilendieabel h d t d  with a smnll W y  in the h l  
des Orres, guarding the Puente de Bibey, a point Appcndix 4. 
of singular atrengt'ti, hoping thnti to  cuver Orense. Romana, 
after a, time, colleckd two or tlirce tliousnnd men and toolc 
post at Toahdo, twmty miles from Lugm Ney saa then at 
Lugo, having previausly sent ca~alry, from Villa Franca, to  
acour the vaileys on his left, nnd Nnrchrinil'bi division by the 
m d  of Orense to St. Jago md Coruña Marchsnd dispersed 
Yentlizabels troops the 17th, and afier lidting aome dny~ at 
Orense, where he establi~hed fin liospital, continued his mnrch 
to St. Jago; this opemtion complcted the mut of Romana's 
amy. The marquis, with bis canlry, and the few infantry 
t h t  wouid follow &m, crossed the W i o ,  descended lnto tlie 
valley of the Tamega, and took r c fqe  on tlie 2 1 st, nt Oimbrn, 
on the frontier of Portugal, close t o  Monterey, where he lived 
opon a mal1 magazine collected for the use of Moore's army 
In tIila obscure situation, unheerlcd by the French, he 
entered into cornmunication with Silveira, and wlth Cnidock, 
demanding money and a r m  from tlie latter; he endeavortred 
also to reassemble a body of troops, tiut Blnke and othee 
officem desertcd Iiim, and these events md t.be general want of 
apirit drew from him the follo~ng observation :-' 1 hnow 
not wherein tlie pntsiotism, so loudly ~ ~ u n t e d ,  consists; any 
reveme, nny mishnp prostrates the rninds of thesr! people, nnd, 
thinking only.of ssving their own peraons, they smrifice their 
country and compromise tlieir commander,' 
In Gallicia tlie pensnnts live Iinrrlly, annd being, like nll 
mountainwr$ very tennciou~i of the IittIe proli~rty tliey possess, 
disregitrdecl political events wliic!i did nut irnmediateIy affect 
thcm. They urere with thc exccpki~ion of tiiosc in tlie ficspr~it 
to~vna, aliglitly moved by the aggression of tlie Frencli, m luna 
as that aggresaion did not extend to tlielr valleys, and at frrst 
they trented the English and Frencli armies tltika Rnirtl's 
division iii ib dvance pnid geoerously for supplies, yet it; was 
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repasdecl witfi jenlouay ~ i i d  defrauded. Sonlt's and Xoore'a 
arinies, pa~ising lilre a whirlwind, were 'tieheld with terror and 
the people fled from botIi. The British md G e m n  troops 
wlie rnarched to Vigo werc conducted without judpent aad 
licentious, the people murdered their stqglerrc, and showed 
without diriguise their natural h a t d  of strangers. On severa1 
occagiona, partiea sent to collect c m  for the conveynnce of tho 
sicIr l i d  to sustain skirmislies, and fiva oficcm, misled by a 
treaeherous pirle, were only saved from death by the inter- 
ference of an oId mm, after one of $he oíñcers had been 
severely wounded in the h e d  On the other hand, Mmband 
discovered so little symptoms of bostility during his march to 
Oreme, that be 1& hk hospital at that town without a guara, 
under the joint care of Spnish and French snrgeens; md the 
duties o f  humanity were faithfulEy dischurged by &e former 
withoiit hindrmae from the peoplc. 
Thia quiescenoe did not last. The &nch generais mb- 
Bisted tl~eir troops by requisitions extremely onemus to a 
p p l e  whme property chiefly comisted of mttle; and the 
many abuses mhich ~Etend this mode of suppIying an amy 
soon created s gpirit of hatred, which Rornann, laboured & 
i n c r w ,  and ~iuccessfully ; for though R bad general, he was 
intelligent nnd dexterous to excita a poptilation. Monks and 
frim lnboured to tlie a m e  purpoEie. Ibrnma 
*Omanab m m n d  death for those wl~o refuad t o  take Mnuifeato. 
m, tlie d e r g  menaced eterna1 perdition ; and 
al1 this WM necessary, for the authority of &e supreme junta 
was only acknomledged as aimatter of necessity-not of liking. 
Gallicia, appsrcntly &m, wns therefore ripe for n gencriil 
insi~rreetion at tllo moment Smlk moveil fmm E%. Jngo 
Compo&eEla. 
From that tomn s m I  roada Iead t o  the Minho. Ths 
principal one, ninning by the coast h e ,  crosses the Tn18, the 
Umia, the Ved% the Octaven; and passes by Pontevedra and 
Redondela to Tuy, a dil~pidated fortrm sitaatd on the 
Spnnisli sirle of thc Minho. The second, mssing tlis #ame 
rivers nearer to their sonroea, p e s  t.he Monte do Tenteyro~, 
entera the d l e v  of &e Avia, and foIlows its come to Fui- 
da,* which behq situaterE at the coduence of the Avia with 
tlie Miinbo* h d  a &ne bridge wer tlie former, d a bnrqua 
ferry on tlre latter river. The tliird, turning tlit sources oE 
tke Avig connects St. Jaga with Orense ; and from Orense a 
fourth r o d  pesse! aIong the right bank of tlie Minho, con- 
necting Ribihvia, Salvatierra, and Tuy, and rmrling at Guardia, 
a s d l  fortresg at  the mouth of tlie Ifiaho. 
Aa the shoitemt route t o  Oporto, and the only one conve- 
nient for tlie nrtillery, wns that of Paiitevedrn, lenxling hy 
Redondela, and !Cuy, and from tlienm by the ñIgs. 
coast, Soult resolved to pme the Minlio betwcen 
Salvatierra and Qunrdia. Wlierefare finncesclii, folIowed by 
tlie maia hody, took the Pontevedm rottd, nnd nt 
Redondela defeatea some ineurgentn, and captured 
four piccea of mnon ; Figo thcn surrcnrlered to a dctiichment, 
wliile Ire marcIied upon Tuy and took poasession af that t o m  
and Guardia. h Housfiayeb dragoons, quitting MeiIid, 
' crofised the Monte de Tenteyro, p a s d  through Bibidavis, 
and took possession of Snlvntierrn on the Mido.  Pierre 
SouIt, tlie marahal'e bmthw, wlio liad assembled t h e  thou- 
snnd atrngglers and convalescents between Aaorga d 
Carrion, rcccived ordere to enter Portugal by Pncbla de 
Sen~bria. But the rajny seaqon waa in full torrent, every 
stream overflowed its baiil:~, tlie soads were deep, tlie diffieulty 
of prmring provisions grent, and Ncy waa to he put in'pos- 
session of tlie dministmtion af Ferro1 and Coruña; for Soult 
h¿i xetained aud paid the  Spnnisli authorities and garrisans: 
hcnce it wns thc T G d i  crti tlio whole ooi.ps codd bc concon- 
trated on the Minlie. 
That river, from M c l g ~ o  to  tlie mouth, forms the frontier 
of Portugal, and the bnnh on both sides mere guarded by 
fortresses, originallp of consideralile strength, h t  at this time 
dilapidated, The Sprtniah foFt of Guardia fronted the Portu- 
lvaa gnrrisond, and tlre woiks betSer tlian tlie rest; Lapella 
bloneao, and 3lelgac0, completd the Portupese line. But 
thc bcst defence nt tliis moincnt wns the Miiilio itself, which 
was nom s brod and raging floorl, and tlie Portupese 
&ancas nnd militia batl-removed tlie h t s  and web in 
arma on the other side; Soult emmined the banks with cara 
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anal, thoudi al1 his troops hd not amived, decilled to pass aE 
Campo Saucos, a little village where the pound m fa~onr-  
abIe, and so c I w  to Caminha that the army once across, 
could easily seize that place and the sarne day reaeh Visna on 
the Lima, within three marches of Oprto. 
To attrnct tlie rntkntioe of the Partng-nesc, La Houssaye 
apred hia dragoons from hlmtierru nlong the Ninho, 
and attempted to pus11 arnnll partim m s s ,  abovc MeFgaco; 
liut the buIk of tlie nmy was concentratd in thc neigli- 
bonrhood of Campo Sauooei, and a detachmeut wizd hhe 
mal1 ma-port of Bgona in the rear, A didsion of infantry, 
and tliree hunclred Fmnch marinm, released at Cornña and 
attached to the smnd corps, mere then employed to transprh 
sorne large fishing boats and heavy guns fmm tlie harbour 
and fort of Guardia oveiland to Campo &ricos. 'Ilrith rolIers 
they were thus camied over two miies of rugged pound, 
and it waa n worlr of infinito Inbour; but from tlio 11th 
to the 15th ths trmps toiled uncensingly, and tlia craft were 
finally launclied in e mal1 lake at tlie conffnenoe of tha 
Tamuga witli tlre hfinho. 
In  the night of the 15th the heav guns were placed in 
battev, ttliree hndred soldim ernbarked and dropped ailently 
down the Tamnga inta tlie Minho, hoping to ieach the Portu- 
p e s e  sidc of tlie latter during fdie darkness; but the landing 
was not effected before day-hmk, and the & m ~ a  frilling 
wit.h great fury u p n  t he  first who got on ghorc killd the 
foremost ; tlia otliem regiiin~l tbeir own mde wlth p a t .  diffi- 
culty. Triis liad ra mrprising iufluence on tlie issue of the 
campaign. It vas n gallant &ion, because it miglit be 
expecteal that half-amerl peasants colIected on tbe instant, 
wouId have been dismayed at the sight of many Tioats filled 
witli saldiem, some pulling across, and othem landing nnder 
tlie promtion of a hemy biittery, that thundered from the 
midst of ra midtitude of troops clustcring on the heiglits, or 
thronging to the edge of the opposite liank. It wm nn event 
of leniling irnportance, inasmucll m it Iinfñcrl: an operntion 
irliicli would hare enaured the fa11 of Oporto by the 21st of 
F e h r u q ,  when ñIackenzie's division was at Ca(liz, Cradock'a 
troops reduced to  alinost notiiing, and theEnglifih rninistem onlg 
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mting an excuse to abandon Porfxga1;-when the people 
of that county werc in the extremity of dkorder, when the 
Portupese mrny waa a nullity, and the regency evidently 
prepnring to receive the French with mlimifision. It was the 
period also when hult was expectd to be at Lisbon, following 
tlie emperor's odera, and consequently when Lapisse and 
Victnr mnst have fulfdled their ~inr t  in thn subjugation of 
PoítngaL 
Soult m now posted in a nsrrom ewtracted poaition, 
hemmed on the left by Qpanish insurgenta,who had 
&e Plan 4. 
msemhled whm La l3ousssye pnsñml Orense ; thcy 
poasead a rugged and dificult country, and wera wpported 
by the mny o€ R o m a ,  which was thonght, erroneously, to 
l ~ e  at Orensc and Riliiditviih In front wrai the Minho, bronrl, 
would h v e  required sixteen da-, hut long before that period 
the sulisistence for tlie ~ r m ~ r  would fnil, ñnd the Portupess 
be greatly aapented on the oppoaite h n k .  There remllined 
then onIy to return to St. Jago, or, breaking tlirongh tha 
Sipanish inmrgcntx, t.a tocend the Brinha and open a, way into 
Portngnl by ysome other rouk TIie attempt to pus the river 
had Eieen baffled the 15th and the 16th Xouit mas in mar& 
Eownrds Ribidavia, upon a new line of operations; and tliis 
promptitude of decision was supported Iiy prompt execution; 
fer La Houssaye's drapons, quitting Xal~atierra and keeping 
the edge of the Minilo, though @led by the Portuguetle from 
tlie opliosite Finnk, tmico in tlio dny brolce tlie inwrgent banda 
md, in rsvenp for aome previeus excesses of the peammtry, 
burnt the ri l lage~ of Morentan and Cobreira. The main 
Iiody, pnssing t6 Tea river at S~lv~t ie rm and Puentc ri'Ame, 
moved by sumessive divisions along the main m d  from Tuy 
to Bibida~a.  
Bctmecn Fmnquem and Canizar the road m cut by the 
Moreata nnd ~ o b e r n ;  nnd hdiind tho~e  torrents, eight bun- 
dred Galliciaas, d i o  had barricadoeri the bridgea and repulsed 
the dmnced parties of cadry ,  stood upon their defencc. 
The pnrisage waa forcerl the 17th, ~t claybreak, by Beudelet's 
division, which piiraucd brislrly iintil, nt a sl~ort distance fmm 
Ribidavia, the Bpaniards rallled upon eight or ten thousmuid 
insurgenb, arrayed ia d e r  of hattIe on a strong biil mering 
the town. T h e  French advancerl guard hnlted for the 
remainder of the division and a brigade of cavalry to mme up, 
and then under the pemnal dimctian of Soult, the Gallicixns 
were driven figliting, througli tlie town and acrofis tlw AGB 
with great losa: tlie bodiea of twenty pieste were fountl 
amonpt the slain. Whether from fenr or patriotism, every ' 
inhabitmt bad quitted nibidavia; bnt on the 18th a bripde 
of Infantry discovered and dispemed three or four thousmd 
cif the inmgents, in the valley of the Avia; wbile a aecond 
Wgade, puahing on to Barbantes, seized s f e q b o a t  on the 
N&o, close t o  that place. Tliese bripdes, being joined the 
mme evening by Fmc~scki'a cavalry, entered. Orense ia time 
to p v n t  the bridge over tha IIinho from being cut. La 
Rousssyet~ dragooea then took post st hfwide, and the 
remainder of the h o m  united with Laborde's infantrg at 
%bidavia : the artillery m stiIl between Tuy and Salvaticrm 
guarded by Merle'~ nnd Mermet's divisions. Thus in three 
days S o d t  extricated his amy h r n  a contracted pwiition, 
&rtrsngIcd 8 formidrtblc inmmtion in i t ~  birth, opened a fresh 
line of communication witli Si. Jqo, and gained an easy 
pasmge into Portugal. 
4, +ent sent ~ ~ ~ r o a s  th  Ninho by the ferries ofñrar- 
bantes and nibidavig now defested the insuqents of the left 
brlnk, advanced to the Arroyo river, and took post oa the 
heights of Meree; the re& of the amy, d t h  exception of 
u division pa~ding the pns,  was cancentrated. at  Orense. 
The artillery htad been baffled by tbe diffimrltieies of tha mad 
fmm Tuy to Ribidavia; m¿i this, viewerl in conjtinction with 
the precarions 8tat.e of the communication, a hily incrwing 
si&-list, and the number of m a l l  detachments requjred t o  
proted the rear, geemed to forbid tlie invasion of Portugal. 
A m m  of ordinary genius would have f i led.  Soult vith 
ready boldness resolved to tlirow the greatest part of his 
p s  and al1 his other innimbrances into !hy, aa a place of 
n m e ,  md relinquislung his communicstion witb Gallicia, 
mar& in one mas3 upon Oporto; from whence, if mocesshl, 
be proposed tu rwpeii liis ~ornrnunimt~ion with Tny by tlie 
coast-he, recbver his d e y  md re+stablish a regnlm 
qstem of oper~tione. 
In pursuilnce of this resolntion, ~ixteen of the Kglitest guns 
and six howitzers, &th some ammunition-waggoos, WerB Mth 
infinite labour traagported to  Ribidavia; tbe remaining fhirty- 
six pieces, and a vast parc of c-m carrylng ammunition 
liospital und commissnriat storm, wcre put into 
Tuy ; wliere prteml La Martiniere was left with Joma1 J 
an wtablisbment of artillery m d  engineer ofticwg, tiye"cm% 
a prrison of five hundred men 6t te  carry armg, 
and nine liuntlrcd sick. A11 the ~GrnggFcm, ~0nVTtleant~, 
and rIctachments coming from Bt. Jago, and the rnilitary 
chest, mhich m stilI in &e rear nnd guarded by six hundred 
infnntry, were likewise dircctctl upon Tny: tlic @ten wem 
tIien sliut, nnd LB Mtartiniere waa abandond to hia own 
resources. Fmrn Kititlavirt the sick were fomarded tn Orense, 
and the marshal'~ qunrters were established in that tonn the 
24th; Iiut otlier obatnclcs wcre to bo vnnquishcd befare he 
coulcl enter into Portugal. The gun m i a g e s  were so fihaken 
that tliree rlaps were required to repsir tliem; i t  m difficuit 
fo obtaiain provisions, numerous banda of tlie peasanta were stiIl 
in arma, nnd werc not quelled until combats liad tnkcn plncc nt 
h x o ,  on the Monte Blanco, in tlie Val rl'Orres, and up the 
valIey of the Avia Tlie French thus lost time and men, and 
e~pended ammunltion rvhlch could not be rcplnced. 8 o d t  
entlciivoured to ~of ten  tlie people by kindnes~i, ~ootliing ?m- 
clainotions, and a strict discipline. mis hnmane nppcndlx 3im 
and politic demeanour, joineil to the adivity of 
his rnovetible columnq nbntcd the firroenc~q o€ thc pca- 
mntry; the inliabiitants of Ribidavia wturned ta tlieir lina8w, 
thoae of Orense l id  never Leen vey  violent, ltnd nom 
even Imt sssistance to procure provisions. Xt wns nnt I~om- 
ever easy to reritrnin tlie soldicra; frequent cornbliL.9, t11a 
aasassinstiou nncl torturing of isolated mem, and tlie privntions 
endurad, had so exasperated them that thcir revcnge could not 
almya Iic controlled. 
But d i l e  Soult was menacing Portugal a horrible anarchy 
prevailed in thnt coiintry. At Oporto the bishop had as- 
wembld little short of fifty tliousanci armed persons, snd 
~ommenced a gipntic line of cntrenchment on thc hiIls to 
the northward of that city. Fhis w o m  thnn uselm l~hour 
cau~ed tlie rlefeuce of the skrong county lying between the 
Douro and the M i n h  to be neglected, and when Soult 
appeebred on tb bank of tlie latter xiver the upper provine~ 
were ~itruck with temor; then it was the people first under- 
~ tood  Eheir danger; then it was tlie bisbop, mused from hia 
intripes, tliought the French more terrible enemies than the 
regency. He became ciamorous for wccour ; he recallcd 
Wilson from the Agueda, he hurried on the entmchment~,  
he pressed Cradoclc for ~ssistance, demnnding nrms, nmrnuni- 
tion, un4 a reinforoement o f  Brikisli soldiers. Wilson BB 
before stiid asregarded his ordem, bnt the Britisli general 
ml~ile refusing troops, supplied liim witli arma and amgle 
Appmdt~ 1, stores of powder; and sent artilleq and engineer 
1-6. oficers to superintend the constmction of t h e  
defenslve morks, and aid the arrangements. The 
.peopIe were bowever too licentiona for control or advice, 
and the soldiers bad keen drnwn into the vortex of Irianbor- 
tlination : universal hopcleaa dimrde~ prwiled. Bcmnrdirn 
Frciro wns the lcpl commnnder-in-chief of the Entre Minlio e 
Douro, Iiut al1 tlie general8 daimed equd md independent 
authority; md tllis WBI~ perhaps a matter of gelf preservatiinn, 
for general and traitor mere at that period almost p o n p  
moua ; to obey the osders of a mpnor qainst the wjshea of 
the multitude was to incur instant de& Nor were there 
men wanting who found it profitable to inflame the passiona 
of the mob, and direct ita blind ~engeanc~  apinst inaacent 
persona adverse to the prelate's faction, which m a  not without 
opponents epen in Opoito. 
Such mns tlic sh tc  of aWm, when the undisciplincd gnl- 
lantry of tlie peamnts, batHing tlie efforts of Qie FrencIr to 
cross the 5Iinlio at Campo Saums, compeUed k u l t  to rnarch 
by Orense; a part of the regular tmops were immetllately 
sent forwwd to tlie Cavado river, where they were joined by 
the w h a s  and the militia of the district; but al1 were in 
o state o£ Tcarful insnbordination, and there was no arrange- 
meut m d e  for the regular diatribution of proviaions or any 
necesmy snpply- Among the troopa m tha aecond battalion 
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of the Lusitanian legion, niue hundred strong, weIl amad, 
well eqciipped, and commandetl by baron Eben, a n~tive of 
Pruesia, who without any known semices to recommend him 
had suddenly attaind the rank of major in the Britiuh s d c e .  
.This man, destined to act a conspicuona part in Portttguese 
tragdy, had been left at Oporta when Wilson marched 50 
Aheicla; he liad orders t o  f d o w  with the swnd httalion 
of the legioa, when its clothing and equipment should be com- 
plcted, biit he rctained tho tmops to push bis own CorEune 
under the prelate's nuripicea, and now joind Mra mhen 
the I~titter reached the Cavado, where fifteen thousand mili& 
and ordmmqas were assembled, he ocenpied Braga, placed 
outposb nt Marnondo and Euivncna, tind cndeavoured to 
restrain the troops from wagting ammunition by wanton firing 
in the street and on the roads. Wa refom was heinowly 
resented; and tw Freire inclined to  the regency, the biahop's 
faction pointed to him M suqected, aud r e n d e d  the mdtitude 
inimical. 
Siheira, asanmhg tbe command of the 'ha os Monte@, 
ndmnced to Chavea, and pnt hirnaelf in mmnnication with 
Romana, who hnd been rejoined at Cimbra and Monterey by 
his dispersed Groopa, antI wñrns again at the he& of eight 
thouaand men. ISilveira's force m abont Tour thouasnd, haif 
rcgiilnra, half rnilitin, anti he wns mompiinierl by m n y  of tlio 
mdmqm;  but here also they were licentiaus, inmborclinate, 
and disdainful of their general, Moreover, national enmitp 
to the Spaniad ovemme their sense of a com- 
mon dfinger ; tlie lntter were evilly treated, and 5 
a dearlly feud subsistd beheen the two amiea 
The generdq indeed, a+ to act in conccrt, offensively aiid 
defensively, yet nef ther of them were the leltst nequainted 
with the numbew intention, or even tlie pnsition of tlieir 
antagonista; and it i n  a proof of Romana's unfi tness for cam- 
mnnd thnt he, having the whole population at his d i ~ p o d ,  
rcas yet lgnorant; of everpthing it behoved him to know relnting 
to his enemy. The Fr~ncli in Gnllicia at this periort wem 
forty-five tliousand, Romana estimsted them at tweniy-one 
thousnnd; tho number nnder hul t  tms above twenty-fout 
thoasand, Romamana supposed it to  be twelve thousand; and 
among tliese he iaciuded Narchand's diviBion of Nefs corps, 
wLch he almp imagined tD be a part af Soult'g army. 
In this atate oT ignorante, Iind eIated by the spint of the 
peapantsi about Ribidavia, he linticipkd nothmg but victory; 
he knew that m the Ama, au wtuary n i b g  up towards 
St. Jago de Compostell% the inhabitants of Villa Gascia had 
risen, md being joind by the neighhouring districts were 
prtpaFing te  attack Vigo land Tuy; hcnce, partly from 11% 
Spaniali temperament, pnrtly from hio incspmity for wnr, ha 
ivas convind the Frcncli only tlouglit o€ malring tlieis 
escape out of &lliciaj and conld not even do tlut. To effect 
their destrnction more mrtainly, he &o peatered 
W o c k  for succoars of money, ammunitionJ and 
tioops; and that oEcer, mxious to suppork the 
muse, seat ammunition, and five t h m d  pounds in rnoney, 
but before it arrived Eomana, m in tlight. 
He ~ n d  Silveira having sixteen thousancl regnIrus d 
militin, besides o~--m, were posted in a straggling uncon- 
nected manner nlong tlie willey o€ tlie Tamega; extenrling 
from Nonterey, Verim, and Villxm, to n w  Clinvm, a dktmce 
of more than fdteen d e s .  This was the first line of defence 
for Portnpl. Freire and Eben, mith fourteen p s  and tmenty- 
fiPe thoumnd men, were ~t B r w  U1 second line, their out- 
posts being on the Cavado, and aii the atrong paseerj of 
Ruiva~ns ~ u d  Venda Nova; liut of these twenty-five thoum4 
on14' six thon~md mere a d  wifi muskets : znd It je t o  be 
observed the rnilitia m d  troops of the lino diffcred fmm the 
md peasmtry only in nnmc. The bisliop, with Iiis 6s- 
oderly mrl  furious &le formd tlie t l i i ~ l  line at Oporto. 
6ncb were the m w m  opposd to hult ,  but hi~l arruy, tliough 
wearied with toii, dieturbed and vexed by insurrectioxts, wm of 
power to break through these multitudes, even as 8. great ship, 
feelingtlie wind, clrives tbrough and scnttem gun-boats tht have 
gathered romd her in e c a t a  
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CRAPTER V. 
TEE Entre hlinho e Donre znnd the Tras os Non*, fonn the 
northern pmt of Portugal. !€'heir extreme depth, mewured 
fram the frontier to tl ie Dourq d m  not eixceed seiventy mile& 
The Tamem ffowing north and south, aiepmtea them; md 
wcst of thnt river a nigged monntain cbain, called the Sierra 
de (Xerez, Siem de Calirem, snd Sierra de Sunta Catalina, 
runa nedy parallel to the Tamega. 0 t h  chains pwallcl to 
that river mt the Tnia os Montes, ao that ddl the considerable 
rivers of that provinos tumbIe into the Donm. But tlie 
western ramificationri of tlie hr, md Catalina ~hoot omrds 
tlie pea, conducting the matera of the Entre Minlia e Douro Eo 
the ocean, and cowequmtly at right angIes t o  thwe of the 
Traa Montes. Hence an enemy advoncing from tIie north 
would pasa the Lima, the &vado, tbe Ave, t o  reach O p t o j  
and if he m e  from the e&, al1 ttli rivera md intmening 
a i m  of the Traa os Montes must be p a s d  to rewh the 
Entre Minho e Donro. Soult being near the aomces of the 
Lima and Ttamegn, could, by the valley of the Lima, penetrate 
tbe Entre Mnho e Dmro; or, by the valley of the Tamega 
enter the !has os Montes ; and there wrta R third rond beheen 
these rivem leatling npon Bmga, but pnasiing over tlie Geree 
Sierm, impracticable for nrtillerg. The French general bacl 
therefore Go consider- 
1'. If, folloming the Lima, he shwld diveme the insur- 
gents between tht  river and the Minho, recover hia artitlecg, 
md march agginst Oporto by the sea-const. 
2". If he sliould descend the Tamega, hKe Chavea, merch 
on Villa Real, neGr tlia Douro, and take tlie Tras os 3lontes in 
reverse; or, turning to  the right, cross the 8ierra de Cabrem 
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by the pms of Ruimena, enter B m  and so ga against 
Oporto. 
Of tIiese projects the first was irregular and hazardouil; 
Romana and Silveira cwld hnve fallen upon hi6 flmk and rear 
in a diffiwlt muntrg; and as tlieir position covered Chaves the 
disposting thcm must be a preliminay to eitlier plan. Soult 
moved ñi th  thia intent on thc 4th of M m h .  The Ftli, Iiis 
vanguard being at Tila b l  and Pennverrle, he sent s letter 
to Romana, in which showing the dmger of his pw;ition, he 
advised l im to submit. No snswer was retumed ; 
nor would the bearer have been suffered to pss 
tbe outpostri, but that h a n a  himrielf in the 
mr;  for he dreaded mieh an occurrence as likely to breed 
jealoug md cause hjs patriotim t o  be nndervalued Tbis' 
attempt failing, three mnch divisions of Mmty md one of 
mvnlry marched agiiinst Nonterey. La Housaaye'a dmgoons 
ooverml the left flanlr, nnd pushcd parties a far as La Qudina, 
on the routo to Puebla de Senabria; the fourth division of 
infantry remained at Villa del Rey, to cover the p a a w  of tlie 
siclc nntl wouridetl men from Orenm; for Soult transportd Lis 
hospitds and 0 t h  incumbmoes h m  place t o  place m the' 
nrmy moved, wting in this respect iiie the Boman genmla 
when i n d i g  a barbarow count y. 
As the French advnnced the Spankrds ahsndoned their 
s. poaisitionq spikd the guas in the dilapidated works 
~omnai  of of Monterey, and after a sliglit skirmisli at 'rTerim 
QwmtiOn" took the m d  to Puebla de Xenabria; but Fmn- NSS. 
ceschi followed and overtook two or tliree thou- 
snnd as tliey were pnssing a ruggd mountain. Aa~lailing 
tlieir rerrr witli n liratt&lslion of inhntry, Iie Icd h i ~  horsemen 
rounil b t h  f l d e ,  limled the colo~umn, md forced it to  
linlt; Bie Spaniards beiig on rough gonnd then drew ug in one 
large square to receive the charge; bu* h c e s c h i  hsd four 
regimeiits of cavalry, eacl~ regiment settled itself qpinst the 
faee of a square, md the whole bore down swiftly wnd 
with loud crics npon tlieir opponenh, who, unstedy, h o -  
lute. disrnayeJ nhrunlr from the fierce assault, antl were 
instnutly tramplad d0x.n in heapa: those mho escnped the 
Lomes' hoofa and the edge of the a w o d  bccame prisonerri, but 

8, a move Go create fmh inmrrections in the reRrJ 
J-ar OF and SwIt marched foward~ Gliares. MerleH 
operat'm" 31 ES. division however remrtui~l at 'Crerim to protect 
the hospital, and Franceschi took the road of Iia 
Gudii, as if going to~rards Salamanea; a report that he had 
sctually entered that town reachad Lishon, and was taken as 1 
an indication that the French would not pws the Portugese 
frontier. Franceschi hovever, returnd by Osonio and Feces 
de Abaxa, and joining Heudelet, iaveshed Chavea on tlie left 
of the Tamega; while Laborde, MermetI La Rousqe, and 
Lorge, deseending the rigbt tia& beat the Portupese ont- 
post$, took a fod  close under the rrallg, and completed the 
investment. Tlie place- summoned, no answer was returnd, 
and the prrhon, like men bereft of their witei and fighting 
with tlie sir, m d e  a continua1 fire of musketry and artillq 
~ t i l  the 12th mhen they mrrenderd Qn ieceiving a semnd 
wmmons, more rnenacing tlian the frrst : the 13th the French 
entered the town, and Silveira retired to Villa R d  
Cfiraves had iifty pnu, fem only being fit for uemice; it 
hd liowever a stone bridge, and waa more suitable for a place 
of a r m  tban Monterey; wherefore f lie sick were brought 
domn from the I~t ter  place, and Ean hogpital established for 
hvel- h u n d d  men. Sonlt'a fighting rncn were now rerluced 
to twcnty-one thousarid; and prtIy from the diffimilhy of 
guding prisoners, partly to abato tlie hostility of thc Porfa- 
guese, he pemiMetl tlie militin and omhmym, priaoners, to 
return to their h e s ,  afkr taking an oath not ta reame 
their arma; to some of the poorest he also gave money rind ' 
clothes, and he enrolled, 8-t their o m  request, the few regular 
Noble's troops hken in Chaves. This gentIe proeeeding 
was much biamed by some of hie officers, espe- 
4.l~ thme who had served under Jonot ; they 
d e s i d  C h ~ e s  miglit be arrsnulteil, and tlie garrison put to 
the sword; for tliey were embued with a persond Eiatred of 
the Portupese, aveme t o  serve in the present exditiora, and 
sought t o  thwnrt their general; but the prndence of liis con- 
duct was immediutelg visible in t l ie  softened feelings of the 
country people ; the ~couting partiea Iieing no longer molmterl, 
apread on the &de of Eraganga and Villa ReaI, and oPer 
the Entre M i d o  e Douro. TIie fomer reporhi  s. 
that no capable enemy mas in the Tras os 3fontes; 
~~~~o~ 
tlie latter found Prcire's advanced guard on the Mss. 
r o d  to R r n p  
From Cl~avaq Sonlt could reach Oporto by the Tmq 03 
llontes or the Entre Xinho e Doma; the Iatter opposed tho 
strongcst, positions, but the road was shortcr, more practic&Bla 
for p ~ i ~ s ,  bettcr for commtmication with Tuy; hcnce when tlle 
Portugriexe nrmy mns hernrd of nt Rr~ga, thnt Iine \vas doptcd. 
Tlie road, liowever, led through a ssuccession of dang-erous 
defilcs, extending from Venda Nova to Ruivaena, interrnptsd 
by tlie Ca~radu, yet reeommencing on the other side. Freire's 
ndwincerl par& mitpicd seveml of them, nntl he hnd plnccd 
Eben torvartls MontrJlegre but recalled him tlie 14th. T ~ E  
IGtli Franceschi forced the Venda Nova defile, and the army 
forming alternate masscs of infantry and cavalry begm to 
~ I W R  tlw Sierra de Cabres. Memnwliile Lorm descending tlic 
Tamega, urdered ratioas along the Villa &al road, and then 
rejoined the m i n  body. The 17th Fmucwcbi won the bridge 
of Ii~iivaens rtnd entered %lamonde, mhereupon the ~ o r t u -  
guwe, oovered by El~en, fell1iacIc un t l ~ e  Pico dc Pngaldos close 
to Braga, and Francssclii took post at Carvall~o Esta, tmo 
leagucq from tlilist city. 
&n!t cxpecting to readi R r x p  Wit1101le further oppwition, 
nnw ciiiisd liis guna, guarde11 I i y  Lnliartld~ clivisinii, to eiiter 
t? ie  ?;si: of  Vcntla Nava; but tlie arrkgnanps, rebiforcetl from 
and ntheked tlic coluinn sitli ~ c a h  ficrmncas nntl rinbtlety. 
The nurtliern Portupuese peasants Rre very robust, very hand- 
some, and esceedingly lirave; their natiiral disposition is gene- 
roiis frauk aiid obliging, and they make docilc, intclligent, xnd 
Iinrirdy soldierci. Velicrnent in nnger, and nnow stiiuuluted by tlre 
exliort~tions ancl pemond eeamiple of tlieir priests, tliep carne 
rusliing down the hills lilre men delirived o€ rencoii, niirl mnny 
al tliern Firmlring furiouvly into tlie Frencli battlilions were 
ttere Icilled; tlie otlien fled up tlie maunt;iin pursued by some 
battalions; but notliing abacl~d, they mnde rr circuit round 
tjlic Iiillu. mnrl f1~1Ting ngnin iipon thc rcnr, kiJTed fifty oof tliti 
strqgler~, and pIundered tlie bag-gge, Ttius pllerl, tha 
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J m d  af French ~Iowly p s e d  tlie defiles of Venda Nova, 
merationa, Ruivaeng mrl Salamonile, to gatlier in fmnt of 
M66. Reire. 
Thnt  general waa no more, and his troops, recking from 1Us 
~Imghter, were r a e g  like savqe Beasts, one moment congre- 
gating nenr the prisoas tu murder some m t e h  within, a t  
another msliing tumultuously to the oiitposts Eben'e 
ncprt, mith design to engap tlre cnemy : tlic o ~ c k m n p e  
aI88. of the rlistant distrid also pourcd into mmp, 
dmgging with them ~uspectorl persoii~ nnd wliling to tlie 
genernl digtrmtion. V%en Freire resolved to retreiit, Iie, ivitli 
thrat deñign, had remlled E l ~ n  on the 14tl1, giviiig rfirectionri 
t o  tlie outliosts in fmnt o£ Braga te retire m the eneiny a m e  
on; but tKs, and Lis attempt to stop tlie mte af ammuni- 
tion, gave ePect to  a plan long prepared by the Iiishop's faction 
for his dcstruction ; in E r a 9  be \vas revilod by the orck~inqxw, 
who disoovered a murderaus intention, wliere fore lie lcft the 
amp, but wni4 scizecl nt a ellngc and brought back : what 
fo3lowed is tlins descrilied by Eben, in his official report to sir . 
John Crndock :- 
' 1 did rrot reach Braqa iintil nine o'clock in tlie moniing of 
the 17th. 1 found everything in the greatest disorder; tbe 
hoiises shut, tlie ~mpEe flying, and part of the populaee nrmed 
mith guns and p:kes. Passiug tlirough the streeb, I wxs 
greekd. with loud vivas. Tliougli ths peopIe knmv me, 1 conld 
not gucss tlie meaning of this. At tlie markcbplncc, 1 wns 
dehined by tlie incrmaing ppizlace, wlio scixcd my reiris, 
+ng out loudly tliq wera ready to do anything to defend the 
Eity, requesting me to assist thcili, md spezkmg in tho lowest 
t e m  of their general. X pramised to do al1 in my power to 
aid their patriotic zeal, but said 1 must first speak to  liim 
Vpon thi, they sufcred me to proceed, awompanied by aliout 
a hndred of thcm: but I Iind not got far on my way t o  his 
quarters, when I ~ a w  him on foot, conductecl by a. gmat armed 
muItitncie, twlio sufferecl no one to pnss, nnrl on my attcinpting 
it threatened to firs. 1 ivrae, tliereforo> oliliged to turn riiy 
harse, and this tlie people appltiudd. Twti incu hnd hold of 
the general's arms, hia award was tiaken from him, aod the 
people abused him most ~cliemently. On my wwy baclr to 
the mwket-place, tliey wanted t o  shoot me, taking me for 
general Freire, but 1 wns aarccl by a soldicr of the legion, who 
explaincd the mistnkc. When 1 renclicd €he marlcct-lilwe I 
found &out e tlinlisnn(1 men drawn up; I cornrnunimkd to 
tliem my determination to aqsist tlieir InudabEe endeavours te 
defend themsel~es, provided tliey ~ o u l d  first permit me te 
qeak to the genernl, for whme R C ~ ~ O ~ S  I promised to be 
answernlile, as lang ns 1 slioulrl be witli hiin. 1 lrnrl onlerml 
a liouse to be got rendy for my reception, where the p e r a l  
arrived, nccomp~nicd aa liefore; 1 sriluted him d t l 1  respect, 
at which thcy diacovcrcd tlieir di~npprolinti on. I rcpcntcl rny 
propost~l. I~uiit they woulcI not listen to  it, 1 perceii-ed tlie 
danger of the genernl, and proposed to  tnke liim to my quttr- 
km; my nrljiitant offcred Iiim his nrm : wlwn 1 spokc to him 
110 only replictl ' save me !' 
'At the entmnce of my house, 1 mas siirroundal by tlioii- 
snnds, annd beard tlie lou(1 cry o f  kill ! kill !' 1 noiv tuok 
3io1d of  Iiim nnd atteinpted to £orco my ~vriy into tlie J~ouse, 
and a gentleman sliglitly mounded Lim ivitli tbe point rif liis 
sworct under my arrn. Be colIected dl Iiis strensli, ruslied 
tlirniiglt them, nncl ltirl himsclf bcliind tlic dnor of tlic Iiousc. 
TEic pcople siirrounded mo and forced me from tlic liouse. To 
draw tlie attention of tlic peoplc from tlie gcneral 1 ortlereil 
the rlrummcrs t o  bcnt tlic nlnrm, nnd forincd tlic OTCEmffi~q-w 
in rnuirs j 11ut they kept o coiistnnt f i r ~  ILprill lriy !lou~t?~ ~ivlirrr: 
tlie general stiIl was. As a last attempt to e w e  l~ i rn ,  1 iioiv 
proposet1 tlint Iie sliould be conhcterl to  prison in oi.rlcs tri 
tnltc n Irgnl trinl; tliis wna ngrcetl to, nntl Iic wna coiiductrtl 
tlicro iri snfcty; I lioped 1 Iiarl succeede(1, ns tlie ~icople 
demandetl to be led againat thc encmy no.iv iwi Jl y dvaiici iig, 
in ntrmhcr nhout trvo tlioiimnd. I q n i n  formcil tlicrn, nnll 
advnliced, h i t  soon after I lienrd tlie firiUn ngain, ~ ( 1  wns 
iiifomed the peolile had put tlie general to dcntli ivitli pikcv 
nnd ~ I I T I S .  T mns nom proclnimerl gcneml.' IVIicn tliis niiirclcr 
mns ~~eq~etrntterl t1ie people seeinrtl ~ntisfied,nnil EIIPII~ nritiiiiiric- 
i n ~  tlie n~ipronch of n Dritisli f u m  ordered tlie outposts tn 
~ t a i i r l  fnst as 'tic intended to fig1i1; biit nnotlicr tiiniiilt aroee 
wlien i t  ~ n s  discovcred tlint ane TTillnliom of Preire's stnff 
~mpris i l i  Eliedu qiiartcrs. Tliu urrlenancw liuled fortli rlie 
E S 
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nnhnppy rnan nnd killcd him at tho door, the moli ~hniitirig 
and firing vollep in at, the windowe, Yet, when their fury 
abated, they forced Eben to come ont and shom he had not 
been wounded, expreasing ~Etlction for him. 
In the night tlie legion carne in from Pico de Pugaldos, 
and &c following morning a reinforcement of six tliousrsnd 
O T ~ B F C L P  carne I I ~  in ono masa. Fifty thoumd rlollrrrs 
also arrived in the Gamp from Oporto ; fer the Portupese, 
like tlie Xpaniarris, comrnonly left their wc~pons in store, 
and brought their encumbrnuces to the field of battle, That 
evening the corregidor and two oflieetri of rank, 6 t h  manp of 
n meaner clari~~, were brougbh to the town and put in-jail, the 
mob being with di6cvlty restrained from slnying them on the 
w g  tliither. In tliis state they were when Francesclii reached 
Cawallia on the 17th, and if that hold md enterprising aoldier 
could linve obtained a glirnpse o£ what was passing, he would 
have broken into the midst of them with bis cavalry; for, of 
their tmenty-five thousand men, eighteen thousand were armcd 
~dli pikes, the mtGnder had wasted their ammunition, and 
tlic powder in doro was not made up in cnrtridgea. But 
RmDq situ~ted in a decp hollow, wa5 luddea from 
S. 
aournar of Km, and the rocky md wooded hílh mrronnhg 
~)t*'"f'On% it wem occupjed by p a h 3  appeared fi formidable ni tis. 
multitude; hence Franceschl, althmgb xeidorced 
hy a h r i ~ í l e  of infantry, m s  ~atisfied by feinta and skirmishes 
to alann his opponents, until the Frencb m y  co~iid arrive. 
While fhese events pnssed at Braga, Silveira lind agnin 
collected a force of militia ancl ordeaaqm in the Trns os 
Montes ; ~ n d  cnptain drentschild, an ofiwr scnt by Gradoek to 
aid the bishop, nlso rnllicd mnny fu i t ives a€ Guimamms nnd 
Rmarnnte; but in Oporto tlie people were more intent on 
murtler tlian defence. 
Ebenb po& atended from Fdpema to Ponte Porto on tlie 
Caido. Bis main bncly was seven miles beyond B r ~ p  on
the Monte Aclaxf4, a lofty r idge mossing the road of Cliaves; 
tlie lcfi ovcrhung thc Cavado, covering the Ponte Porto; the 
riglil; wno woodrd aild mvcrod by a dccp r~vine. Bcyond tho 
\i.ood tlie r i d p  curvcd forwartl anrl was czlIed tlie ;Monte 
T;illoiign, wliere s masa of troope were postad, but seprated 
from tho mnin body hy an interna1 o€ two miles, and by the 
wood and ravine, Another mms still more advancd crolvned 
isalnted hiii flanking the Chaves road, being dmigned to 
take tbe attacking coIamns in ffank. Beliind the Monte 
Vnllonga, at tho distmee of thrae miles, rosc the Fdpcrrn 
ridge, gunrded by tletachments from Braga and Gulmiirnens. 
Tlie Cliaves mad to Braga led directly QVer the centre of tlie 
Bdad6, and wvaa flankcd on tlie left by EL tongue sliooting out 
prpendiculnrly frorn that ridge and ending in lofty rocks 
overlinnging Cnrvallio Este; trie Partu~uae nqlectcd t l ~ k  
tongue and its roclra, and Prancesehi seized tlie formcr. 
Soult arrived the lgth, and to prwent n battle sent in 
twcnty prisonem witli a conkliatory ~imclomiitEun offcring n 
capitulation. She prisoners were immediately shin nnd the 
Fivncli tmmpeter detained. Next da3 Ebcn brought up hia 
rcmmes to the Adaufk; nnil the Portuguese on tlie ixolatcd 
hill in front of Nonte Vdlonga took possession of Lnnhoza, a 
vil las half-way between that hill rind tlie ~ocky hdglit occu- 
lncd by Pranccschi on the 17th. Two Frcneh divjeions mcrc 
in liand. Ona of them md tlic cnvalryj drove &e Portuguase 
fram Lrtnhoza and following dose carricd the isolated h i L  
Tlie otlier diviaion thea took post, part in Camlho, part on 
the rtieky liefidlnnd, wiiere six guus wtire plnnted in the niglit. 
In this position the Frencli were close to Eben'a centre, and 
a forward move wonld separate bis wings. 
At nine o'doclc on the 30th, Fmnceschi and Memet moved 
t o  tum the right of the Monte Vallonga; Laborde, mpported 
liy Ln Hoiiasnyc's rlrwans, ndvnnecrl n p i i i ~ t  lie B. 
centre hy the r idp connccting k a l l i o  witli tlie J,,,nd ,r 
Monte dd~ufé; Heudelet, with part of his Jivision 
~ ~ ~ f t i O n ~  
and a squarlron of cavalry, atta&& Eben's lcft, 
de~ipiny;  to ~e ize  the Ponte Porto. Ti10 P o r t u ~ e s e  opened 
a stmggling fire in thc centre, but the bunting of a gun 
mu~ed confusion, from which Laborde's ndvancing mnsses 
~ U V C  no time ta rcoover. By tcn o'cIocIr the wllolo of tlic 
ceiitre naa ilying doilvn n narrom waodd vdley leading from 
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Eben's t,he Adaufd to Braga; tlie French followed harrl, 
n,eF and disoovering one of tlieir men, 8 prisoner, mutilnted iii n drcdful manner nnd &iIl nlive, 
gave no qi~arter- Brnga wriri abandoned, the victoriouti 
infantry, paasing tbrongh, took post on the  other eiide, and 
the cavalq continued the havoc on the road to Oporto; yet 
so savage were the ftqitives, that they stopped at Draga to 
mardcr the míregidor and ather prisoners in the jaii; tben 
castieg the rnangled bodies into the atreet they continued their 
flight : meanmhile Heudelet breaking over t.he left of the 
Monte Adaufé deecended apon Ponte Porto, winning tbnt 
bridge and the village on tlie other side of the Crrvado. 
Francei~cl~i und hiermet ascended tlie rugged Monte Tal- 
l o n p  wiwitli difficulty, bnt whea they attRined the erestj tlieir 
enemies fled; then they m a e d  the valley to gtiin tlie road of 
Guimaraens, and on the march thgr fe11 in witll ttbree thon- 
sand Portupese posted above Falperra, who dnem up nith 
their backa to  some high rwks md opened a fire of artillery, 
FranceschP placed his hommen on either flank, a, bripcte of 
Uifmtry a,p6nst tlic front, and, as at Verim, makmg al1 ch~p 
tog'othcr, strcwd thc ponnd with the dead : neverhheless the 
Portiipcse fonght valinntly, iantl Fmncemhi acknowldged it. 
Tlia vanquislied a m y  lost its mtilIery and four tliuumud men, 
four liundred only being made prisoners. Some of tha fugi- 
tim, crosmng tlie Cavado river, made for the Ponte de Lima, 
others retired t o  Oporto, the greakst number took the road 
of Gnimaraens during the fight at Falperra. Ehds ofticisl 
report ~hows he wes at Eraga when the &ion commenced, 
and flcd among the fimt; for be makw no mentian of  the 
fight nt Iihlpem, nor ot' thc slrirmieh at Ponte Porto, and hii 
rinrrative lienra every ninrk af inncmiracy. Brngn WUI nbnn- 
cToned 1)y the inlialiitlintg Iiut tLey retwned next rlnp. mien 
tlie Frencli outposts were eatablished, gene& Lorge, cmasing 
the Cavado, entered Bacellos, and was meli received by the 
corregidor; for which the latter was a few daya dtemards 
lianged by the Portupese general, Botilhq who commanded 
between the Lima and the Minho. At Braga provkions mere 
o'btainetl, ~ n r l  R StOm O€ powder which WM immedintely m d e  
u11 into wtridges for tlie nso of tlie Prench; the gun-carriag~ 

being rcinforccd 6th infeintry ho suceded,  whereupon the 
Pottugucse brutaUy murdered their oommander, gcnernl TTal- 
l ong~ ,  thnd di~persed. The whole French anny rws noñ in 
comrnnnication on the Ieft bank of the Ave, tlie way £o Oporto 
was apend, and, on the 27th, fhe troops sere f i d l y  concen- 
tmted in fmnt of tlie entrenchments eovering that city. 
Thwe successw darmed the bishop; he t h q h t  t o  abfindon 
Oporto, yet recoverd spirits when Iie contemplated the rnulti- 
b d e  he Iind msembled, anrl mllecteii that tlie Engli~li amy 
ms iben stronger t h n  it hd been since Cdock'ri mival: 
Beresford &m liad a considerable nntive force beliind tlie 
Nondep,  and the prclate hoping for &eir mppmt resolved t o  
light, He h&d little les  than fifty thousand men, md among 
them many re-dar#, twvo thoiismd o£ whom had just ar.ri~ed 
under general Vittoria. Tkrs oficer had becn sent by Beres- 
forcl to aid Silvcirn, 'biit, bcing too Irate, naw entered Oportch 
Thc hopea of tllc people wcm liigh; thcy coda not b d i c ~ c  the 
French a match for tliem, and the preceding defeats h h g  
attriliutwl, ea& f.o i t ~  particular m e  of treason, the murder 
of many innooent peipons followed m sn expiation. None 
but the bbl~ep dared tliwart the mob, antl he was little rlispoeed 
to do so; mhile Rapundo, and others of  his ~tamp,  fomented 
their fury aad directed it to  p t i f y  persond enmitia. Thus 
the defeett; oE Braga caused a hmult in Oporto, and Louis 
D'Olivera, a man of high sank, who hd been cast h t o  prkon, 
was with fonrteen other persons haied forhh md despxtcbed 
with mnny shbs : the hodies werethen mutilatcd and dntgged 
in triumpli tlirough the atreeta. 
Al1 the entrenclimentri were now cwirnplefc. TIiey consisted 
of numeroas foits, crowning a succession of rounded liills, and 
where the lulls failed, there were emthen rampzrts, 
Plan 8. looplioled houses, ditches, md feIIed trees, mtl two 
hundred pns ivere mounted. Oporto was beliind Sihiated 
chietly on a descent towarde the river, iS hsd a boat-bridge 
tbreo huntlrcd yards long, forming tho onIy conimunication 
with thc aubnrb of Tililln Nova; it wns commanded Srom tlie 
ldt  bank by iyfip g i n a  placed on a Muff cwgy heiglit over- 
hanging tlie river above Villa Nova, and overloolíing tlie city 
and great pnrt of dle entrenched camp. JTithin the Iines 
tenta werr! pitchcd f o ~  a grcfiter number thnn wcre assembled, 
antl thc mIIlhitlirl0 mnnncd tilo woric~ witli grent noise and 
tumul t wheli tlio Freuch columns, gatbering lilre tliunder 
clouh, settled in front of the mmp. 
So& arri~ed the 27th. From Braga he had urgd the 
bisliop to mlm the popular effemescencc; and now heliolding 
tlie workm, aiid rcnrling tlicir wealine~s evcn in tlie numbera 
guarding tliem, he reiiewetl liis cal1 on the prelate to spare so 
peak n city tlie Iiorrors oF a storm. A prisoncs mho c h e d  
thii eiirnmons onIy saved his life by ingeniously pretending 
lic cnmc witli un orer o$ Soult's eiurrcnder; liut ncitlier tliis 
demit, nor s negotintion prolonged till evaiimg, prevonted a 
continua1 fire from the entrencliments. Tlie parley being 
tinnllj* broken, dispositioons were mndc for a battle next dny. 
Ilcrle's division, to divert attention from tha truc point of 
attdck, rtppmached the Portupese left, and thougli a prodigious 
fire was opened, it got inta aome hollows and enelosures wliere 
it maintninerl its footing. At another point khc Portiigueac, 
prctending ri wish t o  riurrender, inducerl general Foy to ap 
proacli with a companion; ths Entter wn3 immediately killed, 
and Foy carried into tlie town ; lie R " ~ S  mishken for Loison, 
nnd tho pcople crilled out, JCiU ~ifmta,' 'lrill one handl but 
wit1it1i grat presence of mind Iw Iield up totli  bis handa, and 
the mob lieing tlien coavinced of their error suffered Km to 
be cast into prison. 
Hnving brought af irs  t o  t l i i ~  aivrul ulisi~, tlic bishop's 
couragt? gave my, Lwving the generals Lima m,nd Pareiras 
to command, lie repited in the evening tAo the Serra wnvent, 
mhich m n e d  the niggcd liill averhunging t!ie Villa Rova 
suliurh on tlie left bank of the river: from t h e m  he belield 
in safety the horrors of tlie next clay. BleanwliiIe thn tnmdt 
was dredFul ia Oporto; the I-iells were ruog incessnntly, and 
n thundcr-stnrm nri~iiig, tlie howling wind wns in the Portu- 
p e s e  canip rnistaken for tiie enemy; then the whoh lino 
blazed witli musketry, tlie mar of two liundred p n s  mingled 
with tlie noiae of tlie tempest, nnd tlie Partupcse cnlIing to 
ench otlier, and uttering loitri cries, were agitated at once mjth 
fuiy and terror. So passed the nig-ht, yet the morning bmke 
serenely, and st smen o'elock tlie sound of dnims and trurnpeb, 
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and tIie gli tter of a r m  @ve notice that thc French amy waa 
moving to bhlie athcck. 
Merle's feint ap in s t  tlie lefb, ~ ~ h i c h  was the ~w&esk partaf 
the liiie, hd perfectly wcceeded, the PoT~~ I$?BQ 
S 
,f genernls had their principal masses on that side; 
*&on% but Soult mas intent npon the ~tmngest points of M5S. khe werlig, desiping tr> foroe his way through the 
town, seize t11c bridge during the fight, anr1 secure the passage 
of the river. hlerle nom attncked the left of  the Portuguese 
ccntrc; Franccsclii and Lihonle sassniled thcir extreme right; 
3Tcrmct's division sustnined by n lirigurle oF drnpona, wn5; in 
tlie centre. Lorge wa8 sppoinfed tci C U ~  off a body of urdh 
vatmc., psterI with EOme guns ia front of the Portuguese ldt* 
beyond tlie works en t11e rmrl of ViIIa de Conde. me Iiattle 
commencetl by the wings, Mermet'a diiíision being witliheld 
until tlie. cnemy's genernls, helieving the whole of the attack 
~ ' F M  deveIol)ed, wealrened tlieir centre to strengtl~en tlieir 
Banlrs; tlien the Ilrencli reserves, rusliing vio1entIy forirnrds, 
broke through tlie entrcnehrnents and took the tmo principal 
fortq cntcring by t he  einbrns~~iires antl killing or dispcrsing nl l  
witliin tlicm. Soiilt instnntly rallicd Iiis traops iii f r e ~ l t  
rnassec nntE scnt tivo liiittalions to tnke tlic Port.~~guese left 
ning in tlio rcar, ndiilc tivo otlicm marcliiug ~trnight iuto tlie 
torvn, mde for the 1iridg.e: f i e  Portupese tlim cut in h o ,  
mrc  soon lieatcn on al1 poiats. Labor(le carried in succpssion 
n number of forts, took fifty picces of nrtillery, md rcrtclied 
the edge of the city, nhere lie bnlted until Frlrance.schi, who 
was engriged on his left, Joined him: by tliis movement 8, 
Iiirgc bwlj- of the Portupese were driven off from the toaer 
oiirl being forccd bnclí on thc iippcr Daurq were follomed by m 
brjgdrle ~intler general Arnalid. 
hIcdc tlien scririg tlle suceess o£ tlic ccntre wns complete, 
brought up bis Eeft flank, k e d  al1 tlie farts to liis riglil i ~ t  
succesion, Hled a great numbci of mcn, nnd drove tlie rest 
tomrds the sea. Shese last dividilig, Aed, one part to tlie 
fort of St. Joa, the other tomarde the mouth of tlie Douro, 
mhere, rnarldened by terror as t h  Freucli carne pouring upon 
them, they strove, some to  sivim across, otliers to get over in 
emxU botlts; tlieir general, Lima, called out ngainst tliis liope 
lcss r$t,crnpt, but tliey tlrrncd nnd m~~rdcrcil Iiim within 
muskeL~lioh of tlio appronchiiig snemy, and tlien rcneiving 
the attempt to cmss, perished. Lorge lid rneanivliile dis. 
perced those on the side of 'Cilla de Conde, and Arnaud 
hemming in tliose above the town prevented tlicm from 
pltingitig i ~ t o  tlic rivcr alse, ns h their desperate mood tliey 
wcre p i n ~  to do. Xcvcrkllelm the b~ttle continued within 
Oporto. For the tmo Sattalions sent from the centre, lial-ing 
b u ~ t  lie barricades at tlie entrance oE the streets, fongIit 
tlicir way to thc bridge; and thcrc al1 thc horrid cireumsttrncm 
of war ircerned to he iexcmunulatetl and tiie calmities of i ~ n  q e  
compressed into pone doleful hour t More than four thousand 
persons, old nnd young and of botli s e m ,  were seen pressinp 
forward with mild tuinult, some alrcnrly on tlie brlrlge, otliers 
striving to gaio it, aud nll in n a h t ~  of rrcnzy. Tlie h t t e r i a  
on tha opposite ha& openerl tlieir fire wlien the Prench 
appmed; and at that moment a troop of Fortttgucae eavalry, 
flying from tlic Rplit, canic down onc of  the strects, nnd 
remor~eless iu tlieir fenm liore nt full gnllop intn tha midst of 
the miserable helpless cro>víl, trampling a hl~laotly pathwap to 
the river. Rutldenly the nearest bonts, unable to su&& ths 
incrs~sing wciglit, mnlc, nnd tho foremost rvretchcs, di11 
tumliling intu the river as ttbey were p m e d  from behiid, 
perished until tlie heaped borlies, risirig abore tlie surface of 
the waters, filled a11 thc &pace left hy the siiikig of tlie 
vcsscIs, Tlie forciiiust Fr~iicli, amaxcd at this fmdul spec- 
taclc, fogot, tlie liattle and hstenetl t o  save those mho still 
stnigglerl for  lifc; h t  wliile some wcre thw nobly employcd, 
others 3iy tlie Iielp oF planlis got on to tho firmer parts of t h ~  
bridge, and thus crosaing ttie river carried the batterie~l on 
the Iieights of Trilla Novs. 
Tliillis tcrriMc destntction did not cornplctc thc mcmrc  of 
tlio city's calnniities. Two Lundred men ensconcnl in tlio 
bisliop's pnlrtce continued to fire from the wintloms, until tbe 
French burst tlie door3 and pizt al1 to  thr! mod : every street 
rinrl Iioii~e tlicn rung Mth the noke of the combatants nnd 
60 PENINWLA WAR. [3la~cn, 1809. 
the shrieks of distms. The mldiem, exaspemted by long 
hwdsbips, and prone lihe al1 ~oldien tli ferocity and vio- 
lcnce during an msault, becme frantic with fnry when in 
one of the principal sqnares they found several af tbeir,com- 
nides, mho had becn m d e  prisoners, fwtencd upriglit mri 
living, but. 6 t h  their eym bumt, their tongues ton1 out, and 
tbmr otl~er nembers rnuti1at.d and pdied: tliose ivho lielield 
thcm spnred nane. It was in ~ a i n  Soult Értrove te stop t l ~ e  
slaughter, in Pain hundrds of officem and soldiers opposed at 
the rislr of their livw tl~e vengennce of their comades, and by 
tlieir gentrws exertions reacued ~nst  nnrnbers that would 
otlierwise have fallen victims t o  the anger and brntality of 
the moment ; t.he frightful Ecene of mpe, piilqe, 8nd muriler 
contuined many Iionrs; and what with tliose who feil in 
Iiaktle, those who were drowned, . those gacrificed 
R. 
;ronrnd t~ mvengc, it is snid ten thousand Porhiguese 
"~mtia died on that unhappy day ! Thc 10% ot the 3165. 
Frencli did not exoeed five h d r d  mcn, 


BQOK VL-CHAP. E. 
CIZAPTER VI. 
TE~S dfre w g e  at Oporto m follawed by irnporhant cvmt~, 
h t  it is essential first to narrat;e the coatemporaneous opera- 
tions on the Tagus and &diana; for the wzr was wide nnd 
complimtcd and the rcsult dcpcnrled more on tlie general 
combination t.hm the particular movements. 
Soon dter %'he new organization of the Frencb army liad 
taken place, the i m p d l  p a r d q  the reserve o€ infnntry, and 
mnny ilhchments, in nll forty thoiisand mcn, wme remlled 
from Spiiin for the war in Qrmany; and tlie whole f o m  uniler 
t3e king, exclusive of his ?Tren& pdq was in January two 
h u d d  and seventg thonsand men and forty ImpaHd 
thousand horses; a decreaee of si*-five thousrand ~ i i s t e r  miia 
men sinm tlie 15th o£ Novembet, 1808. Tho 
lm by battle, sicknme rand desation, in the four months mc- 
ceeding PTqpoleon's arrival in Spain wm therefore a h t  twenty- 
five tbouuand, n vast number, but two sieges tivelve battIes, 
nnd Inmy mmhnts hnd happenad in tliiit periotl. Tlie king, 
commrindinp tlie whole, reinained at Madrid. Victor, as before 
shomn, ms at Toledo with tha fimt corps, Eebtistinni waa jn 
the vdley of the Sagiis with the fouith corp~i. Opposed to 
tliem were Cartonjal nntl Cuesta The f ird Iiaving fvurtecn 
tliousand m m  was ot Ciuilnd lleal in La ITmclia; tlie semnd 
having nearly seventeen tliousnnd, two tliousand five hundred 
heing cavalry, liad brolcen the bridge of Almamz nnd guxrdcd 
thc Kstmmndnm linc of thc Tagus. In tliis attak Yictor Seing 
to aid Soult in Portupl cliungcrl placa with Scbadinni. 
hfontliruu's cavalry coiinected tliem two generuls, aii(1 tliey 
werz supported liy the Iring's guards, the permanerit gm- 
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r i~on of Jfadricl, and Be~wlle's division; hut to nntlcrfitnnd 
tlie militas. connexion hetweed Soult, Victor, Lnpisso and 
Sebastiani the country on both sides of the T a ~ s  must be 
known. 
That river after passing Tolerlo flows tIirough a ddeep vnlley 
walled np on cithcr hand by lofty mountnim. Thoae on the 
riglit, dmnys myipcd with aio\sr, run pnrnllcl with thc rivcr 
nnd divide tlie vnlley of tlie T n p s  from 01d Cmtille and tlie 
Sdamanca country, the Iiigl~est parts being Irnomi as ths  
Sierra de Gredos, S i e m  de Dejar, and Sierra de Gata. In 
these sierras the Alberclie, Tietar and sllnpn rise, and plough 
their way in a slmting direction to tlie Tagus. On the Ieft 
bmk of the htter, the principal manntain, mllccl the Sierm 
de Guadalupe, extenda in a sontIiwad direction from the 
river, dividing the upper part of La 3Iancha from Spnisli 
Estrcmdura. 
The eommnni~tioiis bcbccm the Eal~manea county to  the 
valley of the Tws were neitlier mnny nor gmd. 
1 t. Ry Hmwtjradii, un oid Rrirnnn rmid nin t1irori~I;li hrlm 
hita and Villa Franca, crossing tlie Sierra do Gmlos nt the 
Puerto de Pico, md descending 11y AIomlie7tran to  Tnlnvera. 
2nd. 'Phe pass of Arenas, nearly parallel to, nnd only s sliort 
distance from the Horwjada md. 
3rd. The pass of Tornevecas, leading upon Recentia 
4th. The Bej rnr roacl, croasing tlie sierra nt the p ~ s  of Bdos, 
md descending likewise upon Placentia. 
5th. She Paja or &ta rod, mliieh crosses the Sierra de 
Gnti~ by the pma of Pcmlcs, and nf~crwards dlviding, ssnds ane 
brnnch to Alcantara, ?lie otlici t o  Coria ontl Riwcntin. Of 
t1we five passcs tlio two last only nere, gcnmtlly spcnlrinp, 
pmticable for srtilley. 
Tmo roya1 rods leatling from Toledo and 3ladrir1 to  Barlnjris, 
anite nmr Tdavera, md follow the ceurse of tlia Tngtis by ttie 
*ht bmk as far as Naval Moral, thcn tuxning to tlie Ieft, 
cross the tiver at  the bridge of Almaraz. Rut fram Toledo 
westwa~d tu the bridge of ~l lmnmy more than fifty milcs, tlie 
left h n k  of thc T d , p  is so mwdcd by tlie n i g g ~ l  slioots o€ 
t hc  Sierra de Gudalupe, that it mny be called iniparjw~blc for 
an army; and khia pcculinrity of grouud gives tlic lrcy to tlio 
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operntiona on hoth sirfcs. For Cuesta and CnrtosjaG by ~ m o n  
of tliia in~pnlrisable Gudalupe, liad no direct military commu- 
nicrition; h t  Victor nnd Sebastiani, occupying ToIdo ñnd 
Talavera, could nnite on eitlier Iine of operetions by thc royd 
rods above mentionerl, ar by n ~cmnd y rod,  whiclz running 
iiear Yebenm crosses Uie Taya by tlie stone brid,ma of Puebla 
de 3fontalw11, half may hct\r.een Toledo and Tdavem TIie 
rallpiig point of the French was lladrid, aand tlieir lines of 
dcfcncc mcrt thc Tstgus on one aidc; tIic Alhcrclie nnd thc 
Gudnmmn on the otlir!r. Tlio base of Chrtolijiil'ri opcn~titions 
was tFie Sierra de Jiorena. Cuesta's first llne >vas the Tagt~s, 
bis second tlie Gudinna, from whence he couid retreat by a 
flnnl~ mnrch to narlnjos; or by n direct ono to tlie (lefi1c.s of 
Monasterio in the Siem hforeiira, aherc only Iio muld imite 
nith Cartoajd. But their tmo rtrmics would not llave fiirnislied 
more than twentp-Gx thoiisnnd infnaitry nntl f i ~ e  tlioii.wntI 
mvals; rinrl8isy litcrl na mervc; wlicrens tlic trvu Freiiel~ corps 
exoeedetl tliirty-firo tliousnnrl, supportctl by tlie reserve under 
the klng : the Frencli therefore, Iisd the nxlvrantage of numbers, 
position, nnrl discipline. 
Following Nnpuleon's odcrs  Victor diould linr*e liwn nt 
hferida before the mkldle of Febrnary; tliere he nould Iiave 
mnfined Cuesta to tlie Morena; and mith his tnreh-e regimenfs 
uf m l r y  coiiltf bavc kcyit nll the Rnt country, ns fnr 
Batlnjos, in ~uli~jection. TIiat fortrcss liad no means of rcsist- 
ance, a d  no Spa~~isli force in'tlie ficld m cnpable o€ imyieding 
tlie execntion of the emperor's orcler, wliich was rciterated by 
tlie king; yct Victor disolieyd, antl tlic Spnilinrtls tliinking I i i i i i  
iiicrt from werhess pro~oked the Mom he was d i s p o d  to witli- 
hoid. Cueatat projected otfensive movementq and Nbuquerque 
nrgcd Cartoajnl t o  attnck Toledo; he rcfusetl, hut ofcretl Alliu- 
querque a troop &Ir wvl~ich to act indel~ciidently. Tlie duke 
complainsd to the junta, imd >fr. Frcre w110 wns to be found 
in every intrigue and m r y  alxurd project supported his com- 
plilnints. Tlio junta, matchless in folly, ortlerctt Cadonjal to 
execute Albuquerque's plans, nnd transferred Albuquerque witll 
four or five thousand men to Cuestds command. C~rtoajnl 
thus coerced, mnrclied with twelve tliousand men md tventy 
guna townrds Toledo, nnd his van-stnrd dmvc the Polkli 
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lancers h m  Consuegrrt, but Sebastiani comíng up witli tcn 
Zhoumnd mcn bcat i t  baclt qpin to Ciudad &al, mhcrc tlia 
Bpnniurdn attempted to defend tlie r i~e r  in front of tlint town. 
TIie French liowever soon forced t l ie  pw~ags, md in a t u m ~ l -  
t u q  act i~n routed Cartoajd with t l~e los1 oF his gune and 
several thousand men. He fld by Almagro, and the cs~alry 
p m e d  hi even t o  the Sierra Xorenrs, Thig action, caCed 
the rout of Ciudrtd Rcnl, 3cd to nothing. Scbmtianl, who is 
sraid to havc eqgerated the succws, conoentrntcd iiis army by 
the king's urder on tI1e upper Giradiana and awnited Tictor'~ 
operatium, wl~ile the Spauinrds rallying nt Camlia received 
hesh levies from Grenatla and Cordova, 
Ríeanwhile the king, being informed by Soult that his wrps 
would be at Oporto tlie 15th of March, reiterated Kapoleon-S 
ordets thnt Lapisse should move from hlamancn upon 
Abrantes, rtnd tlmt Victor should pass the T a p s  ',o dnve 
Cuesta beyond tlze Gurrdiana. Tictor rcrnonstrated, smying 
hpisse, wlio helonged to hi~l mrps, would nrrivc too smn a: 
Alirnnt,es end be witliout sirpport ; yeE fin(linpa J u q i h  firm, he 
colleeted five da$ provisioiis and prepared to pms tlie Tague. 
Cuesta h d  sixteen t.housand men on tliat river and eiglit 
tIiousand more in thei rear, but Victoi estimated 
deneral 
,,, his force in position at thirty thouswnd; a, greiit 
an~lmni e m ,  rtot in>-01untm-y. Cuesta WaE as ill-informed, 
ope"'Onp for this w a s  tlie moment when, with his approv;!l 51s. 
and hom his camp, D'Urhan propwed to Cradoclr, 
that curioiisly combined attncIr alreníly noticcd, in whicli the 
Spaniartls mere to cniw ttlie Topus anrl Wilsrin was to come 
doivii upon tho Tietar. Tliis nlso wns the period t h t  )Ir. 
Frere, ignortint that, erclnci~e of the king'a and Sehstiani'a 
troops, at lwt twenty-fire tlioiisnnd fighting men ivere in tlie 
mlley of tlie Taps, proposed tlmt twelve tliousannd Britisli 
under .Cdoclr shoiild march from Gsbon to  rlsive Sehastiani k 
corps from Toledo, and ~onsequentIy r t ~ i  he pIirased it, 'from 
bhclrid!' The first movemcnt o€ Victor amkcncd these 
rlreamers. 
Victor hdd tlic lirirlge~ of Tdnrcra nnd Arxolii$po, fina Iiis 
post3 were puslid down the vnl1ey t o  Penta de Bazagona ou 
ths Tietar. Cueata's position w ~ s  from Garbin near tlie brzo-  
Lis110 I i r i c l ~  t o  tliat of Alniaraz. His centre was on the Meza 
d'Ilior, a lilatfom of surpmsing strength, perpendicular to the 
Tags ,  hnt Iiis hend-quarters mcre nt Ueleytosn, from whenee 
Iiis troops liotl cirt n, rond to  thc: Mern d'nior. Tictor liail ensy 
aecess t o  al1 the briclgea Cuesta liad none practicable f ~ r  artil- 
lery, snve to Almnms ; and to  tliat only by passing the almost 
imyregnahla Mirnbete rirlge, wliich, five miles from Almarnq 
crosses tFio road ar~d l)nm iiceess to Estreinadum XEence tlia 
Prencli genera[ desiged to paRs by Tfiiavern and 
Arzobispo, opcrat.ing with Ilis infniitry and some 
cnmlry ngainst tEie Spanish right in thc Gntiida- 
Iupe, ii~!iile tlie nrtillery, tha grand pnrc and tlia rest of tho 
cavalrg coneentrnterl, ta p s s  at Alrnamz by means of s raft 
bi-idge. This project pruves thut Victol. kncm Cncsta '~  red 
force, oi be wvuld never have plmd Iiis nrtilleryaucl field stores 
with a. w& p a r d  so close to an enemy in position, mho 
possessed n pontoon train, and could ensily have passd tlie 
rivcr. 
On tLe lbth, LrtvaI'n Qerman inf~ntry and Zasdle's cavalrp 
croflsed at Tnlavem, antl, ttlrning tn the right, worked a mnrcli 
thrciugfi tlie raclty liills until tIic infantry rcaclied Alden 
Nueva somewliat short of the bridga af Arzobispo, md the 
cavaly gained a, position Iiigher up tlie rnountayn towrirrle 
Estrelln. The tCtli they ndvnnccd n few rnilca, anrl tlic other 
divisions pnssed tlie bridge oaf Anolii~po~ wliila tlie nrtillery nntl 
the pnrcs, witli their escort, moved to Almaraz; Iiaving orden to 
watcIi, during the 17th tinrl18tl1, forthe appearance of tlie amy 
on tlie heiglita at tlie 0 t h  side, and tLeu t o  launcli tIic raft 
bridge. Cuesta, seeing tliese movcments, hastened to hfim- 
h t e ,  orcleretl Renestrosn to defentl t he  bridge of AIrnsraz Mtli 
eiglit tlionsand inen, and reinforced the rikit wing lieliliind tiic 
nior, s small river, thougli nom running ivith a full torrent 
from thc Gnndnliipe ta tlie Trigun. Tiie ITth, the Spani~h 
outl~osts wcro drivea over tlie Il~ur; tliey a t t em~i t~d  to rc-forni 
on the liigli roclrp liank, biit being cIosely fwllowed retreahI 
to tlie Meza rl'lbor, tlie great nnt;nrnl strength of which was 
incrc~nscd 11s ficld-ivorks. Here tlicir positinn corild only ha 
aseailetl in fmnt, but Lpivd's columns puslietl rapidly up the 
mountain, tlie inequnlities cif grounrl covrriiig them In some 
vvq. 11. P 
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so& from the effects of the enemy'~ artilley : as they neared 
the gummit, the musketry and p p e  became mnrderou~, get 
the Spaniali infnntrg soon fled to Campillo, leaving behind, 
haggage, rnagazineq Reven guna, and a thousrmd prisoners, 
besidea eight handred Iíillcd nnd moundccl. The Frerich liad 
seventy killed, nnnd five liundrecl wounded; nnd wliilo thia 
action was taking pl:ice at Moza d'lbor, Villatk'9 dividon, 
higher np the Sierra, overthrew a smaUcr boily of 8panizxls 
at Frenedoso, making t h e  hndred prisoners and caphring 
a Iarge store of arms. 
At daybrcak on the 18th, Fictor discovered from tlie Meza 
d'Ibor, that G e s t a  ms in fiill retreat t o  Trnxillo, but that 
Henestrosa remained in front of Almamz. Wherefore sending 
Villatte after &esta, he Xcd Laval's Germans winst R e n w  
tras% who Roon Red over tlis 3t i rabh ridge. TIie raFt brIllge 
was then thrown, and on the 19th tlia Frencli dqoons and 
srtillery mossed, whsn the former pushd on to Truxillo, from 
wlience Cuesta had retrented leaving Xenestrosa 6 t h  a rear 
guard. The 20th, Henestrosa ww driven O T m  the Mxmwa, 
and with the exception of a dmgoon regiment left to guard 
tlie raft bridge, tlie wliole Frene11 army poured aloag the road 
ta  Menda C'tcneral Bordesodt, l e a d i  the vanguara of cavaly, 
hhng  nrrivcd thc 2 I d  in front of RIinjnidns ~vbcrc the road 
divaricated, iliscovcred some Spnnigh horscrncn in appnrmt 
darm as jf he~itating between ths  rods;  tlie h n c l i  grilloped 
forward, but in s rnornent twelve or feurteen hundrd Spanisli 
cavalq, placed in rimbush, carne up at speed on the Aanh and 
cliasged home, General Lasalle had from a distante ob- 
smed  tbese rnovernenta and immediately rode fomard mith a 
second regiment, yet Eordesonlt mtrictited bimself by Es own 
valour, though with the lms of seventy kiIled and a Iiundred 
woundd. 
After this welCmnnnged Eombnf, Cuesta retired to IIedellin 
'Rithout being molestcd, while I7ictor, spreadlng hia cavalry on 
tlie diirerent routes t o  gnin iiitdligelioe sni? collect provisiuiis, 
establislied l i i~  rlunrtem nt Truxillo, a towu of 
Pemclen pone trade and ~lmnhgeously situatea for a 
ItSS. 
place of arm. It  liad becn deserkd by the i n h -  
bitanta and pillaged by the first Frencli troops, yet still fur- 
niahed p a t  resources; and the~e waa an nncient citadel, mhich 
mns immedirttely nmed with thc Spanlsli gris, nnd pro- 
visionnl from tEie inligwxineg ttmlcen at RIaxn rl'lbor. Dtiring 
these events, tlic floorling of tlie T a p s  antl &he rocky nnture 
of its bed, injured tlic raft-bridge anll delnyed tlie artillery and 
storcs; wbercfore n bont-l~rirlgt? mas ordercd, and ii. fort con- 
~tructeil on tlie left bxnlc, to lie nrrned sitli tlisee glns nod 
garrisoned urit.11 a linndred and fifty men. T1ie.e anangc- 
nients, md tlie estahlisliment of an Iiospitril for two tbousand 
men at Tnixillo, mupicd Victor until tlie 24tli; btit his light 
cavalry eovercd al1 tiie roa& with scouting iimties, nn3 reportetl 
t1iat some of Cuesta's peolile lind retirecl to Medellin; tliat 
five or six thoiisnnd werc ia thc Sierrn de Guatlaliipe on the 
Frcndi left ; thut fotrr tliausanil iufrantcy and two tliouriand 
cavalry were belihd the river Gargaiiza in front of hledellin, 
and evelhing elce wns over tlic Lhadionn. Merih  and tho 
p n t  m ~ 1  from Bnllnjos t o  Sevillc wcre tlins uncovcicd. 
Victor was ~ iot  Iioivever disposed to profit from tliis, for he 
w a q  awaic that Blbnquerque wns coming from h 3hnclin. ta 
Cuwta; anrl believing bc broiiglit ninc thoii~nnd infr~ntry nnii 
two tliousand w v ~ l r y ,  faid Cuesta dcñijiiid t o  drxw liim into 
a dificult country by mrrking s flank mxrcli to join Cnrkonjal 
in La Mancha; or, by crossing the aundiana Prbove Naval 
Villnr, d e r e  tlle fortls nre alrniys prnctiwlile, to regnin tlio 
Guadrtlupe, and estalilidi n new base of operations on the le& 
ffank of tlie Frcnch. Yeitlier Cuesta nor liis RnIIy mere capalle 
of a~tcli aperntions ; liis liiic of rctrcnt wiis fiolcly dircctctl liy 
a desire to join Albuqueque, and save Iiiinsell in a niggctl 
c0unt.y. Victor overrated 1Un aclvemq's skill. I n s t e ~ l  o€ 
follon*ing him ciosdy, he wtmnccd 'oiily t~ fctv 1eng.ocs on tlie 
hXedelIin road, and from tlience scnt liis liglit cnva1t-y tu 
Ncrida; pushing detxclimenta tomards hdn jos  and Sevillc, 
wliilc othcr pnrtics explored the mnds lending Iiito tlic Guatln- 
lupe. On the 27t11, however, lie innrc:lid iu 1ierr;on to hfedellin, 
at the liend of two clivisions OT infantry, and n bripde of 
heny cavnlry. Eiglit linrnrlred Spnnisli llame, postel1 on tFio 
riglit Iinnk of tlia Giiniiinnn, rctircil rtt liic npproncli, nnd crow- 
ing tliat river linlted tit Don Cenito, wlierc tliey mere rein- 
forced by other sqiiadrons; but no infuatry w r e  to be seen, 
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nnd Tictor pnssing tlie river toolc post on tlic roníl Icrixling to 
Xili&ril mnd D9ii Benito: Iiis situation in tlie evening Iieing 
as follows :- 
TIPO divisi~ns of .infnntry and one incomplete brigade of 
heavy cal-alry, were in position on the road leading from 
Medellii to Don Benito and 31ingnbril. Tlie remainder of 
t he dragoons? mder Latour JIaulioirrg, were at Zorita, fifteen 
m i h  o? the left, u.atcliing the Spanirtrds in tlie CuadaIiipe, 
Tlie light c n d r y  wna at ? l i e ~ d %  cightccn milea to the Rglit, 
Iinving pntrolied al1 tlinh d q  on tlic r o d a  t o  Ddnjos, Seville, 
nnd Mcrlcllin. Bufin's division mas nt Miajadas eighteen 
mila in tlin rear. 
Before dark, intelligence a~rired that Albnquerque was come 
up with eig-l~t thonsand men; t l ~ t  he combined troops, 
twenty-ciglit thousanrl infmtry and seven thomand ciivalry, 
were in position on tlie table h r l  of Don Benito; tlmt Cuesta, 
awnre h o ~ v  tiie Frencli wcrc scnttmd, aas prepare¿! to atta& 
tlic two divisions on tlieir rnurcli tho next dny. Pictor, not- 
nitlishi~ding the force of the Spanish mmy, then decided ik 
figlit, and immediately sent orders to Lmalle, RufEn, and 
LRtour &faubourg, to come down t a  Medellin; but the latter 
 vas directed t o  leavc a detacliment at Miajadas t o  protect th 
route of hierida, and s brigade at Zorita to obserrc the 
Spniarcls in the Sierra de Guadiilupe. Cuestds numbers 
wrrc cx~ggcrnted, Narning evcqbody biit Iiimclf for liia 
fitilure on the Tagus, he lid fallen bmlr to Chrnpanarios, 
rallied Iiis scnttercd iletncliments, and returned to Villa Nirevu 
de Sereria; wliere lie was joined ou the 2Ttb by AAuquerque, 
~vlvlio brought up* nnot the great body supposed, but less t1;lian 
three thousand infantry and a few Lundrod horse. Some 
battdions d r a m  from Antldusia had also arrived, but the 
wvhole ai-mq' did not wceed twenQ-five thousnnd fo. four 
tliousand liorse, nnd eighteen or twenty pieces of artillery: 
ivit11 thia force, Cuccttl, fenring for Badajos, had retumcd to 
figtit. 
BATTLE OF MEDELLCT, 
This to~vn, pesescing a fine stone bridge, stnnds in a liollow 
on tlie left of the Omdina, tlie berl d wkich i s  fomcd by 
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tlic nbrript brcdc o f  nn imtiienso plnin on tlint sirlc. Tlie 
Ortigosn, a torrent Gtli rngged b11a1;s yet liassablc izi plncrs 
for xtillery, cuts this plaiti, rusliing perpeiidicularly doivn to 
thc Guxtliana. Two roads led from tlie toivn mrosq the 
plnin, one to  Don l3cnito on tlic lcft, one to Miiigrhil on tFie 
riglit, tliose pIaees lieing five miles npart. iIt teu o'clock 
tlie Freneh army ~vnv~s wncentrntcíl in 3IedeUin Iiaving com- 
mmd of liotli roarls, nncl at one o'cloclr fourteen GEiousnnd 
hfiint ry, two tliouiirind fil-c Iiundi.crl ~rnvnlq-~ aiid forty-two 
guns, went fortli to figlit. On the ~ide  of Benito tlie plnin 
m s  bounded by a ridgc, betiind wlvicli Cuesta conccaI~l llia 
Infantry, ranrl: only slionctl Iiis cavialry snd somc ptns in 
nrlvnnce. To make hiin display liie liiie of I-inttle, Laaalle's 
cavnlry, two Bernian brittalions, nnd six pns, moved tnwnrds 
Benito, wliik Lato~~r  BIaubourg mitlr fottr aqiiatlrons of 
drngoons, eiglit guns nnd two linttnlioiis, l iavin~ tlie Ortigosa 
close on tlieir BgLt, mnde for a poiiit of the X~ixnish ri~lge 
mlled t l ~ e  Rctamose Villatkk dikiqion aud tlic remnining 
Gcrmans, mcrc poated hnlf en tlie Benito, IinlF o11 3Iiiipnbril 
roarls; Euffin's division mas s little way iu re=, and one 
battalion reniained ah th Medcllin brirlge t o  gmrd tlie 
un,rrgngc. 
Ae tlie Frencl~ aqundrons dvanced tIie d i l l c r y  on both 
sides opened, tlie Spanisls eavalry In tlis plnin retiring slowly 
So the Iiiglier ground. Lnsnllc and Latour 2Iiiiihoi1rg then 
pre~serI forwnd; Iiut just as tFie Iatter, wlio iiad the sliortest 
distance to trzverse, approaclied tLe enemy's posiition, tlie 
n-hoIe Spanisli line of bnttlc eftme suddenly over tlie edge of 
tlie ridge, stretcliing from the Ortigose, to witliin n mile of tlie 
Gudiana, -a  menncing but glorious npparition. Cuesta, 
I-Iencstrosn, nnd the dnke de1 Parqtc, were with tlie mnss of 
cnvnlry on the Ieft; Francisco Frins with the main hdy of 
infnntry was in the centre; E ~ a i a  nnd Portnzgo were on tba 
riglit, ~vliicli wa3 prolonged to the Gunilinna by some scnttered 
squsdrons under hlbuquerque, m110 flanked tlie marcli of tIie 
Iiost as it dmndeil  &th a rnpid pnee inta tlie pIain. Cucsta's 
plan mns nom disclosed. H i n  Iine ovcrliipperl tlie French left, 
mtl lit! wn9 limtcuing to cut tltcir nrmy ofT frorn 3Iedcllin; liut 
his order of battle ww on a h n 2  of three miles, and he had 
no rncrvc. Tictor iostantly broug1it bis e n t r e  a little forward, 
reinforwl htour &Inubourg with ten guns and a battnlion of 
grendiers;, tbnd p~zsliiiig forwaid n brigaclc of infantry M a 
~i~pport, orrlered Iiirn to fa11 boldly on tlie mlvancing e m y ;  
at tlie same time Lasalle, wha was giving way under tlie 
pressure of Cuesta's right wing, ivas directed to retire towards 
Ifdellin, ahvays refusilig his own lefh. 
Erisbly the Spnniards marcherl into the plain, md s ~peeinI 
body oof cavalry witli tliree thoumnd infanty dashing out 
from their left met Latour Jfaubourg in front, while a regi- 
ment of liussnrs fe11 upon tlle Erencli coliimns of gremdierri 
nnd p n s  in liis rem. Tlic liussars, reccived witl~ grape, a 
pelting fise of mu~ketry, anri a c11:1in1-ge in flnuk by some 
dragoons, were beaten at once; but tlie Spanish infnntry, 
closely followed by tIre rest of their o ~ v n  cavalry, cama boIdly 
up t o  Latour Mmbourg's horsemen md with x sliarp musketry 
forced tliem h e k  in disodrr; soon liowe~er the French rnllied, 
nnd smnrshing the Spmisli ra&s with artitlery, and f ightiq 
al1 togetlier, ovcrthrcw tlicir enpmics innn nnd borne: Cuesta 
iva~i woundcxl anrl MI, but lieing quiclcly rcmountert esmpetf. 
W i l e  tliis wns pnsgiiiiig on tFie Frencli riglit, LnsriIle'~ m~alry, 
continiinlly refusing its left, mas drlven figl~ting clom up to 
tlie main body of the infantry, wliicl~ was clisposed on a new 
front, ivith n reserve Iieliind the centre; but when Latont 
Maubourg's division was refomed on the ridge from whence 
tlie Spminds Iind first descended, the mpect of the battle 
cliangcd; for tIien the Spaiiish left m~1 iu Aiglit, nnd tlio 
Frencli righi ove~l.lnpped C~uests's centre, wvliich, in a Iong line, 
ivnvering nnd ~ 4 t h  wida cliasms, mas still advrincing. TTictor, 
seeing the decisive nioment had amived, ivas aoing t o  order a 
gened athaclr, when be saw an isolated oolumn coming 
against the rear of liis Tiglit ming from the side of Miagrabil; 
wherefore he first detwlied a b r i ~ ~ d e  nnd fuw g m s  t o  hold it 
iu clieck, m d  then continaing bis battle, made Iws~~lIe's cavd y 
take ground to its ldh, thua unmaskiig the infantry of bis 
centre wbieh instanintly poured a beavy fire inte tl ie Spniwds' 
line, wXile Lntoiir Mi~ubuui'g's dmgoons swccping ronnd its 
left fe11 on tlieir renr. Ltisalle also plIoperl in, nnd a horrible 
cnrnage ensud, foor the French horsemen mntinued to follow 
and strike mtil three-fiftha of the Spanisli army wallewed in 
blood. 
Sis giins aiid somc thousmrla of prisoners wcre tnlrcn, rana 
it iv,w many dxys era Cuesta could rally o single battalion: 
hia cnvalry liowever esmped by superior speed. Folloming 
gcnernl SeinelSs jonrnal, of  wliicli liowerer 1 only possess nn 
uiinuthciiticatctl copy, tiie Frcneh lost but klirec liunrlrcd m, 
a nurnlier so disproportionnte as to be scnreely credible. If 
carrect, it indicntcs a snvagc rigour of pursuit, for it doee not 
nppcar tliat sny prcvlous cruc¡t*y by i l~c  [Spaniitrds i r r i t a td  
tlic Pmricli soltliers. Pie right ta l d l  in n Linttle cannot be 
iiniited, but a brnve soldier shoulrl have reznrd for the character 
of liis countl and he spnring of  tlie sword to  benten mcn. 
3lost of tlic Prciicli ~ittqsetl tlic n i ~ l ~ t  nenr tlic ficld ofbattle, 
but Lrttour ~ifauliour& clragoona mkl i ed  d o m  the left bank 
of tlie Gundiana to Xferida, 1e~vIlig rletaclimenb to iwtc l i  the 
rontls of Almcndrnlcjo and Villa Iqrancn, nnri givc notiot! iF 
Cuesta mnde for Badajos, tlie design being te intercept him 
on tlut line. Tlic 29th, Villattc advaiiced to Villa Nueva 
repores agrced, tliat Cuesta with a few liorsemen wns in tFie 
Norenq and l i s  troops mtandering tlirougli fields and bye- 
mads wvitl~out powr to  re-unite. The pursuit then ceasctt 
VIctur h e i l  11is Iicn~lqnrtrtcr~ tit RtcrirEn, oceupierl that place 
and 3Idellin witli his infnntrg; annd formed a beIt of cavdry 
from Lobon on tlie right to 31iwabil on tLe left; but from 
nl l  tllnh cnuntry tlie peoplc 1 1 ~ 1  flerl, ond even thc g~mt towns 
aere  deserted. 
Meridn, ~ituntcd in a richly-cultivnted hasin, possesscd a 
fino 11ridgo nnd ~nngnificent rcmains of antiquity, Ronian and 
ItIaorisli; aiiioiigst others, a w t l e  built oir tlie right bank 
of the r i v e ~  close t o  tlie bridge, wliich in eiglit dnys mas ren- 
dered apable ol reoi~tiiig ntiy- sutldeii nssmit; six gum were 
mou~ited QU tlie walls, an bo~pital for a tliousand men uras 
mt,nliliaficd tlicrc; nnd a grirriso~i of tliree Iitmhcd rnen, dtli 
t iro rnotitlis' stores nml ~irovisiuns for eigl:lit liundred, wos piit 
iiito it. 1-iere Yictor receivetl frcqli orders t o  i n d e  PortugnI, 
wliile Lnpisse sfiould move on Abrantes, but he again remon- 
stmtcd, anj-ing Iic coiild not kccli liis cornmunication -4th 
Almiirm, uuiilcss Lnpisso joined liim by AAlcunturo, BnJajos 
was howwer atill far from being in a defemiblc condition; and 
as mmy of tlie riclier citizens, dispsted with mob-rule, were 
inclincd to betnty ra gnte, Victor, wvhose bahkring tmin w,vns 
atill nt Truxillq opened a seeret mgotiatioa for t11is hdlery. 
Tlie pnrtics met nt Albuena nnd lvcre npeeil, hit tlie 
~>ert.qants gme tlie junh notiee tluit Rnme trewon wns on foot, 
and the preject was bzfflerl. 'Z'ictor then sent detacli~nents to 
Alcsntara to get intelljgence of hpisse, mhose proceetliw it 
is time to notice. 
Afier taking Znmora h Jmuary, tliat pgeneml occupieri 
Ledesma and &Iamxnc~, wliere Iie was joind by Jfaupetit'a 
brigde of can1 y. Wilson'a legion and the feeble garrisons 
of Ciudad fidrigu and Almeitln were thc onlg boclics in hia 
Front, and nniversd tcrror yrcvriiled. Ec had ten Uiowilnd 
men, and a powedul h iHery;  y& he rei~iziuwl hcrt until 
tlie md of Marcli, and suffrrd Wilson witli a fem hundred 
Portuguese, t o  vex his O I I @ O S ~ ,  intempt his provisionq 
restrain his pztrolea, and even hswss his infantry quarters: 
this brtiugllit hEm into contempt, and enableti Wilson to iufuse 
a spirjt into the pcopIc wliich tligr werc far from fee!ing 
wlrcn thc enerny fiwt appcad.  &loa cl'&pzTm Non joined 
 ir Robert with a small Xpaniah force, and the pass of Baños 
waa occupied, whicli cut the commnnication mith Vietor, 
yet lapisse did not stir In April ho~vever he admnced 
t o d s  Eejar, bt~t finding the Baños m p i e d ,  t n r n d  t o  liis 
right, dispersed the posta on the upper Ecla mil clrove tbe 
legion, then under colonel Gmnt, to Citidd Fbdrigo, sum- 
monerl tlint place the 6th, ruid nfter a sliglit sJcirmish near 
tlie wnlls took position hetween the Aguell~ nnd Lctlrmsiun. 
There he received ths king's reitemhd oder to mar& on 
Abrantm, but, iristead of obe+g, marclied auddenly tlmugh 
the paw of Perales to Aicanhra, tbua abmcloning al1 connec- 
tion mth Soult. He mas frillowed closely by Wilson, by 
d'Espa@ the tmo batt a~ions at EejarJ ancl by a multitude of 
peasanta. Sprinish ancl Portugneae; for he M ctaused a gencm1 
inmrrection from Ciudad fhdrigo t o  Alcantíara, nnd from 
Tamarnm to Eejor. At Alcnntanb the i n s u ~ e n t s  olipmed iiig 
pacisq, ytt he broks tlirough the entrencliments oli. tlie 
bxidge, Garried the fown oa the other side, pil2aged it and 
rej~ined Victor at hferida on tLe 19th of ApriL 
This false rnovement tras mosh pernicious to tlie Frencli 
eouse ; the conrluering impulsion of Napoleon's marf~re mns 
by thrnt rnnrcli nnd by Bictor's s~~llcil  disolietlicnce dissipnteil; 
ttie in~nsion Iiecnme stationary or retrogmtled, ancl tlie allics 
again assumed tlie initiative, bult ,  not lrnoMng even tlie 
loca~ities of the troops by ~vhicli he ma to be supported, was 
paralyzed at Oporto, wliile reinforcements from EngI:~ancl 
cnatiled Crndock to t~dvence ton-nrda Lcirira; and u siid{lcn 
violent imlietus \vas given to the Spauisli rind Partupese 
insurrections, which sprung into full nctivity on both sidcs, 
from Almnkra on thc T a g s  to  Amnrnnte on the T a m e p  
Cuesta nlso gntliered ra new nrmy in tlie Iiforcnn, Fnr thotigh 
the siniuItaneous defents at Ciudnd Xed suid at Medellin hnrI 
at first causeil grent dismg iil AntIalusio thc 8pnniards, 
f ind iq  tllcy were folIo\~erI by stagnant irinctivity, jndgcd tlint 
tbe Austrirrn war ivm forcing or mould force Kapuleon to 
aliandoa Spnin: and tliis notion uplield botli tlie peopleb 
spirit and t Yie central junta's ~tithority, wliicli could not otlier- 
mise Iime mst&ned suct follim and defents. SIic dlsxsters 
of Clirtmjnl l i d  been lcss tfilui I211estn's nntl more exciisnlile, 
lie rvm far the better solrlicr; but he liad iio ~iupular influence 
nnd m nt once dismissed, md Cuesta was, from ferrr, placerl in 
commancl of both nrmieti. 
To cover Scvillc, Eie t ao l~  post in tlio drfilw af hfonnrqteterio, 
os3 was there joined by ei$t hundred Iiorse, and trvo thou- 
nnnd bhree liundred infantry dxnfted from tlie gnmi~ion of 
Seville; these mere followed by tliirtcen hiindred old troops 
froiii Ciidio, a~ id  Iiy tliree tliousmnd í ive liuiidred of GrniindaU 
let-ieñ; f i n d y ,  eight thwsand foot and t a o  thousand fivc 
huiltIret1 ?iowcmcn, talren from t l ie  mrny of La 31ai1cIia, con- 
triliutrrl to ~wcl l  liis niimlicr~, rtntil jn tlic lnttcr cnd of ApriI 
tliey anioiiuted to t~veuty-five tliorrsmd infiuitry md six tliou- 
snnd cn~*nl y. Trencgns also, Geing recalled frum VaIenciw, 
rrpnircri to La Citrolina rand proccecled to orgnnkc anotlier 
ar~iiy of LR Mnnclia. Josepli, justly disyil~!~~ssrl nt tlic Eiil~o 
moveiilent of Lnpissc, ordered tlint Almatara sliould be 
re-occupied; but this involvecl nn aetion, to be noticed hereafter, 
for tlie opcrntions on tlie Dourointimately conuectd vith those 
on the Guediann, must be first related. 
C m E R  VIL 
Wnm the bisliop of  Oporte behdd fram the Sorra convmt 
the final overthron of his ambitious schemes En the nortli, ha 
íied to Lisbon, reoonciled himself with tlie regencv, becamea, 
member of that body, was soon after created patrhmh, rind 
used his great influence in the most mischievous manner; dis- 
covering on e v q  ocaaion the untamed violence and inherent 
falscncss of hia diaposition. Meanihile thc faii of Oporto 
ennbletl Soiilt to  mtablish B solid bme. He had tnken 
imrnense rnnpine9 of pawder, a bnndrerl nnd nincty-seven 
pieoes of artillery, every gun of wlich Iid been used in the 
actiou, anrI tliirty Eilglifili vessels luaded witli provi~ions nnd 
wind-lionntl in tlie river. Repressing disordem after tlie 
battle, he renewed big former conciliatory pelicy, and sought 
t o  rcmedy as far as poasibIe the deplorable resulta of tlie 
soldiers' fury. Recovering suid regtonng a m of the plun- 
der, he treltted tIie remaining inliabitanter wihh respect, invited 
tliose who Iind fled to rctiin, demanded no contribution, ond 
fram tlie public property supported hiu troops, and even su* 
coured tlie most clistressed of tlie pop~ilation. 
Bis civil and political administration of tlie Entre Minho e 
Dauro produced Ziowever wn unexpecterl effd. The prlnce 
mgent's dcscrtion n . ~  nnot forgotten, and the natioml fee1iing 
was as nclverse to Portugnl beiilg Q. depenrlency on the BwziIs, 
ns it IW t o  tlie usurpation oE the Frencli; a coniprison 
between Xoult's government and the horrible anareliy which 
preceded it, wng in fnvour of the former; ivliilc his vidorica 
and tlie vigour o€ liia diiimcter, conlroded wit.11 the nppa- 
reut mpineness of tlio Ei~gTisli, promised perrnanency for 
the Traech power. Tliese consideration~ caused the party, 
formerly notiwd as inimiml t o  the honse of Dragnnza, t o  
revive, and the leadera expressed a desire for a Fmch prince 
andan inclepeiident government; they even intimated their wish 
to Iiave Soult, nnd rlemanded Iiia eoncunence to proclaim in 
tlie nnme of tlie people that tth~ Brngmza dynasty was ended. 
Sortlt ~voiild not rejcct a plan offcring siicli import.nnt militriry 
wlvaiitnges, antl, tnisttng circumstances wmld justify him 
with Sapoleon, encouraged tlie design without actually rissent- 
ing. He sppointed men to civil employments, rtlised a legim 
of five b~ttttnlions, nnd acterl so dexterously, that In fifteen 
clnys tlic citicri of Oporto nnd Rrn.6, thc tomns of Rncclloa, 
Vimn, Villa da Conde, Povoa de Barcim, Feira and Ovar sent 
atldre~sw cxpmsing: their fnvoumble sentiments and bearinp 
t h i i  tbousand sipnntiires of nobles, clergy, mer- 
clinnts and pcoplc. Tliese i~drlrwsm were burncd hppeudlar 11. 
wlien Iie loñt Qporko, but tlie praj~& liiriñ never beeu denied, 
anrl thc regency even cawed an a f i e ~  inquiry to be rnade, 
when it was asserted thnt fem mere implicater1 ; bnt tlie poIig 
af lcmcning tlie importnncc sw ohvious and tlic inqnisitora 
if williiig coiild not llave probed tlie wtioIe matter. 
mis t.rnnsaction was the foundation of a, story, credited ema 
by liis o1t.n officers, tht Xo~ilt pefidiously aimed at an inde- 
pcnrlcnt crom.  'I'lic circumsbiicee were swpicions, tlic con- 
dusion wns Mse. Napoleon wrote to Eoult tliat tlie nimour liad 
reachetl lrim, adding, with a delicate aIlusion to tlic rnarshnl's 
previous s~rvices, '1 remmnber v & l ~ i y  but Awterl,' at the 
snmc timc he InrgcIy incrcased Iiis commnnd. The policy of 
Suultk proeseding, and the p e a t  influenco of 01% mal-contenta 
was soon prover1 by tIie ameliorated intercourse betmeen the 
army and tlie people; the frerceness of the Iatter subsidd, rand 
In tbe Entre AIinlio e Uouro cvcn thc prieqk abntcd their 
liostility; the soliiicix wero no longer assnssinated, wberens 
previoualy* tht  cruel warfare was very active and the most 
malipant passions existed on Xiokh sida. Amo* other 
tcrrililc instante? thc dcntli of the yoiing Larnctli and the re- 
talisticin, ~nay 11ie cited. Tlint oficer retuming to Iiis quarters 
from Soult's hoiise mns murdercd near tlie village of Arrifanq 
atripped, and niutilntorl in a sliocking manner ; this naltssinu- 
tion within tlre k'rench l i n q  wmhen tlie strictest discipline WDS 
prescrvcrl, violnterI nlikc thc l w s  of wnr rtnd liumnniky, nnd 
provolred a aevere pttnislimeut ; for tbe violence of tlie troops 
Iind Iiccn ivith clifficult.y mtrnincinccl, anrl if thc p c r n l  hnd 
appeared iildifferetit eii this occnsion, Iiis autliority woulil Iiwe 
bacn set at nought, and tlie vengeance of an insubodimte 
ai+niy cxecuted, 
Impressed mith tliis feeling, wnd afflickl at the unhappy 
death of a personal friend, Soult direeted Thomieres to march 
witli a brigade of infmtry to drrifana and punish tlie criminals. 
He wns accornyailied by a Portugucse civilian, mil after a 
judicial inquiry shot fivc or six pcrsons whosc guilt 7varc snid 
to  Iiave Iiccn proved. Howcvcr tlio principal actor, n Portu- 
p e s c  mujor of militia, and inoat of liis nccompli~cs cscalied 
across tlie Toug~ t o  Trant, wlio, clisgustcd nt tlieir conduct, 
Cmmnni- sient tliem to Beresfurd fur ~iunisliineiit, but tliey 
catcd by were well received by him! It would also appear 
Col. Trrnt. fmm tlie sworn tmtimony of a peasant, t h t  
Tlionilerca, exceeding Xoult's orders put h~enty-four innmnt 
persons to dmth, anrZ his eoldiers, dter committing many 
exwssm, biirncd the mllnge. These thinga shomcd the direful 
nntum of tIic cotitcat, Ziut thc pnrt icuh transnction Iias been 
adduced by Englisli writers as evincing mel ty  in Soult, a 
cliwge not sustained by tlle fucts, md tielied by Id$ geueraI 
couduct, wliicli even his Spanish enemies whilst triey sttributed 
it to insidious policy admitted to be mild and 
A m a i x p  bumane. Bnt quitting this anticipnting digression, 
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the militay opeiations shall be resumed. 
h u l t  followd up his b&le at Oporto witti activitp, the 
bo~t-bridge wwau restored: during t l ~ e  night, tlie forts cif Miiziliho 
and St. Jon, clr! Foz were rediiced, nnd Francecchi pnssing the 
Domo advailcerl ten niiles on tlie Coimlira roacl, witIi liiitroles 
on tlie Vouga Nermet \vas posted in support beyuiid tlie 
sukurl, of Villa Nova Oporto \vas hdd by ttliree hrigdee; 
Lorp's &agwns occupied the wdled town of Jrilla de Conde 
at tlie moutli of the Ave. Caulnincourt's brisade o£ cavalry 
ascendig ttieDoura topefinfiel scoured tlievallq of thc Tnmega. 
h o t h e r  briple, ps ted  m the Barca de Trofa road, protectd 
the mar of tlie army, m¿i Reudelet mas ordered to forward the 
I~ospitds from U r a p  t o  Oporto, and tic rmrly to opeii a com- 
rnuniwtion with Tiiy. 
jhult'a embarrassments mere still peat. Tise T m  os 
IIontes w insurgent, anct Xlilveira with eight thousrand mert, 
commanrlerl the vallg of tIie Tamep, t,nd aftw taking Chwes, 
postcd liimsclf in tlie Entrc Jlinho e Daiini, betmccn tlie 
Fiierrn Cstnlinn and tlie Rouro. Lisbon, tlie ultimate oliect, 
mas two Iiitndred miles di~tnnt, and covererl by a British wmy, 
irliose vzloiir vas known, and its numbeiri increasing. Trant 
had a coiisidemlile nntive force upon tlie Vouga? Jiereaford's 
nrmy was between the Ta,w and the Mondego, nnd its di* 
orclcrly contlition being nnltnown nppcarcd formidable at a 
dishnce. Folloming Nayioleon's in~tructiom, tlie French amy 
should Iiave been in Lisbon six weeks before Oporto was talren, 
antl tbe line of corrcspondcnce with Victor being uncertain, 
his co-operntion coiild not be cnlcvlated iipon. Eapisse hnd 
bccn iinfclt as an niding porver, SonIt Irnew not evcn that he 
mns nt Ealamnnca; and tlic three tl~ouennd aren wliich Pierre 
Sodt was Iiringing fmm tlie Astorga country hnd notyet been 
bcnrd of. To balance these diffieulties, a rich city ruid the 
comniand over t i  fertile country, from mhenco thc principal 
siipl>lica of tlic Britisli troops rind of Usbon mae ilmwn, hd 
been gained; a goorl military Fiase antI a prominent politiml 
station were obtained; and if tlio people's fierceness w~ not 
quelled tliey hatl leaniecl their own inferiority in battle. 
Ln tlGs statc tlic most imporht matters were to snccour 
Tiiy, nntl to obtnin ncnra of JJnpisse. H c I I ~ ~ ~  wm to  o f f d  
tlie first, Fmncesclii the second. lCbe latter had spread his 
posts ralong the iigbt bank of the Touga, but the people fled 
beyond t l int river, mhere the rich valleys were protected by 
Tmnt. IVI~licn thc defcnt nt B r a p  mas Irnom, thnt oflieer, bcing 
well known to  tlie nntive~, liad tnlren tlio cornrnnnd of nll tlia 
m e ( I  pnliulation, mcl l i i  forcc nns soonincreased; beeriuse the 
c~tastrophc of Oporto sent thousands of fngitives down, who 
sprcnd dismay and disorder, md being accustomed to violence 
aiid nttrilmting cvrrp misfodnnc to trcachcry, Rockcd to 
lritii ns to n mnn tiicy :~roiild trust. Tlius ennbleri snfely to 
~issurne nn autliority whicli no native of rank muld llave 
aecclited or rcfused ivit11oiiG clnng~r~ 11e advanced to Sardao md 
A~e iro  ~vith eight hndred  men, aud was there joined by Eben 
aiid ITittoria, nnd by Barbacena, who bronght him some cavalry; 
the people ho~evcr  loolccd on tlicse oEcm wjth auspician, nsd 
"haut retninctl Es commnnd, his forco nngmcnting dnily by 
the arrival of orc lmya,  arta evcn oC desedera from Beresford's 
amy. 
mhen Franceschi ad~anced, h n t  sent a detachment to 
occupy the bridge of the Vouga; but the men rlispersed in e 
panic, and thc dcsertion of msny thousand op.&naqa follomerl; 
e happy circurnstance, for the numbem collected behind the 
Vouga excecdd twelve thoiisnnd men, and tlieir extreme 
violence and insubordination excited terror and impded  
mcaqures of dcfcnce Trnnt finnlly rctained aboiit thrw 
thousand mcn, witli which hc imposcd upon tlie FrencI1, und 
preserved a fruitful country from tlicir irrcursions: be iw 
hovcver disiressed for rnoney, because the bisbop had in hia 
flight hid hnnds on al1 that a n s  at Coimbra and canied it to 
Lisbon. Pranceschi, altliough reinforcerl with a brigade of 
i n f a n t ~ ,  contented himself nith chasing some insurgenta in- 
festing liis left flnnk, mhiEe hie scout~ on the side of Visen 
endea~ourcd to obtnin new of Lnpiwe: but hc wag still beyand 
thc Agucdn, 
mhile Frnncesc1:lii TvaR tlius employed, Cnultiíncourt'~ mvdry 
was menmed on the Tamegx by Sil~eira, and Lioison marelred 
t o  his aid on 0he 9th of April. Sjilx-eka p~oved too stroag for 
both, and on the 12th forced Loison ovw tlie Soim river. 
Heudelet was meanwhiIe h-ing towards Tup to racover the 
artillcry parc and depbt, from wliich thc army h d  been scpa 
ratctl forty daps; he was joind at Bmccllos on the 6th by 
Lorge, wlio h d  tnlccn Tilln de Condo and clcnrcd the con& 
link TIiey mnrebed to Ponte de Lima and forcecl a pn~sxge 
tliough :hgorously opposed, and tlia 10tli nrriverl in frout 
of Talenqe on tlie hiinlio, Tlie l'ortupese hntl sufferetl 
from tlie fire of Tuy, and the prrison, two hundred men, be% 
mithaut provision capitul~tted, bi~t ere thc Frencli wuld take 
possession dcserted tlie place; thm the garrison of Tuy mliich 
liad Iieard nothing of the a m y  aftei it quitted Ril-iidavia, sam 
with plensing surprise the French coloiirs suildedy floating 
owr tlirtt fortrcss. 
LB Madinicre had heen reinforced by ~tragglcrs and B 
biittulion of dctncliments whidi followed tlic nimy from &. 
Jago, and he Iitul tliree tliousanil faiir Iiuliclred zilen; yet 
twelve huedred were siek and two-thirds of bis borrres hd 
been eaten. Tbe Portupese h d  passed the Minho and 
united nith tbe Spnniurds to attack him, but frcqiicnt anllics 
lccpt them off; und when tlie defeat at Brqn becnme knomy 
the Portupese repassed the Ninlio, the Eprtniads dispersd, 
and La Hartiniere sent tliree liundred men to  take away the 
@son of Vigo; that place had homcver fallen and the 
det~chrnent regnined !Cuy with dificnlty. Thc Spmniarrls on 
tlie Aroca Estiiriry, livliile ZSoult wns tiGill at Orense, I d  taken 
arms under general Wilva nnd tlie count de Mezeda, but they 
wercl fiudly placed nnder one Barrois, n coloncl, sent by tho 
mpremc junta. Tlieir number waa considcrnblc. Xarrois 
attmked Tuy, anti Silva, aided by the Lively and Venus EngIish 
fiigates, investod Vigo, wherc the prrison, at firut; smail, m 
EOOn inerensed, hecause Soult's pnjmaster-genm~T ins ted  a£ 
going to Suy entered Vigo with liis cliest and eiglit hndred 
men. Tlie commnnder negotiakd for a capitulation, yet disr 
tmstful of the pqantry protraeteit tlie surrcndcr; aed then 
Romnnds strmgp"lcre having collected bet~veen Ttiy niid Tigo, 
Pablo hlurillo a regular oificer 3ed fifteen liuntlrcrl to eid t h ~  
investing force. Acting in concert with captain Mackinley of 
the Livcly he obtained the place : thirteen liundred men and 
oGcers, inc ludi i  three hundred sick, marclied out 
with tlie honourri of war md were embarked for Ilnckinley% 
England. Four hundrcd h~rses  hnd sirty covered h'puQ1l' 
the  victors; and tlie Spaniards md Portuguese tlien renewed 
the nttack on Tny until it wm reFievcd by Heutlelet. 
filaucune's dirision of Ney'~ corps arivecl tlie lltli, hui 
finding tlie place free retumd, and t t e  Frencli íleli6ts and 
p n s  were directd on Oporto. Heudelet then rerIuced Viane, 
ond tlis fort o€ Insoa, plnced a smnll gnrri~o~i ia tlie former, 
ruined tlie works of Vnlenqa, retnrnecl to B q q  and sent 
Logc  ngxin to Villn, de Cande. Tlie sick merc transportccl in 
bonts along &ore from tlic Jlinlici to Vinna Villn dc Cantlo 
and Operto; rind La Rourisnye, Ei~ving one briguls of dmgoons 
and one of infantq-, scourcd tlie countiy bctw-cen tlic Lima 
aiid Cnvnclo in renr of KeurFclet. All rcsistnnce now censcd 
iu tlie Entre hlinlio e Bonro under tha iilfluence oE tlie Anti- 
Brnganwparty; bliiit in tlic Trng os Jiontcs, Rilveisn ndvtmccd, 
aiid Iieing joined by htillia from tlio Lima, boasted Iie would 
enter Oporto tlio 15tL of April. Ttiis boldnesal wna ~xplaineil 
t o  Soult by reoeiving nems of t l ~ e  fa11 of Chaves, of idiich 
until then he had not known; it tauglit l i m  also that to trm- 
quillize the Entre Minlio e Douro effectually lie must destroy 
Si1veii.n; wherefore hc sent Laborde Nith a brigade, to  join 
Loison and attnclc t l~e Portupese general by hinarnnte, and 
he dircctcd La Houssnye to cross the Cnvdo  nnd move by 
Guimarwiis on tlic snmc plncc. Tlie 15th Lnl~orrle renclied 
Peñnficl, nnd Silvcirn, hearing of Zu Eoussaye's rnnrc11, retired 
to Villamea, T h e  1Stli Ldrortle puut to flight Siheira, wlio 
pasad tlie Tnrnegn at Amtimte  and rvas rnaking for the 
mountains, mhen coIonel Patrick, a British ofñcer under him, 
encouraging his battalion, faced aliout, rallicd the fugitives and 
beatt back the enemy. This forced Silveira to stand likerrise, 
nnd whilo Pntrick stoppd on the right banlr nnd covered the 
bridgc vrith obstinntc valour, he took a nrggwl position on the 
left Lia~114 ovcrlianging the suliurli of Villa Rcnl. Next  day 
carne I;a Roumaye, the nttack was renemed, and Patrick fe11 
mortdly wounded; tlisn tlie defcnce slackened and hi men 
retired across the Tarnega> but Qie bridge was Al1 to  Iie won. 
At RIondin ami Cavcz above, and ~t Canavezas below Ama- 
m t c ,  tho bidgcs werc dcstmycd, wd the Tnrncga wna in fa11 
flood over a deep rocky M. The Amnmnte bridge was 
minrd, sncl 'bnrretl aitli three rows of ylrtli~dss, and a ten- 
gun liattery looked over the barnade : Eil~eira w ~ s  in posi- 
tion Behind, and hi advand  guard was in the mburb. 
Laborde puslid a flying sap towards tlse barricade, but the 
&e forced hila to rclinquish this work and seek tu constimct 
a tregtle bridge hdf a miIc below; tliat dso fxiled, and thw 
~ I F :  engineer Emdiaxd preposed a rnethod of forcing the s t o n ~  
Lridge, so daring that al1 tlie generals and efipeciul1y Fop 
oppuscd it : Soult Iiowcver scat Bulot t o  nscerkrtnin its merita 
on tlie vot,  snd thnt gcncd npproved. The Portilprse 
mine was oonstructed with tlie muzzle of a londed musket in 
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the cliamber, ib string being tied to the trigger and p s e d  over 
the trendies to secure the greatest precision for the explosioa. 
Bmchnrd mis riware of tliis, but he plmed tfie Frencli troops 
in tlie nigllt of t.lie 2nd of hfny m ncai tlie liridge as tlie 
necessity of kecpinz them liidden would peraiit, and at eiglit 
ci'clock, tlie mooa sliida,: briglitly, seut tiventy men down tlie 
Iianlr of tIie river to opcn n slauting fire against the trenc1ies 
beliinrl itlic bridge, Tlie nthntiou of the Portuse8e heiiig 
thus rlrmvn to tliat side, it snpper, dresserl in dwk grcy crnwlecl 
out, pushiq ~ n t h  bis head a barrd of powder mhicli ~ w i s  
enveloped in cloth t o  deaden the sound. Tima advancing, on 
tbet sitIc of tlic bridgo wliieli wr~q ñhrulcd t)y the parnpct, he 
plnccd liis TiarreI mgminst au cntrencfimei~t cxiveriiig tlio niina 
and retiretl; tmo otliers follo~reci in succession; bnt thc fourth, 
d tcr  plncing his barrcl, run hnck, TVRS dcacriccl nnímd ~voiri ldd.  
Tlie I'urtuguese rnuakekry \i.m tlien turne11 un tlie bridge, yet 
soon ceiised, aud tlie barrels wmo undiscovered. A fifhli 
sapper now attaclied a sausage seventy yards long, and  EL^ tmo 
okloclc tlie wholc was cornp?cted, tlie Portupese remaining 
unsuñl)icious, 
Droclinrd judged the explosion would destroy the entrench- 
ments nnd burn tlie cortl attacched to tlie musket in the mine: 
thc evcnt psovcrl Iiis sngacity, A tliiclr fog nrose nliout thrce 
a'clock, tlie ssusage ivns frred, the explusion mado a lwge 
brendi, Erocliarcl and Lis snppers instantly lenped forwmd witli 
bueketa t o  tlimw mnfer ii~to tlie mine, and then cutting sway 
al1 obstncles, nntl licing cIoseIy snppor-tcd by a coli~mn of 
grendicrw, gained tlie otlier sirle before tlie srnoke rose. TIie 
genatliers Scing follomed by other troops, tlie suburb and tlie 
camp nliot*e iverc soon won, ~ n d  tlic Poi-ttip~csc fi MI over tbe 
mouritirina. Tliiñ lioltl rand Iilge~iious acttciii mst tlie Frcncli 
only seven or ciglit men, rrliiln In the previous futile attempts 
aeveral engincm nnd artillery officers, aiid more tLnn onc 
liuntlred nnd cig1:lity men fcEl. It is howcvcr singiilnr that 
therc wns a ford near tbe bri Jge anl~noivn to eitlier side, 
Hwdclet norp carne i tp from Braga, Loisrin pursuctE tho 
fugitivec, Laborde occupied Silveiray's ccnmp, nnd scoiircd tlie 
Ieft Iinntc of tlie Tnmegii up to  3Sundiu. Slie Portupcsc rtt 
Cuna\-evw rleitroyed tlicir atiimunitioii nnd crossed the Douro. 
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and over that r i ~ e r  also went aU the inliabihts of Mezamfrio 
and Villa Real when Loison's troops were decried Sonlt 
hearing of thiq reinforced Loim, directing him to cIear the 
riglit bank' of the Douro as high rts Pezo de Rago4 to com- 
plete the mia of Xilveim's force, nnd, with a view to th0 
suhjection of h os Monte4 to pntrole towards Brngam, 
on which side Bessi&rea had been mked to cooperate: that 
marshal had however gone to  Fmnce, and the replp of his 
auccessor Kelleman, being intercepted, toId the allies He wa~i 
nnable or mwilling to gve aid hborde ww now rw1Ied 
to Oport~  He took tmo corprr of infantry, laving rt regi- 
ment and a brigde of dragwns to p d  tbe comrrianimtions; 
but Loison, opposed a+ Pezo de Ragoa, ond obseming a grwt 
movement on the opposite bank, fe11 back t o  Mezamfrio. The 
8th he returnerl to Amarante, hia mar& he iq  harassed by the 
peasnnts with 8 bolrln~ss indimting some powerFu1 aupport; 
m1 in truth it ípas m; a new man waa at hand, tlie whole 
counkry was in commotion, md the duke of Dalmtltia wm 
suddenly pushed liackwards by a strong and q e r  hanrt 
19 The pemding error of the @ a n i d a  was the seeking 
to fight, wliereas t o  ~mid general battles ahould have been 
with tliem a vital principie. Another error wtig the making 
the Iinea of opmtion in Ls Mancha arid in E h n i d m  of 
eqmE importante. Estrernadara was only an accessory; the 
first rank bclonged to La Mancha, bemusc it was moro open, 
and directly menaced Mdrid;  nnri because e defeat. there 
endangered Seville more tban one- in Estremdura wauld do: 
from La Mancha a Beaten army must hava fallen bnck on 
Andhlusia, from Estremaduri it might have retired on Badajos. 
13ut that place being defensible, and of Iess consequencc ta 
the Spaniaiula than Madrid vias to the French, tbe lead belonged 
ta La Maacba, mhence the Epankde conld always menace &e 
capital. The m y  of Estremadura might fherefore hwe h e n  
reduced to fjftsen thoi~cancl men, provided thc nrmy of LR 
&nclia hnd becn inercascd to forty or fifty thousaod; and it 
would appear, thnt with a little energy the junta couId h a ~ e  
~roGded a larger force : it is tnta it would havo been be~ten, 
but that wlas an arpmcnt against grcnt battlIes. 
29 The third great ermr waa the inertness of Valencia md 
Murcia, or rrrther tlieir bostility, for they were upon the ver* 
of civil mar with the mpreme junta, Those provinoes, rich, 
populous, unmolcstcd for ciglit months, harl wfferd nothing 
from Moncey's jncursion, luul remived hrge saccours fmm the 
English government, and 'ITnlencia had written her pretemions . 
to patriotism in the bIoody cclinrncters of asaassinntion: yet if 
tlie force nnder LInmaq which Aed from TurIeJa t o  Z n r n g o r ~  
be ~ e t  aaiile, Valencia and Murcia might have h e n  extinpished 
witliout any sensible effect upon the general a u ~ e .  They 
wcre, howcvcr, mcll si tutat erl to mpport Amgon, Cat,nlonia, 
Anrlnlusin, nnd La >fiincTia, and could haw pwalyxed a laqe 
French fome by seiiding nn amy to San Clemente. It was 
dread of thcir doing so marlc the king iestrain Sebetstinni after 
tlie rout of Ciudiid Rcrtl, iinrl asarecuy tlie VaIcncians should 
have moved; for it is ia the variety oE tlteir lines of opere 
tion a mhole people find their advantap: tlis the okrvation 
a f  tlint profoantl r n i l i t q  write, Lloyd, mns confirmcd in 
Xpain; and Xapoleon, almya protmting his o m  communics- 
tions strongly, sought t o  break up the Epanisli l i e s  by move- 
nble columna. 
PRENCN OPERATIONS. 
1'. KapoIeon wris as amious to mize Scville and Cadia as 
to get Lisbon, but Lloyd's martini regu2ated his proceedingrc. 
If Victor had moved at once upon Andalusia, the Portugaem 
and Valenciana cauld have actetl on botli Iiia flanks; if lEadajo~l 
aiid Lislion hnd lieet~ hia olijecta tiie Anhlusiana could lii~ve 
vexed bis communic~tiona nith llaxlrid, These diculties 
mre avoided by the direction gíven t o  Sonlt and Lapisse, 
whoso marches mcrcly pmlongcd tha grcat lme oE commu- 
nimtion with France; Ney protected the rear o€ BouIt, 
Bessierm protected tbe rear of Lapíase; he also isolated 
t l~e Asturiaq md thus restricted the Slianish mrfilre to the 
mhli riide of  thc Tagis. Tlic conm of conqucst then t o  
linve ~iroceeded from Portripl to Bndnlusia, ~vliich would Iiave 
becn aasailed in front and flank, vliie Seliaatiani and the king 
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held the Valencifintnrr in checlr. Ln this manner a central posi- 
tion would have bocn constnntlg retaineíl, nnd tlie grent com- 
municntion covererl 
24 That a plan sn conmived sliould h v e  failed without 
any corps employed ~uflenng a serbua deferat, is surprishing but 
not inexplicable. Napoleon's ordere were isued when he liad 
no rwon  to expect a bdtle Pbt Coruña, when he diid not anti- 
cipate the sepere sufferings of SouIt's army from Iiad senther 
md long marches, nor that the Portuguese would resist upon 
the Xnho and the DOUKI, mese were miscalculations, and 
tlie last depended on the two fir& for he designed that Soult'a 
mpidity should %rcstaI defence : the d c l g  cnnnot howevcr bc 
cliargetl on tho mrshal, his cncrgy wris conspicuons. Nnpo- 
leon tlid not mako suficient allownnce for tlie difficulties of 
tlie r u g g d  country before Soult, where al1 tlie rivers and 
~trerams were flooded; and the delay thus caused Gtiaterl 
hpisee's insenictiom. IIe might indeed bave still mrclietl 
by Guarda upon Abrantes, while Soult moved by Coimbm on 
G b o n  and Victor invatled tbe AJemtejo; but the combimtion 
waa wide;, the mmmunicatíon uncertain, and nnity of action 
not easily obtaind. Lapisse, howcvcr, shoald certaínly havc 
abandonad bis eonnexion with the first corps to march on 
Piseu, whcm uniting with h u l t  aftcr tlic fdl of Oporto, they 
could have forced a way to Li~lion without r e , d  to Victor's 
co-operation. 
3". Napoleon seem to  have overIooked the chanw of delay 
and oombined the movements on too great a sale, giving 
Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantes instad of Lamego and Tieu 
far the clirection of Lapisse's march j but the facts mq have 
been misstated by the acting generala; it h dangerona to 
c e w m  his ditary dkpoaition~i however fanlty they may 
appear, snd his crrors, if emom they were, cannot wholly 
riccount for fnilurc. Ho put skty tliousand mcn in movcment 
~gainst Lisbon, nnd on sound general principlcs; wc must 
therefore seek in Iiis Iieute~nt's conduct why n project of such 
a mmter, executed by iyixty tliousmd French veterans, entled 
as idly md ineffectually as if it liad beén concoctsd by the 
Spmis11 junta. 
LAPISSE. 
lo. An interceptd letter addi-essed to Naupetit from b la -  
mana,  chom IEOW fcebly Lapisat! endrnvoud to  communic~te 
witli Soiilt; in that Iettcr he aMrl tliat ' m n  ao nzang nsthrce 
h~iiilidretl meii sl~ould patrole towmtl3 tho Tnis oa hlontes to 
get news of tlie seoond corps ! and tliis ivhen he should have 
moved bis division in mas3 ratlic~ t l i ~ n  failed in tbat object. 
At ths same time ho auffcred WiIson to gatlier Iieml and iiisult 
liis posts, mhen Iie could bave dicliemd eevryhhing in his fronr; 
rtnd menmed Ciudd Rodriga and Almeidn. One, if not both 
tliose fortrcsses mould prorolialily hnve fnllen; mrl from tlicncc 
strong defachments, pudied towads Lamego, meuld have Iienrd 
of Sod t  md a i d d  Es propss  by thrwtening OyioPto nnd 
Rmgn. Siilnmnnm, wlierc hc remninerl inactive, required no 
strang forcex tl ie opm country t h e  at tlie merey of 
Eessi6res' cavnlry; and m sensible of it mere the local junta, 
tlint hlnmnnca and Ledcsmri, refiwer? rtssistmce from Itorlrigo 
wlvlien oflcred, prefeming quiet siilirniasion. 
2 9  'CVlien $he king forced Lapisse fa move, Iie made a 
demonstrrrtion agaiast Ciiided Rodrigo, so fecbIe it scarcely 
called the garrison to tlie rampark~; and then as if mccess in 
Portugal IW bopeless, he broke tbrough thc pas3 of Perales, 
t o  rejoin the first corps, in opposition to Nnpoleon'a orders 
nnd to militnry sngcity; tiie fiixt directed liimupon Abrnnteu, 
tlie second mould have camicd liim iipon Visen. A mar& t o  
the latter place, mliile it insured ib junction with SouIt, n~otild 
not Iin\+e preventer1 an nftei mo>-ernent upan Abrantes ; tlie 
obahcle~i wem not so great as tlxosa on tha mareli t o  Alcaatrva 
and tlie great error of abandoning tZie wEiole countv  between 
t11e Taps  nnd tlie Douro, to thc inmirgcntq, would hnve lieen 
avoidetl. Eere rr-ns one cause of failnre, y& the error, although 
grent, W R S  not irreparalde. Soult mas ahancllonerl to liis own 
rrsoiirccs, but lic lirarl otitainctl i-tn impartant position in the 
nortli; nnd Victor, reiiiforced by teu tliousnnd men, waa 
enabled t o  operate ag-ninst Lisbon by the Alemtejo more 
efficaciously than before : bnt he was even l e a  disposed than 
Lapisse t o  execute his inatmctioas. 
lo. Ea inactivity after the mnt of mes has been not id .  
If the fomh and first c o r p  had been well liandled, neither 
Cuesta, nor Cartoajal wouEd have ventured out of the 31orenrg 
much less have estabhhed a line d defenee along the T a p ~ .  
Fifty tliouasnd French troopa shonld in two montlis have done 
something more than maintain fifty miles of eountry on one 
side of Madrid. 
2". !I'hc pnssage of the Tngus WM a mceessful, but can 
linrrlly be caUcti a skilhl ooperation, unleas Victor dculrnted 
on the ignorante of his advemary. Before an active army 
fiaving a ponhon tmin it would he most dangerou~ to  sepa 
rate in tliree divisioari on an axtent of fifty miles, l e a h g  the 
artillery and parc of ammnition, protectd anly by some 
cavriiry and one battdion of infantry, within two houmV rnarch 
of tlie enemy for t h  &ys. If Cuesta h d  concentrated Es 
whole force, the Meza d'Ibor might b a ~ e  been he14 and ten 
thouaand infantqr with al1 the cnvaIry dehcbcd wmaa the 
Tegua nt ATmnmz to take the Freiich artillery. 
33 When Tidar p w e d  the Tagus he let h c s t a  escape, and 
even lost the trace of bi8 amy; a fault not exmed by plead- 
ing the swelling of riaers, protAction of communicutions. If 
&esta% power wits desplsed before the frght, there needed no 
mch cirmimspection after his defeat : it waa not prudente, it 
mas inactivity. 
4'. The scattered ~ h t e  of the French the evening bcfore the 
bnttle of Medellin indicated want; of rigilunce. Victor was in 
a manner mrpriaed; he had dloweed Chest~stn ta rctalcc the 
initid movement after n dcfefeat, and his firat menmre t o  meet 
the dnnger wm fawlty; bnt this msy be b e t k  shom wben 
the Xpanish operations are discussed. 
54 The battles of XedeIlin and Ciudad Real destroyed tbe 
BpanisL m i e g  a ~ a  lwid XevjlIe md Dadajos open, Blolood 
f l m d  l&e m*, yet ñithout pmfit to t l ~ e  conqueron, the 
French generals seemed to have touehed a torpedo. Sebt iani  
indeed would have entered the Morena; but the king, fearful 
of tlie Valenciana, restmined Km, and urged lTictor to inwde 
Portugal, mhich he would not do even when reinforced by 
h p i ~ s e .  There was the fatal error af the eampaign; al1 
thc avrtilable Bntish and Portuguese fnrces wcre t1iu~ cnabled 
t o  atta& Soult; tind Victor neitlier fnlfilled Napoleon's orders, 
nor the king's wkhes, nor acliievd any ttseful ohjsd bimself. 
He did not invade Portugal, lie did not hola Estramndura, nor 
take Senllc, nor hinder G i i h  from tivioe rctnking the offen- 
sive; he remained passive in a notorious1y nnliealtliy country, 
nntil be lost more mea by siclrncsa than thm such battlas a s  
hldelfin wonld Iinvo cost: tm montha morc unprofitably 
wasted cannot be cited His reputation debarfi the suppoai- 
tion of incapacity; Lis aversioa to aid Xeult was obviow; but 
whethci it q rung  from personal jdou~iy,  a dirilike to ohey 
tlie b g I  or from a mistaken view of affaira muat be left in 
doubk 
CUE8Tk 
lo. To defend a river on a long line is generally hopeless, 
mpecidly whcn the dcfenders bave not free aocesa t o  the 
oppoei te bank. AIexantEer, Hamibal, C~sar,  Gustavus, 
Turenng, NapoIeon, Wellingkon, and hundreik of  others, have 
stiom how thc pnsaagc of rivm mny be won ; Eiimcncs, wlio 
prevented Antigonus from pssing the Copmtes, is, perliape, 
the only general who hss b d e d  a skilfuI, enterpriaing enemy 
in such nn aikrnpt. It follow~-that no general sl~oulcI 
calculnte upoii suocess, and ahould exert. great energy md 
vigilante to ravoid disaster-tlint &S retreat should be free 
antl mncentric,-that to toliring his magnainea artd rIepBta 
dose up to tlie army on sucli occasiom is iñalinsm itself. Now 
Cuesta  was inactive, and brouglit up al1 his mngazincs tu 
Delcykom md TmxiIlo,-abamloned Mirabete ~vithont nn 
efo&-hia depfits fell into tlie liands of tiie cnemy,-bis 
retreat was c o n f u d  and eccentrie,-part of his amy Fetired 
into the Guadalupe, pnrt wcnt to hfcrida, and he hirnaclf to 
Medellin. 
2'. Bie retrmt upon Carnpandoa instead af Badajo~t, being 
detennined by the uecessiti of uniting with Albuquerq&, 
cannot be blmed, and tbe immedirite r h r n  to Medellilin wnri 
bold; bnt :t3 merit was in recovering the ofíendve immedi- 
ztely after a clefeat ; wherefore hc should nat have lmlted, thus 
giving tlie I e d  again to the Freneh. He sbould have rapidly 
fallen iipon thc scattcrcd divisions of tht: Trench, bcat them in 
dehil, and d i e d  his o m  dcfachments in the Sierra, de 
Gutitlalíipo: tho cmr would havo h c n  mnnifmt if Vidor, 
placing n rear-pard to nmusc him, had takcn tlie r d  to 
Soville by Almendralejm and Zrdra. 
30. Cuesta's plan of keeping Lis infantry beliind tha Adge 
at MedeUin, until Tictor showed his order of hattle in tlie 
plains, was good; but when the time to sliow liimseIf cnmc, 
instend of ofdVR3ItiKtg a weak m ~ e r i n g  line be ahould have 
thmst hig army in masses betmeen hsalle and 3faubourg$ 
colums, wvhich were pusbed aut Jike horns on either d e .  Tlie 
battle would then have been well bepn, sqmting the 
French amy in threo uneonnected portions, lerrving tbe 
Sp"nrd~i in c l m  ortlcr n d  m&rs of thc initinttve : Ciimta's 
dispositions made it i r n p ~ l i l s  for thc S~i~niurils to win by 
Eournge, oi escape by swiftness. 
4'. Truxitlo, Gundalupe, 'derida, Eptrella, and MdelIin, had 
mcient walls or castles; yet fiesta, thotigh holding Ks pod- 
tion on. the Tqus from Janumyto the rniddle of Msrch, never 
put one of tbem in a state of defence. They nUght have 
leen gtlrrisoned hy the Ejtizens and peasnntiy, and mould in 
some degree have eompensated for thc inferiority of discipline 
by ddaying md hampcring tho Frencli movements. 
19 Tl~iri m h a l  merchec1 in one eoIttmn npoa Tny, think- 
ing no resistame would be oRered; otllerwise, a division o£ 
infantry and a liripde of m d r y  shonId have been sent fmm 
St, Jw or NeIlid &e& upon Orense, to  insure tlie passage o£ 
the 3finho. It seemu t a h a ~ e  been also m m o r  iu Ney, not to 
have kept Narchand's division of the sixth co rp  at Orense, 
nntil the second corp~ bad efleeted an entrance into Portugal, 
2". Sodt's rerioIution t o  place the artilIey nnd stores in 
Tny, and march into Pertugal, trusting ta victory for re-open- 
ing thc cornrnunication, wouEd inerease tlie reputation of any 
general. Three times before he renchcd Oporto, he ms oliliged 
to Iinlt, nnd fiibricnte cnrtrirlges for tlie iiifrtntry from tlie 
p o d e r  hken in bnttle; his conduct m in evcry way able 
un(! encrgctic. EIis military procectling after Oporto fe11 were 
not ~o admirable; civil nfFnirs engrosserl Iiim, and liis nbaenco 
from tlic fidd scnsilily affected tlie eperntions. Pruncesclii 
liad too mach respect for Trant's force, Loisoii waa timirl antl 
slom, hborrlds genius seemed to sleep. TIie importante oT 
cmsliing Rilvcirn w n 4  obvioits, niid it is r~~entinI  wni to ~trilre 
mitli a11 possili7e force. That mmim aas not reiiismbered. 
Caulancoiirt wna first sent,, tlien Loison, Laborde followcd, 
and iiltogcthcr thcy coiiid scarcely cffcct what so fem wero 
emplej-ecl to do ~t first. Tlie tranenctions at Arnnmte nra 
obscure. TFie delay hefore tlie hrirlgc, tiic liesitation in action, 
tlie freqttent referentes for fresh onlers indimtccl mnnt of zed, 
or an op~iosition to  Soult : Noble, in Iiis Iiistuiy of  tlie cam- 
1mign, refers it to a secret conspirncy i~hicli shall be touclied 
upon hcreafter. 
3'. Tlie great cournge of tlia Portugue~e pcnsnntry, mrl its 
incffimcy in reslstanee, proved how useles9 sudi effort,s are 
d e n  unsupported by good troops, hTo coiintry is more 
fiivourntjlc thnn tlic nrirtli of Pr,rtitgrtl for sticli a wndnre; 
the peopIc mere Firrave nnrl robust, tliey rere nided by the 
organized mosses unrIer Ronirtna, Silveira, Ehen, md tlie bishop ; 
yeh Sotilt in tlic worst sen.qon ovcwnmt: nll wsiatnncc nnd 
stomerl Oporto ivitli no greater loas tlifin trvo tliousand five 
hundred mcn, iiiclutling tmelve hundred siclc crtptured at 
Cllavcn. 
RO1LLTd. 
lo. He remninctl nt Oimlirn nnd Montcrcy, unmoTmtri1, from 
the 21st of Jmnnry to tlie Gtli of Marcli; lic l i d  tlrerefore 
time to re-organite his foices, nnd l i d  in fnct ten tliousnnd 
replnr troops in tolcrnblc orclcr. Hc lrncm on tlic 1 ltli or 
12th t h ~ t  Smlt r v ~ s  to pnss tlie 32inho bctmeeu Tuy and 
Guardia; tlint tlie paople of Ribiclavia and Oxense were 
in arms, tiiosc on tlie Arosn prepnring to  rise, nnd conso- 
quently that the Frencli must, were it oiiIy to wek food, b w k  
ont of their contmcted position by Ribidavia and Oreaae, 
by crwsing the Minho, or by retrwting to St. Jtt ,~ .  With 
this informtion, p1ain as the mriting on the w d ,  to pide 
him, Bomana d~ould have carried bis ten thousand men to 
Ribidavia, there to take position on Sodt'~ left flank, to rally 
ali the iasurgents aiid organiee a formidable wadare. The 
French could not pasa thc Minho whilo Iie was in advance of 
Ribidavia; if thcy turned against him thc ground wae f8vour- 
&,lila for battle, s mtreat open by Orense to Monterey, and 
purmit would have beea retardd by the diñtmltg of moving 
the guns; K Soult retmted it woulil have been tmtemount 
t o  a Victory for Romana, wIio coda have followed, communi- 
cating as he advsnced with tlie Eoglish veasels of wru: 
2 9  Romana having diisemimted his sma11 force, was specu- 
lating n p n  his enemy's wertkness, his ultimate retreat to 
Fmce 1 and wss only awakened from hia reverie by finding his 
troop be~ten in detail, and no resource left sare to join the 
Portupene with whom he was at feud, or break his promise 
t o  Silveira and Ay ovcr tbo mountpaina; he adoptcd thc latter. 
GpabEe of extiting an inswection he could not dircct me, 
and though b m c  nnd encrgctic by s M a ,  destitut~ ot' niilihnry 
t~lent:  ata later period the duke of WelIington after s long 
and fmitles discussion, driIy remaiked, th& Itomma or himlf  
had mistaken their profesaion 
B n m  
13 Hia fimt opcrationa were fecb1e; ho did not rep~ir the 
worke of Chavea, nor aid the important inaurrection at R i b  
davira He m without power; liis ofIicers held a muncil of 
war agakt his will; thirty w m  for fighting, twenty-nine 
aggnst it ; the casting voice was given by the voter caliing on 
the troopti to follow him 1 I e  retaking of Chavm, probably 
directed by marshal Beretrfoxd, wacr bold; but the subsequent 
advanee upon Peñafiel when La Houssaye md Heudelet mu1d 
from Braga intempt his retreat on Amarante, was rmh, and 
his Aight from thence d iape fu l ;  yet tthmka to  colonel Patrick, 
Silveirda reputation WM established with hiri oountrymen by 
en &ion which shouId have excited their mnternpt. 
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B003C TRE SEVENTH. 
CHAPTER 1. 
CRADOCK unmoverl bv ttie remonstranocs and absud plans 
addressed to him, hhad awaited at Lumiar tlie promised 
rcinforoements from Rndand; biit he mada evcry efFort t o  
obtain tninspart for suppGes, remounts for cavslry, nprrnau #, 
dranght animaIs for the ar&y, in fine to  prepare 
for tlie field. The repncy grave Iiim no aid, mil fin ~ttempt 
to procure horsc~ antl mulcs from Barbary having failed, tlie 
a m y  mas ao scantiIy furaished t h ~ t ,  other msnns failing, it 
could not act on kha frontier. Victork imetivity mrprised 
him. 11ut b j ~  resaIution to remain at Lumiar was not afected. 
mtil he wa~l assured that f i ~ e  thouaand of the reinforcements 
were off the rock of Lisbon. Then he held a 
council of wnr. A11 t h ~  genemle were avcmo f o rm: 2;- 
marching on Oporta except Beresford; and he 
admitted tbat it demuded on Victor's rnovemeets. It was 
soon aftcr thio miincil that Victor nppronclicd Bwlnjos, 
Lapiase alipeared be fm Itodrigo, and Boult s t o m d  Oporto. 
The nationnl htinct of danger then sbowed tl~e force o£ 
Nnpo!eon's plan of inwsion. Ono nnivcrrinl my oF trcnson 
was heard througliout Poitu~al:  people and aoldicm alike 
dimered s spirit truly alarming. The Entter disregnrtling 
Beresforci snd menncing thcir ofriccm declnred Appendrx l. 
that ,t thonmnd traitorri must i io  1rilI:cl in Wsbon. 
The regiments in Abrantes abandoned that post and rnarched 
to join Trant; but when this disorrlcr wns nt tlie worst nnd a 
concentric movement of t.he French would Iiave lieen fatal, 
general HiIl landed 14th five tboasand men and threehundred 
adiillery homeq and Crrtdock resolved tu dvance, moved chiefly 

the firmness and ski11 of British gencmlci, thc conmgc of 
Rt-itisli troops, wtiose fierceneñs no dnnger could clieck, wliose 
liasciiness no privatioas covld abate, that remetlied the eterna1 
errors of the cnbinet and won the long figl~t. 
Thia uncxpcctcrl arrivnl of  n victorioua mmmandcr cmated 
tlie p z t e s k  entliusinsm; the regency nominater1 liim marchnl- 
general, t11e people, almnp fond of novelty, llailed his prcfience; 
and tliose persons, Portupese and Bfitisli, who blamed 
Crndock's prudente spolre largely of future operations: rin 
uudefined yet poworful aentiment tlint sometliing great would 
soon be acliisvcd pervatIed tlie public mind. Like W o c k  
sir hrtliiir fclt tlic necessity of covcring Lisbon Appenaiir 16. 
wliile Yictor ~vtis oii tlie Alemtejo frontier, anrl Iio 
anxiously compared the enemy'n resources ivith his own. He 
saw that if tlie Fieneh lid any eonccrted plan, the fnluc march 
cif Lnpi~se murit hnve marred their comhiiinntionq, by plncing 
Portugal with its fortresses and d1 itsforces, insurgeats, reguIars 
md nnxiliaries, betmeen Victor and Soult. Neither concert 
iior communimticin cuiild longer exist bctmccn tliose rnnml~lials, 
and Soult's offcnsivo strength was also exliau,uskd. He might 
~tablisli liimself in tlie provincea beyond the Douso; he coiild 
not fowc bis way to Lisbon, n distance of two hundred milcs 
through a country tangled with fl o d e d  rivera, mountaing nnd 
defiles. He coulrl not bope, with tmenty-four thousanrl men, 
to bent a whoIc people in ams, nsiristed by nn anxiliary nmy 
of as Lig-11 ;fieputation, nnd nearly a4 nurnerous as Iiis own; 
nioreover diacontent rrnd conspirncy were ia his camp, and of 
tliis sir Artliur mns nware. h u l t  tlien dirl not mcnnce the 
capital; but Lxpiiso by wealrening Iiiin had iacrmed the 
power of TTictor, who rtt the Iiexd of tbirty thoumnd men, 
iniglit mnreli iipon Lisbon, tlirougl~ nn open countrp; tEie only 
barrier being tlie T ~ t g s ,  n river f u r h t l e  in nlniost nll seusons. 
Such u movement, or the seinblance of it, would draw tlie 
Rritish nnd nntiiw nrmica to tliat sidc; nnd thcn Soult coming 
clown tu thc hIoiirlgo, miglit froin tflenco connect Ilis opera- 
tions with Tictor's by tlie Iine of thc Zezere, or advance nt 
once on Lislion ns occnsion offererl 
Sir XrtErtir TVclledey's owu military rcwurcea mere,- 
lo.-Hia central posiGion. 
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So.-The British md k m a n  troops, twenty-six thonmd, 
having unrler arms, inclnding gergeants, twmty-two khonssnd, 
with ttirec thousnntl sevcn hundred Iiarses and mules; but in 
the Britisli nmy corporals fina privatea onIy aro undemtood 
as prcsent under arms; wlierea~ h tha French army dE mili- 
hry persoiis, oficers, non-commissioned officers, ~olrliera, 
drnmmera, combatants and non-comhtants, are included: a 
distinction to be borne in mind when compring the forces on 
ew11 sidc. 
T.-The Portupese troops o£ the line, of which sixteen 
thoiisand were organized and m e d .  Nearly ail these troops 
were colIectad between the Taps antl hiondego, and beyond 
the latter river were Trant and Silveira 
4O.-The militia and o m h q m  or inenrgent force. 
69-The fortresces of Almeida, Ciudad RodAgo, Elw, 
Abrrtntes, PenichB, and Badajos. 
Po-The English fleet, t.he Portupese cm&, md frce use of 
the wnat and river nnviption for supplies. 
'lb.-Tlre co-operrttion of Cuesta, who liad. six Uiuusand 
cinvaIry rtnd tliirty thonsand infantrv, of which twenty-five 
thousmrl were in front of Tictor's posts. 
I l i a  moral resources were the high courage of the English 
tmops, personal p~pularity~ the energ-y of m exciked peogle, B 
favourablc moment, the presentiment of vidoyt and a mind 
equal to the occasion. In a strategic view, to  fe11 upon 
Victor was best ; he was tbe most dangerous neigI~bour to 
Portugal, his defeat would be most detrimentaI t o  tbe French, 
niost admtageous to the Spaniards; and the *test body of 
troops wuld be bmught to bear against him. But Soult Leld 
rich p~ovince~i, from whenoe the chief suppIy of cattle Eor the 
n m y  wtls dcrived; he hnd thc m n d  city of the Itingdoin, and 
mns £here forming a French pnrty; und tlie regcng and 
lieople, troulild by the 105s of Oporto, Ioudly demrandert its 
recovery. To attack Victor, it w a ~  indispensable to concert 
with Cuesta; but lie was ill disposed, antl ta iiisure liis 
tu-operation would have required time, which could he bettw 
employed in expelling Soult. For these reasons, sir hthur 
determhed to fa11 upon tlie latter; intendhg, if sumssfui, to 
orgaaize a system of defence in the ncirthern provincea, tbnd 
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tlien, in conjtrnction with Cuesta, tum agninst Victor, hoping 
thus to reliel-e GnlEicia more effectually than by following tha 
Preneli into that provinoe. 
Lisbon heing tlis p h t  of operatious, time W L ~  the principal 
ohject t o  be gained, Lf Victor camo fiercely on, he could iiot 
be stoppetl, but he rnight be impeded bis patb ceuld not be 
Mocked, but it might be plpranted ivith thom. To effect this, 
seven tltoiisand Portuguesa troolis were tlirectcd upon Abmntes 
and Santarem, whitlier two Britiali b~ktnlions and two reni. 
ments of cavalrg, just disernbarked, also rnarched; anrI they 
wcre joincd by thrce other bahhlions draftd from thc n m y  at  
Leirin. h borIg of two thousmd men, composed o£ s niilitin 
regiment and the Lusitanian legioa, which remained near 
Gaste110 Eranw after Lapisse had crossed the Tagus, wcre 
placed under colonel Moyne, with ordera t o  defend the bridge 
of Alcantara, and if neceasay to bloa up the structure. The 
flying bridge8 at Villa Velha and Abrnntes were removed, tlie 
garrison of tlie Iatt~r place reinforced, rand Mackenaie took 
commilnd oi al1 the troops, Portuguese and British, thus dfs- 
t.rihuted nlong the riglit bank of the Tapa. Tliese precnations 
appenred suEcient, for there wrta a general ~Tjsposition, and sir 
hrthur 7vas not exempt, to thliik the French werrker than they 
really were. 
Vidar muld not by a mere demongtration 811ake t l i is  lino 
of defence; and if he forced the bridge of Alcantara, and 
penetrated by Junot'a route, it would bring him, mithout 
p n s ,  upun Abrantcs, A ! W M ~ ~  capabIe of ra sliort rmistnncc; 
3fwltenzEe also wonld hsve time to line tlie ruga@ lianks o£ 
tlie Zexere. I& leaving Badajos a d  Elvas behiud him, Victor 
sliould enter tho Alcnitejo and cross tlic Tngus bctwccn 
AEamntea snd Lislion, Cuesta promised ta follolv him closely; 
and Xackenzie, altliougli unable to prevent the passngige of tlie 
river, could rcgnin Lisbon, whcrc, nided by tlie fleet, tlio 
citizens, nnd pcriinps by reinforcemente from Ifngland, Iio 
rnight defend Iiimself until the amy could return from the 
Douro. Victor mrm cighteen mnrchcs from Lisbon, ho .md 
Soult could scnrceIy act in concert; but the nllied army, 
Iiadng a sure nnd rapid correspondente with Cuesta mrta 
alrcacly withii four mardes of Oporto. 
rPbm these rnattem were arranged, the main body ~f the 
di- mnrehed upon Coimbra, and four Porkupese battalione 
were incorporated in each British brigde. Beresford retained 
under his pasonal mmmand only six thoasand. Trnnt re- 
maincd on tlic Touga, Silvcim on thc Tamega; WTIson wns 
detachcd with a ,mal1 hrtugriwe force to Iriscu, t o  hang 
upon Fmnoesclii's le& rtnd communicate witli Bilvcira by the 
way of hmego.  Tho diffirmltp of Iiriuging up fo%o nnd 
proviaions was now somswhat leseened; liut tlie 1 ~11d transporti 
was stiIl scanty ; and khe admhl,  dreading the long shore 
navigation for large veswl~, liad no small crraft to victnd the 
tmops by the mast. The magazines at CCald~s were however 
partly fillecl, and tmenty Iarge country-boah loaded with pro- 
viaions, the owaers being induced by preminms, p t  safely into 
Peniclié and the Mondego : in fine, the obstacles to a forward 
mo~ement were great, bnt not insurmountable. 
Sír Artbnr renched Coimbrtb the 2nd of M B ~ ,  wcl on the 
5th concentrate1 there twenty-five thouaand sabrea mind bayo. 
nets, of wbich ninc thonriend mere Portugacsc, threa thouaand 
Germans, the remaintler British. Soult knew nothing o€ tbia 
armyon tlio Nondcgo; but rnany of I i ig officera kncw of it and 
mere silent, h i n g  cngagcd in an extraordinary pIot; probalily 
a brancb of that conq~imcy dluded to in thia mork, as being 
conducterl by tlie princesa of Tour md Tais. The fimncli 
soldier's afhchrnent %e NapoIeon was deadfast, yet human 
Patnre shrinks from perpetua1 cantad with death, and theg 
were tiretl o£ was. This feeling induaed some oficexs of kigh 
rank t o  form a phn for dan& the Frenci p~ernment;  few 
of them mere inimicai to Napoleon persondly, but they were 
repuliiicnns, nnd mncst ta rcduce tlie power of thc ernpcror. 
Tlreir prajcct, foundcd upon thc discontent of the trooph WM 
te make tmce witli tlie Englisli, to el& a cliief, nnd mar& 
into Fr.mce dt11 B resoIution to abate Napoleon's power, or 
pdl Iiim fram Lis throne. At Sirsi? they tarned tlieir eyesi 
upon Ney, but findly fixed on Gouvion Xt, Cyr for their 
leader; it was hoamer earrier to resolve than t o  exmte: 
Kapoleon's sascendmcy, supported by the l o ~ e  and arlinimtion 
of millions, was not to be sliaken by the compirw of n few 
discontentd mea W r  plot  vas not eiltirely relinquished 
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until nfter ;2iassena'a retrent from Partugnl in 1810; Fut long 
bcforc tlint thcy found the soldicrs, tiretl m tliey were of wiir, 
were so faitlifiil to their great monarcli, they would have slain 
any mlio openly stimed apinst bim. Tliese facts are h t e d  
on the aittliorjty oF a principal mover in the seclition, md many 
minos ploh liad contcmptmry cxistcnce, for tliis waa the 
spring-time of foIiy In Soult's coqs  the con~pirators were 
numerous, snd by their diacouraes and sloiv sullcn cxecution of 
orrleq continually thwartctl hia oprations witliout exciting 
Lis suspicions. As lis penetrnted into Portugnl thcir counter- 
aetions incrmed, and wl~en he atrived at Oporto thcir dcsign 
was ripe for execution. 
Tn the middle of April, John Yiana, tlie son of an Oporto 
merchnnt, nppeured at Bere~ford'a liend-cluartem, urith pro- 
posals from tlie malcontents; who desireri to bave nn English 
officer scnG to m n g c  IL plan for aeiziiig thegcnernl ond giring 
Km over to tbe Hritisli outposts. !€liis wns tt detestnlile 
project; it is not in tLe field, and wikh a foreign enemy, that 
soldiers ~ l ~ o u l d  conced the owertliro~v of tlieir country's &ti- 
tutiuns. It would be impertincnt in rt forcigncr to soy how 
mnch, or liow Iong men sliall Iiear with wliat they deem rnn 
oppressive gol-ernrnent; but there is a distiuct and especial 
loynlty due from a aoldicr t o  h i ~  gcncral in thc ficld, n com- 
pact of Iionmir, wliich it is ainplarly base to vio1:itc : nnd so 
i t  lins in al1 nges been considered. IJ-hen tlie Niicedonian 
A~gyiñspidtq drlivcrcd E~i incnc~  in bonds to Antiguniiti, tlie 
lattcr, ultfiou~li Fie liad teiiiptcd theni to tlie (leed anrl grrupled 
not to glay tbe hero, repronched tlie treiicherous soldiers for 
tlicír conrluct, nnd with tTie approbntion of al1 inen, destroyctl 
them: yet Antigonus was not a foreign enemy, Liut of tfieir 
oivn kin and liloorl. 
A nritisli ficr~r+fficcr reluctnntlp und~rtook to  see tltc 
coiispimtors, bttt in iiiiiform, and it \r.ns settleJ tliat on? oP the 
mrtlcontcnts sliould meet itim on tlic lake of Ocnr; tlie boats 
Iiowevcr lirisqetl cnch otlicr in tlio dnrltiiess, mll tlic IIngli~Ii 
oficer, finiliiig liiriisell hfiind tlie Frencli poñts, rctiirued tn 
hi-ciro. Tlicre hc found T'iann and the Frenci~ acijutont-mnjor 
IYAqcntnn, ir-lio confirmcil Vinnda ~tory, cqiresgcil rmprrt 
for Soiilt, Iiut tliought it cssential to remove liim Liefore 
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an a p p d  was made ta the soldiers : lie readiIy ngreed t o  visit 
Beresford, saying he was too ntrongly supported in the French 
amy to be afraid. Beresforü was tlien at Lisbon, D"9rgenton 
ment there, saw &m and sir A rtbur, and then regained Oprto. 
While at LLishn he added to his former rcrisona for conipiring, 
tlie crroneous d o y  that Sanlt q i r c d  to  be king of Portugal 
Whetihd-qiiartcrs reached Coimbra, D'Arpnton carne ~gain ;  
but tliis timc he wae, by sir ArEliur'er oders, conditcted throu& 
liyc-patlis; and so dmlt with tlia to return convinced tlie dlies 
mula not he ready Sor msny (39s  tD move on Oporto. During 
hia nlisenm genmd Lefelire, wrongfully supposed to bbs ri 
oon~pirntar, hsd denonnccd him, and he was now arrested. Ria 
guilt wns provcd by pssports signod by ndmird Rerkeley, 
wliicli, contrnry to sir Artliur'~ urgent dvice, he l r d  insiskd 
on haing. Soult, liitliertv without mspicion, belield with 
amazement the aliyss tliris tipened hneatli l i s  feet: bnt hia 
firmnesa did not t i l ;  he offered D'Argenton parden and re- 
~ard if he would giw the ame3 of the other conspirators, and 
relate truly what he knew of the dlies. He re~li ly betrayed 
, 
the aIlia, but sir AItlinrh foresight had rendered that tale 
useleqs, thnd even hiirtful to Xoult. Ris acwmplices he would 
not betray at first, and, cxaggcrtiting the ,mvity of the plot, 
dcfid ttlia rnnrshd, ndvising bim to adopt thc wnspimtom' 
sentiments ap the safest c o m e .  Thia holdness did not lut, 
and Soult, anxious t o  pruve the affiiir, delyerl executing him. 
Be escnperl during tEie sulisequent oprhtionq returned to 
Fmce at a lster pcriod, wiirc iliscnvered nod ~hot .  The 
colonels Donadieu and Lsfitte were also in aommunication with 
sir Artliur, m d  Lafitte is said to have liad a secret inteFvjm 
witli liim; al1 were urgent h llave tFie allied force moved so as 
to favour tlieir proceedings; but the Englisli general sternly 
replied tlisrt liis opeintioiis slionld not be regulated by their 
plots. 
Sir Arthur, thinking Silveira was si~ccessfully defending tlie 
Trunegq rcaolvcd to send Bercsford xnd FF'ilson m o s s  the 
Bouro a t  Lamego, to join lrim anrl cut Sotdt o f f  from thc Tras 
os hfonte~, dcaignlng liirnself t o  priss tFic Doz~re nbovc Oporto 
witli tlie nid of Rere~ford, w l ~ o  woiild be tIien strorig un tlie 
rib'lit bznlc. Tlius, including Trant's, WiLoii's, aiid 8ilveirz7s 
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peopIe, thirty tliousrind men n-ould liave interposed bstwern 
the Tr~s  08 Montes and Soult, who must have accepted a 
dingcroiis battle or gone back t o  the Minho, mhich wns then 
in full flood. This plan wail abandoned when it became known 
tlint Si11-eira wna chiven across tha Douro; nnd though tlie 
intelligence only reached Coimbm the 4th) on the 6th the 
army ims in motion with a Gesh project adripted to circum- 
stances, S~~ciicli promptncss wouId scem condemnatory of Cra- 
dockk prcvious caution, úut tlie state of affaim ii-m entirely 
sItered. When Cradock refused to advarnce, the I'ortnguese 
t roop were insuhdinate and riiaoganirred; tFicy mere now 
nliedient and imlirovcd in discipIine. He liocl scraroeFy nny 
cavdry; four regtments had wince joined. In tbe middle of 
April Cuesto mns only gathering the wwks of hia forces after 
lierlellin; lie uw now at the hend af thirty-fivethouamd men. 
TLe intentions of the Dritish government h d  tlien been 
douhtful; tliey mere no longer ao. Crdock's influence lid been 
restricted; sir Arthur cunie with enltirged poivers, tlie full 
confidente of ministem, znd had Fortuguese rank. His repn- 
tation, his popularity, and the disposition of mankind, a1w.s 
pone to rnqn i fy  tlic future wlictlicr for gaml or b ~ l ,  coni- 
bineii to give m unusual impulse ta pul-ilic feeling, and enabled 
him to  dictate t o  the: regency, the diplomattste, tlie generals, 
and thc people; to disregnrd petty jenlousies and intrigue$ nnd 
calculate upon resourccs froni wbicli Iiis predecessor was 
debarred. Finally sir Arthur Wellesley, habituated t o  tlie 
command of  arniies, wns endo~ved by nature with a lofty 
geuius, nntl capacious for mar. 
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CHAPTER H.
CAMPAICX ON TilE DOURO.
[Mn. 1809.
WHEN Labordc returned from Amnrnnte the Portaguese
general Botilho came to the Lima, and Lorge's dragoons were
detached to watch him; Mermet was at tlle same time pushed
nearer to Franccschi; and thus the :Frencll, occupying two sides
of a triangle, Gpotto being the apex, were extended from the
Vouga to the Tnmcgo. lIud presented both flunks to tlu} enemy;
t1le Douro separated the wings, and there WIIS no communica-
tion save by the boat-bridge of Oporto: throo days were
n:quirN to unite on the centre, five upon either extremity.
This disposition offered sir Arthur two lines of operation.
One through Viseu and Lamego, by which he could in four or
live marches tnrn the l-'rcnch left Rnd cut them off from 1'ras
os ?tontcs; the otlu::r. leading direct; upon Oporto, whereby
he could in two marches throw himself unexpectedly and with
IlUperior numbers upon Soult's right, with hope of crushing it
between the Vouga and tl\o Douro, Those lines were sepnrnted
by the Sierra de Caramula j but Wilsoll holding Visen, and
Silveira Lamego, covered the £rst j and Trant 011 the Vouga
covered the second. Thus masked, sir Arthur resoh'ed to
operate by both lines, but to make his chief effort a,,"lIinst
Ororto; bcCIlUSO the French right WIIS most exposed aml ho
could more easily feetI his troops near the coast.
SouIt knew nothing of sir ArtllUr's position, numbers, or
designs, and had no suspicion of Ilis vicinity j but sensible of
his own inability to reach Lisbon he meditated crossing the
Tamega, and then, covered by that river and the
8oo1t, lISS. Domo, puss throl1gh Bnlgllll~n into tho &lumnucn
oS« l1llll I. conntry. In tllis view he had sent Loison to Me-
zamfrio and Pczo de Ragoll.; IUld Menllct's lulvance
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tomar& the Vouga, was only to mpport Fmmchi'n retreat 
when the movement towarde the Tameg~b should mmmence. 
D'drgcnton's amst  on tho 9th disclo9ed a11 the pcril~ of 
SoitIt's position. Treason in l i i  camp wZJch he could not 
probe; ra. powerhil exlemy close in his front ; tlio insurgents 
again in activjty beliind Iiim; liis own troops smttered from the 
Vouga to tlie Tamegn, from tho Donra to tlis Limn; nnd under 
o f i c e r ~  necessarily suapected while tLe extent o€ tlis conspiracy 
was unknown. Tlie view wns sppalling but he did not quail. 
The generala new liim voucher? for thc soldiem' fidelity, snd 
bis niemurea wero instantly hken. Loisw was clirected to 
lreep 3fezanifríe if he could, and to hoId Amarante tenwiously; 
the guns and &ora at Oporto were sent towa~ds the Tamegh 
thc ~mm~rnition wns, pnrt removctl, pr t  rlcstroycd, Lorge wns 
ordered to withílrn~v tlic gwUson of Viana and make for 
Amnmte ;  ancl D'drgcnton \vas more closely preamd to niame 
tho conspirntors. But t l ~ o  war wafi coming oii mith n flootl. 
Loison liad given wny on the left, n o t  witliout auapicion of 
treacherq; wliile on tlie riglit, Wellesley liad passecl tlie lToupa 
nnd Frnnce~chi was struggling in IiEs grnsp. 
Bir Artliur lid twenty-four guns, one division of horse and 
three of foot. The cavalry rvas uader general Pape; the firrtt 
division of infantry under Edward Paget,; the second under 
Slierhroolíe; tlie tliirtl iinrler Flill; prese~itingr a mme ofsix- 
teen tliousand combnttcnts, oE wliicli fifteen hundred uwe 
Iiorsernea Beresiforrl's sepamte coqis, consisting of six tliou- 
snníl I'orttigiicsc, tnw Riitidi IintGnlion~, fivo mmpnics of 
siflemen and a nquxdron of lieavy eavalry, moved the 6th upon 
Lamego bp Viseu; nntl on the 7th, tlie liglit caw1ry under 
Cottori, preceding Pnget's division moved towads tlie T O U ~  
bridge, folload by tlie m ~ i n  hody j but tliey halted the 8th 
to iiisure Eeresford's co-operation on the uppr Douro. The 
9 tli tlic ~lviitice t\*as r~mmcrl, Hill's division toolr tlie Aveim 
rontl, znd tlie ~vhole reaclieci the Iine of the V o u p  that evening; 
but Pngct mme rip criutiouslp ~ n d  after dark, tlie ilcsign being 
to sur~irise Fraucesclii. Tlint gene&, Iiaving liis own cavaIry, 
a regi~iinent of 3Iermet's division, fin4 six guns, was at blber- 
garirin Sova, eiglit miles from tlie 'rTouga bridge; tlie rem6ntler 
of Jlermet's infmtry ms at Grijon, one mar& in the rear. 
Francesa hd juat infomed SonIt that the allies were COI- 
lecting nn the Mondego, nnd tiat !lhnt's po* were dosing 
on the Trouga; bnt he had no suspicion that the mhoIe m y  
mm at hmd, thoiigh an English officer, hearing n flag of tmce, 
lintl, most imyirudcntly hinted that rin athicli \rns being prc- 
pared. Sir Artbur's plana were founded partly on a suggestion 
of tke oficcr who m& U'drgcnton. Re liar1 ohPRmcd tliat the 
Inke of Ovar, ext ~nding  twenty miles Iieliind tlieFrencb outposes, 
wm ungurtrded, and al1 tlie Iionts were at Aveiro in tlte allies' 
power. ni13 was thcrefore Grected to turn Pranmclii's Bgllt 
hj- the Iake, and he emkked on tiie evening of tlie 9th with 
me brigade; tha fishemen were passive ak first, but soon 
compreltended the object and riislied in crowds to tlie boatq 
raorking with guck a will that tlie flotilla reaclied Ovar pre- 
cisely at mnrise tbe 10th. On that tlay aIso Beresford, haring 
united m-itli. milson, ieached Pezo de k o a  and drove hison 
as we Iihve seen bmk on Amarante. Both flanks of tlie 
I1rtncli were thus turncd nt tlie moment ~iir ArtEiur fcll upon 
fianceschi; for whilc tlie Aotill~ was on the hke, thc attcrnpt 
t o  mqrise tliitt ofioer mndc. 
Gotton, cm~siug tlie T o u p  with tlie ligh mvnlry aliout 
micfnight, had souglit to tuni tlie enemy's lefi wtiile tha hend 
of Paget's divisiun moved throngh tlie defiles of 1-ouna upon 
Alberpria E Trant w a s  to l m ~ e  moved betwaen Pqet and the 
lake, but the wl~ole comhimtion was b d e d  by oone of those 
p t t y  events whicli abound in mr. T k e  ground beyond the 
ITou,rpa ww not ~vell known, md late in tlie evening of the 
9t11, Trnnt,: f i n n d i  an impracticable mvine, extending from tlic 
lake Xnwards to Olivera de Axemis, would bar liis march, 
passcd by tlic bridge and drnggcd l i ix  grms beyond tlie dcfiles, 
tliinking thus to Ieavc tlie bridge clcxr for tIic Britisli iirtillcry. 
Tliis nlter~l tlie dispositions; for sonie gun carriaop brcitkiug 
down irnpded the march of 1'iig~+'s column, ancl trius Trant 
led in tlie centre instead of hirning tlie Frencli 13gl.lit. lieim- 
mhile Cothn, misled by his pides, carne in broar1 dayliglit 
nponFrancesclii mho wais flanked by a wood 6Iled with intntry, 
and off'ered a battle Cotton dared not accept. Thus was 
mamd a well conceived project, mhich wodd have shorn Soult 
of 6 tliid of h i ~  infantry and nll liis liglit c a d r y ;  for if 
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Frniicesclii liad bccn surprisetl wlien E l 1  was nt Ovar Bfermet 
wuliZ not have re-crossed tlie Douro. 
Cotton wns soan aidctl by Trnnt, but Frranceschi Btill mírin- 
tnili~tE Iiis grounrl, Iieirig igirorant of tlie gmt force in his front, 
until sir Artliur arrivcd with Paget's division and drove his 
infnntry from tlie aood;  then he retired, and tliough liotly 
pressed extriented hiniself vnlian'cly, readieil Olireira de 
Axernis with 1itkIc loss, antl mnrcliing ni1 niglit joined lfermet 
at Grijon neat niorniiig. He hd however seen the whole 
Englisli wmy, including Hili's troops, md it may create siir- 
pfiar: t1int l ic wns not attncked by thnt general ; hiit Hill's 
instructions forl-iada Iiim to mt on tlie enemy's rear, sncl he 
never fe11 sslioit of or exceeded 'liis ortlers. Those orders mere 
misc nlsq tlioiigli here Fiurtfnl ; for tlie principie of opcrnting 
witli smdl borlies on tlie flxnks nnd rear of a pomerful enemy 
is vieious; tlie numlier of the French on tlie Douro wm 
unknown, ancl it wiiuld lisve been msh to interpose ra single 
I~ririgdc betiveen tlie a~lvanced pard rrnd tlie main bdy.  Rill 
was sent to Ovar, ptrtly ta ense tlie line of rnarcb, partly to 
dis twt  tlie encmfs xttentian, pertFy ta Fiave a body of men 
rentIy fur ~iursuit, wlio lieing quite fredili mlg11;lit ~ i a s s  tlie bridge 
of Oporto pelImelt mith tthe f l ~ i n g  encmy, but hcesc l i i ' s  slriI- 
fuE retreat liindered the attniiiment of the last object. 
Papt '~  clivision anrl tfic mv~1ry Iimltcrl for the night at  
Oliveiru; Slierhrooke Ziad pnssed tlie V o u p  later aiid re- 
tnnined in dltergaria, but tltc! pursuit mas renewecl next drry, 
and tlie men, rnnrcliing strongly, enmc up nbout cight o'dock 
in tlie morning with the Prcnclq wlio ivcrc liostetl mross the 
s o d  on a rnnge of steep liill~i. A wood prnidicd with 
infaiitsy covere(l tlicir +ht flra~ik; tlieir front wns protected 
by a d a g e  and brokcn jisounr!, liut tbcir lcft was ill placed. 
Tlie Ilritisli went hiskly up in one column nnrl tlie licnrI mas 
instnntly snrl eliarlily cupged, ~vliile tlie IGUi P o r t u s e ~ e  re$ 
ment, quittii~iig the line o€ mnrcli, rlrove tlie enemy from the 
wood; tlic Gcrrnans alqo, l i r in~ ing  lcft sho~ilrlrrci forwartl, tiimcd 
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hllicitt i n s t d  of Leon. Ttirtt it eould not do, unlesa tbe 
French were pscmed by tlie m i n  amy, and Xault at &lamanca 
would be mcre formidable tban at Oporto; and heiice the 
saiety of Beresfortl and the great object of tlie campaign dike 
dema~ided an immerlinte pttssage of the Douro. Biit liow 
pws EL river, deep, swift, mtirc tlian tliree hundrcd yards d e J  
wlien ten t h o u ~ n a  vetemns l i n d  tlie opposite bank! The 
Xacedonian liero miglit liave tttrned from it without shame! 
The Berra rock, roand whicli the Douro carne with a shnrp 
clbow, lisrretl yigllt of tlie ulilicr cliai~nel, nnd Soult tliinking 
it secure took liis station mestwrtrd of the city, frwm mhence 
lie coulrl see tlw lower cliannel to  ita moutli: blit on tlie r& 
stood sir Arthiir, srnrcliing mitli an qle's glance the river, 
tlie city, uiirl tlie count,ry lieyond. Hnrses and liqgnge were 
on the Pallonga road, tlie diist of columns in rctreat, xtid no 
large force near the river; tlie giiards were fem and wiaely 
sprcnd, thc pntrolca not vjgilnnt, nnd an auapieious ncgligcnco 
seemed to  prevail. Surldenly s l n q e  building ca1led tlie Semi- 
nary cauglit the English general's eye; it r a s  isolated, mith 
enny w e s s  f ~ 0 m  tlie river, and mrrounrled by a high m11 
extcnding to the wnter on either side, offering room for two 
battalions; and the oiily egms m s  by an iron gate opening on 
tlie Vallonga road. This stmcture wmmanded cverytliing 
arortnd, esccpt one mound, wikliin cannonsliot but too 
pointod to Iiold a gun. TIiere were no Frencll poets nenr, 
and tlio diroct line to the building ttcross tlie river ~wis liidden 
from tlie towm by the Xerra rock. Here tlien mth a mame!- 
lous hnrtIihood Sir Artliur reeolved, if he could find but ono 
boat, to force a possqe ín fwe of a veteran a m y  and a 
renowned general. 
Colonel Watcrs, a qliick darinq man, discorered a poor 
bsrber mho hnd come over tlie river witli a srnnIl skiff tlie 
previous night; anrl these two being joincd by t l in prior of 
hamnnte, who pllantly offered liis seraices, crossetl tlie wnter 
unperceived and returned in haI£ an hour ivitli tliree large 
bargres. Rfennvhile cightecn guns mere pTwr1 in Iinttcry on 
the conveiit heigllit, sud general J u h  Murmy w x  sent with 
tlia Gemnn hrignde, tlie 14tli dmgoons anrl two girns, threo 
milw up tlie stream, t o  tlie Barca de Avintns, witli ordm to 
seelr for hoab and pasa there if posailile. 'When Watem carne. 
baclt with tlie barges, some English troops folIolvcd ITursay 
in mpport, and otheps cautiowly nppmwlied tlie river close 
under tha Seirir roek. It wns tlieii ten o'ctock, tIie Frencli 
were tranquil anrl unmqiciouu, the nnt i~h  wrvrindering and 
expectant, and sir Arthur wae told t h t  one boat had reaclled 
tlie p in t  of pms&E:ee ' Fd EeE l l~ M m s , '  nnu the reply, 
antl on thi simple ordm al1 officer mith twenty-five men were 
in s qua,rier of an hour gilently pIaced in tlie midst of the 
Fmch army. Tlie Semimry mas thns gnined, yet tLe 
French remained quiet iii Oporto. A ~econd boat crossed, no 
hostile movement follon.ed, no sound was henrtl, and a third 
boat pnased liigher up tlie rher; but then tumultnous rioiss 
rolIed tlirough Oporto, the drums beat to m q  sliouts arose 
n al1 parts, and tlie peopIe were seen vehemently gepticidating 
and making sigaltls from tbeir bouses, nhile confuseil massee 
o€ tmops, rusliing ont of the city by the Riglier streets and 
tlirowing out mama of skirrnishers, came fnriously d o m  
against dic Seminrtry. The Briti~h soldicrs instantly crowdetl 
tlie river Iiank, Paget's aníl Hili's divisions at the point 
of passage, Sherhrouke's wliere tlie bout bridge liad been cut 
away; but Paget himself wlio liad pnssed in tLe tKrd boat 
md inountecl the roof of the S e m i n q  fell tliere deeply 
woundetl, whereupon Bilt took his place. Tlie inusketry, sharp 
md voluble, au,mented as the foroes ~cumulzted, and tlie 
French attnck was eager and constant, their fire increusecl more 
mpirlly, and tlieir p u s  opened on the buiIding, while the 
English p n a  Trorn tlie Serra commanded tlie enclosure and 
swept the gro~tnd ou thc left so as to conñne thc axvault to 
tlie iron giatr! front; but hfiirrny did not nppcar, thc stnigglc *ras 
violcnt, thc momcnt critical, and Gr Artlinr wns only pro- 
ventcd rrowing in pemn by tFie interferencc of those al>ont 
him nnd tlie wefidence lie 11d in Iiill. 
Tn thia state of tiffaim some citizene came over to Villa 
Kova with several great  boats; anri Xlierbroolre'a men were 
beglnning to cross in 1arg.e: bdes ,  d e n  a lmg loud shout ia 
the town, md tlie wa4ng of hmdkeiclii$s hom tiie windows, 
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gnve notice that the French had abnndoned the loraer city : at 
tlic sarne time Jlurmy was descrieil coming down tlie rizl.lit 
bank of tlie rivera Tlirec Iifitttalions were nom in the Seminnv, 
t l i c  attaek slackened, and Hill advancing to the enclosure mal1 
pourcd rt rlestri~divc frre on tlic Fmnch columns, ns they 
passd in hnste and conrusian doug Lis froiit on tlie ?7dlonjis 
road; fiue guw then carne galloping out of the town, liut, 
apptiIld by tbe terrible line of nirslcetry from tlie s~closure, 
tlie drivccs p~illcd i~p ,  nnd wliilc tlius Iicsitnting n volley 
from beliind stretclied many artillwpeu in tlie dust, RIIIT 
tlie rest dispersing leR tlieir guns on tlie road. This volley 
caras from Slierbroolrda men, wlio hnd come tliruiiglr the 
totvn, nnrl tlius the pnssnge beitig won tlie nllies linil tlie 
right bank of tlie Douro. f31ierbmol~c from tlic city nom pressed 
tlie Frcncli renr, Hill from tlie Scrninai~ aent a rlamaging fire 
o11 tlie flnnk of tEie rctiilng mticses, and fnr on tlic riglit 
llurrny iuenmtl tlie line of retrent: tlie reiir of the nrIiiy 
iras ~t i l I  pasping the river, Iiut tlie guiis aii tlie Scrni. sock 
~earclied the French oolumas from rear to front as they 
Iiiirrictl onwmls. 
If Murray Iind fallen upon tlie disordererl crowrls tlleir rlis- 
comfiture ~voulrl have been complete ; but lic suffercd colunin 
nfter column to pass witliout cven a cnnnon-shot, and seemed 
fcnrfiil lest thry dioulrl turn and pu~li Iiim i n to  tlio rivcr. 
Cxciieral CliarIes Bte\mrt and major neivey, imp~tient of bis 
tiniizty, chnrged with tmo sqnxrhns oT driigooris, ~nr l  riding 
ovcr thc cnetny'ri rmr-pnd,  ns it wiis ~iiisliing tlirougli n 
nnrrolv rosrl to gain an open sI)nce Firynud, unliorried Laborde 
siid wounded Foy, yet on the EiigIish d e ,  Rcmey lost an arm, 
nntl liis gttllnnt Iiorscmen, receiving iio siipliclrt from 3Iurrny, 
11~11  tr3 fiFgjlt f,lieu wny lmelí with IORR. This finisbd tlie 
xctioa, the Freiich continued tlieir retrent, tlie Britisli remained 
nn tlie grounrt t l iq  bnd gained; the lntter lost t~venty killed, 
n gencrnl nnrl ninctj--fivc mcn wounded; tlie formcr Iinri firc 
liunrlrd meil lcilld nnd woiznclecl, nnd fiw guns wcre taken. 
A rluantity o€ ammunition, nnd 6fty guns, the cnrriagw of 
i~liicli liad been liiirnt, n-cm ~ftcrtr,nrrls fuzinrl in tlie nrscnnl, 
aud several Iiundred mea nere capttirerl iil the Iiospitiils. 
Sapoleoli's veterans n-ere so csperienced, so i n u d  to R-ar- 
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fare, that no troop codd more readily recover from a surphe. 
Before they rached VaUonga they were again in order witli a 
r e r t r - p d  ; and aa a sninlI g~fiison at the mouth of the ' 
Donro, guided by some friendly Portuguesc, also rejoinocl tlie 
m y  in the night, SouIt, believing Lvifion wna still at Ama- 
rante, thouglit Iie h d  Iinppily cuclillerl tlie dtiiiger. Sir 
Artliur Wellesley now brouglt over his baggqe, stores, md 
tlie artillery, which occupieci tlie 12th aud 13th; and Ihougli 
Rlurray's German~l pursued on the rnorning of the 13tli, tIiey 
did not ga more than two leagues on tlie road of Amarante. 
Tliis delay haa been blmed, It is arped that an enemy 
once surpnsed should never be dluwed to  recover while a 
single regiment could pnrsue. The rensone for halting Fere, 
tliat parh of the amy was still on the left b:mlr of tlie 
Douro, and the troops had outmarclied provisionb bagDVe, md 
ammunition; tliey h d  made eighty miles of dicult county 
in four dxys, during three of ahich they were canstantly 
fighting, men and animds requiretl reet, md noeliing mas 
lmo\vn of Beresfunl. 
When that general drovc Loiaon from l'e~ñi de &goa on 
the IOth, Silveira, who was then nt Villa Real, ivas urdered to 
fecl towartls Mczamfriu; nnd Beresford, who rcmpiincd on thc 
Douro, was thus in a position, with thc aid of thc insurgcnt 
pemnts, t o  turn Seult frem tlie Rnipnpn on to  hlic Chnves 
rod .  I3ut tfic 11th Loi~on  ngiiin fe11 Iitick, nnrI Eeresfontl 
fiiiding hirn timid liarnsscrl liis rcnr.pard; Silveirii also 
aclvimced, and on tlie 12th the Fr'rendi posta were drivcil into 
Amarante, mliicli Loison alimdoned, talcslring the rmd of 
Guimnmens. These eventg were unkno~vn to sir Artliur on 
the 13tl1, but be Iieard Eoult l i d  destroyd his p n s  and sm- 
munitiun near Peñdel, and crossed the mouuta.iiis towards 
Bwa. Judging this a result ol Bcresford's operations, he 
reiaforced Murray with cavaly, ordering him to rnaicli on 
Peiidel; and if Loison lingered near Amarante, to open a 
communimtion with he~lforrl wlio ww to aacend tlie Tamega 
anrl intcrcept the French at Chavea. Next. day the army 
rnarclid in two coTumns towarcls tlie Minbo, tlie riglllit by 
k c a  do Trofa snd Bmp, tlie left Ly Ponh  ~l'~2rc md 
Bacellos. Towanls evening it w s  j u d g d  from the French 
movemcnSs thak Chnvcs nnd hfontnlcge, not Vnlencn and 
Tuy, wi~ulrl Iic tileir line of retrent; the le'& culurnn wna 
tlierefore directed un Braga; anrl Eeresford wm osdered to 
move by Rlonterey upon Villa del Rey if Soult should make 
for aiuntdqre. Tlic 15tli sir Artliur renclied Brap; hIurray 
wag at Guimaraens on the riglit; Bemford, ranticipating hi 
orders, i, mar Clia~efi, liaving sent Silveira towards %la- 
monde to scize the p ~ s w  of Xuivncns and Melgwso. Soult'a 
capture nolv appared inevihlile ; yet he \vas ufwntly beyond 
&e toils, having by a surprising efTorb extricated himself from 
perils as fe~rful as ever bwet a generral. 
In  retrcnting towarrls Amnrniitc ho bad the Douro on hia 
rigl~t litaud, *he Bierrn de Catalina oa his left, both reckoned 
impmsnble; nnd the mrrow m y  between them mas very 
mggecl. B r a p  mas bcyond t l ~ e  Sierra, and fmm tlience to 
Amarante, a rond, practicable for guna, run thraugli Guima- 
raens; btit it cwiuld only be reached througli Amnrante. 
Hence Senlt's safetyy whie penetrating betwecn the rnountriin 
nnd tlic river, depended apim hison's Iiolding tlie Twnege 
That genera! had not correspontlerl for several dap. ColoncI 
Tholosé mho had bwn sent tlie 12th to ascertain his situation 
foiind Iiim rrt Amnmnte; gct neitlier tliat officer's rcmon- 
stranees, nor tlie afber intelligence tliat Xoult was in fu11 retreat 
for the Tamegn, could prevcnt hirn marching on the 13th 
towards Guimnrnenns; he thus abendnner1 his commandcr and 
two-tli i~ls of tlio army to mhat appenretl certain destruction. 
TEiis ciilarnity ras made knom h Roult as he maa passing 
thc rugged lisa of the 8onza torrent.. Tlic wcnthcr rrw 
iioisteruus, tlie nrniy, morn with htigue, was disinayed, and 
voices were henrd callig for a capitulrttion. l3ut in tliat 
tcrriMe crisis the m 1 1 d  cluke justified fortune fur hvlng 
rnised Liin t o  gich digity. Re Ilatl accidcnttilly fallen from 
his liorse, ,md Iiis Iiip formerly iirolren by a shot at tbe siege 
of Genoa, mag scverely injured; but ncither pnin, nor mcaluiess 
oF bocly, nor pciil, could ahnke tlic Arrnncss o€ h i ~  soul. A 
Spa11isli pdlnr lud told liiin of a patli tvliich, asmcling tFie 
riqlit bank of thc Eouzm, led over the Sierm de Gtnlina to 
GiiItiitirticit~; mlicrefore, ~ilenciiig tlic niiirniiirs of trcaclicroiis 
aXecrs aud fmrful solrliers, he destroyer1 Iiis p n s ,  ali~uiniloued 
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the milltay chest and bagpge, lodcd tbe anlmals which 
crarried thcm witli ciick men and mitsket smmunition, relmsed 
tlic Seuza, rinrl fuIlowed Liia E p i s l i  guide with a liaray w o -  
Iution. The rain fe11 in tomnts, tlie p t h  sucli as miglit be 
expectd in tliose wild regions, but with a fieroe dl he 
f o r d  hi6 t roop over the mountain, ghineil Pomhira, and 
at Guimmus  found Loison'~ &&ion. Lorge'a dmgoon~ also 
carne from Draga, and thus almost beyond hope, the whole . 
army waa concentrated. 
Soult's energy had h n  great, bis mgwity ww not  le^ 
compicuous. The slackness of pwuit sfter passing Vailonga, 
made hira judge tbat sir Arthur was pushing for Braga and 
would resch it hst* A fighting retreat, and the l o s  o£ gtm 
and baggage, would then emue, whi~h migbt fatally cleprecs 
€be ~oldiers' +spirits. It wodd abo favour the 
roble. 
mdcontentri' v i e w J  and aheady one general, rippa- 
rently Loison, was urging a conventioa Soult replid by 
destroying t h e  guns, a~nrnunition, and bagpge of the two 
divisions he had reunited, md no& took to the rnounths 
oa bis riglit. In thia snanner he reachcd Carvalho cl ' f i te  late 
in the evening of the 14th, hnviPg gained a day'a march in 
point of time. The next morning ire rhcw up the troops, 
tmenty thousantl, on tlie position be Iiad ocmipied twvo montha 
before at the brtttIe of Braga; and by this imposirig spectacle 
on tlie soene of B mcent vi&ry aroused the sinkig pide of 
tlie Frencli aolcliem. It waa a Iizppg reach of generalsbip ! 
Tlien he re-orgaaized his army and tmk the rear himself, 
giving the advanced p m d  to Loison. Noble, the French 
liiptorian of this mpaign ,  s q s  ' f l ~ e  do.& m y  cssto- 
nklhad,' as if it were not a ~itroke of congummate policy, thnt 
the rm, pursud by tlie Eritish, shouId be under the general- 
in-cliicf; while the front Iiraving to dght itEi wny through tlie 
inrinrgcnts, l i d  a comrnantler whase very nnme cralled forth 
execriatiene from tlie nnt.ives. 'dfamfa dwed not s z d w l '  
Xoult tliw dexterously forced tliose least inclined to seme 
hisn to act with most z e d ;  but in ~00th~ so mmy were the 
traitors aliont him tliat al1 th rwources of hi4 mind, and a11 
liig wanderful Isravery, were still required to s w e  tlie =y. 
From Carvallio tlle Frepch @ea Xdmonde, whence there 
were two lines of retrent ; tlie onc through Ruivncns and 
Verida Nova to Montnlem; tlie otlier sliorter lwt more 
nigged, lending by the Poiite Novx rtnd Ponte Miserella into 
thc road of hfontaIepe. TEie scouts seid the bridge of Rui- 
mens was liroken, aiid dcfenrled by twelvc hiindred Portupese 
with nrtillery; nnd that another party liad been ~since tlie 
morning destrojring tlie Ponte Nova on the Czvndo river. 
The destniction of tlie fimt bridge bloclccd thc mnd to Ghavcg 
the second would, il completerl, cut tlie Frencli off from Monta  
lcge.  TLe nigbt was setting in, tlie soldicrs harnsserl, bare- 
footcd, and stnrhg, tlie nmiiliinition w m  injui.cc1 by thc riiin, 
wliicli Iind never censed since tlie 13th, and wns noa inereasing: 
in violcnce accompanied with stoms of rvind; the Eritish 
would fnll upon tlie rear in thc mornrng; and if the Ponte 
Nova, lvIiere the partl  wns weak, mnld not be semired, tlie 
haur oF surrender rms mived In $bis extremity, Xoulc, 
nddressing mnjor Dulong, an officer jiistly rcputed onc of thc 
lnost dnring in tlie Frencli rmks, silirl, '1 have dosen you 
from tlic mliole nrmy to seiee the Ponte Nora, wliicli lins been 
cnt thc cncmy ; ñclcct A hundrcrl grcnntlieni nnd tmcntp- 
Rvc liorscincn, entlcavour to surprisc tlie guarJs nutl secure tlio 
pasgnge of the bridge. If you siieceed, sny 80, but scnd no 
otlier rcport, your silence mil1 sufnce.' Thus exl~orted, Ilulong, 
fnvoiirril Iiy tlie atnrm, reticlierl tlie bridge, killed the sentinel 
hefore nny nlarrn was given, md being follo\ved by tivelve 
grenatliers, crnwlcd don() a m o w  slip of masony, $he only 
part iinrlwtroyerl. Rie Cniratlo mm Auodd nrid rti~ringjn its 
deep cliannel, and a grenadier fell itko tlie gulf, yct the water3 
were lourler than his cry. Dulong and the otbers surprised 
tlic ncnrest post, nntl thcn €110 mnin body mshed on, and serno 
crossings otter, mounting tbe lieiglits, sliouting and firbg, 
scared the perisrtntry, who imagined tlie d o l e  army mna upon 
thcm. Thiis the pnwnge wns non. 
At four o'cloclc the Ilriclge rvas repaired and the troopc filed 
s l o ~ ~ l y  w e r ;  but thc rond mas cut in tlia side of a mowtain, 
Icaving an unfenccd precipite on the left for several miles; and 
jt iws Finally crosscd by ttlia 3fisarella torrent, mhicli rolling 
don- a p l f  TvnR to be crosscd by the 'Sal& or leaper, 8 
brirlgc ivitli a single arcb, ao narrom that ody t h e e  persons 


the 'English mere crossing the river; the report was premature 
because no man passed before Gen o'clock, but it reached Soult, 
and he sent general Quesnel to vexify the fa&, QuesneI 
reporked truly that it was an error, and Soult took no further 
prwaution; the putroles were not increased, no staff-officers 
were employed to watch the river, no sipals were mtablished. 
It m s  however but threc dqs  since n'hrgenton'a conapivq 
hd becn dismvercd, and the extent of it wns nnknown. This 
should h ~ v e  induccd khc h k c  of Dalmntie t o  augment the 
numbcr of poxts, that the multiplicity o€ reporta might render it 
i m p o ~ ~ b l c  for the malcontents t o  cleoeive. Renoe tbe aurprise 
at Oporto waa n f~ul t ,  atonerl for by tbe higli re~olution and 
commranrling energy with wliich he saved bis a m y  in the mb- 
sequent retreat. 
3". When Loison suffered Beresfod to d r i ~ e  him from Pezo 
da Ragoa and hlezamfrio, he cornmitted a great error; whea 
he rmbaiidoned Bramante, be relinquished al1 claim to  militav 
reputation. The evening of the 12th he m t e  to Sonlt that 
one regimenl; had mily repulsed the whole of tbe enemg's 
forces; yet with six thouaand men, ca idrg  infantry and artil- 
lev, he, that night and mithout ariotlier shot being fired, 
Jmdoned the only paserage bby which, rtrc far M he knew, the 
rest of the fimy conld e a q c  from its perilons sitnntion with 
hanour. It wm not Loisan'a Fault if England did not triumph 
a seconcl time for the captuic of n Frendi rnarshrml. 
1". Hi campnign as a whole dlsplaycd saggty, decision, 
celerity. When he hnded at Lisboa the nation lvas dismayed 
by defeats, distracked with auarchy, inenaced on two sides by 
pwerful m i e s ,  one of whidi wus in posseasion of the second 
city in the kingdom. In twenty-eight deys he restoredpublio 
confidente, prux-ided a defence ngainst one dvermry, rnnrched 
two liuntlrerl miles through n ruggeed countv, forced the p ~ s s g e  
of a pent river, and caubused his other opponent t o  flee over 
thc frontier withoiit urtillcrp or b~gagc .  
2'. TIiis auccws was due, not to the caprice of forhne, 
to the skill of thegeneral : he was quick t o  see, active to stri 
The eecresg and despatcli 6 t h  wliicli tEie armj mas collected 
an tbe Voiiga IieIongs cntirely to the mm; tliere were many 
obstacles t o  avercome, and Dkrgenton, as the seque1 provetl, 
would hy his di~closures hnve niinetl sir Art11ur's combinntions, 
If tha latter hnd not providently &en him a falsa viem o£ 
aff~irs. Thc subsequent rnarcli to thc Douro was no mem 
eft'ort; for tliat rapict advnncc, apinst an cminent commnndcr 
and n, veteran urmy of d o v e  tweuty thul~smd nien, wm m d e  
with a heterogeneous force of which on3y aixteen thousand 
mere npproved soldiers-the remaiiiider were totally unformed 
Eiy discililine, urttned jn lmttle, nnrl only tliree w e e h  hefore in 
a stnte of  open mutiny. 
39 The pnssnge of thc Doiiro would nt first +bt seem 
m l i ;  Ilut it renlly wns nn esnmple o€ consx~inniate getieraldiip, 
Tlie careless watch mrrintained by the Frencli m y  be cnIled 
fortunatc, bccnusc it permittcrl tlic Englidi general to gct n 
fe*. men over ttnperceived; yet it was not twenty-five, nor 
tmenty-five Iiundred, soldiers, that muld Iiirve mriintained them- 
seIves, if licecllcs~~y cnst on the otlier side, J\Tlien  ir hrthiir 
~aicl-~ let tim pms,' lie \vas prepared tu protect tliem wlien 
tliey had passed; lie did not rrny so until lie knew Murrny lind 
fountl honta xt Avintrs; md could by dmcending tEie Douro, 
cover tTie riglit fianlc of tlio Serniiiary, wliile tlie bwns ~ilnnted 
on tl ie Iieiglits of  tlie Berra could sweep tlie Icft fiad, niid 
s w c l i  xll tlic gounrl enclosed by the mnll ronnd thr? building, 
Ratl nune Eiut Murrny's troolis pnssd, tliey ~vould l i n i ~  'riecli 
compromiseci; if tho wiicile army liacl m d e  tbe athmpt nt  
Avintrts its rnaich moiild bnve been discovered; i a  tbc doiible 
paswjic ull wns sccurctl; tlia men in tlie Scinintiryhy tlic guns, 
tlio strcngtli of tlie Iii~ildiug~ and by 3furm.y ; the Intterby the 
surprisr: on the t o m  mhidi drew the enemy's attention m i - ~ y  
from liim. Hcnce it was only necessary t o  throw a fcm hrwc 
meii into the #?eniinary iiiipcrceived aiirl tlie auccem wrm nlrnost 
ccrtnin ; mliile tlie building mns mnintsined, tlie troopfi in the 
act of prtqsitlg could neitlier be pievented nor hnrmed hy tlio 
enem y. 
4C, Tlic oyiportiinitg offered to hlunng miglit Iiave tempt,ecZ 
n lilinrl rnnn. TTnw wniilrI Iiis n-nnt of hnrrlihorid linvc ~ppciirrrl 
if Lvison hit9 riini~tninerl Briinraute? Soult would tlien 
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have reached Zamom or Sdammca in good odcr, and have 
tiirned cin Ciudad Rodrigo, perhaps have taken it, and would 
ccainly have occupied the l'ritish army an that side; he mould 
Iiavc hd free componrlencc mitli Victor, and tllrat marahd 
miid hnve rnnrdietl apiust Seville or ngtiinst Lisboa Tlien 
sir Artfiur's liold and skilful operutiong heing witliout adequnte 
recults, would have furnishd a suhjiject for the abuse of some 
iporant mriter. 
59 If no lidt had tnlren place at aporto, 8ouIt mast have 
sumndered on the Souza river. But sir Arthur knewnothing . 
of Loison'a failure, or of Bermrford'a situation; rtnd judgiiig 
ttie latter t o  be menacing 't'ille Renl, mnjccturcd tlint Eoult, 
te avoid him, mould rnalíe for tIic Mi1150 by Villa Pouca nnd 
CFiaves, or hy Guimaraenrt anrl Brnga: hs tlierefore remained 
at a poiilt comimnding the main romls to that river, wheuce he 
could by f o r d  mmclies intercept tlie Frencli retreat and force 
ou a bzttle. If he h d  once entered the namem m y  between 
tlie monntaina and t l ie  Douro, he mnst have followed Soult in 
m e  column; and with little advantnge if Loison had been 
ti.ii.c to liis gcncml. Yevcrtlicl~w i\fi~my, who was acnt tliat 
wny, diould have been instructed to preresa the enemy, which 
wm not done. EIere liowever a politiml difficnlky interfcred. 
TIie Englisli cabinet, reckleas and imprwident; of prepamtion, 
liad no firmness, it dreaded niisfartune in action: sir Astliur 
tltired not risk a brigde except for a p t  object, lest a slight 
tlisaster should crause tlie army t o  be recalled. Tliis considera- 
tirin often curlsed liis nntudly entcrprising spirit; and to tliis 
1 itirtlien of ministerial incnpocity, wliicli he hora even to the 
bettle ef Mamtincra, may be traced tliat over-caution which 
has been censured by milittry writers, and even 
""eph'a c~yturerl ~or. by Napoleon, who emneously supposed it cha- 
rehpondcncc, mcteristic of tlie man, and often rebnked hiri 
315s. lieutcnants for not tnking adv.nntw thereof. 
63 From tlie 14th to tFie I'ltli, the marclies andencountem 
wcrr: like tlie wheelhg11 md h f f e t i n g  of vultures in the air, 
rine general cocontending for ~ictory, tlio other for safety- SouIb 
wwld  however have fallen if Bewford had not faiied sir 
hitliur on one point. The Tmnch marshal's rear-guad vas 
~tiil in Xtll&monde the evening of the 16th, Beresford sas in 
pemon nt Llinvcs tlint dny, and liis troopu ni~ived thcre cxsly 
on tlie 17th. 8oult pnscd Nuiitalegre tlie 18tliJ ttnd frotn 
Clinves to Montalegre is only oiie ninrcli: he miglit tl~erefvre 
have baen forestalled. Beresfortt entered Rinarniite tlie 13th, 
an ~xccllent mnp existcd, nnri Iie rnlist liuva Iruown tlic imlior- 
tmnce of *Sltlniniinrle, wliicli ivns only tliirty-two miles oñ, ~ 1 ~ 1  
tliat tl~ere ivere roncls to  It by FreilJm ~ n d  by Xontlin, Iiotli 
~liortcr than tlie road of Ouiiiiaracns ancl Chaves. Silveirn 
u ~ s  inrteed ordered to occiiliy Ruivaens and Melgasso, but 
obeyed atowly, rind Zlie Snlhler bridge mns ncglcctctl. Jhjnr 
Warre, one of Ecresfods stnq endmvuuretl to break tlio 
Ponte Nova and tlie Ituivaens bi-idge, and it was he ivlio 
ptliered the peasanta siirprisd by UuIong; but lie lind only 
o. single rtragoonJ and no powder; niid tlie puor ~ i e o p l ~  dcsiring 
to be rid of the French, mere reliietnnt t o  stop tlieir retreat. 
Nor would tliey destrog the Saltador, because, being the key rif 
nll tlie pmvincid cnmrniinici~tion~~ it wnv aum to l ~ e  rccon- 
~tructed, and as tliey well kneiv by ttlieir uupaid Iabour. 
Soult owed his final escape t o  tliese failiires in Beresfod's 
operatifina, eripecidly at tlie bridge3 wliich Warre attemptcd 
and ~vould cerhiuly li~bvc de~~kroyer!, if lie lmd been furnislierl 
6 t h  pwder and a few troops. Silveira WRS accuaed of nedi- 
p n c e  and slownesq yet it ivouEd seem there mas Borne mi~take 
m t o  thc infitructions, ~ind it NILS diffimilt to avoicl error wlicre 
orders were trminitted througia ofLccrs spealsiiig ciifferent 
b n m g a  
CHAPTER 111. 
SOULT hnfted tlie 20tli at Orensc, nnd the next dny mmrsichd 
to  Buccour general Fournier, of Ney's corpg wlio 
Soult, MSB. 
was besiegetl in Lugo by fifteen tliausand Spa- 
Mnn 4. 
niards under general &Mi. To mplain thig 
Romana's operations mwt be resumed Raving rallied his 
fuglti~es at PaetiEa de Senabris on the boider of Eeon he 
made fresh levies and being joined by three tbowand Gas- 
tilliana, formed unpermived s new armp in mar of Ney, and 
rcsolved to  surpise Villa Frana del Bierzo where there wera 
only two weak battalion~. Scnding Mendieabel by tlic vnlley 
of thc Syl t o  take it in rwersc, Iic marclied himself by Calca- 
IxIIos, nnd rtfter & shrtrp akirmisli capturcd thc v i s o n  and 
seiit it t e  the Asturins. Tliis effected, he detnclid men +a 
Orentre and Ponte Vedra to aid &Iorilla an(E tlie iwuigentfi 
aliout Vigo, where in con& with the Endidi ~Iiips oE war 
tlie patriots were acting SO vigomusl~~ that Ney's moveable 
columns daily lost men in fig11ta and by assassínationn The 
Iatter mere rigorously visited on the districts n.here they 
Iiappened, and in Q11Ecia m elsewhere the war assumed a 
herid aspect. Referring to this p e r i d  colonel Mas told 
h!lr. E'rere, Iie h d ,  in cdd blood, drowncd sevcn 
Wrl.PBPem* hundred French in t be  Ninho! an avownl of 
1810. 
crime reeordcd by Mi, Frcm ririthont animarivcr- 
sion, but whicli, hnppily for Iiummity, there is good rmson 
te Zielieve was ns ft~lse as it woulrl llave been execrable. 
After tlie q t u r e  of Vigo7 the Spraniali furm iucreased 
rapiclly, Barioa depmted for Seville, Murtin Carrera assumed 
Zlie command near Orense, sud the Conde Nomña neibr Vigo; 
p w l  hTaumrne then returned ta 8t. J q o  from Tuy, and 
KCY, rapprized of the loss at Villa Franca, advainccd to Lugo. 
Romnna, tlimi aliandoned Gallicia to enter thc Asturi~s by tlie 
pass of Cienfuegos. Comting Jong  the Gdlician frontier unti1 
he reaclied Navia de Suama, he Ieft R.Ia11i there nith the 
amy to obxeme Ney, ancl went t o  Ovido  to redress tlie 
crying wrongs of tlie people. It is unnecessary to recn- 
pitulnte tlie evil doings of tlte Asturinn junta, so notoriously 
conupt and inmpntle; Itoman~, aaet a sliort inquiry, dis- 
missed the mernbers by virtue of bis mprerne autliority, and 
rappointccl new men. Shis offendcd dovellanos and otlierw; it 
qipenseíl too close an illiproximntion to Cuesh's's rnocle iia 
Leon tlie yem hfore; aiid the central govt-ernment, always 
gelfish, and jealous, and abhorriag any indication of vigour or 
proliity in n general, Roon nfterwnrrl~ d~prived Romana o€ hi6 
comniailrl, 3Teanvhile he resolutely refamed aliuses, unti1 
bie pmcedings were sucldedy arrestetl by a vigorous strolce 
of tlie cnemy; for wlien Ney understood tlint X~innish t r o o p  
liad appemed on tlie Gallician sirle of tEie Asturias, and that 
Romana maa exciting tlie Asturinn people, he made combina- 
tions t o  surround and dwttvy tlic wliolc togctlicr. Thc As- 
turim nrmy, fifteen thousnnd st,ron~, including tlie pfirtidih of 
Porlier, called the Jlaquisetto, mas, undcr Ballestcros and 
Irorstcr, at Ovierlo md Gastropo1 on thc mast. Ney's pro- 
j ec t  wns tliat Hdlerinan slioilld, witli nine thousaud lnen 
and six guns, drawn from diffcrent corps to A~torga, penetrate 
tHe Asturias hy the p s  of Pajnreq \vliilc Bonnet from Xan- 
tmdcr broke in Iiy tlic cnest runtl, and li im~elf wit1i tlie sixth 
corps malre an irruption by the Conceja de Ibns, a sliort Lut 
clifficiilt ívay leading from Lugo. IVhen tlie niatter wm rife, 
Ney @ve 3iarcl1and cominnnrl in Gnllicia, Icf t  Jircc bnttdiona 
witli hiaucune nt St. Jngo, three mora at Coruua under 
D'hmagnac, placed one in Femal, md tliree witli a regiment 
nt Lugo uuiidcr Pownier, Taking twclve httrrlions of  infnntry 
aud tliree segiments of w n l r y  Iiirnself, Iie inerclieil first ngainst 
Ihhi, idio immdiately abnndoncd NavIa de S m a  and re- 
gained tlie ~nlley of tlie Xyl, Eiut nithout giving noiice to 
1:ornanrt. Ncy, niore intcnt to mptzirc hrnm tlian to dia- 
perse his troop, then moved by the valley of tlie Nsrccn so Jiii- 
gentIy ns to get witliin one mar& of Oviedo before liis march 
rras kno~vn; and Xaman% after a feeble effork to dispute tho 
bridge of Pefi~flor, sent tlie only regiment be had to In- 
fiesta, aiid escaped liimself, by Gihon, on board sn English 
vessel. 
Nep enterd Oviedo, where he tras joined by Kellennan, 
and nest day pumed  Romana to  Gihon; Bonnet also executed 
his prirt pct somcwhnt later, and Vorstcr, unmolcsterl by 
Rey, had time to eollect his mrps on tIie conñt. Bdles- 
teros, findiiig Ronnet h d  ppnssed Iictwecn him nnd Vor~ter, 
marclid npon St, Xndero and cnptured eleven liundred men, 
sick md well; the Ame& and Statira, Dritish frigntes, 
arrived also at the mrne mornent, and mptuitured tliree French 
comettes and tmo Iuggers, on board of ivhich some staff- 
officers were endeavouring to escape. Bonnet following hard 
upon &llcsteros, routed him so entirely thc I l th of dune, that 
he dso savived himself in an English vcssd: thus rill thc 
prisoncrs, and mnongst them thc mcn talrcn at Villa Fmnm 
by Romana, wem mcoveredl. Howevm, b ~ h r e  thia, Nsy, 
~ineaqy for hiu potits in GdIicia, hhnd ret.iirned to Coruifa by 
tlie coas&road tbongh Gwtropol; snd Kdlerman, nfter several 
triding ~kimishes ktli Vorstm, also rctired to Valbdolid. 
T h i  expedition proved that Asturira wm not cdcnl~ted for 
defence, althwsh, with the aid of EnglisZi shilis, iit might 
become extremely broublesome to tlie Frendi. Bu; ~vhile 
Mey wns absent, Cwrrcra, ndvrtncing from the side of Orense, 
a m o  t o  St, Jngo de Compostell.a, ot tiic! momc~it cotoiiel 
D'Esmenraid, a staff-oficer sent by the rnarslial ih give notice 
of his appmaching retnni t o  Coruriq arrived with m escort of 
dragmns in Xsucune's m p .  Tbis eswrt was mapifiad by 
tlie Bpniards into rt reirifozcement of eiglit hundred men; 
nevertheless Carrera, being joined by IIo~itlo and hnving 
eiglit thousand mcn, engagea and defeated AXnucnne the 23rd of 
Nny at the Campo de Xstrella. The Prench Eost six hundrd, 
anrl mveml gunq yet retrmstcd unpnrsued, tiioiigh in confusion, 
t o  Conrña: mc~nwhile RInlii, uniting n levy of peasanh to  h i ~  
armg, i n ~ e s t d  genernl Fauniier in Liigo. 
It was in tliis state of affsairs 8oult reached Orense, nnd hexrd 
from the inhabitants, rvho exaggemted their rxiutqmen's suc- 
cegq how mattcrs stood. The intelligence was al.larming, and 
he ~ e n t  formard an advsnced pard of iris stoutegt men by 

Alcantara. Dnring Tictor'e absence, Cuesta attacked Merids, 
biit on his return re-crossed the Gudiana and fe11 bnck to 
Znfra, mvaping the fat mcointry m he pwsed, and forcing Uio 
inhaliitnnts to go into the rnountains. 
Rome time before this, Joscpli reccivcd a deapntcli from the 
Frencli minister of war, giing notice tliat reinforcements had 
sailcd from England, and warning him to Iose no time in 
marcliing apinst Lisbon to create a useful diveraion in favour 
af Sonlt. He mns inclined to obey, but doubt pemnded h% 
conncilri, and, swayed by the followiog extraneous circumshnceai, 
he final ly abandoned operstions ~gainst Portugal. Napoleon 
ttiinking tlie Sustrian wwar, though certpin, would aot lirenk out 
so soon as to forestal1 tlie orgrtnization o€ a aufficient army 
in Chmrtny, liad Iaft tlie imperial guards at Vitorin, and 
sent Berthier to  command tlio troopa 1tssem2iling on tlio 
Danube. The Austrians however, apk imitators of tlie perñdy 
used towardrr Xpah, athked the Frencli outposts and dccliired 
war at the same moment. Bedhier, thus surprised, made a 
succession of false movements, wllich wouId have been fatal if 
tlhe ernperor, journeying rlny nntl night, hhd not m i r e d  nt the 
momcnt Iiis lieuteiiarit wm consumrnnting tlic ruin of the 
army. Then was seen tiie supernatural force of N~pleon'a 
genju, In a few hours be cl~~bnged the aspect of alfiira j in 
a fem by, m a u p  their immense number, Iiis enemies, 
Ziaffled sud flying in al1 directiow, proclaimed liis mmtery in 
an art which up to tliak moment was. imperfect; for never 
~ i n a e  troops first trod a deld of battle,  vas such a display of 
miEihy ski11 made by maa But iprevioiis tu these successes, 
so tlircatcning had been the r i fF&~ of Ckmnny, that tlie Impe 
rinl gurtrds were liurried from FTitori~ to tlie Ilntiube, tlie grent 
reserve of infnntry was struck off thc rolla, aad dhe skcletonm 
uf t l ~ s  fowth sqiradrons oC every cavalry regiment were cirtlerd 
to return to their dep6ts in Pmnce: cven Mortier's corps, then 
on ita way to Valladolid fmm Zaragoza, ww preparing t o  
quit Spin Thua, while Victor mas reluctant to niovc, wwliile 
Key w ~ s  demanding more troops to preserve Gallicia, and &he 
fnte of SouIt wna unlrnown, the whoIe army was actuallg 
diminished by forty thons~nd men; nnd fifteen tho~sund moro 
were pnmlysed witli regad to offeilsive operations. 

Sir Artliur liad d~eayrr looIred on Yictor as tlie principd, 
md Boult as the sewnda1.y object of the carnlidP; 
"RT1. Pnpm and he had obtained t!ie ministera' lealre t o  enter 1810. 
Spain if the safety of Portugal 7vas secured. In thst 
vtem he had intreated the supreme junta, and Cuesta to woid 
a serious collision mtil tlie Brjtisli army eonld a& in concert. 
The junta assenkd t o  fliiti lidviee, and Cuesta so far acceded 
tltat lic did not seclr ra. bnttic; tiut he esposod liis advnnced 
pods, wafi disdainful of sir hrthur's ribilitics, and cxprmsetl 
doiilits of his dsire  t o  co-opernte, Liemuse 'tlie British systcm 
never t a  expose tlieir trooys, a i ~ d  Iicnce tlicy ncver gainerl 
deciaive ~ctions liy jnnd.' Gaesb'e Icnowlerlge of Iiotli friencl'n 
and encmy's strengtli nnd positions wns dwnps inuccurnte, mnd 
his judgment fdm; he nwer gained tb ckcisive fiction, antl 
lost every army he commmded. IXe mas discontent~d with 
the moacments agR-fnst 60uli5 sriying tlie Frencli huld a€ Gal- 
Iiciia would be thereby iytrengthened, unless that fnvourite fuIIy 
of al1 Spnisli generals m attempted* nsmely, tllic surrounding 
an enemy without thoright tliat the surronnded miglit be tlie 
strongest. Sir Arkhur in contrdiction, afirme& tliat ta drke 
Son1 t over the Mirtho and make a comhined nttack dtermarc! s 
n p n  Vidor mould p e r m m 8 y  deliww GaMkia. Tbe tmo 
genemls were t h ~ s  nt issne. Sir Artliur's plan IVAS fu;lowml, 
Gnllicin, na Iie prcdicterl, rnm abmdoned 1~ thc French, hnd 
t h g  nover rcturncd during tho wnr ! Whcn t h ~  Bn'tisli nrmy 
CItnlB hnck to the T q u ~  Cuesta m imporhinnte for a joint 
offeiisi~e operntion ngnim.st Vietor, but in~isbd upon tracing 
tlio plan of mmpaign; his vielfs mere humever so nnsound 
tliat sir A~tliur, though willing to me& h i ~  h o u r ,  could not 
conoerle tlie sinsilest point wit,hout danger. Time was tbus 
Iost in idIe diamasion which rnigl~t h v e  been eruployed in use- 
fi~l  action, for tlie arrivrtl of tlie Britisb army on tbe  Tags 
had falsified Victor's position at Torremocha. As late as tlie 
10th of  June Iie l i d  only ooe {Iivision parding the bridge of 
Alrnarnz; nnd he c w l d  not dificovcr the English movcmcnts, 
screeticd ns they were by tlie T:w~s, by ttiie insurrcction, nnd 
by Mackenzie's corps of ob~ervation : Iience it wus pornilile to 
reacli Almmw whilc he was ~ t i l l  at Sorremodio, anil so cub 
ting liim off from Madrid, place liim Tietmeen tmo 
6eme1B, fires. This did not escape the penctrntion of 


cithcr cornmrtnrler; hut ~iir Artliur rtnorinced the nttcmpt, 
purtly hci~use  Iiia troops, sickIy nnd ftltiped, wanM slioes, 
pmtly tliat lio had no nioriey, snd few suppliee* Appendix 1 4 .  
cliiefly thz t  Cuesta woulil neither conoentrate his 
scrnttered forces, nor retire, and Victor miglit tlwefore hare 
crrtslierl him and yet found time.to mcet tIie Eritisli army on 
tlie Tietar. Eeresford rnnrcliecl however mith three bripdes 
tipon Cii~tcIlo Bnanco, nrid Tictor, lieiiring from t.hc king of 
Si~ult's rctreat, iimmerliately resolved to recross tlie Tws, 
tlrst destroyiiig tLe bridge o£ Alcantara to secure his left 
fi unlr. 
Colonel h f a p e  m at tlie bridge, but unfortunatcly his 
original urtlcr to hloiv i t  iip if tlic enemy nrlr.anced, Iind not 
been rescinded mhen thr! return of tlie army iiad rendered that 
measiire unnecesriary. Nor liad >Tape kept tliis order so 
secrct but Vietor heard of it, and sent a detsbchment mith n 
viciv ta provoh iits execirtion. He succeecled, arid tlint nolilo 
rnonument o£ Trajan geniua mns broken. Yet sucli is tlie 
nature o£ war that not Ioiig afterwards each zrmy found ita 
fa11 nliI;r! injurioue to thar intercsts, anrE as a methr  of  ttbste 
anrl of rnilitnry utility 110th s ighd over tiie niinerl arclies of 
Alcantara. 'Vickor pnssed the Tngs at Alinnraz on tlie I cEt11, 
removed the Iioat-bridgeI and took post nt I'lasencin. Afean- 
while Eeresford returned to tlie north of l'ortupl, now again 
mcnnccd hy Soult ; for diiring thc farccd innctivity of t l ~ e  Rrit.isli 
8t Ahrantes, tlie relativo positions of the ripporring ormies 
were being changed in s manner to pvern tlle result of tlie 
succecding campaign. 
Ncy met Soult at Lugo witll little cordiality on eithcr side, 
j*ct tlicy a p x d ,  tliat 8ic first slioitld mrarcli from Coruíix by 
8t. J n ~ o  mil Vigo qainst Carrera and the conde Noroña; 
tliat the ssecond should mter tlie mlley of tlie Xyl to drive 
Eomnna npon Urense, mhcrc Rey miglit reach Iiim nnd tlins 
criich the Gallician marfare. Soult; was then to menucc tlie 
Tras as Sfontes by Brngnnyn, in t11c vicm of lrccping sir rirtl~irr 
in tlie nortli wliile Ney olienetl a direct comniuiiicntion wikli 
tbe lring and Ticter. Soult marclied on the 1st  and 2nd of 
Jnne to llonforte; mid Franccschi, mlio WM on tlie Fereira 
ri~yer, Iinvjng Ls Houseaye's dragoons in si~pport, mns directed 
t o  acour the rosd t o  St  Jngo, and then fa11 dolvn the Rglit 
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bank of the Tnmbnga tomards Oreme. At Ifonforto Roult 
hralted six duys to  gct iip stores and to scour the cauntry, for 
Romana h d  agrain raised tlie peasantry of tlie valleys; Lut oa 
the 9th, Loison linving entered tlie Ya1 des Orres, feigned o 
movement tow~rds Villa Franca as if lie expected si  I"renc1i 
S, 
force from that sidc, yet t11e IOtll pnssnl the 
joutnpli of $y1 nnd descended towsrds the Puente de Bibep. 
opmtion% The 12tIi Franceschi, reinforced with infanty, 318s. 
rewhd Monta Funda on tlie Xyl, and con- 
nected himsdf witli Loison by Laronm. He wa8 followed 
by Xoult, wbo sent debhments townrds Dancos and between 
Trilt  Frmm and Lugo; Loison then forced the Puente de 
Bibey and dro~e  the insurgents t o  Puebla de Tribes : thus a11 
the valleys descentling to  tlle upper lfinho were cleared, and 
Romana rras forced hack to the Io~ver Minho. 
On the 13th Franceschi, ascentling the ~ d e y  of the &ley, 
occupied 330110 nnd thc Hermitage bridge, ancl patroled to 
Glu~liaa, Monterey, and tlie Sierra dc Porto as far tlie sources 
of,clic Bibey. Tlils wns to naccrtain by whnt road Romniia 
moulcl evntle Loiaon, nnd t o  prevcnt his pnssing thc left of the 
Frcncli nrmy to regnin tlie Ashrias 11y Puelila de hnn l i r i a  
On tlie 19th Xoult, finding Xoniana maa at Moiiterey, judged 
he mould a p i n  attempt 11is fomer movement to h e b l a  de 
Senabria; wlierefore be moved the anny up the valley of the 
3ibey upon Yianq wbere there was a lisdge and lvhere many 
rods united. Thnt day Fmceschi fe11 in with t l ~ e  head of 
Rornma's force nnd iepulsetl it, and next el-ening tlie whole 
FrencIi amy  ww concentrated near Viana, Itornana retreated 
prccipitatdy during the night snd mmy of his men dispcraed, 
Iint SonIt continud 11is movcments until Iie rcached tlic grcat 
roatl from Cnfitillc t o  Orcnsc. From tlicnco he sent Rcudeld 
to tlircatsn tlie Tras os Montes, and Nermet's infantry, rein- 
forced with Loqe's dmgoons, to observe tlie ronrl of Pnebls, 
Senaliria: LalioruFe antl La Boussaye remained in reseme 
while 8oult marcbed mith the van pard to  LR Gadina. 
ZTme movementg led t o  many skirmishes, the most importnnt 
a t  tlie l'ucnk de 13iliey, a position so strong it i s  inconceivable 
lioiv mcn rvith arms coizld bc pcrsiintlctl to aliandon it. 
hrriutia's shte was become desperate wken a, fresh misun- 
derskmding betrceen the Prench marslial~ saved Iiim. Ney 
had entered St* Jago with ten tliousand men, and Carrera fe11 
back ta Riente  Te'etIm, where Norofin taok the command and 
plncerl Eiirnself licliind the Octnvem river. His mnin body 
was ak tlie Iiridgo of San Yayo, aurI tlie 7th Ney carne ap. 
Noroiia lid thirteen tliousand men, mine field pieces, and t ~ v o  
eighteen-pounders. Xeven thousnntf mcii only were m e d ,  
h t  al1 the artillery wns in battery at San Prtyo; thzt bridge 
m 9  cut md swcpt by tlie 11cnvy Fins, n rcacrvc o€ tlirce 
thonsnnd men were at I?edondeIn, nntl sixty stragglers from sir 
John IiIoorc's srmg, aided by some seumen and marines 
occupied tlie fort.4 of Vigo. Some gun-lioats, one manneul 
by En~lish scnmen unrler nptain Wioter, liuving come up tlie 
rivcr to San rayo, ~Funng tIie 7th, some desultorg fiiing took 
place, nnd on t,he 8th two fcchl~  nttempts to force n vas- 
Erige rit San Pnyo nntl Soto Mayor, were sepulsed; but tlasc 
were feints designetl to occupy tlie Spaninrds until some 
officerri aent t o  nsccrtnin Soult's liosition cnmc back. Tliey 
re~~orterl, on tlie nutliority of tIie prnñnnts, tfint Roiilt was 
retreating to  Castille; and 1 have been assured by aii oficer of 
Nefs personal s t a q  that he raslilg conclucied personal feclings 
had swnyed Boult to betrny the 6th corps, antl in tliis error 
returnerl i n  wmtli to Coniña, Soult, tliiiilcing tliis nil unrler- 
l m d  poIicy t o  keep him in GaIlicia, tlien stopped hia opera- 
fions and so Romana nnd Noroña were sarwl. For the 
lattcr coiilil Iiavc bccn kept hchind the Octitvcm wliile a 
coliirnn mnrclied to Orcnse and linrred Romana's escnpc; nirtl 
Noruña, tl~ougli his conduct wns spirited and sble and l ~ i s  posi- 
tion strong, muld not nftemrr ls  bave misted ten tliousnnd 
French troops lcd by flic dnring Ncy: thc principal objcct 
of Irerping  ir A. WellesIey in the nortli nlso vnnishrd, he lind 
reacliecl ~llirnntcs the dny Ney arrived at  h n  Pnyo. Tho 
duke uf Dalmatia then marchal to Zarnora mliitlier bis sicFr 
hnd beeii sent, nnd his brother, Pieme Soitlt, l i d  condtictcd 
tlircc or four tliousnnd convralesccntrr and stwgglcrs. To 
Zaniora also tbe king sent artillery and ~tores to requ ip  
tlic troop~, who liad been for eight moiitlis incessantly 
marcliing and figl~ting, nnd wvere, men and officers, dispirited 
aIike by iyp*ivütions nncl thc horrible naturc o£ the warfare. 
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From Zxraora Franceschi was sent on s mission to the king, 
ttnd, refusing an escorh, fe11 into the hands of the 'Capetchhto" 
an insurgent chief. Be mas transferred to Seville, 
P. 
ao,ir,ixi oc und the sulirerne junta, trenting him as ci'iminal 
(Jperakio~~, instmrl of t he briive soldier lie W ~ B ,  ivitli infnmous 
XSS.  
cruelty put hi~n in n tlungeaii nt. Ciirthngena, Tlw 
citixens nshntned of tlieir rulers plannsd his esmpe, but he died 
in cnnfiriernent at the moment Iiis deliverance was ceh-iin. 
Wlien his young wifc, the dnugliter of count Matkieu &mas 
Zieard of his fate, alte rdktsed nouriahment, and expired I 
Xoult entered Zarnora the 2nd of July, having rejected a 
proposition t o  hold Gallicia joint1y with h'ey. Tlie latter 
then forrncd a ciimp nt Betnnzos, disabled the land defenccs of 
Ferro1 nntl Cnmfia, dcetmyed the nirieniils md nbnndoned tlie 
province ; 'tiut tlie Siiriniiirtls still Jrended Eiim so mucli, tliat 
mptain Hotlmm, coinrnanding m Englirrli squadron o€€ Coruña, 
found them liostile, md waa compellerf t o  spike their pns  on 
the sea lines anrl force a Spmish garrison, left by Key at 
FerroI, to surrender. Tlizit mar&$ reached Astorga the 30th 
of July, having brniight o f  his o m  nnd Soult's siclr from 
L .  Tliiis GnlIicii~ was tlelivered. Tlle pemsnntry hnd 
fought gnllmntly, liiit it was t o  protect thcir propcdy; m11 ~ h e n  
tlie Freacli withdreir*, the same motive led them to resist tlie 
p a p c n t  of tithes and rents; their efforts were suskined also 
by Eiiglish slips, m s ,  and money. 1t camot be said tliey 
drovc Ney from tlie Innd, he retained every important post to 
tlie lnst ; and s i n ~ l e  French divisions had nt diff crent periodv 
trnvcrserl tlie country from Corufía to  Tuy : neitlier coul(1 the 
Gnlliciltiis prcvcnt liis o~crntnning tIie Asturia~. Soiilt told 
tlic ldng tlint Gnflicin wauId wenr out tlie ~trong-est amy, 
unless some great central points were fortified, from mlience 
rnoveable columns eodd o v e m  the co11nt.v; this plan of 
forts and columns wm dso Napolew'fi Piew ; and 
ZnkPccptea Sonlt tlioi~ght si% meeks lahour and fifty thou- 
Derpalclics. 
mnd pounds would eftcct the ohject. But it was 
not the cforts of tlie Spnniards, it wns tlie qnnrrels o€ tbe mnr- 
aliidx, niiil tlic oppctí~~iincc o€ the Rritish nrmy on tlic T n p ,  
t!iat tleliveserl Gt~Ilicía ; for an intcrcqited lletter, froni Suult 
to  tlie Iiiiig, expressly nssignerI tlie dmger menaciiig Vidor 
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severe conflict. He repulsed tlie fimt wailants, but B violent. 
storm arising, the amim eould not see each otfier alttiough 
close togctlit~, und tlie uctiori wmed for a time. Tlie pmition 
was mrrounded by mvines, and the only retreat was by tlie 
bridge of Maria which wm behind tlie rig11t ; hence 
""EhB wben the weatl~er cleared, Sucliet, iiaving de 
11emoirs. 
tectecl the defect, first engaged tlie centre and 
left, and then forming a, column of cavalry and infantry broke 
quik t h n g l i  tlie Spanish horsc and sciaed the bridge. 
Blnkc, at  al1 times intrcpid, conceatrnted tlie infantry of liis 
ccntrc and left, nnd stoorl for tlis victory, liut tlie Frencli 
ol~ertl~i-ew him \Y ith great slniighter. One general, twontg- 
f i v ~  guns and rnAy s t a n d d s  were taken, yet darknesa 
enhbled the Spaniarrds t o  eecape by the rnvines, and they mUied 
Glie next day at Bottorita. Tlie French lost a fhousand men 
and general Earispe was wounded. k i n g  the fight, general 
hya1 had remnined with a brigade on tlie Monte Torrero to 
ame Zaragoza; hc was now aent down the Ebro to cut off 
Blake'a rctrent, but neglocting thnt  business suffcrcd thc 
Spadards to retire uninoleatcd in the niglit of the 16th. 
TIioir rmr guwr1 ~ v ~ s  attacked at Torrecilla on tlie 17tli, and 
I on tlie 18th tlie two amies were qain in presence at Eelchite. DIake reinforeed by some detaclimenta had atill fourteen 
tliousand cornbatantq yet they weere dispiritd, nnd he had 
lost ne~rly al1 hia p n s .  Euchet had fifteen thoiisand figliting 
men exmtcd by victory. 
BArPLE OF BELCHITB. 
Blake occiipied a range o f  hills hdf criclosiiig the town. 
H ~ H  righk, r'stinp on a liermitnge niir1 some build- 
Fuchet. ings, wm ;iinccecsible for wvalrg; tlie lefh was 
well covercd. Deliind tlie right a hill, topped by a buildirig, 
overlookecl al1 tlie position ; it was held by a Eztch+ reseivs and offcrd a general rallging point, 
hecauae there was easy commanication from it 
to tlic lcft wing. Thc ccntrc mri on roligli ground con- 
taiiling tlie wnlled t o m  of Bddiite, rintl tlie positioii rvnfi se 
rornpnct, tliat rifter filling tliis line tIiere wm a strong reserve. 
BIakris design was to fight with lis centre and riglit, but 
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Sucliet broko Eiis dirrpositians hg attncltin~ the riglit antl left 
aimulta,neous!y, while tlie centre KM 1.cxerl by skirmishem. 
The left nttack mas thc principnl one, tlie French, preceded 
by a fire of nrtillery, soon closcd, and ttioiigli tlic Rpnnish 
p n s  fired Iicnvily from tl~e centre nnd right, tlie vígotir d 
the attack, aided by tlie accidentxl explosion of a bqgnge 
hggon,  created a panie on the left wliicb apread along 
the h e :  Blake clrargctl with I i i ~  cñvnlry but fnilcrl, and 
tlie coiifiisinn wliicli ensued was thns descrihed by hliimadf. 
' One regiinent Red without firing a shot, it was followed hy 
anotlier, and athird, a71 flying mitliout having diachnrgcd a 
e n ,  nnd in a fe* moments tlie whole posit,ion ~ R R  nhnn- 
doned.'- Tlins we, the genemls and oficers, were left done, 
without heing able to r n l l ~  a body mhich muld make any 
opposition ; nnrl 1 lid tho mortification to see rrur ~rmy diw 
persed, abiandoning al1 its bqgage, mand throming amny its 
s m ,  rand even ita clothes, before a single corps of tlie enemy; 
nor werc we nb7e to nmil our~clves of thc drfcnce of nny 
strong place, as it me lmpossibIe te collect two hundred men 
to d e  Lead against; the enemy.' Elake, although u bad 
gencral, was a man of real spkit, Stung by this rliagnce, he 
reproachetl his troops, tlemon<lerl an inquiry luto Lis own 
conduct, antl witll n stron,: and sincere feeling of liononr, 
restored t o  the juntta the estate wliich brad been conferred 
upon him for tlie aucceaa at Almnitz. 
T h i ~  Einttlr! and Uie pursuit, in vhich were hkcn aborrt 
four thousaiul prkoners and al1 tlie artilley ammunition and 
baggage of the Spaniards, mnde Suchet master of dragon, md 
rcndcrd ths fifth coqs under Tvfvlortier, who wae at Vnllad~lid, 
disposalile for offensive opemtiona Thiis, on the 1st of Julp, 
tliere mere, exclusive of Kellerman's and Bonnct's ¿ii&ions, 
tliree complete oorps 6améB, furnishing six tliousand mvnlry 
and fifty thoiisand infmtry diaposnble betweeo korgn ,  
Znmorn, itnrl 7rnIlrulolid. Tlie inrontI on Podugiil lrnrl fnilcil, 
tlis loss of GnIlicin followed, yet Nnpoleon'~ invnviou w ~ s  
unbroken; hls troops hnd beea stricken scwrely nnd sliruok 
froni further aggression, they bad beea foo rviddy spred for 
a secure gmp, liut tbe readion diaclosed al! tlie innate 







SIR ARTJIUR WELLF.SLEY, although pas3ionate to enter Spain,
was held back by various ctifficulties. His killed and wounded
had 1I0t cxCOOtlcd three hundred but the deaths from sickuffiS
were many. Four tllOlJSlllld men were in hospital, llmllifl:eclI
llUudred employed as C3Corts aud ill depOts. A reinforcement
of five thousaud had joiued the camp, yet there were only
twenty-two tllOusand combatsnt-ll, and those liable to sudden
diminution, because the ministers, still intent OIl Cadiz, autho-
rized Mr. Frcre to draw a garrison from sir Arthur's force
whenever the junt'lo agreed to admit onc: the army was the~
fore weak in cvcrytlling but spirit, the commissariat WIIS
deficient in trnllsport, tlw soldiers !loorly barefoot lInd without
pay, the military cllCst empty, the hospitals full.
At a low estimation two hundred thousand pounds
a month were requirOO, and only onc hundred and
sixtr thousand had been obtained in the two months of May
and June, thirteen thousand being a remporary loan effected
fit Oporto. .At Lisbon t11c rate of exchange WM high, and
notwithstanding thc increased yn.luo conferred Oll bfOverumeut
p,lj>er by the success 011 the Douro, thnt rate \I'M rising. TIle
Spanish dollar passed for five shillings, but Spani.h gold sunk
so much ill value, that the commissary-geneml sent all he got
from Euglnnd or could collect in Lisbon, to Ca.diz, to truck for
dollars. Yet in all commercial plaoes the eJ:change rose
against EngJnml becnu!lC of her great and increasing Ilaper
is.~tlC8; and thOSll issues, the Cx:tra.vagllllt SlIllplics to Sptlin, Ilnd
tile AustrialL subsidy, rendered it impossible to }lrovide specie
for the army, saWl by purchasing it all over the world with
trea.ury bills and at an enormous loss. This evil, great in it;elf,
opened a wide door to fraud, and made the war between Prance
and England not so much a glorious contest of onus na 1Io
Btnrggle between public crcdit and militnry genius, victary 
being to the first nearIy as pernicious ns defeat. 
Vrant oT money, sicknesq Cuesta's temper, and many minor 
dificulties kcpt the army inRctive until tire end of June. 
Tictors retr~at f r ~ m  Torremaclia, and tlie consequen t nilvance 
of Criesta, removed one olistacle to offemive opcrations. Then 
sir Artliur, knowing eiglit thousnnd sdditional trmps wcre ~ f f  
tlie roek of  Lisbon, comrnencetl. ra mareli by tth nnortlicrn 
bnnk o l  tiie Tn,m, m m i n g  tu join Cuesta on tlie Tietar, nnd 
m n g e  a plan of opemtions against Mnclrid. Eut preaious to 
embrlring on tht fiill hroad ~trcnin into wliich the surges and 
orldieq of t11e wwfare whicli succeeded Napoleon's ileprartiiro 
merged, it is  fitting to sliom flie general s t a t ~  and tha mact 
streiigtli cacll pnrt.y brought to tlie encountcr. 
FBBñCE POWBE. 
M- H m .  
The French, h v i n  recsived a rcinfomment of con- 
wripta, smound, in Qie beginning. of .Tuly, includ- 
ing tlia king's parda, to .................................. 275,000 
1n hrispital .......................................... 81,000 
Stmgglom nnd primera bono on iba Btntrs, 1,000 1 68>000 
"Cota1 unrler nrms ............ 207,000 86,000 
The militarg governmanta, lines of correapondcnce, 
gnrritionii, and dctnchmentJ, aLsorbd ................. a2,ooO 3,000 
--
Prmtm&ram~n6hef i e IdJ  176,000 33,000 
The strength and situntion of ewh m y s  8 a d e  ñ.as as 
fdows  :- 
U d m  t7w KP'v, nnim'ng Madrid. 
Inf. &A-. Cnmlq. 
First corpir, &tor, in the valley of  the Tapa .............. 20,881 4,200 
......................... Fonrth corps8 Sebasti~ni, LCL Mancha 17,41i0 3,200 
Ilivision o f  De~olleu, 3iadrid ..................... .. .......... 6.864 
Kiog's h c h  gua&, Madrid, about ........................ 4,000 1,500 
-- 
T o d  ............... 49,235 8,900 
-- 
lnf. & hrt. Cisdrg. 
Becwd c o ~ s ,  Zarnora, Tnm, *nd %~a.zlamrtnca ............... 17,707 2,883 
Fifth corpJ  MoLtier, Vdlwinlid ............................... iü,042 $74 
.................. Sixth c o ~ ,  Ney, hstorga, and itsvicinity 14,913 1,446 
-- 
T o a  ........,.... ..48,662 5,203 
--  
A¿ Catalonia, & mar~7mZ Aup-m*. 
IaP. & Ari .  C a n b  
Seventh corpa, Tich, Gerona, and Darcelona ............... 30,593 2,500 
--
To thesc must be dded twelve hundred men belonging to 
the battering train ; four tliousand infantry under Bonnet at 
hntander; two thousand two hundred cavalry under Keller- 
man in the Valladolid country. Thc fortrcsseri were-St. 
Sebastim, Pampluna, Billiao, hntana, Xt. Andeso, Burgom, 
Lcon, Astorgn, on the nortliern 1ine.-Jam, Zarnpm, Gua- 
dalnxnm, Tolerlo, Scgovin, and Zamom, on tlie central link 
Figucms, Rosns, and Barcelona, on tlie soutliern line, 
This exposition Eilio~vs witli what a p m e r  Napoleon had 
faatened upon the PeninsuIa during l i s  six weeks' campaip. 
Much had been lost since hia departure, bu€ his asmy stiIl 
pressed the Spaniarda clown, and Iike a stone mt npon a brood 
of snakes was imrnovable to their prritliinp. Neverthelas, 
tlre stnte of Sprh was nn nmeliomted one, wimpnred to that 
wliidi, four months before, the vehemence of tlie emperor's 
warfare liad produced. The dementa of mistmce were a@ 
mnmulated, and the confidente of a u m  wm in full vigour; 
far it wm in tlio cliamtcr of this people, whiFe p ~ e l l i n g  on 
the earth to suppose themselves standing firm, and when 
crawliig in the gloom of defeat to imagine thcy wero aoaring 
in the fulI blazc of victory, Thc ccmfition o€ conquest causcd 
by t l ~ c  pcraonnl jertlousie~ of thc marslinls and the king's wnnt 
of vigour, wns attributed to  fesr, t o  meakness, t o  the premre 
tif the Austnan war, It was not considered that the nmt of 
unity, cliecking conquest, would cease when tlie French were 
placed en the defensive; tlie might of Franee was not duly 
weighed, and the strcngt11 of Austria wm iinduly exaltad. She 
diwkcm nt Ucles, Alrnm~z~ Znmgoprrr, Roxlta, Cnrtlndci~, nnd 
Valla; at Ciudd Real, Medellin, Bra,p, Oporto, anil in the 
Asturias, were ali forgotten; tlie French had been repdsed 
from Portugal ! they had not taken Seville! This vas weak- 
nws; and when the French were supposcd weak, the others, by 
a curious reasoning process, concludd they mere themsehes 
strong. Hcnce tlie fore-boasting was at this period like that 
nfhr Baylcn, and the est,imatcs of relative nnmbers nlrnost ns 
ahs~irrl. TIic iitmost nmount of theFrench force wns not tlinug11t 
to  exced one lrundred and tmenty thousand, even by sir Artlinr 
'Tclleslcy; af tlme fifty thousand were supposd to be on the 
Freneti side of the EI>ro, and the whoIe only waihing fm an 
excnsc to nhnndon the Pcninsu?m. 
The Spnnisli armiea, numerons on pepcr, and tlie wrd 
nmount considcrnhl~~ rvcre inndcrlunte to  tiie cxigeiicles nnil 
the rcsources of the country. Eefore Blake's strength mas 
broken at BeIcliite, there mere under arma twelve tllousand 
cnrnlry, nnd one hunrlred and twenty tliousnnrl inftlntly, 
cxclusive of irregulnr hnds md armed p a n t r y .  After 
Elalre's defeat, tlie regular foices, mpablc oT tnlcilig tbe field 
in tlic soutIi-enstern provinecs, ivcrc about twcnty t.Ilousnnd, o£ 
wliicli ten tlrousnnd under Couliigny wers ~vatcliing Barcelona 
or rdlyIng under Blake; tlis remainder were in 'Valencia, 
wbere Cam, Romana's brotf~cr, bad taken the c o m n d  Zia 
thc north-wcstcrn provinccs tlierc mere twcnty-five tlioirsand 
men, of ~fdliicli fifkeen tliousnnd were iii Gallicia, three or four 
thwmntl in the Asturins untler 'C'orsher nnd Bnllcsteros, the 
reminrler nntIer dcl Parque, ~v l io  was directd t o  organize a 
new army in tlie ncighhurliood of Ciudatl Itodrigo. In 
Anrlnltisiii, or onvering it, tlierc were ~cvcnhy thousuntl men. 
Of tliese, twenty-three thonmnd infantry and two thousand 
fivc hundred cnva1ry were assembled in tbe l lorcm near St, 
Elena nnd Carolina, under 'rTenegas; thirty-cight tlioussnd, 
incltirling ecven thousnnd cnralry, were in Estrcmadiirn vndcr 
Cuesta, ~fr.110 wns nomiaally cumrnlmdcr-in-cliief of botli ami=. 
Thcse threc grand divisions wcre calId tlie armics of d e  
.;SItt, t i te mtre, nntl tlia Lj. 
Cerona, Roatdricli, Lcrida, Mequincnza, Tnragona, Todo=, 
Vnlencin, Cnrthngena, Alicnnt hdonged to tlie nrmy of the 
right.; Cittlix iirirl Entliijou to tlint rif tlie centm; Cittilnrl 
Eorlrigo, Coruñn, niid Feml t o  tlie nnny of tlie l e k  Tlie 
Spnish t r o o p  were nbt serviccnblc in proprtion t o  their 
nu~nbem, most af tliern were ne.w levi- tlie reat ill-twined; 
tbe generds liad lost; nothing of their prwumption, lwrnb 
nothing of mar, and their mutua! jdwgies were as strong as 
ever. Caesta, hating the junta, was feareti and hated in return, 
snd Venegas mas plmed at tIie head o£ the Carolina m y  m a 
~unterpoise t o  him. Romana also wm obnoxious te the 
junta, nnd in rcturn, with more rcamn, thn juntn. was despissd 
nnd didilrccl by him. Iii Vnlencia nnrE Murcitt, gcncrds nnd 
juntas appenrctl nIilte in rliffereiit to tIie public wel fare, satisfied 
if the war was kept from their own doora IR %Qtalonia there 
never was any unarizmiity. Blake had abandoned Romana in 
hllicirt, and was Cuesta's enemy E for theee reasoms he was 
in~ested mith supreme power in Valencia, Arapn, rrnd Cata- 
lonia, Tbe armies of Cuesh and Venegas were liothds of 
petty faetions, blbuqucxque wantd chief command, and 
Frere intrigaea for hirn, being still irndcr thc dclusion tliat he 
waa to contliict the military instenrl uf tlie political s e M c a  Tn 
Apd he lid pressed on the junta, that five tlionsmd mmlry 
and some infantry, taken from Cuesta and Vencgaq shauId be 
given t o  Albuquerque for offerisive operations in La Mancha : 
tbi8, he said, aould, ' if th -y mJc9etk to tah mtn'cr~ of dS 
Z>acwne a vmj mrhw a& demX2ie nuivenaml.' And witliout 
informing sir Artliur, or awdting the rcsult of his rnarch 
against SouIt, lie prctcndd to tlie jiinh, tthnt the cc-operatim 
of the British amy witli Cuestq wbic1:li it was tha Englich 
Appendix 6. general's first wish to dtain, could only be the 
price of assent to this ridicuIons project t In his 
zeal to pro- an army for Alhuquerqne he ev& urged thot 
Vcnegarr rrhauld be d i s p l d ,  but Cuesta and thc junta alike, 
peremphrily rcjeded tliat plan as pnssing al1 decornm. Frcre 
att.ribiited thia to  rneliu jcalousy of Alliur~uercpe's Iiigh birth 
and capacity; get the junta liad sufficient reason tu rcfuse the 
duke an independent command; for thougli a bra~e good 
ofñcer he was duped by a woman who corresponded with khe 
enemy. ~ e a r i n g  to  a&er hirn sbe m w  not at first meddled 
with; but ffnally she m s  sliut up, and nieanwhile he could not 
bo entrueted mtli  commnnd. Thua MF. Frcre*s intrigrtcs 
faiied, auiid ar Artliur neglecting his projecií, nxlvised the juntu 
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not to weaken biit reinforce Cuesta7 not to  n s s d  the French in 
La Mancha or Estremadum, but to preserve a strict defensive 
, ira al1 quarters. 
At this time the Ruprcmc junta wnri in drenrl of the oldjunh 
of Beville, snd ita folly, arrosnce, and neglect of tbe pirblic 
weal furnished nmlile grounds for attaclc, hfter tlic battles of 
MedelJin aiid Ciudarl Weid, the king had employed Jowhiin 
Sotelo, n Spnni~h ministcr iii his scrvicc, to ncgotintc for thc 
snbmission ef the junta. Tlie jiroposnls wcre sliurned, andin 
suitulrle t ems ,  for dignified setitinients and lnfty expresiona 
were nwer wnnting to tlie SpmiltrA; yet taken witli their 
deeds, they were Iiut n stronq ivind Eilowing ~Lrivdled Pcaven, 
The junta hiled not t o  make the ntltion remark tlieir 
pntriotism, nntl on every occnsian louclly prniscd thcmselves; 
tliey nere  liowever Slisiiiurtls of n diffcrent tcmper; meii 
snxious to check the abuse of pomer, h lay h e  ancient 
oppressiona, and recur ti) first principia for present reforma 
ruid future governmciit. Tlicy anowetl tlie misrule whicli l i d  
led to tlie misfortuna rif Sliriin; and knoming tliat national 
indepenclence may co-existwith tj~anny, yet ia necessarilyjoineri 
with civil nnrl religions liberty, they rlcsired to assemble the 
nncient cortez and givo tlie peoplo nssunnce tliat indcpendence 
wrts lPOFth fighting for; and tliat theis sufferinp and excrtion~l 
would leed to a sensible good instead of a mete choice between 
an olcI and new despotiam Tlicqc mcn wese powcrfu1 enoiiph 
tn have w manifesto to tiieir purpoae drati-n np l ~ y  the juiita; 
and it would llave been published if tlie English ministers liad 
not interposed, ior their object rrit4 not to serve Spnin but to 
hnrt NapoIeon. Frere oppurictl the publication, and not nmlii- 
guously Fiiiited that EngJauSs displensure, and tlie vengeairce 
oF tlie partizans of despotivm in S p i n ,  woultl fa11 on the junta 
if thia approccli to libeity wag mxle. Ee nssureri hifi ewn 
governmcnt thnt hc tliouglit it n'ght t o  check a tendency to 
freaduin at tlie outset; h t  he I r ~ s w  tlic rncnibcrr; oF tlie juiitii 
would ' J v i d f m  t ? ~  idm of givi'lqg pe7rncsmt @ct ¿o t?e 
m m w e s  wl~icIb they hdcl&,' iin expression rneaiit for praise l: 
His sentimenta were then very a p c a l ~ l e  to bis immediate 
mipcrior Ciinning, nnd furnisli R ciirioiis wntrad fto tlic libcrnlity 
wliich that politician nft~cnviirds tliuupht it for liia iuterevt to 
aiTect, 
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Pretending ík mrite as a Spaniarcl, Mr. Fi.cn! thhns ndrlrcsad 
don Martin Garay :- 
If we have indeed pesed three ccnturiea nnder an arbi- 
trary gavernment, let us not forget tliat it is a price which ve 
p y  for baving conquered and peopled the fairest portion of 
the globe; that the intefity of this iinmenae power rests 
solely on these two worrls, religion and the king. If the old 
wmtitiltion hna been lost by tthc oonqucat of Amcrica, our 
fir6t oliject ahould bc t o  rccuvcr it ; hub in sudi n. manncr na 
not to loso ivhat lias cost us so niucli in tlie acquisition 
Prom this considei~tion, i't sppears t o  me tliat me ought 
Zo avoid, as pliticak pkm, any a m u n c i a ~ h  ofgmmal p'n- 
d p k ,  tle applicatba ofw/¿2ch Zt d Se impos82bZ.e tu &mit 
w &$j,~, wm w Am the aegroes nad Indians shmltk p t s  
in jazmr of t i m I e s .  But let us dlom that we have 
mnde a bad e x c h q e  in hbrvrterhq OUT a n k t  n a h l  l W y  
far thm glory a& cxh-isim af €714 Spanis7~ m a m  Let as 
nllow thtst tlie nntion Iina heen dcccived for thmo ccntirriea, 
and thnt tliis error s11ouId at a11 hamrds, be immediately done 
a~vrty. Even tliough it were so, it docs not tippear aery kcm 
inq tAe clwader cf a mI2 d~cated pwsm to pms cemztw 
upm the &u& of Kis frnefa87m8, oor t o  complain of what he 
has Iost by their tiegligence OT prodiplity; and seill Iess so, if 
it is done in the fiice of al1 the world: nnd what daal1 we. sny 
of a nntion who woidd do this publicly, and nfter mature dcIi- 
hcrñtion'1' 
This opposition cairsed the manifcsto ta bc suppressd, nnrl 
a new ono, more consonrtnt to hlr. Frere's notions af what waa 
due t o  tl~cir forefithers, was publi~hed, and s promise to  con- 
voke the cortez @ven, but without naming any speciflc time. 
Tlie junta, m Mr. Frere tmly atated, were nof as a boclj dis- 
posea t o  gire free institutions, nnd now proceeded h prop up 
their own tottcring powcr by scverity. Thcy h d  issued, 
prcvious +a thc mnnifesto, n mcnncing proclnmation, in rrhich 
tlie-j cnrfrnvnirred to confnrincl tlieir political opponents witli 
t,he spies and tools of tbe Frendi; nnd lianng estrililisbd a 
tribunal of p u b k  secwity, tIiey cnused it to piiblis11 m di& 
in whicli al1 men who endea~ourerl to rake distrnst of the 
junta, or who tried to omrturn tlie go-o~ernment by popular 
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eommotions, or otlier mwns by klle junta xeprolintecl, ti-ere 
dcclrarerl giiilty of IrigIi treason, untleserving tlic nnme of 
Spaninrils, nntl solrl to is'nyioleon : tlieir punisliment wns to  lie 
dcratlq and conliseatlon iif property. Any pewoil propnpting 
m o u m  tcnding to menlren or ~ o f t e n  tlie fiatred of tlie p p l e  
against tlie Fr~rench, waq iinstnntly te he arrested and punished 
without remisdon, and rewrtrrls were ofYered for aecwt infor- 
mntion upon t,Iliese heatl~. This ntrocinus decree wris nnt a 
clead Ietter. Ifriny persons mere seized, inil~risoned, and ex+ 
cuted, without trid or knoMng tlieir ncmsm. RuG the deep  
cat stan upon the Spnnisb rhnmcter, nt hhis vriorl, ww the 
treatment experienced by prisoners ofwar; tliousnndo, amongst 
tliern part of Dupat'a froops who were only prisoners by a 
brcricli of fnitli, wcre sent to tlie Rnlenric I d a  witithout nny 
ortler bcing tnken for their sutsisbce;  and tlie junta ivliea 
renionstrtrnted with cast swen thousand ashore on tlie little 
desert rock of  Cabrera. At Mnj orm nnmbera l i d  heen mas- 
sacrctl by the inlialiitnnts i i i  tlie most cowartlly anrl lirutnl 
manner, and tl~ase left on Cubrem fiuffered miseries scaroely 
t o  be dcecrihetl. Tlie mpply of food, alwap scanty, was oftea 
neg1eck.d nltogether, tliere m biit one spring on tlie mck, 
and it dried rip iti  rnirnmer; clothes ivere never ggivcu save 
by Eu:1"lisli semen, who from compnssion nssisted them wlseu 
passising the islnnd. !ll~ue aRiicted vitli liungcr, tiiirst, nnd 
nrtkerlnefis t.11cy lived like wild bensts ivhiIe thcy could live, 
buh perPi11ed in sucli numliera tliat leas tlinn two thousand 
xemainerl to tell tlie tale of tllis inhuznniiity : it \vas no 
Jiglit disgrace to  England that ber government fdled to 
interferc. 
Atitl ~~Ivlint wcre tlie efi'orts maile for tlia defcnce of the 
countiy by tIiis bnrbamris jniita, ii,lricl~, originally nwmbled 
t o  discuss the form of n central govcrninent, Iiad unladully 
retaincrl tlicir delegnted power snd used it so shxmefullyl 
Tlierc sus a S~iuniñli fleet iinil snilors suficicnt to mnn it in 
Cartliagem, and tliere wws anothcr fieet witIi abundnnca of 
rieamen in Carliz. Lord Collinpvood and otlierr; preesed the 
junh conatantIy to fit these vessels out md use them, or place 
t2iern bcyond tlic re~cli of the cncmy; thcir rcmonqtrnnces mere 
unlieedcd, tlie siiilors v*ere mutiuoiis for ~\.lint of pny, and 
even of subsistenco; yet the governmont would 
Appcndlx ?. 
neither fit out the sliips themsdves, nor suffer 
the English sezmen to do it for them. When Romana and 
the insurgentg of GaIlicia mcre praying Qarloclr t o  give 
them a fem sbnds of arms ~ n d  five tlionsmd pounrln, the 
junta pomcsscd many milliuns af monc;F; nnd tlicir maga  
zincs In Gdiz  wcre bumting witli tlie continuitlly Incrmsing 
qnantity of storw and arms arriving from Englmd, wiiich 
mere left to rot M they amived, wl~ile from every quarter not 
y& mbdned, ths demand for these thii~gs ivas incessmt. Tlie 
fleet in Gdix might have leen at sea e d y  in Febmay; En f i  
weelt it rnight have been at Vigo d t h  money and succonrs of 
al1 kinds for the insurgents in GalIicis; after whieli, by skilfui 
operntians iilong tlic coaat from Vigo to St. Sebastian, it niight 
hnve occupicrl an cnormotis Frcneh forre on tliat lino of 
wuntry. Instcad nf ta fi eet, tiia junta sent colonel Barios, 
an obscure person, to steal kbrougl~ by-waq-s, to t&e commnnd 
of nien who mere not in wanf of such leadera, and t o  mnrder 
prisonern 
In like manner, tlie Carthagena Aeet could bave been 
employed oa the Catdonian and Frencli coasts. Tl~e jjnnts's 
real menns werc enormoris, hut thcir wnrfnrc waa onc of vim- 
lent publimtians ngainst tlic Frcncli, nnil tlie nriocmliling miae- 
mbIe pmsmts in masses, tu  8taI-Y~ for a whde md then be cut 
pieces by tlieir experiencccl opponents. Tho systeni of false 
reports, also me persevered in without relaxatinn :-' TI@ 
Prmh m e  Imtm m all p o i . i a f . 4 ~  mwsIds wwe slain m , 
taJcm-th& stiId&rs mí-8 deswting, M $9ing ifi terror at ~JM 
+Id of a XpmiaPcGJosepIb Jlmd phndmed am? n b a w d d  
dt&&--Xa?-~~~oza I d  m1 f~ l l em~  Cnstrnl envay to tbs 
Portupese reEcncy, so late as April, anxiously endeavoured 
to persuaile tliat pvernment md tlie Englisli gonml, tliat 
Zaragoza h d  never lieen siilidued, and that tlle hory of its 
' fail w a s  a Freaeh fdseliood ! In June, official Ietttem were 
written t o  Beresford from the neigliliourhocd of Lup, d a t d  
tl ie vcry day SoiiIt's army rclicvcd that t o m ,  but not to giw 
inteiligence of thnt citcnt ; thcy nnnounceil tlie utter defent of 
that rnarshal, md tlie capture of Lugo itself 1 The amonnt of 
tlie killed and wonnded, the prisoners, were mactIy stated, md 
deceived Beresford, notwitbstandiiig hls expcrience of the 
lmple he hacl t o  den1 with. 
Proafs of tlic jiinta's comption nntl incapucity are not con- 
fuied to the records kept by Brikisli oficem. Romana, a few 
months later, upon tlie question of appointing a rcgency, thus 
deseribed their condiict: ' f l e  himey ?md doubtd if tle c* 
trnljunta zaaci o k a ~ f w L g o e i m m t ,  anrZ tkk  dmbt 2~0.8 generd 
in ~SJLB prmirzces t l~~mqh whicEiCJ~ IR Imd pmsed; yet lae I t d ,  do 
p m  the n u t h  fiona anarci'iy, not only yielded okdimce to 
3, hd I d  fwced tlg prowinces of Gallick, han, and As furias 
i!o do thd s m  ;d e c m ~ t ~  he thouyRt un. l lhyd g o v m e n t  miyht 
be amfd PY D rl~vwtvd IIM con&tlmm o f I I ~ B  po1J.(:, n d  thmj 
' ~ e g p t e d  2s aut?~mPty+ f l ~ e  centra! janlo WJCLS not tJ1218 silw 
atecl; t h e  pmple, & I g i ~  of mearureB by fhei?. eflcts, c m  
p l a i d  that fhe nrm,im Tuí.re ? / d i ,   ti^ governmmt w i t l ~ l ~ t  
m p j ;  €ha£ 1Jm 2~xi-e no mppFU:s; f7mt IIh puna<wd a c w 2 t ñ  
of d e  pubtic q i d i t u r e  wwo wilIdeEcd; mnd gel, di !he atcllks 
droswnf~om Awica,  dt  ti^ saccours grantscl by E~zqlund, ~ I M  
T&S of I?M wmm, c1nd d~e mvoluatmnj c w t i d a l i m  w e  
mpstded. TILcptlZC m,plo?prm,ta ? m e  not yiven, to m ~ i a  of
~ & t  amd trus lovera of &ir counlm/. Sme of l ? ~  jb?atca 
~ m d m d  ~JL&T p m  a u b s m q i p n t  ta t7mi oewb dvnntage; 
othas mferred lucratik~e aaigohim~nis on tl&r ~elations rrw2 
dqm4inlinlq. EccJ~WrntP"~d nj ice .~  had loem filleierl wp io m b l e  
individuuh ED S& ilwse r e d 8  for t 7 m e I v e ~  u~?¿icL QUCJJL~ 10 68 
apprcpkp~ed fuv the epv~lic s&e, TIiwe was m imiC/ to  6a 
jbwnd; mny  of dhe junh aa~d m ! y f o ~  t7i.e intwwt of €.heir 
pvticu7h prmíwxc, m if tJwy w a e  wat ~ ( P P B  of f 7 ~  
spmhl~ mmmcltp/; t f q  c c q h E r E  t?w ~ i i n t ~  of t?m 
h l  juntas, zvitlmt regurtl t~ Jtness, a& mm msipzed 
a a c v  to .pnen dwtilxfe of rnilitlcry Xmwlerk/e, WIW 
Fd &tlm seen am;ce mor perfornted tle dufk aariyilrd lo 
tlm.' 
fliejjuntrc, di.tii&d ido sectim~8, m~der~ooJc to mnage q f í c i ~ ~  
eul~icl~ t h q ~  unerwsd, cand wlrich w m  d toge t lm  fureiyn 
to t71eir pofi58ions. IIo~acs, t d m  fiom dhir mrmers urzdw 
pe&m ~f si1pIyin9 tlie m&, were I$t to rlk of f~u?iym in 
s e l c m n ' ~ " ~ 6 ~ ;  {t~d wm?/ ~i?r.&pmtm€ ha?zchgs of uíhnini8h- 
¿ion wwe in .!he Jmacla of q n m  s q d e d ,  both fim tlkr  m 
mdwt, amd f v m  t h i ~  Fmmky hm crmiwiw of lfmt t n m  
fmoupita WJW m t ! ~  mtI~or o f t h  g m d  mbety' 
It m at this period the fmticlaa first commenced tlie gw- 
&Da, or petty warfare, whieh has been so lauded, m if that hd 
been the cause of Napoleon's di~eomftture. !hose bands were 
many, because every robber who f e n d  a jd, or codd break 
from enc; every smuggler &ose trnde liad been internrlited; 
every frior dialilring tlic tm,mmeIs of liis convent; cvery irller 
who u~islied to avoid tlie ranks of the regular =y, w a ~  t o  be 
found either as chief or associate in a pa~tidh. Tlie Trench, 
akhough continudlp harassed by tlie cruel murder of isolated 
soldiers nnd cainp followem, and sometimes by the Iw of 
convoys and strong escorh, were never thwaded any p t  
object by these hnnds; but the necessity of providing sub- 
sbtence, and athcliing rnen to his fortunes forccd the guerilla 
ctiiefg generitlly to ~ilunrler his oivu counttpcn; iirirl one 
pBncip:il uitise of tlie ~urIden growth of the pwtidm waM tlie 
liope of iritercepting the public and prívate plate, which under 
a dwree of Josepli was being Iirouglit to Madrid; for he ~ v a a  
driven to forceil loans and t o  seize the properby of suppressed 
convents and proscrihd nobles, to  maintain wen the appear- 
mce of a con& Tliis description will apply gcncrally to the 
pwtidm, and pmrlrillua ras tlic h d s  forned of smugglers 
wcre called; yct tliere were stinie cliiefs actuated by nohler 
motives, by revenge, by iy gallailt spirit, and honegt ambition, 
thinking thzts t o  serve their country better tlim by joining 
tlie replar forces, Among tlie principal lentlers mriy be 
placed, Renovalcq and tlie tno Minas in Navarre and Arapn; 
Porlier, in the Astuñw; hnp, in Kicay; Jnm Martin, 
ca1lc-d tlie Kmp&nerlo, wlio vexed tlie iieigl~Eiciurhaod of 
RIulrid; Julinn Sltucliex in tlin &ntB and hlnrniinca cuuntry; 
doctur Xov~ra) Pereíia and some otliers in Qtalonia; ths 
frnyIe Nebot in Talencia; Julian Palare% the Mdico) bctveen 
the Moreno and Toledo ; the curate h1erin0, El Pq'li.ncm and 
&mil in C ~ t i i l e ;  the friar hpia about Soria, Juan Abril 
new Segovia. 
Renovnles, a regrilnr oficer, mised tlic p m n t r y  of tIio 
d e y s  betrveen Pnrnpeluna mnd T~iñgoxa afker the Ea11 of t?ia 
Iatter city, but was Non subdud Juan Martin, Pmverh 
Julian hnchez, snd the eitudent Mima, discovered militay 
tnlent, nnd Snncliez n-as n vcry hold nnrl honcst mart. But 
Eqpox y 3Zliia, tlia uiicls and succmor o£ tlie sturlent, out- 
stripped Iiis contemporaries in fume. fie slied tlie blod of 
prisoners ireely, yet rathcr from falsc principle and peculiar 
ciicumshnces thnn from nny real ferucity, for his mtaral 
diwpoaition mns mnnly nnrl gcncrons; hc did aot psaess any 
pecuIiw militiiry geuius, Iiut to n aouiiJ jutlgmeiih, he added 
surprising energy and a constant spirit. By birth a peasant, 
he despised tbe higlier orders of Iiis own country, and never 
would mKcr nny Ikidabo to join his bnnd. From 1809 until 
tlie end of tlie war, he helJ h e  provinuw borllering on the 
Ebro; and though often defeuterl and cliasetl from place to 
placc, hc yct pitlunlly incrcnscd bis forcc, until, in 1812, lio 
wm nt tIle IiearE of tnoro thnn ten tliousuiid inen, rrgnlwly pnid 
and hiupplied by diffcrent means, one of mliicli was renmk- 
ab1-e:-lie establislied a treaty with tlie French genernls, by 
ivhich cvcrytliing but maclIlre E ~ O ~ C S ,  coniing from Frnncc, 
liad lis snfe coiiduct on liaying a diity, wliicli >fina nliliro- 
priatd to the subsistente of Iiis follo~rers: English succwrs 
were liowcvcr Iiis cllief rcsource. 
T h t  tlie gitcrillta sy~tern could ncver aeriously nffcct tlie 
Iirogress of tlie Frendi, iz proved by the mmtnut rtttenipts of 
the principal cliiefs to introduce the customs of regular troaps; 
and their succew ag-ni& the cnemy wras proliortiounte to 
tlieir progresa in discipline and or~anisation. Tliero wcro 
not 3ws than fifty tliousand of thece irregulur soldicrs nt one 
time in Spnin; and so severely ¿lid tliep prcss upon the 
coiintry, tlint if thc Englisli army liatl nblinnrto~ied tlie mntest, 
otie oP t l i ~  surcst rnenils by wliicri tliu Freticli eouid liuvo 
piiied the good will of t1ie nation ~vritilrl Iinve Leen tlie 
extirliating of tlic linrtich. Kevertiteless tliis grent i inycs-  
tionriEilc nhntiigc !vhq derivecl from tliem, wirl eg~ecially by 
tlie nritisli; tlia Fre~icF~ could iiever coriiiiiuiiicatc witli cacli 
otlier nor combine their movemcnts exccpt by tlie slow metliod 
of sendinp oficcrs with strong rscorts; whcrcns, their dver- 
sarics ooiild corrcspontl liy post, nutl cven by iyclcgnph: un 
radvautago equd to a reinforcenient of lifty thousand mcii. 
Under the milit~ry polity alrcatly dwcriw, ttieiank~ of &e 
rcgulnrs nnd militia wero rnpidly fiIlwl, rind Englnnd supplied 
arrns and equilirnents. Tlie Capitks Mor, or chiefs of db 
tricts pthered the ordenancas for defence, axd the peopIq for 
tLe second time relieved from invasion by IEritish amy, wem 
disposed to  accept the @dance of their deliverers. But the 
effwt of former mispvernrnent pemadeed me7 branch of 
administration, political anrl municipal, and impcdcd the 
cffort,~ tO d m  forth thc militav resourcas of thc Iringdom. 
And so reluctnnt \vere the pcoplo ta  bccome aoldiers, tliat, 
notwitlmtanding their liatred of tlie Frencli, tlieir natural 
docility, and tlie visiMe mperiurity of the soldier'n conrlition 
over that af tlie pensnnt or &izan, the recruiting even to 
tlie end of t.he war, presented tlie odious spechcle of men 
mnrchd in clinins to reiaforce amics wliich were fighting in 
wliat wasi a popular, and ougl~t o hw Iieen a sncrd carne. 
Tl~e  nctval nziintier of regular troopa armed anrl organiired 
was Jiout Fifte~n thousruid; but nohnthstrtnding their courqe 
Beresforil jvas reluctant to  act witli them e;cparntcly from tlie 
Britisli troopa. Of the fortresaes in a condition for defence 
tlie most importnnt werc Elms, Albuqueque nnd Almeida in 
thc fimt line; Ahmntes nncl PcnicliB in thc second; the 
citndel, aiid Sorts of Lisbm, Falrnelrr md Suteva1 in tlie Iliird. 
But tliere \vere many other wzlled places, capalde, if armed, uf 
~taiiding a siege, and presenting z variety of strong poinb for 
the hegulnr foxce of thc country to  assemble upon. Hence, 
Portugal oft'ered, not unly grent resources in men, but a h e  
of operntions fiolid in ibeif, mntrnl witli respect to tho Frencli 
amies, and enabling tlio E1iglisli general to act witliout 
rercrence te tlie X~laiiish govcrument or Spanish oommanders : 
an advantrtge more juatlg ~ppreci~ted rtt &e end of this 
cainpaign tlian at the commencement. Xuch were the rela- 
tive situations of the contending hosts in tlie Peninsula, yet 
to tnlre an cnlnrged view of affnirs i t ia ncccssa'p t o  loolr 
bewirl tlic nctunt ticld of  M t l c  ; for tlic contcst in Spnin wns 
nolv heconle an integrd 1iwt of tlie great Enropean stniggle 
agniust France. 
Napoleon bsd entered V i e q  and attempted to carry the 
war t o  tlie Jcft bnnk of tbe Danubc; hut u aevere check, at 
tlie Eiatbttle of Esling, so aliook 1Js moral ascendnncy in Europe, 
that he deerned it neceaslaig. t o  cancentrate al1 fhe diriposabTe 
stren$Ii of liis empire for one gigantic effort which should 
restore the terror of his nams. Tlic appmrance of inactivity, 
wsurned by Iiim wliile tlius miglitily gatliering bis frirces, 
deceived his enemies; lsnd M their hopes rose their bonsts 
bemme extravqant, more eapecially in Englmd, Tvbere to 
expresa a doubt of his immediake overthrow was regnrded as 
IP lieinons offenm. Tlic government, butiyed lip 6 t h  fooli~iti 
expectations, tliought Iess of mpporting a noble lana effsctual 
e r e  in Portugal, t1im oof nourishing md aiding the aecon- 
iLay and mther dagmdig hostility of conapimtoiw, mal- 
contents, and military dvenkurers in Qarmsny. PYIiilc rrir 
Arthur WelIesley mas waiting imptiently on the Tws f o ~  
the ~cnnty reinforcements affoded him, two other armiea 
wcre simultaneoiiely prepnring to tact ngaind the extremitiw 
of the Frencli empire, Tl~a  one of twelvs thousnnd nieu 
dmwn from Xicily, was ta invade Ita.ly* the aonthern parts of 
which h d  been denuded of troops to oppse the Austrians on 
the Tngliamento. The othcr wns nssemliled on the comt  o£ 
Englanrl, wliere forty tl~ousaod of tlie finest troops tlie nration 
could hast of, and a fleet of powr  to orerthrow al1 the otlier 
navies of tlie world combined, composed Ean wmnment 
dc~igned to destroy t1ie grent mnrine establishment tvhicli tlia 
Freiicli emperor liad so guddenly and portentously meated at 
Antwerp. 
Xo vast an expedition had nevcr befow left the Britiah 
sliores, neitlier any one se mcanly conceivea so impro~-irlently 
nrinngerl, su calamitously condiictetl. Tlie mnrine annd lnnd 
forces comliined, numbered more t lm eighty tliousand figk 
íng meir, and those of tlie Ziravest; the object in view ww 
compamtivcly insipnificant ; y& it wm not obt ained ; and this 
ill-futcd m y  with ~pirit, ntid strengtli, nnd mnl, to hnve 
8pred flie fame of England to t he  extremities of tbe earkh 
perislid in tha pestilent mmhes of Walcheren. dnd so 
utferly had party spirit gtifled the feelinp of national Iionour 
that men were found in Parliament base enou~h to reprobate 
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the convention of Cintra, to sneer at sir John Moore, and ta  
declare the Walcheren expedition whe, profitable, and men 
glorioua! Tiie operation against ItaIy was Iesa unforhmte, 
not more ~ b l y  condueted, and equally aborti~e. What with 
slow preparationis, the voyage, and tha taking of the petty 
lsIands of Iachia and Procida, thirteea weeks were wasted; 
dthough during tbaf period, Murat, consciow of bia inabilitg 
to reskt, waa only restrsined from tlbandoning Naplea by the 
firmnm of his q u m  and the energy of h1icett.i the miniatei 
of poli= It wwas indeed the wish of the Engli~h minister~ to 
have the troop~ in Sicily employed in the south of Spain, but 
yielding to &e repentabions of sir John Sknad, they pw- 
mitted him to make this display of d i t a r y  foo1q. How- 
wer it ia not with tbe bad or good mcma of thse expedi- 
tiom this histoy has to deal; but with that direful ministerial 
.inmpacity, which d e r e d  two men noto&nsIy nnfitted for 
war, to  dissipte tho militnq- ~trength of Englnnd on man- 
d a ~  objects, while a renomied cornmander placed at tlrs 
most Lmportant point was left without an adeqnate h. 
For the fimt time since the commencement of the Peninsula 
mnteat, sixty thowud S p a d  troops, weU amed and cIothetl, 
wcre collected In mass, at thc right place and communicnting 
with a Rri t i~h  forco; for the fimt time since Nqoleen mlayed 
tha destiny of Fmnce, the principaI amy of tliat country had ' 
met with an irnportant check; the geat  conqueror's fortune 
rieemed to waver, and the momenf had arrived when thc 
British government waa cdIed t o  dispIay ali Ita wisdom md 
energy. Tbe duke of York had performed his duty, He hd 
placcd abovs nincty thonsnnd ~uperb aoldiem, diqosable for 
offensive opemtions, in tbe hmda of the h i a t e m ;  but the 
Iatter imew not their value, and inatead of conmtmting 
them upon ong scatkered them upon mmy points. Sir 
Mbur Welleslg might hv8 had above eighty thowsnd 
EritEsh troops on thc fmntier of Portugal, and he was a 
general capable of wielding them; yet he commenced s 
mpaign, npon which tbe fate of tlie Peninmla, a qui~k 
triumph or s long-pmtrd agony of twelm millions o£ 
people depended, with only iwenty-ha tbousand ; while sixty 
thowand lghting men, and ahip8 numeroue enongh ta darken 
dl the & of Spain, w m  waiting in Sidy and Englmd 
for orders, which doomed the one part to rnwkeryj tbe other 
to ~n inglorione and miserable dmth. &al1 tEiB deliveianca 
of the Peninmla then %e attributed to #e firmnesti and long- 
sighted policy af men who gave tbese glaring proofs of im- 
pmvidence, OF abnU the glory of that gmat exploit lighten 
muna the head oE Iiim who so manfully maintained the fierce 
stmgsle under al1 the buiden of thcir foITy4 
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CHAPTER 1. 
IX tha foregoing cliapters the real fitnte of &ira in the 
Peninsulrt has been dwcrilied; but it appeared with a some- 
what different m p t  to tlie Engli~ih general; because false 
informationa, egre,dous boasts, and holloa ptomiaes, such as 
had been employetl to mislead Gr Joha Moore, werc rencwed 
nt  t h i ~  pcri~d, nnd tho nllicd nations wcre inflnwced by a 
riotons ratlier tlim a monable mnfidence of victory. The 
English nemspapers teemed w i t h  letters describing the enerny's 
miscry and fem,  nor was the camp free from these ida ted  
feelings. bresford m w  so credulous of French weakness, as 
puhlicly to nnnounce to the junta of Bridajos, tliat Seult's 
force, wandering antl hnmsed by continaal attacks, was 
reciumd tu eiglit or ten thousand distressed soldien; nay 
sir Arthur himself, swayed by the pertinacity of t.lie M e -  
mkers, t11e unhpsitating assuranw of Zhe junh perhaps 
elao a little e.xcited by a scnse of liis o m  great hIents# ww 
not free from the impreqsion that khe hour of complete triurnph 
wns come. Re hnrl not then, m Iic did afterwartls to l i s  cost, 
probed Spnnieh mlcm and Spnnisli gencrals, who were nlilre im- 
pomnnta for ofensive movementa, nnd lavish in their promises 
rif uttpport, And the Englisll general m ager enongh t o  fight: 
for he hatl gallant troops, his foot wm on the p th  of victory, and 
he felt that if the dulce of BeIlnno m nat quickly disabled, 
the Britiah amy, threatened un both fimks, wonlrl, as in the 
c ~ s c  of Cdock, be compdlcd to tnke some dcfcnaivc position 
near Tisbon, un object of siispicion and hatred tu tLe Epaniñb 
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Them mrc tlircc linca of offeensivc apcdona opcn:- 
14 TO CTOM {Ile p~~jl7.M m d j &  !5?!&%1~'# W?IZ?/, m& B?vnB 
m d  Jadajos t l ~  6me of mmnmits, a& atta& Vktm .i.n frmt. 
This linc rvas circuitous, Estremaclura could not slipply pro- 
visions and forage, and the m r c h  of tlie Britisli would bave 
becn too rctpitl for convoys. Tlie enemy could cover himself 
by tlie Tngus, nnd tlia operstions af tlic nFliw mauld bnve hccn 
cmmpecl Iietrvcen tjlc Sierra da GuadaIu~~! anrl tlic mountains 
about Alliuqucrque and Alcantara ; strong cletaclriiiciits must 
bnve been left t o  eover tlic rortds to Lisbon on the riglit 
bnnlí of thc Tilgus, nnd thc commutiiciition bet~veen Victor 
and Soult bdng free, l3eresford"s corps mouId have been 
endangered. 
2". 2'0 a&p6 Almeida ancl Cizrlo!d Radrigo m t h  h c m  of 
s n o v m r s ,  m d  O~YPIEEO, im colaj t .ndh W ~ I J L  Bmfwci d e &  
F a ~ p e  tMad ~ o n a a n a ,  6y 8&wnm, ?o/¿& buesta and Vmgm 
ocncpid tlte attedon of thejirst and fmrth corps un t7a Tqw. 
This mould scparnte tlie Briticli from thc mosf efficicnt, to act 
with tlie wenlrwt aud moet irmplnr of ttie Slinuidi armier;, 
and woi~ld leave Cuesta to the ruin h i ~  lieadstrong hnmour 
would certxinly provoke. The losa of Be~ille, or of Lisbon, 
mould inevjtably follow, and t.lic iilritructions of the English 
miniukrs now m d e  tlie defence of tLe lntter ciky pwnmuunt 
t o  every other object, #ave ehe military poasession of C d z .  
3'. Xo m c h  wpm Pheneia nnd ATmutrtkz, fom aja- 
teWa m'tl~ C w a ,  a& d v m c e  w ~ a k s t  d d m W ,  wJ1& Yenegaa 
o p r a t ~ d  im  thB 8 m  &m hy t h  of La JIancTm. Tlie 
obdaclea in tlie way of this plan were-lo. Exposing GuwEa 
to a defeat. hy Victor before tlte junction; and nfter the jnnc- 
tion tlic comliinations ~vould still bc depcn!ntlcnt upon tlic accu- 
m y  of Vene%ds movemerits. a*. Tlie mnrcli woulrl lvitli 
reference to Soult5 corps be a flnnk mzrcli; an unsafe opem 
tion at al1 times, but here, moving through the long n a m w  
valley of the Tagus, peculiarly daagerous. Neverthelcss it 
mns arioptcd; nor werc thc rcrnsons in favriur of it dcvoid of 
force. She Frencli immellintely proteeting Mdrid  were only 
csitittiatetl at fifty tliomand; confidential o f f i c e ~ ~  sent to flio 
liead-qunrters of Cuesta and Penegas, ascertained their 
respective armies t o  be thutty-eigtit thousand for the h s t ,  
twenty-five thoosand for the second; thq were m11 m e d  
iind equipped, and the last cerhinly the best md mmt &cient. 
m y  the Bpaniards had yet brought inb the field; anrl when 
Pache, the rnilitmy agent, wamed sir Arthur that however 
well Cuesta's men lookerl, they were not to be m d ,  hia 
admonition watr dkeprded. The English force in Portugal 
amounted to thirty tliousand men, exclualve of the aick; 
twenQ-bo thmaaiid Leiug uder  m s  on the frontier, and 
eighlit tbousand at Lisbon. Thus it apgeared tbat s mass of 
nin* thoastind repiar trmpe aonId be bronght t o  bear on 
fifby thousand; beriides wbich, there were Wilrion's legion, 
a thousand sErong and the Xpanish pa&k of tlie Guadh 
lupe and Sima de Eejar. 
As the ridge of mountains aepamtbg the vd1ey of the 
Tapa from Gatille and Leon m impr&ide for artillerg, 
except nt Baños and Pemles, it waa suppoaed the twenty 
thousand men under Thrmford and de1 Parque woutd d i c e  
to bIock t h w  plrgseg, and tht Romana, moving by the Traa 
os llontes, would join del Parque : thm thirty thousand men, 
siupported by two fortresaes, would prcrtect the fl& of the 
Britisli twny in i t ~  march from Plaaencia h w a r d ~  O d d r i t L  
But tlis catculaticin was f&e. Romana remained osten- 
tatiously idle at C e d a ;  sir ArtI~ur, n m  having seen tba 
Spanhh troopri in action, tbought tao well of them; and 
having no experienee of Spanish promises, tntsted them too 
far, and mkjudged the  f m e  and position of Es ad~emarim~ 
The mival of tlie aixth corps at A ~ t o r p  and of the fifth at 
Talladolid wrss unknown to h h  ;the strength of Sontt's c o y ,  
nnd tlie activjty oof its cliief WCrE nndermtecl: inatead of fiftecn 
or twenty thousand h m e d  Fsencli troops without artillery, 
as he mpposed, tbem were seventy thoumil figliting men 
welI equippd behind the mountains l 
On the 27th of June, the English amy, o r g a n a  in the 
foliawing rnmner, m d e d  into Xpain :- 
AdPIhym 
ois brigdeq 30 y n ~ ,  Major-peml H&h. 
Cavaby. 
Three brigada, 3017 aabra, Lieutenaubpd F a p .  
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1st divihn of 4 bri eb 6,028 bagmsh, ht.-general Sherbmnki. 
2nd do. 2 , M 7  d .  Major-pnml Hi i .  
3rd cio. Z do. 3,736 do. Major-aeneml Msckenzie. 
4th c I a  2 do. 2,957 do, Br&adier-generd CmpbeIL 
+ - - 
L divisionq 13brigdes,19,?'10 a a h  and bcyoneta, 
1,287 engineera, arhiller~; and wmggon-train. 
h i d e s  tiis force, the 40th regiment, tio Iong detajned at 
Bville by Mr. Frere, had nwived in Lisbon; an~l  tlie other 
troops iñ rnareh from thst citp, being somewhat l e s  t l m  
eight thourrand bayonets, were organkd in three brigades, 
under major-genera2 Lightfoot and the brigadier-operals, 
Rohrt Craufurd and Catlin h w f o r d  ; bui the l d n g  brigade, 
nnder Cmfud ,  o d y  quitted Lisbon the 28th of June. 
The troopo moved iñ t w i  columna npon Caatelb Branco, one 
by Sobseim pon no^^ the 0 t h  by Villa Yelha, wliere a boat- 
bridge waa eabblished, From Cnstello Bmnco tliey mwched 
ia one column, a tlanking bripde, under general Donkin, 
expEoring the country between Zarza Mayor and the Tapa. 
T h e  10th they reached PIasencia and x m  joined by one cavdrp 
regiment aucl kwo b~ttalions of inf~ntry from Li8bon. Cuwb 
was then at Alrnmaraz, md Vidsor whose intermediate rnove- 
ments muat be noticed was at Talavera de la IEgrnie. The 
vrillep of the Tagus had been exhuskd by the fourth and 
fifth corps, Lnit tlie fertile d l e y  af Flmencia wng untouched ; 
lience Victur, whoae troopa, weakened by the tertian fever, 
ieguired g o d  nourifihment, resolved at first to take post them 
and ihmw a bridge over the Tietar at Bamgona. Fmm Pla- 
aencia he conld in two marches fa11 upon Cuesta if he p s e d  
the Tsgus at Almaraz, and he could closely observe di 
h h u r * ~  rnovements, and g e n  a communication with h u l t  
and Mortier by the pass of Baños ; but when b i ~  bridge BE 
Rnzngotia, WQS tinishcd nnd his Iight froops were fmnging the 
valley of Maaencin, the king, wlio liad already withdrami 
mny of his fmes  t=o reinforce Beb~tiani, odered him to fail 
back upon Talavera, IeeMng rew gusrda on the Tietar and at 
AIrnwaz. Thia order ariived the 22nd of June, it wae the 
mul t  of an indedsion which none but grcat men and fools are 
free from in war; the First becausa they see clearlyj the last b 
cause they see nothing, . 
Bebastiani had reported t h a t  Venew was reinforced and 
rearly to invade Xla >lancha; and the kmg swayed by fhis false 
Information, and disturbed by Cuesta's dvance; alarmed also 
by Blakets propms towarrls Zarqoza tlie ~eault  of which was 
then unlrnown; Rd oriIered R. Cyr to move to the nid of 
fitrchet, and fir~t wenkenecl nnd t h ~ n  mitlidrem Victor from the 
T i e h :  he epen calied Mortier np towards AviIa, tliough2 fol- 
lowhg Napoleon's orden, he should havc been at Salamana 
Designing ta figlit T'ene,~, Joseph advanoed to the Jabalon 
river in h M m h ;  but the S p a n i d  retired to tbe Morena, 
nntl the king leaving some troops rit Toledo retnrnetl to 
3fndrid rind rcstored Victor'~ troops. Whilc he had becn 
fdjiowing n trhdow, that rnar~hal mna in real dnngcr ; for the 
Jabalon m six long marches from Madrid, and for ten daya 
tlie duke of Belluno having only fonrteen thousand men, 
remained at Talavera without snpprk, when sixty thonsnnd 
men were menaeing him from different points, Victor escaped 
rlnmngc, bnt hia wcraknesa wwed Cue~titn, wlio hnxl mos~cd thc 
Tagus tlie 53rd June and gnshed an advanced guar,ad to 
Oropesa, Be had thirty-eight tliwmnd men, yet quietly 
allowed fourken thousand French to make a flank m m h  for 
threc drrys only twelve miles from his position. h d  hia 
ncgligcnt method was so obvious, tbat Yictor's mvnlry were 
prcpan'ng h punish liim, when tnkig nlgrm, Iie recrassed tha 
river a p i n  nnd proceded t.o f i n i ~ l r  his biidgea 
It was on tlie 88th of June that lrictor, liaving removed 
his hospitds and depdts from Arzobispo, p l a d  bimself b e b d  
the Aliierche, liaving an ridranced guard in Talaveiii, and out- 
postri at Calera mbnd Gamonal; his detachmentg on the Ieft 
mtched the Tagus from tlie mouth of tlie AIberche to the 
Gtdamma stream ; on the right tliey observed, from E d o n b  
the Vera ile Plnsencia and the passes leading upon bvila, 
During thia retrograde movcment, una% to transport liia 
ponhons, be bnrned fifheen at Baaagone and &rew mmuni- 
tion into the T i e h  ; his troops had been four days on quarter 
d o n a  and were sickIy, the Tapa waa fordnble, hi fiank 
wns exposed, the  danger iuimineiit; but the Britisli were still 
at Abrantes, Cuesta was Incapable, and d a i m  remrtinecl In 
this stnb until the English nrmy reaclied Pl~sencin. Sir 
Arthur Iind seen the letter from Soult to Joseph, takee upon 
Francesclii, and had conversed with that general while passing 
towards Senlle a prisoner; he t h s  Iearned that the 2nd 
corps WW at Zmora, and the 5th corps at Vdlarlolid; bnt of 
Ncy'a mar& from Gallicia hc kncm notbing, and thc tenonr of 
EouIt's lettec ~eernerl to recommeud tlie retention of Gallioic. 
Noreover an interwpkií letter from Victor, dated the 2 3rd of 
June, was so desponding, that traken in conjunctian with 
k l t ' s  pictnre of difficulties, the general impression of French 
wenkness and d i ~ m a y  was nu,pented. 
KV drtliur, though fm fron augpecting his real peril, 
finding two corps d'arrnEe mere beliind the mountains on hls 
flank, took dditional p~ecautions. He warned Eeresfod to 
watcli the French movements nnd Iwk cxrefullg bo the pass 
of Perales; and aa the pasa of Batioa was afso to be guartled, 
he applied t o  Cueat~ That general reIn&ntly consented 
that two httalions from bis a r q ,  md tmo already quartered 
in Bejar on thc 0 t h  ~ i d e  of thc pass, shonld unite to defend 
it; and thnt de1 Parque shauld also ~end troop~ to the. pasa of 
Penales. These measures wouEd h a ~ e  guñiced apinst Sonlt if 
he had been as crippled m he mas mpposed to be, but were 
futile ~gainst his real power; and thcy becnmi? ridicnlons when 
Cuesta sent only six hundred men Wrth twenty rounda of 
ammnnition: but; this was part of a system wbich was now 
weighing hcaviTy on the English general. 
Cuesta was nlwny drcntlccl by tlic supreme juiitri.; and whcn 
the defeat at BBchite cni~hed BlaEce as a rival, the junta 
uought to make Venegm a couiiterpaise, by inmasing liis 
army and giving him the best troops. Etill Cuesta s n s  
powerful, and to Ecssen him sm a common object with the 
junta nnd with >fr. Fr~rere, who wishcd to  mise dlbuq~~erqiie. 
 cuesta'^ nntiiml obstinacy and piolence ñrere emoertiated by 
these inttigiim, in mhich he erroneously thouglit sir Arthur 
wm concem~l; and Iienoe, when the latter carne to him at 
Mirtcbetc on tlie ZOth, and proposed at the imtigation of 
Mr. Fmm, thot ten thoiisand men sl~iliould be detadied to Avila 
and Scgoviq Cuuegta absolutely refused, and d d  only give 
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two battslions and a few c a d y  to reinforce Wikon, who wss 
to aict in the mounkintl on Victor's right. This refusal a@ 
baffled Ms. Frere, whcm design waa to  have the dehhmcnt 
plnced nnder Albuquerque; and it also forced tbe junh to 
other expedients for d u c i n g  the mthoxity of Cuesta, whwe 
obstina7 howmer wved his troops; the ten tbousand men 
would have pne  into the midst of the fifth cor~w, which, ia 
expectation of mch a movement, was at Villa Cadtja; and 
hving been rejoinail by colonel Bricheb dehchment ffmm 
Catalonia it was eighteen thouamd strong and mpported by 
KelIemm's indcpendcnt crrval y at Valladolid : thc Spaniamls 
mnld thns hnve becn cruabcd, tho campaign would have heen 
ruined, and sir h h u r  Wellesley's iiifluence in Xpain would 
h v e  been destmyed at the outset by Mr. Fmre'a ghallow per- 
nicioug intripes, 
At Mirabete the discnssien between Cuesta and tbe English 
general lasted two &ys, bnt findly terminatd in an agm-  
ment that both generala shmld rnarch on the 18th against 
Victor; and tliat Venegas sliould push thmgh JA Mancha 
t o  Fuente Duenas m d  Villa la1aitrique on tlie u p p  Tws. 
If Vene,~' movenient drew Sektiilni to that ~i(le, he was to 
be heId in play while the allied armiea defeated Victw; if 
8eWiani disre-ded it, V e n e p  wm to mrch on fifadrid, 
~viiiio air RObert Wilson, reinforood with some Spnish bab 
tnliona, was to menaci! that capital on the oppi te  qnarter. 
But behind this fair plan foul intriguee wero in activity whicli 
were t o  render it nnll. P&ow to  eotering Spdn, #ir Arthur 
liad ascerhined that the d l e y s  of the Alqon and Arago, and 
tliose between Bejm aad Ciudad Xodrip, were capable of 
nourishing hi amy, and he had sent comrni&sariea there to 
pnrchape muleq md arrange d t h  the alcaldes for the sugply 
of the troops; he bad obtained also wam abisumcea from 
the Bupreme junta that sverg needful article should be forth- 
mming, and their intenhnt-gened, Zonxano de T o m ,  m 
at the British hhedquartera with fu31 powem ReIying upon 
these preparatiom he crorid the frontier with mnty meaos 
of t ransport, and without mapinerr; for Portugal ~uuld not 
fnmish what was required, and tbe Portuguwe peasnnts had 
an bmprtbb1e objmtioa to quitting their omn country; yet tila 
bazaid did not appettr p t ,  because Mr. Frere, writing 
officially, deseribed the people of Estremadum as viewing 
th.8 & I d  ofmli .  a carne/' 
Fmm Castello Bmnm to  Plasencia i a  bnt seven Jays' rnarnb, 
but tlmt time was sufficient to pmve the bad faith of the jnnta, 
and the fdly of &fr. Frere. Neither mulea for transport, nor 
the promised belp of the authorities, nor aid of any kind oonld 
ba pmmmd; antl Lonxano de Tems, although to ~ í r  Arthnr 
he freely acknowledged tbe extent of the evil, the ill-wilE of 
the inhabitants and the shameful conduct of the supreme 
junta; afkrwarda, without shame, asserted thnt the Britisb 
troopa liad alwity~ rcociv~l and consumd doulilo rations, trnd 
were in want of nothing. This ~sest ion was repeatecl by 
Martin de Qaray the Spaniah secretary of atate, Appenarx 
the whole being a ooncerted plan, t o  afTord the 
junta a prctext for justifying their own and cañting a slnr 
upon the English general's conduct, iE any disasters ~honld 
happen. Sir Arthnr, seiously alarmed for the subsistente of 
hk amy, wrote upon the 16th to Mr. Frere and to  O'Donoghue, 
thc chief of Cuesta$ staff; he &ted to Goth the distreas o£ the 
troopa, and intimated bia resolation mt ta pro& b q d  th 
Alberehe, un1 esa hig wants mera irnmediately aupplied. Faitliful, 
however, to hls rigeement with Cuesta, he prepred to put h 5  
foicc in motion for that river. 
Oa the 15th he knew that Ney had abandoned hrniía, but 
it wm thought tie had been redled  to Fmnce, and no change 
was marle in the plan of campaign; it wm not mspected thnc 
tltc sixtl~ curps hnd thcn been ~iixtecn dtrys at Amtorga, rand in 
tliis ignornnco the Bntiuil generni plunged into the m l l q  of 
tlie Tapfi. Shc line of rnarch was i n t m d e d  by several 
riverri witli rugged banks and deep ch-els, whose fFaw is no$ 
mucli out of prrt1Iel 6 t h  the T a g s .  The courao of the 
Alhrclie is nerirly endosed by that o l  the Tietar, and Wilson, 
ascencling the right Iiank of the Iatter, pined the pase of 
Arenas which leads on Aviia, and the pass of San Pedro Ber- 
nardo abich leab apon Madrid. In this pmition, having 
four thoumnd troops, ho covcrcd the rich Vera d e  Flasencin 
and m e w e d  Victor's cornmunicntion with the kiig, Tha 
welkidi8S. French mmhnl w a a  darmcd lcat a rnovement 
see 6. o€ tlte Brjtisli army in tlie m e  direction sl~uuld 
ia a few marches nulliíy hia pmition on the Alberclie, mil 
inkrcept his r e h t  ta Madrid. ETa judged ill. n a t  iine of 
mmch mas too nigged for rapid movement. Tictor had 
twenwfive thousand men, and couId not be tnisted so near 
Cuesta; it rvas therefore eseential to join the lattcr md $he 
British gencm1 resolved to cross the Tietnr, F L ~  the Vcnta de 
Bneagonri, and mar& by Mitbjdas upon Oropwa 
It ia said ths Frencli are in military mattera quicker than 
the English. Victor had wastd mmy d a p  dragging pontoons 
from the T a p  to the Tietar, md he de~troyed them when he 
retired; m Englii  oficer of the staff corps taok the materiaIs 
of an old house, felled some pine trees tkree miles from the 
Tietar, and in one deay threw a ~ o l i d  bridge over that rriver by 
whkh thc army pwocl on tlie 18th. 'Ihe 20th it reached 
Oropesa, nnd hnlteil the 21at. On thnt day Cuenta passed 
Oropesa nnd comentrnted liis whok furce nt Vcllatlta, with 
esoeptiw of a small dehchment sent up the aouthern bmk of 
the Tagw to menace the enemy's bridge at Talavera, Tictor 
immediatelp reinforced bis pcsts at  Talavera. His position 
seemed critical. The allics, wvered by the ~llberehe, might 
stifl reacli Escnlona before he could, nnd might tnkc post a t  
Maqueda ta cut him off from Mdrid or pus11 throngll Bntnete' 
to tliat enliital. Ris sources of intelligence were liowever 
mre. HB sent h w s a ~  t o  match the upper Alberche nnd 
~upport he troops opposed to Wilson; and on the 21st, when 
Cuesta was In motion, he recnlled his foraging parties, altered 
his line o£ retreat from the Madrid to thc Toledo road, removed 
his parc fmm Et. Ollallri to CevalIa, and conccntrated two 
divisions beliinrl the Alberehe. 
On tlie 23nd, tEie alliea moved fonvuiu1 iii two columns, nnd 
Cuesta, attaclred tlie Frencli rear gunrtI nenr Gamonal with 
jncredible ignorante, timidity and absurdity, &tour Mau- 
boutg, riding boldly on to the table land of animonal with 
only two thousmd dragmns, forced Zayas t o  display tlie first 
Spanbh line of fifteen thousand infnntry and three thoitsand 
cavnlry; nor would he hwe gonc bnck nt nll if thc mt itiiifoim 
ef England had iiot been descrid on liis Rglit, iden supporkd 
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by soma infnntry he regaincd the Alberche withomt 1 0 ~ s .  Bi 
thomnnd Spnnish home and mmy battcrim were cIose on hia 
m, yet t h g  woaId not make men a padid chtutge, and by 
two o'clock the whole Frencli army wss concentrate& R&n7i 
division on the left touched the Tagn snd p r d d  tbe bridge 
over the dlberche, which waa under the fire of fourteen p n s  ; 
the henvy mvalry wcre in second line mear the bridge, and the 
otlier divinions ompied higher ground on tlie rig1it overlook- 
íng the snrronnding country. Here they rsmained t m  dap. 
It waa d i m l t  to obtotin information from the Xpniards by 
gentle mesns, and hene  the French were usuully better semd 
thm thc British ; thc nativo generais never linew, nor cnred to 
know nnytliing about tlieir enemy until they felt I i is bIow ; 
and up to this +od sir Arthur'a be& sourca of infmation 
were the intercepted French Ietters.  reto^ hnd bcen in 
poaition without chungc of n u m h  sineo tlie 7th, yct the 
inlialsitnnts of Tilavera could not or would iiot say mj+hing 
about his strength or ~ituation ;nor could either be discovered 
nntil u ir Arthur ascended the mountains #out31 af the Totgus 
and from thence lookd hto the French position. The out- 
line of an nttaek was then n p e d  npon, liut wlicn tlie detaila 
were to be arranged Cuesta went to bed! Tiie British troops 
were in arms at fhree o'dock, next rnorning Cuesh's staff 
were not arouaed until seven o'clock, and findly the oErl man 
objocbed t o  figliting that dny. bJr.~ere was morc thnn incrtness 
in these promtlinp. Vlctor rvas well nssnred the allies wonld 
not attack, Iie kad corrupted some of thc Spanifih s t d ,  ñ,d 
thc rmult of thc dismusions betmeen sir hrtliur and Cuesta 
3 rvLicL onIy onn olfrccr on ench sidc wns pment, became lcnown 
to tlie enmy twenty-four hours aftcnvards ; Cuesta liimself 
mas suspted of the treachery Iiut nppmently without reason. 
In t he  coume of the 23rd tbe fipanish outposts gaTc notice 
that tlie Freiicli mera going to retreat, Cacstn tlien becnrna 
willing to attack and proposed t o  examine the ground; he 
a m e  ie a coach witli s i l  horaes, and mhen tlie rugged gronnd 
forced him to descend, he threw. himself undcr a tree md 
ment to  sleep! Yet he WFN a l m y ~  ready to censure and 
thwart every plnn of liis great condjritor. This time indeed 
he consented to fight, md tlie troolis were put in motion mr1y 
on the 24th; but Viator had been agah duly infomed, and 
withdrawing his troope from the upper Alberche, feU back in 
the night to Torrijos, Thns the ht comblnation failed, and 
the enemy'a forcea were accumuIating dangeionsly sround the 
allies; for Venegas had not pwsed Damyel, the king was 
colledng hiil whole atrength between Toledo and Talavera, 
and Soult waa gatliering a more POrmidab1e poww beliind tho 
mounhins of Bejar. Sir Arthur kncw not of tbis last danger 
or he would doubtieas liave returnad at onoc to Pl~encim, mil 
~acured his cummunicatiom with Lishn md witb Bcreeforcl: 
but there were 0 t h  pawerfd reaaom to stop his advarlce. 
Befom he quitted Phsencia he had oompIeted contmts with 
the alcalda of the Vera de Magenciq for &o hundred md 
fifty thouaand rations of forage and prorisiom, which, added to 
bis psevious coliectiona, would have furnlshed supplies for ten ar 
twelve dgs ,  a suñicient time to h t  ViFtor and gain a fresh 
o o n n h ,  These rations hsd not bwn deliverd, and bis repre- 
santations on thc mbject were by &esta and the junta 
disregarded wherefore tie gave both natice foi the second time 
thst he would not mwe beyond the Aiberclte, unless bis wants 
were immediately mpplied. Thia w a  unheeded, no mearts oE 
tmnaport M been provided for him, hia koogs were on hdf 
allowance, absoIute famine approached, and when he demanded 
food he was answered with false excaries aad false s t a b  
ments. Without food he conId not move, Iint aa liiB sdviimw 
had been made in the exercise of lik own di~~smetion a d with- 
out ordera from hb government, he liad no imm for hesitation, 
and expreasing wrmiy hirr dtscontent with the eupreme junta : 
he then declared he would withdraw from Spain altogether. 
Thk &te of affaira and Cueatds folly justifid his anger, but ' 
the Ethless and p m e m  wnduct of the Junta' o+ pnrtially 
known to him, exceedcd even the rneasure of Cuesta's obdu- 
mi% folly. After consenting tu ths genemI plan of opera- 
tiom, the junta concluded tbat the al lk  in the  all ley oF the 
T a p a  would d i c e  to o d h r o a  Joseph, and sscretly ordered 
Venegaa not t o  fulfil lia part; aqning with a stupid cmning 
thak, keeping him d e ,  they would h e  a powerful force under 
one of theis own creaturca to maintain their powcr7 while 
Cuesta'b's defmt if it liappened would he ie them s gain. 
Venegaa obeyed these treacherous ordera, and tbe melf~re of 
milliong was =de the sport of men who, never tired of 
pmising tliemmlvea, have been by EngIhh writers Iauuded for 
patriotiam! 
As the Spaniards are perfect mastera of the art of mying 
everything and doing nothing, sir Arthur's remonstranoes 
drew forth many ofñcial statemenh, plausible replim, and 
pompous mertiona, after their mranner, bu€ produced no 
smdiomtioa Mr. Frere also, tbinklng it necesBary to make 
aome a ~ l o g y  for Iiimself, declared the evii waa deep rooted, 
and he M neither time nor power t o  arrange any regular 
plan for the subsid~nee of tfic English amics. Bu€ al1 tho 
evila blighting the Spaninh canse were deep-seated; and BIr, 
Frere, who couId not a m p  a p h  for the mbsistenee of the 
trmps, an indispensable preiiminary t o  müitary operations 
and within his pmvince, thoughk himself competent. to dired 
all tlio operatima themselveq which were in the province of 
the generals. He h d  found Ieisure t o  rneddle in al1 tke in- 
trigues of tlie &y, to aim at msking and unmaking Spanisb 
mmmandm, t o  insnlt sir John Moore, to p t e r  sir John 
Cradock with warlike &ice, and to  armge the plan o£ 
campaign for sir Art11up Wellesley's army without that offim's 
concurrente 1 
Sm Aamm T ~ ~ L R ~ L ~ s  declarations were Iost an Cada. 
A French armg mas retreating before him, the P p n e e s  mse on 
hi ~anpine view, and, resolving to be fimt in Madrid, he 
pwbed forward, reckleas alike of military precautions md the 
friendIy irarning of the Englisli general, wlio vainly mm- 
mended lum to commnnicate quickly with Tenegas, nnd to 
h m r c  Iiow he let the enemy know he hd scpramtcd from thc 
British army. Heedless md headstrong, f i e s t a  m s a d  the 
Aiberche, and not knowing by which road the Fmcli M re- 
tired purmed thm on botli. rfbe 25th he sent one mloltunn 
to Torrijos and rilarchecl liimelf to St. Ollalla as if chasing r 
deer, Ziut on the 26th Re found tliat he had beea hnnting a 
ti-ger. ;Sir Arthur foreseeing the result o£ this folly had, not. 
withstsncling his dmIarntion, sent Slierlirooke with two divi- 
sioiisi of Britisli infantry and al1 the cavalry across the AIberche 
to Gmalegtq where, hing centrimlly situated with mspect to 
Talavera, St. OllaIh, antl Escalona, he muld support C h e s h  
and communicrite with Wilson, who had been in the latter 
p h e  sinm the 23rd. But a grext ancl s i p d  d a i s  m at 
liand, whicli m only bc understood by an eñact knowIdge of 
the sitiiations and procecrlinga of $1 tlie amieo invol~ed in this 
mpl icn ted  cnmpnign. 
On tlie 30th of June, floult, then at Znmom, liad received 
a despatch from the emperor &tea near Ratisbon and confer- 
ring on him tlie supreme comrnand of tlie second, fifth, aud 
sixth cerps, &li odere to concentrate them and wt decisively 
agwinst tlie English, ' Wellesley,' said Napoleon, 'm*llpvrobdY, 
d v a m  by $!de Tmjw8 a g n i ~ e t  JfodrX; eia t l ~ t  me, pase tJ~t! 
m t n f a i w , f d  m I~Lqfimmlc amd r m ,  amd m h  him.' Thus, 
even at tliat diskance and without otlier idormation than what 
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lending opcrntionq w soon, nnd aa oertainly, thosa wbo pro- 
jected them. Souit imparted tliese instnictions te tiie king, and 
made knom hia own opinions and designs with respect to the 
probable projecb of tlie alIies. He was ignorant. of the precise 
oliject md emct positiorr of sir Arthur; but jutlging from tlic 
cessstion oE hostility in the nortli tliat he was in rnarch to 
join Cuesta, he proyiosed to draw Sudiet's wrps t o  Balamanca, 
besiege Ciudad Itodrigo and meaace Lishon; which he justly 
observed, would hring the Englieli amy Zinck to the northem 
pr~vinmq of Portugal. Antl if, EM some anpposed, air Arthur 
sliould unite at Eraganpwith Ramma, and open the campaign 
t o  the north of the Doum, the Frencli nrmy would stiii be in 
a suihblc position t o  oppose them. 
In ppursuance of ibis view, BouIt ordererl Mortier to ap- 
pronch Ciuclnd Ibdrigo, ~ 6 t h  the deuble view of prepariag for 
the ieege and covering the qnartem of refmhment so much 
nectFcrl by thc  2nd corpa; Xcy also wna dirccted ta mar& 
tPibh the sixth wrps by the left bank of the Esla to Zarnora. 
Eut the spirit of dismrd was strong, and it waa rtf  this mo- 
ment the king, alarmetl by Scbmtianiag repork, drew the fifth 
corps to ViIln C ~ t i n ,  wliile Ncy, holding it irnprudent t o  un- 
wver h r g a  and Leon, mortified aiso at being plsced under 
the orders of  another marshal, refused to move to Zamora. 
huIt, sordy crosseil by these untoward circumstancea, then 
aent hia brothsr's divisian of ligLt aivalry nnrl Eeudelet'm in- 
fantry frorn Zarnora and Toro t o  Strlnmanca; with ordem to 
explore the couae of thc Tomes, to o h e m  Alba and Ledesma, 
anrI scour the randa lertclingupon Ciucld Rodrigo and Masencia: 
tliese troops relieved n, rlivision of dragouns belvnging to KeI- 
lerrnan, wlio was stilt chmged 16th the general governrnent af 
the pmvince. On tlie 10th of July, the march of the British 
upon Plaqcncin liccnmc known, and it was rnnnifest air AIth~ir 
had no k i p n  te act nortli of tlie Douro; f ien  h u l t  dvanced 
mith tlie remainder of the seeond corps to Salamanca; and 
partly by authoriQ, partly by address, made Ney put the 
sistli corpa in movcmcnt for Znmorn, lenving Fotirnicr'~ 
dragoona to cover Astorga and Leon. Meen~vhile the king 
returned from the Jabtilon, and though increduloua af sir 
Arthur's junction with Cuesta, agreed to Sodt'a project 
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sgaiikat Ciudad Rodrigo, and ordered Mortier to regain Vaila- 
dolid. 
On the 13th of July Soult, he* that tlie British army, 
reinforced from Gsbon, was on the eastern frontiw of Porhrgai 
and meant t o  operate by the Taguri, again movd tho king cs 
ta  the siege of Rodrigo, promising to have his own thrce corps 
in full activity witliin fifteon days if hia demands werc complied 
with. The mmt important of thege demands were a Iirattering- 
train ; the conoentration of numerous detachments which 
weakened the active bodies ; and a reinforcemmt of fifteen 
ar twenty thousand conscripts to enable the old h o p s  empIoyed 
on the communicationa to  join thek -les. Victor shouhi, 
he said, watch Guata and prevent his uniting with 
e. j,,,a the English to dist.urb the sicge; and be prcpared 
OPCrntImr also t o  join thc othcr corps and give battlc if one MSS. became necessarg : when Ciudad Tell, Almeida 
conld be invested and the Engl i i  comrnunication with Lisbon 
menaced. Joseph replied on the 17th through marshal Jourdan. 
He approved of tlie plan bui could not meet the demank He 
propos ed instead, that Soult should reinforce Kelleman wnd 
Bonnet with ten thouesnd men, to seiee tho Asturiag and 
atreiigtlien tlie commmictltione with Franca !llis drew tlie 
folIowlng remonstrance :-' U+ pwwt & r n & c ~  m 
cmmt c.cvoid m sa&& of t m ~ ~ 0 p . y ~  Jet ua crmcen&ata 
on afm p&a&, c~cvp& of dBfenc~ and cov&ng $7~3 hpihh 
ÚMad d.póts wJckh m y  ba m t h  extrmay of genadpo& 
~ W R  5%28 eailk mi! ?M so d&~$s$ing a.8 2t MI/ qtyew, becaua 
1E, maonae?at we Jm 7reac.m d&peraed th mrrnay18 WRM 
w ~JlffilE ~ e o o ~ e 9 .  dl OUT growwL' Then reitemting liia o u n  
dvice, Soult concluded thus :-c Ic&vs Zt impm~i3h bJ;&Id 
db& W W  @ & a G I b m e r k t ~ .  It i.9 k q d  7#7.U&m d y ,  BL9stmge~t 
tiaal m fm, tjíd m'U sueceed,' It is rrmarkable that 
sir Arthnr Welleslej~, writing at  the same time, mys, " 1 mdue  
tJie 3Te)ZCJB m dangerma &y w7ma in lwge mtaasses.' 
During this correapondenoe, Heudelet's division, having 
pnshcd del Parquek mlmnced p d s  bwk on Ciudad Rodrigci, 
nscertarned tliat n greot morement af troops was tallting plnce 
near that dty ; and tbat sir Arthur, advanCing qZlicker tlim \vas 
expected, hd dredy reached MaEienQa, Wherefore on tbe 
18th Soult direcbd Mortier upon Salnmnnca, and reinfowcd 
Eieudelet with Ifermct's division, Ney ~emaining on the Fain 
facing the Tms os Montes. Tliua noG lcss tban fifty thoir- 
sand mcn wcrc nboirt Snlnmanca, mitli c~~~-r.nlq~-po&s inting 
towartls the pus of &Gas, on the day sir Artliiir lV\~ellmlry 
crossed the Tietar to effect ljia junction with Cucsta. Pet, 
neither throngli del Parque, noi Beresfurd, nor tlie perillas, 
nor tFie pm~antry, did intclligcncc of this formirlable fnct rcnck 
Km! 
Raving put liis three corps in motion, Sodt despatchd Foy 
t o  Madrid t o  te11 of sir Artliur's mrch and arrange futiire com- 
bina ti un^. ' It i~yiro&aliic,' Fie snid, 't/vIt t 7 ~  cmcenhalim of 7my 
m y  al&dccm~ca will m p d  t ? ~  ZgrliBh6 g e l i d  to dwnp 71i8 
dan; 62cr $ 1 ~  sTmR atreadylia~ n d v a > d  on t L  ved toAiídki, 
m slmldmqsmblr: alil OUT forcm, bot7~ m tJw T m p s  a d  m tl~aa 
si&, to  fa%? .upor~hinaaltogstlaermdm?~ Aim.. YJtw himawzpaiyn 
will ZlaJnidd, a& OUT o ~ d b n s  m y  go m m'tl$ advantqe.' 
Foy rencbed Mdr id  the 22n4 anrl a fcm hours aftcnvnrds the 
lcing lieard tlinh tlie n l l i e~  were at Talavera, nnd tliat Tj!son, 
whese force \vas stmngely exaggerated, u*as at Escalona. me 
&e was cmt. Joseph Ieft genem! Bdliard with tbree tliousnnd 
men in the Rctiro, orrlered Soult to move instnntly on Plnqcncia, 
rtnd marclietl himaelf with his pwds &nd raserve hy Mostules 
to join Vicbr. TIie 23rd, being at N a d  bmeioo, he got 
aotice that Victor mould retrent in the nigl~t o Torrijos, nncl 
wouId be in tme dnya behkd the Guadnrama river; wlicrcupon 
turning to  his left he descended the Guadamma nnd effected 
his jiinction tlie 25th. himnwliile Webastiniii, dece i~ng  Veneghs 
ncnr Damycl, mndo Forccd mnrclies t o  join tlie lcing; biit Ilc 
left; three tlioumd men at Tolede t e  compcl Veness iF Iie 
advanced to crass the Taps higl~er np at Amnjiiez. Tlius 
fifty tl~ous~nd comliatnnts and ninety pieces of nrtillcr3; were 
conwntrnted on the morning of the 26th lieliind khe Guarlaraina 
atream, within a few miles of Cuesh's acivanced pnrrl, The 
Syia~sli mnin body was tlien at St. Ollallri, ~lierbiooke IW at 
Cnsi~lcgn~, nntl B ~ F  Artliur at Talnvera; tl ic Frencli wcrc thcre 
fore in fuIl innrch to attnck wliile tlie allies were se~inmted in 
four unconnected botlies, of w11ick tliree were enclosed as in s 
net by tlie Alberche and the Tngus. Napoleon's stroke on such 
ar 2 
an ocm~ion would h v e  been ~wi f t  and dcadly: Joscpli wm 
alow. 
Victor had ~ d e d  liko an abIe comrnttnder wlicn he fe11 bnck 
on Toledo i n d d  rif Madrid. ToIedo was the strntegic pi~ot  
npon which the fieoch movementa turned. It WM only 
through that city Veiiegsur could co-operate witli the allia on 
the Alberche, and if the latter advanced to wnnect themselvea 
with him Soult's bperations rerrrlered their deptnidion certain: 
every step fomard was a stride towards ruin. The king h e w  
Foy would on tlie 24th m c h  Bonlt, mho being tibout Sala- 
menea m only Tour marches from Plnsencia and might be in 
thc valley o€ tha Tngus the 30th; hence to insuro sucews thcl 
roya1 amy needed only to keep the allies in check for four or 
five days. Tlis plan 8oult recommended, the king assented, 
and mmhd Jourdan strenuowly supported it. Cnesta's folly, 
V e n e p '  duplicity, the aepcaration of the aliies, khe distressed 
state of the Engliib army, actnsally on the wrge of famine, a 
circumstance not unbnown to Victor, greatly facilitated thie 
project; and i t (?id not preclude Qe king from puni~hing the 
Spnriish army, smttered as it was, wipithout order discipline or 
plan. Cuesta had some perception of his dnnger on the 25th 
and gave orders t o  retreat on the 26th. But tbe French, 
suddenly passing the Guadarama at two o'clock in tlie niorning 
of that dny, drove t,he iSpRnish cavalry out of Torrijos, and 
piimned them t o  Alcabon, whcra Z n p s  hrad drawn np four 
tliownnrl infantry, two thou~and liorsemen, and eight gunR on 
s plain. 
COHB4T OF ALCABON. 
Z a p  had bis ight on the matl of Domingo Perez, his Lft 
on a chttpel of thc sane name. Latour Maubomg'~ cavalry 
dvanced in a paralle1 line againat tiie position md ra cannonacle 
commenced; but whea the head of the Frencb infantry appeared 
in siglit tlie Spitoiard's brolcg and flad in disorder toivmds St, 
Qllnllti, folloaed at fuU gallop by tbe horsemen, mho pressed 
them gorely; tlie padc monId then have spread through tlie 
~d.liole mmy but for the c o u q e  of AIbuquerque, who carne np 
with a, di~ision of  three  thousnnd fresh cavalry, and held tlie 
cnemy in playJ íi'hile Cue~ta retreated in the p a t e s t  disorrler 


towards the Alberche. At St. Ollsüa tIie pussuit ~lackend, the 
main body halted, and the advanced par&, save a few cavalry- 
postq did not p s  E1Bravo; no att empt ms &de to profit h m  
the nnconnected posiiion of the allim-a p s s  and palpable 
mor; for eitlier by the sword or dispersion tlie Spaniards lost 
four thousand men, an8 such mas thelr fear it required onIy a 
slight purauit t o  cause a gencml mrit. Albnqueque i n d e d  
ahowed front, bnt his efforta ivcrc unavniling, nnd tho disordcr 
continncd t o  inmmw, unti? Sherbrooke, mnrching out of 
Cazalepq p 1 a d  his divlsions between the scared troops nnd 
the enemy. XtPl the danger wm imminent. Them was uo 
wncert between the commanders, tbe p u n d  on the lePt of tlie 
Alberche was rinfavourable to a retiring pmty, and as yet no 
position npon whicli tho combines foreea eoulrl retire brul becn 
agred upon. CVhat then would liravo beon the wmequence if 
the whole French amy had borne down, wmpact md drong, 
into the rnidst of the disordered mas=! 
Sir hrthur seeing the confusion beyond the Alberche, kaew 
that a battlo was rtt hnnrl; and being persudd thnt in R 
strong defensire position only couM tlia iSpaniamTs be Iironglit 
t o  stand a shock besought Cuesta, while Sl~lierhrooke'~ peoplo 
could yeh mver hhe movement, to witltdraw 50 Tn1nverra, 
where there WM ground auited for defence. Cuesta% uunconth 
nature q o i n  broke fortli. KM &ten army, dispiriterl, 
fatigmd, hwildered, were clu&ering on a narrow slip of Iaw 
h t  lana between thc Alberehe, tIie Tags ,  and the lieiglits of 
Salinws; the Grst  shot fid by the enemy musb have been 
the signnl of dispci-sion; yet it m 9  in vnin sir Artbiir 
pointd out tllii, nntI entreatea him t o  nvoid tlic fitll of the 
sock thus trembling oTrer h d :  he replied, tht liis troope 
mould he dishewtened by further retreat, that he wonld fight 
wherc? he stood, and in tliis mood  sed the niplit. At dray- 
liglik, tho Britislr genemi renewal liis salicitations, at Sirst 
fruitlessly, liut when the enemy's cavalry a m e  
in sight, and Bherbrooke preparecl to retire, xate~bp 
thn Dnke d Cuesta sullenly gielded, yet, addressing bis st& ,v,l,;,,+,, 
witli fmntie pridc, ssaid, ' Hs A a d j ~ s t  mude t l ~  ltss- 
By7hI~mn go dolmz on J L ; ~  h.' 
Xom by virhirt: of lis ge~ius sir ArGliur assumed the com- 
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ffitlod of both armies. He left Mackenzie's division Bnd a
brigade of cavalry to eover a retrograde movement, took a
position six miles' in the rear, and recalled Wilson who had
reached Nflval Cameiro on the 25th, and would certainly have
entered Madrid. Between the Alberche and Talavcro the
country was a plain covered with olive and OOTk trces; and
nearly parallel with the Tagus at a distance of two miles, a
chain of round steep bills bounded tbis woody plain. Beyond
these hills, and separated from them by a deep and rugged
"alley something less than half a mile wide, was the moun-
tain-ridge whidl divides the Alberche from the Tietar; hence a
line drawn pelllcndiculnr to the Tag-us would cross the first
chain of 11il1s at the distance of two miles, and at two miles and
a half would fall on the mountains. Sir Arthur taking Tllla.--
wra, wllich was built close to the river, ag his fixed point,
placed the rigllt of the Spaniards there j drnwing them up in
two lines, tlleir left resting upon a mound where a large field·
redoubt was constnJcted, and behind which a brigade of British
light cavalry was posteo-L The frout was cOl'ered by n con-
vent, by ditches, mud walls, breast-works and felled-trees; the
Spanish cavalry was posted bellind their infantry j and their
rear was supported by a very large house in the wood, wen
placed, in case of defeat, to cover a retreat to the main roads
leading from Talnvern to Arzobispo and Oropesa. In this
position they could llot be attacked seriously, nor their dispo-
sition be even seen; thus onc-half of the line of battle was
rendered nearly impregnable, yet held by the worst t,roops.
This front was prolouged b>' the British infantry. Camp-
bell's division formed ill two lilies touched Cuesta's left;
Sherhrooke's division stood next to Campbell's, but arranged
on one line only, because Mackenzie's division, destined to
form the second line, was then near the Alberelle. Hill's
division should have closed the left of the British, by taking
post on the llighest hill in the chain before mentioned as
bounding the flat Ilnd woody country, yet from some cause
unknown the summit of this height was not imlllediately
occupied. The whole line was two miles in length; the left
rested 011 the ravine between the round hil\s and the monn·
bin j the front was covered by !l water-course, which corn:
lllencing about the centre of the line beCllme deep Il8 it passeu




the left, and was a. chasm in the vnlley. Part of the British
cavalry was with Mackenzie, part in the plain beyond the left,
part bellind the great redoubt at tIle junction of the allied
troops. The British and Gennans under arms
Appl'DdilC 9.
Wflre somewhat above nineteen thousand sabres
and bayonets, with thirty guns. The Spaniards could only
produce thirty-three or thirt:r-four thousand men, yet they
llad seventy guns. The combined army, tllerefore, offered
battle ""ith forty-four thousand infantry, ten thousand cavalry,
and a huudred picces of artillery; the French came on with
eighty guns, and including the king's guards nearly fifty thou-
sand men, of which seven thousand wcre cavalry; but what a
dift'erence in the quality of the troops! Tho Frcnch were all
bardy veterans, while the genuine soldiers of tho allied tl.rmy
did not exceed ninctl':Cn thousand.
Joseph had put his anny in motion before day_light tIle
27th. Latour Maubourg's cavalry led the march, Victor,
Sebastiani and the rOJ'al guards and reserve followed in suc-
cession. At one o'clock Victor reached the heights of Salinas,
from whence the dust of tIle allies, then Ulking up their posi-
tion, could be seen, but their dispositions could not be made
out because the fores,t masked them, Victor how-
ever, blowing the ground, guessed tIleir true posi-
tion, and the king following his advice directed
Sebastiani against the allied right, the cavalry against the
centre, and Victor lJimself against their left: the guards and
the reserve support-ed Sebastiani. Two artillery roads led
from the Alberehe; one, the royal road to Talavera, was taken
by the fourth corps and tIle reserve; tIle other, passing by the
Oasa des SaUnas, led directly against the allies' extreme left
and was taken by Victor, who to reach the Cllsa had to ford
tIle Alborche and march two miles through the forest. A
thick dust indicated the presence of Mackenzie's division and
8 brignde of cavalry near the Salinas, Bnd no llatrolcs had
been sent out, tl. negligence which brought on the
CO.llBAT 01' SALuas.
About three o'clock, Lallisse and Ruffin's divisions came so
suddenly on, that the British outposts were surprised and sir
Arthw wha m in the Casa hardly acaped capture. The 
clinrgc wns het, tEie English higades were sepnrntctl, md being 
principdly young ~oldiepa fired upon eacli other, and wcre 
drivcn in confiision f m  the forest t o  tIie pltsin. In the 
miclst of f h i ~  disorder tEia 45th, a ~tubhorn old regiment, and 
soma oompanies of the 60th rifles kept good army, and air 
Arthnr in penon restored the fight; the enemy ww thus 
checked; but tlie divivion lo& about four hundrd infanty, 
and, snpported by two brigades of cavaIry, khastily crossed tlie 
plain to regain thc position. Maclrenzie ieok post with one 
brignde 'tiehind tlie guarrIs in tha oentrc; donel D;oakin finding 
the Iiill on tlio extreme lcft ~ t i l I  nnoccnpied crorrned it uitli 
the atlier brigade, antl so accidentnlly filIctZ tlle position: tbe 
m l r y  fomed in oolumn beliind the left. 
Tictor brought liis artiIlery, his liglit canlrg and Tiliatte's 
inhtry, tto the Casa, snd tlien ksuing fmm the fomst, rapidly 
crossed the plain, and made up with a L e  drrplay close to 
the left o£ the allies, where he seized an bolated lUll in front 
d Donkin and opencd a heavy cannonade. About the gamo 
time tlie 4th oorp  and the reseme appmadied tlie allim' 
riglk, iind wnt tlieir light csvalry fonvard ta innke Cuesta 
show l U ~ l  line of battle. The horsemen rode bol<?+ up and 
commenced s pisto1 skirmish, whwenpon the Spanisirrls made 
a geneml d i i a r g e  o£ musketry and thn ,  rss if deprived of 
reason, ten tl~ouaand infanty and al1 the artiilery broke and 
fld. Tlie arbillerymen carrled off their hmeg, th0 infmty 
thkw away their B-, the adjutant-general Q'Donoghue 
waa forcmost in flight, anir mcn Cuesta himalf wcnt off 
slovly. The panic sprcad md the French chargcd, but sir 
Arthur flnnlced thc mnin road with some Englisli siqwdrons, 
and the ditclies on the oppoaite side rendered the ground 
impr&icalile for hommen; tLe Spaniards who remained 
used tlislr mnsketa wihh efict rind the French hal ly  retreatd 
with some loa. lfost of the mnaways fled to Oropesa, 
saying the dliea were defeatd md tbe Frencli in hot pursuit ; 
thus tlie m r  became s scene of incrcdible diiorder; the 
commiasaries went off with their animels, the pay-mastem 
carried away thcir money-cheatri, the baggage wm scattcred, 
and the aIarrn ~pread far and wide. Nor is it t o  be ctmccded, 
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that some English offioerw disgmced theis uniform on this 
occasion. When Cuesta recoverd himself lie sent many cavdry 
regimenta t o  hend tlie fugitivea and drive them back, and prt 
of the artilhry and same tlionsnnda o€ thc infantry were tbiis 
recovtjred during tlie night; yet in tlie next dny's figlit, the 
Spanish army sas less liy six tliousnnd men tlim it sliould 
hxve been, anrl the redoubt in tlie centre wns silent for want 
of guns. 
The hili on the left of the Britisli wua the key of the 
position. It wns steep, rugged towrds tlie Frencli,,and ren- 
rlercd moro inaccesaible by tlie mvine nt  the bottom, but 
torpnstlri tiie Engliñli aide it JVL~ of ~mootlier Bsme14,a 
ascenf, Tictor seeing Donkin'~ brigde feebIe and dollrnnl, 
the high point of the hill nnoccupied, conceived OISS. 
tho d e s i p  of scizing thc 1rtttCr by a siidden aasnult ; the sun 
waa sinlring, yet tlte twilight, aud tlie confusion amongst thlis 
Spaniards on hhe allies' right, appeared ao hvour~b1e for this 
project, t h ~ t  without informing tlie king he directed Itufiiia 
division to ~t tac l r  ;Villntte followed in aupport, and Laliisso wtis 
ordered to engage ntitli tLe Gmans,  aa a. diveraion for Ruffin, 
y& not aeriously. The assuult wos guick und Ggorous. 
Doakia repulsed the assai1.ilants in Iiia frant, but otliers tiirning 
his left, gaind tha top of tlie liill. At this c r i t i d  mornelit 
Rill mas aent t o  hia aid ; it mas nearly darlr, and that officer, 
mhile giving ordem to  t.he coIonel of the 48th reginieiit, tpas 
8h0t at by some truops from t l i ~  liighcat poirit, tliinking tliey 
were atr~tgglers from his o m  ranks firing st tlie eueiiiy, he 
rodc up t o  them in comptany with Iiis brigade-major Fordyce, 
and in a moment founcl Iiimeelf in tlie midst of the Freach. 
Fordyca wae killed, and Hill's Iiorse wns wounded by a pena- 
dier mho mughly s e i d  tho bridle also, but tlie gencml, spur- 
ring hnrtl, brokc the m~ds hold, m d  gauoping down mct t.hc 
29th rcgimcnt, wlvliich lic Icd up with aiich n ficrw chnrge tlio 
French coulil not sustrain the shock. 
Radng thusi happil y recovered the snmmit he bniught up 
the 48t11, and a batblion of detachmenta composed of  ir John 
Moorc's strn@~m; and tliese in conjunction with thc 29th 
ind Donkin's brigade presented an impusing masa. In time 
they carne, for the French troops repulsed were ooly a part of 
their ninth regiment forming Bufin's van; the other t.wo 
regimenta of his division had got entangled in the rri~ine, md 
tlie a t h k  hnrl only mrbdded. Lnpisse nlsa wns in motion and 
soon opened his firo on the German teson, wliile al1 tlie battt-t- 
liom of the 9th regiment, liaving re£omed agnin, mounterl the 
hi1l in mass. T h e  fighting now became vehement, and the 
opposing flaahes of muslietry seen in the darkness showed 
with wlmt a resolate spirit tl~e dniggle was maintained; the 
combatanta were mt~cely twenty yada munder and tlie event 
seemed doubthl; yet soon the w e i l - l ~ n m  sbout of the BritiA 
rioldier wm hewd nbove $he din of w ~ s ,  md t he  enmfs 
brolren troops were driven once more inta the ravjne below. 
Lapisse who had made sorne impresxian on the h a n  legion 
immediately abandoned bis £&e attack, and the fighting of the 
27th ceascd. The Briti~h llost eight hundred rnen, and the 
Prench ~bout  n thousand. Then the bivouac fiws blam$d up 
on both sides, nnd the French and British soldiers wwe quiet ; 
but, at tmelve o'dock, the Spanlards on the right, hearing 
Borne horsemen rnovjng, opened s prodigioua pea1 of musketry 
rand artillerg, which l m t d  for twenty rninirtes witliout my 
oliject; and during tl~e rernainrler of tlio night, the whole Iiae 
m fcequmtly disturbed by their desultory firing which killed 
several men and oficers in the Dritisli lines. 
Tictor hming leamed from the pnsonem the exact position 
of the Spaniads, until then unknown, reported his own failwre 
t o  the king, and proposed that a second attempt should be 
marle next morning at dagrlight. Joiirdan opposea tliia aa 8 
partid snterprise wliich corild not lead to any gcat muIt; 
'Irictor was carncat for thc triul, qokc of h i ~  intimate know- 
ledga of the p n n d ,  won Josepli's apsont, end iminediatelp 
made the folIowing di~pmitiions for tlie attack. Bis m n  artii- 
lery being formed in one mass, on a beight corresponding to 
t,hah on mliich the Englisish l& was posted, commanded 
the peat valley on its right, could smeep heavily along the 
~ I m m i t  of thc hill in front,, and obliqucly scarch tlia whole of 
the Britiah line t o  the lea tw for i19 the redoubt l i e t w w  tlie 
aliied a r m i e ~ .  EuEin'~ clivisioa wns place4 in advance, Vil- 
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Intte's In mnr of thls art~llev ;but the former kept, one regi- 
ment c lo~e  to tIie ravine. Lnpi~isc occ~ipierl some low tnble 
larid opposite to fierbrooke's divisian, Latour IIaubourg's 
cavnlry formed a reserve to Sapissq nnd Benumont's cnvaly 
fonned a 'eseme to Ruffin. Rill's division wns concentrated 
in tlicir front, tlie Engl islz cavnlry was massed beliind tlie lefh, 
tlie pnrc of artillary, and hospitals, were established, under 
cwer of tlie heiglit, between the ava1ry and Hill. 
At dllirenk R~iffin'~ troeps, d r n m  up two regments 
nbreast and supported by a third in colurnns of batbliuns, went 
forth against tFie left of the British, some ctirectly agninst tlie 
front, snmc h~ the vnllcy on their right, tlius embrncing two 
sides of tlie Iiill, Tlieir march mas ~ a p i d  and steady, tIiey were 
followed by Villatte's dividan, and the a ~ a u l t  aus preceded 
by e tiurst of nrtillery, wl~icli rattled mund the hdght fina 
~ ~ ' c p t  a w y  t,lie English ranka by wetions. TIic slinrp chat- 
tering of the rnwlcetq ~uooeedcd, and tlien tEie Frencli guns 
were pointcd towaríls tlie Ilritisli centre and right, mhile tLe 
grenlidiers closed upon Rill, anind the lieight sparklcd with fire. 
TIie ineqtialitics of tbo ground iirolre tlie compact forrnntion 
of tlie troops on t o t h  sides, and Iiere nnd there, small bodiea 
mere seen struggling for tlie mastery with al1 the virulence oE 
a single combat; in aome places the French grenadiem wero 
ovcrthro~n nt ancc, in otl~em tliey would not be denied rand 
rmclied t11e mnimit; but the English reserve8 were dwaya 
reatly to vintlictlte tlieir gronnd, and no pemanent footing was 
olifaincd. StilZ tEic conffict wns mraintnind with ~ingulat 
oliatinacy. Hill vas wounded, and Lis men fe11 f ~ t ,  yet the 
encm7 auffered more, and p e  back, step by step at first and 
slomly to corw tlie retreat of tlieir wounded; yet finally, 
nnaLle to s n ~ t n i n  the incrcnsing fury of the Englidi, anri 
ha6ng lost Above fifteen liundred men in tlie p a c e  o£ forty 
minutes, the wliole mass broke in disorcier, nnd retnrned 
to tlieir o m  position cavered by the ienewed play of their 
poircrfiil artllkry. 
To this rlestructir-e fire no mleouate ansver could he m d q  
for the English guns were few and of ama11 cdibre; and whm 
air Arthur desired n reinforccment from Cuesta, the latfer sent 
him two piecej! yet those were servioenbla, and the Spnish 
pnners foughh them gallantty. The principal line of the 
enemy'a retreat waa by the great va!ley, annd a favonmb1e 
opportunity for a, charge of home ocmtrred, bnt the English 
ci~mlry, Iiaving retired during tlie night for water and forw, 
were yet tm dishnt t o  be of aercice. Rowever, these repezted 
effoh of the French against tlie hill, and the appemnce of 
Borne of their light troop~ on khe rnountain bgond tlie left, 
bug11t tho English general that he sriould have prolonged E i i  
Aanlc on that side; wherefore, obtaininp33~secour's dihion from 
Cuests Iie placed it on the niountain, and hrought up a mass 
of Iiis own cavalry beliind tlie extreme leí?,, 11311 the leading 
squaxlrons looking into the valley: at the same time Albu- 
querque, diseontented sith Cuesta, cnme there with ]lis horsc- 
men, and tlius n formidable mnss, eix lines deelp, was presented 
in apposition. 
Joseph now held a counciI sith Jourdan and Tictor upon 
the expdency of a gened  bnttle. Jourdan sud, 'When the 
Mnmhal valley and the mountaiain were anocmpied on the 
Joiirdan, STth, the Spaniards should h a ~ e  been m e n a d  to 
116s. attract attentyon; thcn, in the night, thc Frmch 
m y  should have been silcntly p l d  in columna at tha 
cntrnnm of thc valley rcady to f o m  in o d c r  of battlc at dny- 
henk, perpeiidicular to  the Englirih portition, and NO ha\% 
asmiled thot. hill from whence Tictor lias lieen twice repulsed. 
Tbat disposit,iion wonld have f~rced the ailies to change their 
front, and during their mo~ement h g  might be attacked and 
beaten ; it cannot now be attempted M bithe EngIish general 
has occupied both valley and rnountain. The mIy pmcht line 
& to go b e l b i d  tlw AlbckB and ami€ Sou!t's apmaEzaEzm m th 
EnqiUh rem.' lrictor oppoaed this. He promised to carry 
the Iiill notwitlistnntllng Iiis fnrmer fdureq providd Sebastimi 
w0111d asmil tlie centra antl riglit at tlie snme time, finisliing 
his arfiument hIus : (If d b  a. comalrinatim fails id & thm to 
r m w e  w.1 
Joaeph was embarrassed. Ee liked Jourdau's counsel, yet 
ferarcd Victor would muse the emperor to belieae a great 
opportunity hnd been lost ; ruid while thns wrivering, a 
deqntch nrn'vcd from Boult, by mhich it appeared lie could 
only reach Plnsencia between the 2nd and 511 of Aupst. A 
detachnient from the army of Venepa Lad alrendy appeared 
near Tolerlo, that general's dvanced guad was appmching 
Arnnjucx, snd tlie king mas troubled by tlic dnnger nf Madrid, 
temuse tlie stores, reserve artilImy, and general liaqituIs of 
tlie whole n r m j  in Spin were deposited there: moreover, the 
tolla at tbe gntes formed rilmost the only p e a n i a y  resource of 
his coiirt, so nnrrowdy ditl Nnpolcon retlucc the sxpc~lditure of 
tlie ~mr. Tliese coniiidcrütions averpoaered Iiis jutfgmeot; 
adopting the worse counsel, he resolved to succour the capital, 
but Br& to try tlie chance of n battlc. Indccision is a canoex 
in wur. Joselili ehould llave oiilliered to tho plan m n g c J  
with fhult, tfie adviinhrges were obvious, the succeas sure. 
The loss of Madrid was nothing In the d e ,  because it could 
onIy be temporny. If Iie tltouglit otlterwisc, he sliould hava 
fouglt for it before; thak i4 he should have drawn tlia fiftli 
mrps to h i i  and fnIlen with the utmwt mpidity upon Cuesta 
thc 26th; hia advnnced p a r d  ahoiild Iinvo been on tlie 
AkcrcLe tliat evening, mJ tefure ttveIve o'cloclc on the 27tt, 
the EngIisb m y  would have been witliout tlie aid of s single 
Spmish soldier. Having negleeted that opportunity d e n  Lis 
army ~ n s  full of adour, he iiow with singi1ar inwnsistency, 
resolved to fight when his enemies mere prepred, atrongly 
posted, md in tlie pride of snccess; the confidence of his own 
tr00p8 lieing ~hnlíen by the pnrtinl act,irin of Uie moming. 
JVliile the Frencli generals were engnged in council tlie men 
on both sides took aome rest, nnd the English waunded mere 
cmied tu  the rcnr; Iriit tlic saldicm nrcre atiffcring from 
Lunger, the regular service of provisions had cenad Eor severa1 
dqs ,  and a few onnoes of whcat in the gmin, fomed tlie whole 
subsistente of mcn mho had fought,, antl wlvlio werc yet to fight 
sn liwdly. In tlie SpsnigIi cump conCusion nnd distnist pre- 
voiId, Cuests inspired terror Mthout confidence, nnd Albu- 
queque, from conviction or instigoted by mornentary anger* 
just tis the Frcncli mcm corning on te thc final attaclr, scnt 
one oF Iiis ata@ to infurm tlie Enclish conimanrfer tlirtt C ~ e s t n  
m betraying him. The side-dexamp charged mith ttis 
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meas* deliverd it to Donkin, who carrid it t o  eir Aríihnr, 
The Intter, aeatcrl on the aiimmit of the hill which lind been 
so pllontly contested, waa inteatly watchiq tlie rno~ements 
of the racivancing enemy; he listened to tliia samewhat startling 
message without se much aa tnming his h d ,  and then drilp 
answeing-c V q  &A, ym m y  wtum to y w  h4qade; con- 
tinned his survey of tlie French. Donlrin retire J filled with 
admirtatiun of the imperturbable resolution and quick pene- 
tration of the mnn; bnt tlironghout that dnyJ sir Arthur's 
bearing was thrat of a general iipon wliom vigilnnco anrf 
intrepidity the fate uf fifty thousand men depended. 
Soon were the dispositions of the Frencli completed Ruffin 
on the extrcme riglit, wm destincd to cross tlic vallcy, nnd 
moving by tlis foot of tlie mountain turn tlie Britisli leit. 
Tiilatte m to menace the hilI with one brigadq and p d  
+,he ~ d e y  ñnth another; wliich being strengtbened by a bat- 
talion of grenadiers, ww to conuect Ruñin's movement with 
the mrtin attack. 
Lapissc, ~u~ipcirtd by hkour Maubourg'a drwons m d  the 
king'8 reserve, wns to pw8 thc wnher-~otti~o in ifront af the 
Engli~h centre, and fa11 with haIf Lis infmtry upon Slier- 
brooke's divjaion; wliile the other hslf, connecting its attack 
with Villatte's brigde, mounted the hiI1 and rnade a third 
effort t o  m w r  tht importmt point. 
Mibucl's 6ragoonri were on tlie main road opposite T& 
vera, to keep thc Spnnirtrils h check; the rest of the havy 
cavaly vas brwght inte the centre bchind Rebmtinni, wlio 
mas to assail tlie right of tho BritisIi line. Part .o€ tlie light 
cavnll supported VilIatte'a lirignde in tlie valley, pxrt 
r e d n e d  in reserve, and nnmber of gun~ were distributed 
among the divisions, but the principal mass remained on the 
French hill with the reserve of liglit eavalry: tliere also 
Victor rrhtioned l i i se l f  to direct the movemenh of thc first 
corps. 
Frorn nine o'clock in tlie morning iintil middny, tlie ficld of 
battle uReret1 no appcnrance af Iiustility. Tlie weatlier ivus 
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iatensely hot, and tha t roop  on both aides rninfilecl dtlliout 
fear or euspicion to quench their thirst at the little brook which 
divided the positions. Bcfore one o'clock homever, the French 
mldiers were seen ta guither round the %lea, anrl the rolling 
of drurns was heard along the mhoPe line. Half an hour lnter, 
Joseph's @u, the reserve and tlie fourth corpa were descr jd  
near the centre af  thc Ling's position marcbing t o  join the 
first corps; and soon tlie tuiile-lwci and lieiglit ou tlic Frencli 
xight, even to the valley, were covered ivitfi h r k  and larvering 
masses. At this moment, some hundreds of English soldierq 
miploycd to cnrry the woun(1ed to tlie renr, ieturned in one 
body, md were by tlie French supposed t o  be Wilsnn'~ corlis 
joining tlie m y ;  nevertlieless, the duke of Belluno @Te the 
aignal for bnttle, and eiphty pieces o€ nrtillrry immcdiately 
seiit a tcrnpest of bullets befere tlio liglit tiooyiq wlio carne on 
with the gwiftness and violence of n bail-storm, closely followed 
by the broatl black columns in al1 tlie mnjmty of war. 
Sir Artliur 'lVcIlcslg from tlie summit o€ tlic Lill on Iiis 
left vierved the wliole field oC Liattle, He sam the fourth 
coqs  mhing  forwnrds with tlie usunl impetuosity of French 
soldiers, clearing thc intcraected ground in tlicir front, nnd 
falIing upou CumplieIt'a division with infinite fury; yet Itliat 
general, assisted by bfwckemie'a brigade and two Spnnish bnt- 
taliong, withtoorl their utn~ost efforts, Tlie Britisli solrliers, 
putting tlie French skirmisliera aside, met tlie advmcing 
coIumns mith loud sliouts, lirolre their fmnt, l n p l d  tlieir 
ffnnks witli fire, nnd giving no respite putihecl thern back 
~ 4 t h  s terrible crirnnge. Ten p n s  were tnken, liiit as Cnnip- 
be11 pnidently resolved not to break lus line by a pursuit, 
the French rallierl on their wpports nnd made Iimd for 
nnotlicr nttnclc ; tIicn t l io Rritisli nrtillcry nnd m n s k e t ~  plngcd 
veliemently upon tlicm, a Sliankh cavialry regiment clinrged 
their flnnk, tliey retired in disortler, and the victory aa3 mured 
in tlint quartcr. 
WIiile tliis was passing on tlie Englisll riglit, Villatte's 
division, preceded by ttlie puadiers  aud ~iipportetl. by two 
regirnenta of liglit mvdry, \vas secn arfvancing up tlie grertt. 
vnllrp ngninst GEie ldt; nnrl lieyond Villntte, R~i f in  ivns dis- 
coverd marcbing towarda tlie mountain, Sir Artliur ordered 
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Anson'g brigade oC cavalry, composed oC the 23rd light
dragoons and thc first Germall llUssars, to chllrge tbe boad
oC l·hese columna. Thcy wellt off' at o. canter, increasing
tbeir apeed as tbey adv8nced ll.nd riding hcadlong against tbe
C!1cmY:i but in a few morncnts, a hollow clcft which was oot
perceptiblo nt a distance intcrvCllcd, ¡lOd at tllC saIne momnnt
tho Frcnch, tbrowing thClusdves ¡nto squnrCll, opencd their
fire. Colonol Arculschild, l'OIIlll\andillg tbe Imssars, GU officer
WhOlU forty yean' e.~perience had nlllue a nmllter in !lis arl,
promptly reined up at tbe brink, exclaiming, in bis brokcn
phrase, '1 wif.lnot ki1l rIl'!J ~Qung ma118/' The twenty-third
found tbe chasm more practicable, tlle Englisll blood is hoto,
aud ¡he regiment plunged clown without a clicck, men and
horse'J rolling over each other in dreadful confusion; yet the
Burvivors, untamed, mountcd the opposiw bo.nk by twos aud
threcs; Colollcl Seymour 'WILS severe]y wouuuetl, but general
Ansoli UliU IIllljor Frt:deriek POllsonby, o. haruy BO!Uier, IlflSllillg
tbrough the midst of Villatte's columu.s wllieh were pouring in
a fire fmm eaeh side, feIl witb iuexpre5sible violellce upon a
brigade of Freneh chasseurs in thc rearo Tbe combat was
then ñeree, }'et sltort, for Victor seeing t1le au"anoo of tl1e
English, had detachcd bis Polisb lancers and Wcstphalia light-
bOrlle to tbe sUllport of Villatte, and these frcsll roen coroing
up when the twcnty-tilird, already ovennntched, conld searcely
hoId nI' al,,''ll.iust lbe ChU8Scurs, eUlirely broka them. Tiloso
who werc uot killed or takcn, ruade for Bassccour's Sp[Ulish
division and so escaped; yet with a 10ss of two hundrcd aud
aeven men aud officcrs, a'bout half the number that wcut into
actioo.
During tllis time tbe hill, the key of the position, was agron
attaekcd, and Lnpisse, erossing the ra\"ille, llressed har<! upon
the Ellg1ish centre; !Lis artillery flideu hy tilc !,lTcat bnttery on
hjg rigbt opencu large gaps in Sherbrooka'g ffillka, flud tilough
tila Freueh carne up to tile Britisll in tbe rcsolution to win,
they were driven back iu disorder. In the exeitement of
sueccss tlle English guards followed wit.h reeklcss aroour.
but the Freneh reserves of illfantry and drngoollS advanced,
tbcir rcpulscd rnen fnccd IIbout, the batteries smote tite guarda
in ílauk am} front 80 lleavily tllcy drcw Lack, aud at th(l
mine time the  Germans bcíng sorely presged got into confusion: 
Rill and Campbell staod fast on the e~tremit~iw eof the line, 
yct tlic Briticli ecntrc WRB aI)~olut.cly I)mken, nnd fortuna 
~ccrnecl to incline to tlic French. Riirfdcnly the fudy-eiditli, lcd 
by col onel Donellan , w s  clescriecl advancing tlirougli thcvwt dis- 
orclcrctl mames, wliicFi seemetl suficicnt to ciirry it awmy bodily ; 
Iiiit wlicditig linclc by compnnies tliat rcgimcnt let thc c rowh 
pnm tliruugli, nntl tltali rcsiiniing i t s  lironrl and bei~utiful: liiis 
fe11 oa tlie flxnk of tlic rictorioiis Frencli columns, plying thcm 
vitli sucli n dcstructive miisketry, nnd closing upon tliem witli 
aucli n firm rcplnr ritcp tliat tlicir ofcnsive rnovcmcnt wna 
cliecked. Tlieri the guar.rds and hrmans  rallied, a brigde of 
light cavnlry cnme i ~ p  rrt a trot, tlie artillcry hnttercd the 
Prcucli flnnlta without intmmission, tiiey wavcrcd, Iost theis 
ini~~ulne, nntl tlie bnttle u-BS reatored. 
In a11 mtions tliere is one critica1 moment wliich el1 giye 
thc victory to tlie gcncrnl d ~ o  knows Iiow to  scize it. Wlicn 
tlle p:inJs first marle tlieir nwli chnrge, sir Artliur, foreseeing 
t1ie issue of it, liad ordered tlie forty-eiglith down from tlio 
liill, altliough a rrug11 Sattlc WRB going on there, and at the 
mmc timc hc tlircctcd Catton's liglit cnvralry to  advanec. 
Thcsc dispositions p i n d  tlie dap; tl~e British became atrongest 
nt tlic dccisive point ; tlic French relaxd their efforts; tlie fire 
of tlic formcr ~ c \ v  Iiotter, nnd their r i n g i n ~  dtouts-~um 
nu;rtisy of siicces+~i-ere Iienrd along the ivbole liue, In tlie 
I.;:ii.c:~ ~ i f  a gwat ge~ernl, Joseplib gun.rclls and tlie rcscr-ie, 
rnigtit Iiiivr: rr'stnrcil tlie comlint, hut nll comliiri~tion wns nt nn 
end oii tlio king's side; the fourtli corps, beaten on the Prench 
lcft rritli tlw loss of ten guns, mas in confcidon; tlie troops in 
tlie grcnt vr~lIeq- on tlic E'rrncli nght, nrnnxctl nt tlie furiiius 
rlinrpe uf tlie twcrity-tlii~l, nucl p~wxl hy tile sigl~t o f  fmr dis- 
tinct liiics of ciiviilry still in rescive, r~mained stxtionnry; no 
iiiipr~ssiriit linrl lircn ninilc un tlio key liill, Lnpissc  vas 
iiiurt:iTTg ~ruuiidcd, Iiiu division liad given wq in tlie ceiitse, 
nntl tlie tvliole ririny finally rctired to tbe position frorn ~vl\.liencc 
it lintl dcsccudcd to tlic nttack. This r c t r o p d c  movcincnt 
tws rrivrrracl 1). sl<irniislicrs niid un aiigmentcd tire of nrtillcry. 
Tlic Dritisli, exlinustcd by toil nnd want of foorl and reducen 
to Tcss tlinn friurteen tliousand sabres and bnyonct~, corilrl not 
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pume; tlio Spnni~h nrmy m incap~ble of any evofution, nnd 
about six o'clock al1 hhostiIity cerned, each amy holding tlie 
position of ktlie morning. Tha bnttle waa sczrceIy orcr ivhen 
the dry grass and s h b s  taking fire, s voliirne of flames 
passed witl~ inconcdrable rapidity acrocs a pad of tlie field, 
scorcliing iii its course botli tlie dead and tbe wounded. 
Two Hritish generds, Mackenxie md Lanporth, thirty- 
one oficers of inferior m l r ,  and nearly eight hundrcd scrjcnnh 
and aoldiers were killerl; thrce gcnerals, n Iiundred and nineb- 
two rifficen, anrl more tlim threo thouwnd mvcn hiintlrcd 
serjeants and privates woundecl, Nine oílcers and nearly six 
hunrlrd and fifty serjeant~ and sddim were missing; making 
a total losa of more than gix thausagd h o  hundred, of which 
five thousand four hunclred fe11 on the 28th. Tlie Frencb h d  
Jrmfid ahore nine hundred, inclutling tvo genemls, 
$OUflfi"l kilIed ; about Gx tliousnnd tlrree hundred wounded, 
FISS. 
seme,&, ~ n d  one hundrcd nnil fiity m d e  prisoncw; fur- 
JISS. nishing n total of seven tliousnnd tliwe Iiundred 
and eighty-nine men rand officers, of mliich four thoitsand were 
of Tictor's coqs. Ten p n s  were taken by Campbeli's divi- 
sion, seven were Ieft i n  thc mooh by thc FTcnch. The 
Spninrds returned about twelve Lundred men lrilled md 
wounded, but thcir raccuracy W ~ B  mucli doiibted. 
The 29th, at dny-lirmk, tlie Frmcli m y  quitted i t s  position, 
mnd hcfore siix o'clock wns q n i n  in order of Liattl~. lieliiurl ths 
Alberche, Tliat rIxy Itnl~ert Craufurd reached tlie Euglisli cainy, 
with tlie forty-third 6fty-seoond and niilety-fdtlli regimentB, 
~ n t l  imrnecliateIy took charge of tlie outposts. Tliose troops 
lid been, dter s march of tn-enty miles, Iiutkrl nenr 3lnilpmtirla 
de Ylmencia when the almm ca~tsed by t l~e  Spanisli fngitives 
sprmd to tliat part; Craufurd, f w i n g  for thc nmy, rallowcil 
only a few Iiorirs' rest, nnd tlicn mitlirfm\ving nbout fifty of 
tlie wmkest froiii the m k s ,  re-conioiencetl liis mwch with a 
resolution not to halt unti1 t,he field of bnttle was reacl~ed. 
As thebrigarle di-anced crowcls of the runaways were met mitli, 
not al1 Spaniards, but al! propagating the vilest fnlsehoods: 
' bhe m y  w a  ~kfeat&,'-' S~T d rtI~u?' Wd-Shj atas kZled,- 
thre F ~ m k  m e  ody a feeo  mil^ dktnd ;' nmy, sornc, blinrlcd 
bj their fe- pretended to point out tIie euenig's iirlrnnccd 
posts on the ncnmst billa. Tniligrinnt nt tliis slinmeful scene, 
the troops hnsteued rather tlian slackened tlieir imlietuous 
pace, antl lcaving only seventeen st.ragglers beliiníl, in twcuty- 
sis Iiours crosscc? flic ficId of bnt,tlc in a closc R~CI campact 
J~ody; Ilnviiig in tlint time pnqsctl over sisty-two E~rgIiaIi 
miles in t l ie  Iiottest season of  tlie ymr, each mnn crirrying 
froni fifty tri sixty pounds weight upon Lis slioulders. Had 
tlic biqtorian Gibhon knoivn of siidi n mnrcli, hc woiilcl have 
sliured Iiiu siieer about ttie 'delicnc~ of modcrii soldicrs !' 
OBSERVATIOSS. 
lo. Bir Arthur Wellesley's couragc in riccepting bnttle with 
~ 1 1 ~ 1 1  n conrljutor ns Cucstn, wna moro rcrnarknble tlinn the dis- 
positions wliich *ve him tfie victorp; Could lie llave lield 
his ground if tlie French strengtli l i d  been reserved for the 
grent bnttle instead o f  licing wacted in isolate(2 attncka 
tlie evciiing of the 27th mcl morning of tlie 28tIil A pitched 
liattla is a grent affair; nll moral nnd pliysiml rresources must 
be ernploycd to min; and al1 may be too little, Jourdan hatl 
mcll conceivcd tlio plan of placing thc amy unpcrccivcd on 
tLe Ieft Annk of the English; yet sir Arthur b d  forethougl~t 
oT mich a morement, nrrd designed to me& It wivitli 14s left 
ming nnd cnvrilg, iising tlie: lnrgc Jioiisc in tlic soorl ns a 
~ii~iliorting post, whiIe iivitli his right Iie seized tlie position 
JiniirlonerF by tthc Frcncli and cut tbsm from tlie Alterclie. 
TIrcn cnllinp in IVilson'~ corps, which wns nenr Cnznlegns, the 
coiitcnrlin~ iirmies would lime exclianpd tlieir lines of opcm- 
tion; antl the French, unless tliey mon ra complcte victol ,  
woiilri linvc gnined nothing, wlicrens thr! nlliea would cven 
iinrlcr drfcnt, Iitive inmrcrl their jiinction mitli Vruegm: 
IInrFEid nnrE Toledo would Iiave fnllm to tliem nlso, anrl tlie 
fert.ile LR 5Innclia b a ~ c  bwn o p e n ~ l .  
S 9  Yictni-13 elispoñitions wcrc Iinrl. Tlie nttrmpt to tiim 
tSir Eriglisli lrft witli one divisian mas pnerile. Tlic wliolc of 
Rufin's oncl IinlE riillntte's division were pnrnlyaed LFy the 
cliarge of a siiiglc regiment; liow tlien muId t,lie former Iinve 
dwelopcd its attnck dien five tlioiisnnd liorscmen ivere 
merincing its f nnk? Ta cnnble it to {lo so t l ~ e  p t c s t  pnrt 
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of the Prench cavalry shonld have preceded the infantry ; bnt 
the gmt error wns fighting at al1 before Soult reached 
Plasencia. 
39 It is said sir Arthnr should have used the Spanísds to 
compl e& the victory. It twould hnve more likely 2ed to  dcfent; 
neitlier Cuesta nor his troops cauld be safcly Eiandled. The 
infantrg of the fimt and fourth corps were twenty thonsnnd, 
repulsed, not discomfited troops. Tlie mvalrg, the kirig"a 
par& and D~solIe's reserve were untouched and done di- 
cient to  meet the Sysniards; and rt second panic mould have 
had depIoralile rmItg as those who knowhow rapidly h c h  
soldiers recom from ~b repulse, wiii acknowledge. 
4', Hnrd honest fighting distinpished the bnttle of Tala- 
vent rtnd proved the exceeding grsllnntry of t1ie Frencli and 
English soldiem. Tbe lntter owerl much to tlieir Ieder'a sldll 
md somethizig t o  fortune; the French O T K ~  their cornmmders 
nothing; but thirtp thousand of thcb Xantry  minly stxove 
fur thrae houm on the 28th, to force sixteee thousand Bfitish 
soldiers, who were for the most part so recently drafted from t l~e  
militia thlbt many of tliem stiU bore the distinctbnfl nf thd 
force on their aecoutrements. 
Iw tlie nigl~ t of bhe 20th the king .rvithdrew the ourth corps, 
tlrc gunrrls nnd tlle reserve, ta St. OIlnllra, and eent a diviaioti 
to siirniir Toledo. !Clie 1st of August lie took post at Illescna, 
from wlience he coda intcrcept lTenegs' inarch on lhdrid, 
~ n d  Iic lcft Victor on thc AlbcrcFie to ~ s se i l  tilo ellies when 
Sorilt'~ opemtionii slioultl cnuse tliem to retreat. lfennivliila 
R'ilson, qui tting Cazalegas, returned to Escslona, and Victor, 
thinldng tlie w11ole E n g l i  nrmy was movinp tlmt way, re- 
tircil in d n r m  liy Myiictlo t o  Snntn Cruz ila Retamnr; iie 
mould hnve gone eyen ta 3f ostoles if a rctrograde movement of 
the allies bad nut reublled him fo the Allierclie. Sir Artliur's 
troop hd m~ffcrcd so much that tlic 29th and 30th were 
pwsed in estalilisliing hospitals, and in fruitless effortB to  yro- 
cuw food rtntl n s s i s h c e  to savc hia woundad from pcrisl~ing. 
Roth Crtmf8e nntI tlic pcople of Talnvcm hnd nmplo menm, yrt 
woiild ncitlier give food to the living nor rtseist to bury tlie 
dml; the eorn secreted in Talavera would have supporterl the 
nrrny fur n montli, liut not a m e w m  coiild be olitnincd far 
tlio starving soldiers. To keep tbeir provisions mas a natum! 
iastinct, yet the npatliy with ~vhich tliey beheld tlie wounded 
rlying nntl tlic sound ñinlring from h u n , ~ ,  did stn~ngely con- 
tmt with BXr. Frere'a assertion thnt al1 Spniiiads, ' look~clwplt 
tJsa war {n i?tl tlg1t-t of a em~~arle ,  anúl c&ed Zt m al? 
th4 & T ~ ~ ~ g l ~ r n n t  af mch a mwe' TE& condnct wns nevcr 
effacecF from t l i ~  soldi~rtrs' recollection-Enrlujos and St. Sc- 
bastiun surered long after for tlie churlisli behaviour of the 
Talnvcrn people. 13ut pemonnl rnnooiir wiis nlwriys the mnin 
spring of Spuiiisli pntriotisni. Cuesta's troops, so disgrncerl iii 
Liattle, nnd thc citizens of Talavera, saved by the bravery o€ 
the men to d i o m  they refused nssiatsnce, mcre busy after the 
Tiattle Iicating out tlia h i n s  of wounded Frenclimen, and mcre 
JUI:I', 180'-).J BOOK VIII.-CHAP. 3.
CHAPTER Ill.
[81
h Il igM t 9 withdre ll ll
h ard R h caerVlJ, o ~" l a a, u s 0. s n
t ijuCCQur l . Th t .dn t h t lIIaseus
h uld e Venegas' lll lXl Madrid
and he e e rehc assail the a
oult's ra lls h ld u. o t t. Mcanw l u
W n, l u ea u u
ll ki h hole nglish a Wl\S \ g tha r ·
t ed ll ala IJ a(lu d~ &uta ~ do lulIllr; h
w l a v o M f e f
l iCll 1I0 cal e t hc eh . r h
roops aJ suflercd he t n t r
us nbli hill it l8 . uitlCSll forts p
re a d lISSistan e s e r e i hing.
B ucsta 1111(1 he o o l'lL vcro. a a }Jl ans et
ul e h il ass t r th
ead c ll m rt d t
llnJ1Y o a th, h IIOt 0. ellSuro u 00 h ll ue fo
he rvill s. h i w ral
in i ct, a th which. h h
dying d the si ki nger, i trangely COI1~
s \\" Mr. 's u l nL n l aniar , looked UP01~
the in the li llt f crusade, d arried it on with ll
tire enthwria8m of eu I~ caua .' 'fhis u a er
mu);:d he a ldiers' lX:oll ctioll-BlIulljos nu L'
tiall ff l t th li h i r f t
l era l . B t rs al ra c ur WlIS al ll a t ai
spring f panish patriotism. uestn's troojJs, so disgraced in
battle, and the citir.ens of lllavera, SIIved y thc bra\"ery of
the en to who they refused assistance, wcre husy after the
haWe benting out the braiu!> of oundcu French en, anu were
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only cliecked by the British aaoidiers, who in Eiome instarices 
fired on tfieperpetmtors of that horrible iniqnity. Cuesta also 
disldayed liis ferocity. Eh whose incapacity, indolente, nnd 
stupicl pelfidi pride had renclered bis amy Ineffieient aitd al1 
liut caused its destruction, now assnmed a Roman se~erity, 
and decimated the regiments wliicti had @ven way in tlie 
evcning of tlie 27tli. Ahove fifty he slew in tliis mnnner, and 
ifliis crudty ltrul not Iieen mitigated by thc cnrnest intermsion 
of sir ArtEiur, more men would bave beeri destroyed by tliis 
smage old mnn in cold tiloor1 tlicu liad falIen in httle. 
IIitberto tLe dIied generds liad thougl~t little of Soult'a 
movernenb, their eyes mere fiirmi on Nadrid; iiut tlie 30th it 
ms knovn tliat twelve thousand rationa hsd been ordered for 
the 28th at  Fuente Dueña, by that rnarshaL, and tventy-fonr 
tliousand at Lm Santos, a tonm &mted betiveen Alha dc 
Tomes and the pa9s of Bdm. Cuesta, smctly coiiacious he 
l i d  nq lec t~d  thc ht tcr  post, suggcstcd that Wilson shouIrl be 
sent tlicrc; brrt sir Arthur, wlio wantcd liim nt EscaIona to 
renew hi Intermurso with IIndrid, proposed tlint a Sprrnisli 
corps sliouhl p: indeed, he still slight>ed the danpr, sntl 
lioped the result of tlie bnttle would check Soult's marcl~. 
Cuesta refused at the time, and again on tlie 31st when the 
ripplicstion wari reaewed; yet heming tthat Sonlt was in Ecjar 
he sent Eassecour on the 2nd of August to defend tlie psss o€ 
Rafioa. Tliat place ~vns four long marches distrint, Cuesta knem 
tlie enemy lintl been witliin onc mnrcli of it on the 31stj nnrl 
scarcelg l i d  Rwscconr rlepartorl when it heclame linonn tlint 
Boult wm in P1mencin, tlint &%os liad been nliandonecl ivith- 
out a shot, t l ~ e  battbons from Dejar dispersed, anirid tliost! sent 
by Cuesta w i t h d m  to Almam, by tlie marquis de la Reyna, 
mho declard an intention to deshoy tlie bmt-bridge tliere. 
This stirretl &esta and he groposed that ltaif the d i e s  should 
atta& Xciul t. Sir drthur would nat divide Ziis arrnq; yet 
offcrcd to  go or atny iti mas$, nnd Lx?ing dmired to  cIiocise, 
saiJ lie woulil go, wit1i wliicli Cuerrtn seenicd conknt. 
I n  tlio iiight Wilson annonncerl the aplieornnca of the 
French near Nombella, mhither, unconscious of the eñcct pro- 
duced by liis presence at Escalona, he Iid t~ken liis infmtry, 
~ending bis gum to Et. R o m  ncar Tdaveril. Sir Arthur, 


little thinking Wilson's mar& had cawed 'ITictor's retreat, 
imngined the lntter's desigil was to criisli tliat partizan aud 
open ra cammunication nitli Soult by tlie Tietas vullcy. Such 
a mercmcnt mould neccssarily sencl Cucsh from Talnvc- nnd 
hliercfore Dhe Spnnisli g c n c d s  promise m3 dciiiantlcrl niid 
olitained, t o  prnl-ide tran~port for removing tlie Englisli 
mounrlcd: be broke it disnrncefiilly, and the Britirih general 
hatl pt to learn the extent of bis bml faitli. Still mrtking 
ligbt of Soult's army, mhicli he estirnated at fifteen tliousand, 
sir drthur moved on the 3rd 6 t h  seventeen thoumtl men, 
rlcsising t o  join Biissccour nnd give battle ; bi~t nt tliia time 
tliere was musmuring in the crimp, niid tlie genernls leirig 
called toptl~er, iiome of them thou~ht, or uFccted to think it 
a eoumil, and one offered &ice ; wlierefore they mere Ixoni- 
caIly infomed they Iiad been ca1Ied t o  receive orders not to 
offer mggestions. 
On the 24th of July, Foy broiiglit SonIt the Iring's concur- 
reme for tlie eombined npenthiona yirojecterl, wliere- 8. 
upon he repaired to Sdamnricn, d~~ignilie; tn uiiiie fournJ0f Opermtioiis, 
t1ie thee corps t h a e ;  but Iicaring of Tictor's 2nd t~~~ 
first retreat frorn the Alberche to trie Gudaram "". 
river, Iie diiwterl Jfortier tli mardi tlie 3Stli iipon Pl~senciri, 
by Fuente Roble and Bejar, nnrl plraccrl Ls Housmyc'a nntl 
Lorge's driigoons under liis co~nmniid: tlic r~mairitler o€ tlie 
2nd corpii were to folEom mllenevei Ney-, wlio closed the rsar, 
olioukl be in motion. TImt effectcd, he \mote tlius: ' Jfy 
wgmt d&~e k tt'lat yow v j & y  may not a genepal 
6ntdb befwe yrou m c e r t ~ i m  of tfu concm,Erabiom of afl mj 
b f o ~ ~ w  PWT P I M  G.h m I  imporiwn€ ruzdl8 r&Ll he 
o l i t f i i d ,  éf y w  mqjwty m&! dstcbin from at td i izg until tb 
m w h  a knmc7dge of my wwch C C C Z G S ~  SJH W R L ~  to 
r d ~ m  hi8 slepsl z l f i b k h  b mwE do oi- ?E he b3t.' 
0ii the 59tii tlia fiftli c o p  heing nt Fiieute IloLle, iiifornin- 
tion vas received that Bcresfortl Iind rewhed Alnieida ~vith rili 
amy on tbe 27tli, ~Eiewfore Mortier t h c w  out stroiig de- 
tncliincnts on tlie ~ i d e  of Ciurlnd EwlPign. Meanwliile x 
lotig-expccted cniivoy oE nrtillery and nnimunition renclietl: 
S.ili~man~3, aud Ney mrrite Eroui Toro, tliat he would Le in 
that him the 31st. Tlie 30th tlie fifrlr corps drove tLe 
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Spaniards from tlie pags of Bañosi, md the second corpa, 
qnitting Salamanca arrived at Xicte Carrera. Thc 3 1 6  the 
fifth corps renchd Rnscncirs, tha sacond corps ente id  Fn'iicntc 
Caca, Filmte Roble, Snn Eskvnn, m d  Los fhnto~. Rnaen- 
tia ~vaa tlien full of convdcsoents, dctachmcnts, mrl nnnoom- 
batmb, and when the Frencli amived, two thouciand men, 
including fire huntlred ef the Lnsitaninn legion, d e  for 
Moraleja and Zarza Mayor ; four bundred eiick, followirl; 
Boult's aocwnts, vere captured, to@her aith a fielcl ~tore. 
Duriag theae rxpid marches the Fsench were hzrass~d by tbe 
peaaantry, $he vlllapc ivere deserted, the cavalry wrinded far 
and near to procure subsistente, and several slight slrirmishes 
and Borne pilllage took p1m. The 31f  tlie l i d  of ttie second 
coipentered PIasenciii, nhich ww, like other plsces, deserted, 
and T e  reporta that a battlc bad been fonght bctwcm the 
26th aiid 29th wnsthe only intclligcncc obtrsind; an thc second, 
nn nrlvnnml p a n 1  movetl to tlio Yentoi de Bazagana, while 
scouting pnrties were directetl towurds Cori~, to nequire news 
of hrcsfortl, who wna now said to bo moving rtlong tlia 
Portugime frontier. On the 3rd, tIie fifth coi-ps and tlie 
dragoons, passed tlie Tietar and reaclied Toril, hho out-posh 
being piishcd t o  Cazatejada and Sierra de P&quemedw: tle 
second corps remriined at Plasencia, awaiting the amival of the 
sixth wrp, the head of mhich w s  now at Ey;ñog. Thm on 
tEio 3rd of August, the king and hbastiani being at Illesms 
aud Valdemoro, T1ictor at Alqueda, Cuesta at Talavera, sir 
hrt~inr at O~peNh, nnd Souk on tlic Tietxr, tlie nwmw vnlley 
of tl10 Tmps wns cromrld in its wliolc Imigtli by tl1e matcnding 
troope. 
Wellesley and Cumh lieing ody one ma~cli apart lidd tlw 
centre, get tlieir united forces did nat exceed forty-seven 
thousand. The Frencl~ revired three dnys nnd a 
A ~ n d i x  battle t o  unite; but they bad more tlinn ninety 94. Vol. I. 
thonsand combatants of which fifty-three thousand 
Tere with hit. In this singular &te of affairs al1 prarties 
were ignorant of tbe etrength and movements of their adver- 
~ r i m  Victor ftnd the king, ffrightenetl by NTilaon's prtrtizan 
corps of four tlroussnd men, wcm prepring ta utiite at 
Xostoles, wLile Cuesta, equdy frighkned by Ector, maa 
rctiring from Talnvcm Jogeph imogincd tlie Britisli to  ba 
tivcnty-five thousnnrl, nnrl sir 12rihi~r cstimnting Soirlt's force nt 
fifkeii tfiomaud, was inurcliing with twenty-tlirae tliousrind, 
Spauisli and Englislt, to cngqe fiítp-threit tliousnnd: mem- 
while Xoutt, unable to risccttnin tha  exnct situntion of either 
frien& or cnemic'i, little siispcctcd tlint tlie pr.7 wm m~liinp 
i n h  his jnmu. Tlrc thte rriF tlii? Pcninsiiln Iiiaiig Iiy n tlireail, 
wl~icli could nnt lierir tlic wcigIit for tiventy-four linura, yek 
fortiine so ortluned tl~at no impainblc dislistcr msuect 
At five o'c?oclr on thc evenIng of the 3rd, tlie EnglLsli general 
lrnrm tlint SonIt w~is nt N~val  3Éornl lictmerri him and thc 
bridge of A!niarraz, ht six o'eioclr Cuesta ~ l v i s e d  hirn thnt 
Jos~pli nas a g i n  advaiieing, tliat intereepteil despatclies indi- 
eatetl n peater forcc vi th  Soult thnn n*as supposd, mil tIint 
111: 1vo11111 qilit T1111ivcr~ tlmt evening, in ot,llier wertls ~Pinnrlon 
tlir Rritisli Iiosliitnls ? To tliis sir Artltur rclilictl thnt tlic kfng 
\vas seveinl ninrcliea distant, tliat TPenegm sllouId menace Lim 
o11 tllc upper TaBgts, tliati Soult's stren-Gli was exaggernteci, 
nnd Vict~Js movernents too undeeiderl to m ~ ~ s e  this siidden 
dlntidnnnierit of Tralwcrn: ~vlicrrfon: iie reqiiircil Eiim t u  rcmniit 
until tlic next dny to covcr t t h ~  cvacuation of klie S";n$jsli Iloqii- 
hls .  Xnt Cuesta m s  drenrlp iii mnrcli, ancl Iris coIumns wre. 
r l~cricd eenly on tlic 4th coniing domi tlie vnllcy. 13rm.9ñrcoiirk 
rliviuion joiricd tliein soon aftw i'mm Ccntitidlo, aiid t1ieEii::lisFi 
ptroles found tlie Frencli ncar Naval AIornl. 
Sir Artlitir bad now secn tlir intrrccptccl lcttrrs and foitnd 
tlint Snult Iind nt Icmt tliirty tlioiisnntl nicii; tlint intiwliall~iml 
algo interccpted Englisli letterñ wliicli told him tlie allics were 
stil1 at Talavem ou flie 1 s t  and 31-informed of Lis mal-emenh : 
tliw tlie one general perceived liis danger the dlier his aclmn- 
tnge at the samc momcnt. On tlie French mde Xortjer T T ~ S  
orrlcrrrl tn tnIte a position nt Cnzntcjatln, to acizc thc Sont- 
bridge of Alninraa i f  it wa.9 not rlestroyed, and to  potrolo 
tr~wards Arzobispo; the smncl co1.p~ wns directed upon the 
mame place, nnd the l i e d  of thc siiíth corps cntered Phsencia. 
TIie fiirtlier progreys of the aIlies was thus barred in front, the 
Tapia 1vo.q on tlicir left,, iinpncsriMc notintnins on tlicir rigllt; 
niir1 it was certnin Ciicstn's retrcnt moitld imrncclintely liring 
tlie kirig und Tictur doivn iipou tblieir mar-the psril was 

attil~bing, nnrl lilrc men iyoswased, cutting ofl tlis flesli whiIo 
tlie Iiensh wero yet dive : tlie ferocity of Iiungcr tlius dislilnyed 
was a horrid spechcle, ltnd tlie loss of the he& a calanity for 
the poor pens:ints. 
l\rliile khc army m o ~ c t l  t ow~rds DcIcy-koza, Crmfiirrl's brignde 
nnd Rix pins mere rliredcd to p i n  Almrtrnz, acciiro tlic bont- 
bridge nntl opposc any zttampt to seize tlie Puerto de Mirabete. 
Tlie way tvas very mgged, and the g ~ n s  mere rlragged np tbe 
Mcait d'Ibor by tlie mcii, yet, on tIie evening of the 5th Almamz 
mna seciirctl. RcntF-q1~1rtcm mere c~tn1)li~Iicrl on tlio 7th at 
Delej.toza; tlie adillery occitpied Campillo; tlie rem-guarcl hdd 
tlie impregnnlle Meza cl'lbor; tlie siclc nnd aoimded wcre sent 
to  l l c r i d ~ ,  tliorqh to convry Gliem both amrniinition anrl tren, 
siirc cnks ivcrr: iinloniIrr1. hTenn~vliilc Sotilt iinit-ittinglj ron- 
ti~iucd liie mnrcli, rinil Noitier renclied Naval Moral, Iiis 
ndvnnced partl enterecl Puebla de Nriciadn, and his pntrolcs 
fell in with tlie Slianish clivnlry at Arzobispo the 5tli, jiist ns 
Gue~ta JVW ,r)i-vsiiig tlie hrirlqc. 011 tlie fitli tlie Bpnninli rew- 
parcl wvhich liad rainain~d oii tlic ridit bnnk was d r i ~ e n  across 
tlie bridge by Mortier, Ney reached Faval Moral, and the 
secontl coilis entererl Grerlo, 
0 1 1  tlic 7th hforiicr reportcd tlmt tlie nllic~ were nll ovcr the 
Taps, nnd tliat di~ubis l io  Iii5dge rrms barricn~loccl aad raked 
bp twenty p n s ;  thak Cuesta hntl lcft tlie1-e tivo divisiuns 
of iiifnntry and one of mvalry, bttt liis main hody mns at 
Mezn  tl'JIior. Suult inimerliittely Iirauglit up tlio sccontl mrpa 
nnd scnt tlie liglit cavalry to opcn n c~iiirnaiiication witli tlie 
kiiig by TaInrcm; n4icre Victoi. Iiml cnptured aliout fiftcen hnn- 
drcrl Rnglixli siclr niid woundctl t2ic Gtli, antl trcntcrl thcrn witli 
the geacmsity to  Le exliecterl from n gallant and courtecrus 
nntion, for the Frencli antl Dritisli solrliers clierislierl tlie nsages 
of Iionoitrrable mnrfnre. Tlie 7th Yictor prissed t be  Tnps  by 
8ie Tnlnven~ bridge, mitl piislicil Iiis van-g1nrr1 cloiva tlie lcft 
bnnk to Aldea Nuem witLin n few lwgucs of Cueñtii'a posi- 
tion. Soult mas mciincing it in front, and Eiaviug observcd 
thc Spxnisli liorscs, ~vlvlien Iirauglit to dcinIc, ame far into 
tlie ~trtnm nt nne point, soiiniled tlicrc for R prissnge in tlic night 
anrl disoovp.rer1 n deep 1)ixC prnc~tir~Lle furi3, a uiile above tlie 
bridge. me second and fiftli aad a rZivision of the sixtli corps, 
were assembled earlg on the 8th t o  force this passap, wben 
S ~ u l t ,  hearing of Pictor'a mavement, and seeing t h ~ t  Albu- 
querque had wjtlidmwn thcSpsnisli cnvnlr;r, lefinng only a w e ~ k  
rmr-pn~l ,  tliot~ght hs nllies were al1 retrentitig; wlicrefore, 
purming Iiis design, he sent Ney's clivision back to  h, md 
the plan of a Eoxl below Almnraz, by which that marcha1 might 
m a s  the river, seize the Mirahete, and fdl upun the allies es 
they came out of the defiles Jsetween Deleytoxa ancl TmilEo. 
No retreat m in contemplation. Albiiquerqne'a cavdry 
had merely s;oilgI~t shelter from the heat in a wood five miles 
from the bridge; nnd the Spanisli infnntrp werc sIseping or 
Idtcring withozit gnard ar thought o€ dangcr, d ~ e n  boitt two 
o7cIoclr Mortier, who had secretly assembled six tliousand 
envnlry nenr tlie fOril, ~ c n t  Cnulnincniirt's lirigradc into thc 
river. Tlie Spaniards nrn to tlieir nrms antl tlieir Iintterjes 
opened on the horsemen. hfortier soon overwlielrned their 
gunners with a concentric Rre fmrn h i ~  superior art i l lq,  wliile 
Caulaincourt g~ining the left bank, took the batteries in 
reverse, mt down the gunnera and hroke the infantq. 
Albuqnerque heming dis firing thea a m e  down s i t h  al1 his 
horwmen jn ane Iiirp disorderly mws, and Cnuhfnconrb m 
like ta lie ove~owerctl ;but the mt of the Frencli cm~*di-y 
saon joberl in tbe figlit, md one brignde uf infnnkry fortlerl 
khe river while another burst tlie barriers of tlie bridge, nnd 
the Spanish foot being dhpersed Albuquerque vas driren 
Bnck; a general rout emueii md five gum witli four h u n d d  
pisoners were takea 
Xoult anxiou~ to hprovo hii mxcess cnlled on Tictor to 
mow in two columns upon Gmclnlupe md Delc$oxn, design- 
ing to support l i i  with b own mcl Mortier's corps wliila 
Ney seized tlie Mirabete. This if executed would have ralned 
Cuesta's iuny and forced sir Arthur t o  a dis~strons retreat ; 
lor so complete WM tlie enrprlse tliat some English fomgers 
fell into thc enemy's Bands, and í?uestnls conduct throughont, 
aftcr lic hd pnsscd to thc left oF the Tw8 Iinxl boen fntuitous. 
Wlieii he fimt mardied to Meza JIbor, he left fiftrran 
gunn upon tlic rond, mhich Alhiiqiierq~~c's flight uncorecred, 
iuid atruinpeter nttcuJiilg an Englicli fltig of tmce, treaclierously 
tir fooIislily, nitide tlie fnct known to tlie Frencl5 who i m m e  
diately sent cavalry to fetcli tliern oK The BrEtisli militmy 
ageilt ut tlie Sjpaiiisli heatl-quartcis )vas kept in ignorante of 
tlic rlicnqtcr n t  tI~c bridge; nnrl   ir Arthur oiily kncw of it by 
rllbuquerrliie'a arrivd at BeIeytozn on the eveninfi of tlie 9th. 
He lind befortj urgert Cuesta to witlidraiv Iieliliind the Ibor 
rivw, and even now mntemplated a partid attack to cover 
tlie mo~enicnt; Iiut when lic reaclied tlie RIezn on tlic 10tli 
110 found tlic cuit~itry covered ivith fi~gitives, niid tlia old man 
hnughty anrl helpless as ever. IIis amrnunition and forty 
guns ivere oii the m n g  side of the ibor, nithin sight and 
cannon-sliot of tlic Frcnch from thc riglit bnnk of thc Tngiis; 
md tlicy woiiEd Iiave been taken liy tlie firct pntroles ii sir 
~ b l i u r  liad iiot ~ieisuaded tlic Spnniards t o  drng tliern up t11e 
lleza Iiciglit ~vitliout Cuatde  kiiowledge. Disorrler follp and 
sttipid obstinacy were pnrrimount. In tlii~i crisis tlle irnpend- 
ing ciimgcr wns n~crtcil tiy tlic Iring, wlio rccallcrl Tictur to 
mrpport tlie fourth corps npinst Tenegaai; and by fortune, 
for Nej- fded to discover tlie for¿l at Alrnarax, and on tlie 
11th tlie allied liue mas re-estatlished. Sir Arthur'a heitd- 
qunrtrrs wme tlien fixed nt Jaraicejjo, Cumtii's at Deleytoxe 
Tlie Britisli guarded Alniaraz on the left; tlie Xpnniartls 
necupied Canipillo nnd the Meza dIbor on the Sglit. The 
12th Cr~ratn rcsigncil, nnrl Egiiia who succe~rlcd Iiim, seemcd to 
Zre reiisoii,ilile, Iiut GIie evil ivau iil tlie; Spanisli cliarncler. Tlie 
alEied position wna now howwer compact, tEie reserves could 
wsily aupport tlie adx-anced posts, tlie rem was open, the 
Meza iniprepzlile. Jf tlic ficiicfi pnssed the rivcr at A l m a m  
o 1 1  tlie Icft, iio ensy nititter, they would be huddlcd in a 
danperous manner in contsactd ground between tlie Maza, 
the Mraliete nnd t he  river; they could not pass between 
Almnrns nnrl Arzobispo, nnd on th0 riglit the Meza iiws im- 
pr~gunllls. 
IsouIt, tlius tliwnrtetl, coujectured sir Aithur vould repass 
the Tagus by Alcrtntnra, to rejoin Beresford; and the five 
tliousnnd Uritisli troops untlcr Catlin Crnufiird and Uglitliurn, 
whicli werc tlicn iielir ths fronticr uf Portugal, Beuce Pie 
resolved fa march upn  Coria, with tlie aecond, fifth, and 
sixtli corps, to tlireaten Beresfortlis and sir Arthur'~ commu- 
nications wivh Lisbon; and at the same time, prqnrc 'for tllc 
siege of Ciudad bdrjgo. Ney ahsolutely refuscd to conair in 
this opemtion. Sir Arthnr lic mid was not yet in mnrch for 
Arcantarit, nnd it %-M dnngerous to inrntle Portugal in a lmty 
manner; the mny coulrl not be fed betmeen Curia, masencia 
md tlic Tagus; and as Salammca warr again in posscssion of 
tlie Spnnimds, it was more fitting the sixth corps shonld retako 
. tliat t o n ,  and occupy the line of the Tomes to Miver Castilla 
Josepli, dreding fatigue and privntions in a wasted country 
during the autumi~-d heat, ~ided witb Ney,-md inilecd the 
emperor's orders, dated et Sehombrun the 25th of July, Eorbad 
offcnalvc opcmtions iintil the rcinforoemcnts which Iiia receni 
victorg nt W ~ ~ - ~ I T I  enablcd him to acntl, shonId rericlt Spaui. 
Tlie secontl corps was t1klierefai-e directd to tnke post at 
Plwencis; the fiitli corps ~elieved the first at Tnlnvera; md 
tlie Englisli lionnrletl being given omr t~ Mortier, be +tb a 
cliiwlrons feeling would not ~ufler hie owm goldiers, tbough 
euffering severe privations, to receive rations until tlie bos- 
pitals lere supplid. Ney then rnarchd to Valladolid, Eor 
t l i e  king was alarmed lest an insumection, jnst cxeitecl in that 
muntry by clel Parque, sliould qrend ovcr Cwtillc and h n .  
On f.Iio 12th Ney renclisd Bar'ios, and to liis curprise 
found the pass occupied by Wdson with four tliousand men. 
Tliat prtimii, being st NombeUa mhen the Dritisli army left 
Talavera, hlid bLvn put in mmrnunimtion with Cuesta, and 
on his setraqt liad dso retired t o  FTeIada a fem miles nortli 
of TnInvera ; fram wlience, being ody twenty-four miles from 
Arzobi'ip, as Cuesta did not entircly p e s  tlie Tapa nntil tlie 
Gtli, he could have joined sir AstIiur; but he knew not this and 
prridentlg crossing tbc  Sictw marle for thc monntains, trust- 
ing to Iiis activity for cccaping. Tillntte Tind p~~mrtcd him on 
the 6th to  Nomlidla; a detacliment from Aviln, wntclied for 
liim in tlie passea of h e n w  and Monlii31tmii; Foy waiterl for 
him in the Vera da Plasencia; nevertlielesq he brolro throu~h 
their circle ak Vinndar, pssed the Gredos at s ridge called 
t!~e Eierre, de Lrines, and pt t ing  into the  all ley of the Tormes 
rewhed Brjar. From thenoe, thinkiig to  remver Es commu- 
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nications di11 the arrny, lie marched tomards Masencis by 
tlie pass of Míos, and thus met Ney returning to tlle Xnln- 
manca coirntry. The dust of tlie French cdumn being seen 
from nfttt; nnd R rctrcttt t o  Ciudad Xorlrigo opcn, it is not 
ency Zo wm~ireliciid ~ d i y  sir Robert p v e  liattle to the sixth 
corps. His position, althoiigh diíñcuIt to approncli, mati not 
one to stop a whole army; nnd accorclingly, when tlie Frcricli 
o~~er~zme  tlie 1 0 4  obstacIes tlie fighh \vas at an end: tlic fimt 
cliiir~c prit bis ~vlvliolc force to fligTit. Ney Iiraving socoverrd 
tlie lirie of tIie Tormes resiped liis cornnii~nd to  gen el.^] 
IfarcIixnrI nnrI retnrnerl t o  France. Rnt nhile tliese tIiingñ 
linppener1 in Estremadura lk Manciin was tlie tlieatre of niore 
import~nf opemtlons. 
W ~ I E N  Tictoi retimil from thc Nbcrclie, tliinking Rilson wns 
tlie forerunner of sir Aitliw's nrmy, tlic kiiifi talting tlw 
snme vien,, marcrdicd witli tlie reserve i i i  tlie iiiglit of tlie 3rd 
to Mostoles, leaving Seiiastinui nt Illescas; but d e n  'CVil~cin 
retrmted tlie 4tl1, lie concentrated all his o m  force at Talde- 
more to attnck Tenegns, mliile Tictar advunced towads 
Talavem Veneps, in p m w c e  of  his secret orclm, ha<l 
loitered aliout D a p i e l  and Tembleque, annd the 29th of July 
mns ttt Oenfik, liaving outposts rit dranjuez; h i ~  xear WM 
nt Yclcs, nue rfivisioii untler Lncy I ~ L S  in front of Tolrtlo, nnd 
a smalP Fi-ench post wlis surpririd by a partida cliiei on tlie 
ríglit of tlia Taps.  Tlie 30th of JuIy he Pieard of tlm battte 
of Talavera; and as Lacy liad reported t l ~ e  appliesrance of an 
enemy on tlie road beyond Toledo he was immediately reinforwd 
and liad IIore given as Lis poiat of retreat. Ou tlie 2nd of 
A~ipSt, Venegas, hlsely informed Iiy Cuesh thxt tbe zllics 
mcrs goiiig to rnarcii upon Bidrid, conce.ntratcd nll liis trotitia 
at Arniiiie~, prctciidiiig lie a180 wouErl niwcli on tlie alpita1 
for the junta, haviug nu ivisli t o  see Cuesta n t  the lieatl rif sixty 
tllouszntnrl mcn in tlizt capital, hsrl Iiefore the tiattle of Talavera 
fo rhd  Iiim t o  enter ancl nan~ed another gomrnor. 
This proliibition would Iia~re Iieen disregartled by Cuestj 
but Venrgas wae oliedicnt, anrl rinder pretence of iliiiipr to 
his fiaiilrs if hc mtirclicrl, rcinnincd at Amnjuex, wliere, Iits 
flniilr bcing cqiinllj- cxposctl to an cncmy coming from Tolerlo, 
lie yet ~isrrormsrl no scrvica l o  tlie gencrnl cniisc. Vio 3n1, 
he piished an arlvanced guard to Puente Largo, and lcxving 
aUr huiidred iiifiint~y and soma eavalry near Toledo, cuncen- 
trated liis army betiveen Aranjuez aiid Ocañn. In tliis posi- 
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driven from thc Pucnte Largo ncross the T~gas;  his linc 
of pmts ciu tliat river mns ttien nttack~l  l ~ y  the Frendi 
sIdrmisliers, ami under cover af a lieavy cannonade his posi- 
tion m examined. The bridge8 abom and below hranjuea 
mere broken, nnd the Frsncli resolved t o  pnss the Taps  at 
Toledo. llFith this intcnt, they recromdl the Xaramn rivcr 
and marclicd in tlio direction of that city, wliile Venegns;, stilt 
kecping bis po&s at h n j u e q  foolishly dispersed Iiis otIicr 
divisions at Tembleque, Ocaííx, and Guardia. He was desirous 
of defending Ln Filmdio; tlrc central juntn, mitIi more pm- 
dence, ivisbd him to retre~t into tlie Sierra Morena, &Ir. 
Frert3 proposerl tlint his army should be dirided, one part to 
enter tlic Momn, the othcr to m m I i  by Citciica upon Aragon, 
end so mcnace tlie comrniinications lvitli Franm! znd tlie 
adinirile absurdity of tlie 1)roposnl ir*onIrl probnbly linve 
muscrl it to be adoptad, if [Sebastiani's movemeiits liad not 
put m end to tlie discussion. n a t  ggccrltl, crossing tlie 
Tws nt  Toledo nnd at n forrl IiigJier upI drovc tlic Spanisb 
left Iinclí upon tlie Gunxnlotr! tlic 9th of Aupst. Tlie IOtli, 
Tenepns concentmted hia amy at Almanacid and Eield a 
council of war, whcrein i t  was resolved to athck tlie French 
on thc 12tl1, but the time %.as miscalcnlatd, for on the I l t h  
Sebustiani comnience(l 
t ' e n c s s  hhaíl, includiiifi two thousand five hnndred cavdry, 
more than twcnty-five thousand men, with forty piicces of 
~ctillery. Composed of the besG rcgimentc in Spain, tfiis 
army mns wcll nmed and clotlierl, and tlie genernls of divi- 
sions were neithcr iincapacitated by age nor destitute of expe- 
riencc; most of them had been emplay~l in tlie previous 
campaiga T h e  village of Almonacid was in the centre of the 
po~itioii ,  nnrI n-ns oociipierl, ns mclI n~ some tnblc-1mtl in front, 
by two divisions o£ iiihutry uiider ~cncrnl Cwtqjon. TILO 
lefh wing, under Lacy, rested on a LiIl ~i-hich covered the 
main road to Consuegra. Tlic right Sng, nnder Tripdet, 
~vnc dra~vn up on soine rising grolind co~ering the rond to 
Teiiiiilequc. A reseme, undcr Giron, and thc grcntest pnrt of 
tlie iirtillery, were poshd Iiellind tlie centre, 0x1 Q rugged hilE 
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crowned by m old castle: tlie cavalry were on tZie extremity 
of wcli wieg. 
Tlie French reseme, under Depsolles, waa still soma hoars' 
marcli behind, when fkbastiani, after observing the Zjpanist 
dispoaitiona, resolved to attack aith tbe fowtb corps ody, 
The Polish rlivision marched apinst the front, h l ' r i  Ger- 
mans tumed the flanlhof the hilZ on wliicli the Spmish Ieft, 
wils posted, and @o French brigades were directed upon the 
centre. dfter a sharp figbt the Spmish le& m put to  íiight, 
Eiut Venegaa, outflankimg the victorious troops e t l i  hia c8vd y, 
charged and tlirew thcm into disordw; at that moment 
Demolles arriviiig with Sebastiani'a rserves mtored tlie 
day, and the Spanish mvalry, sfiattered by musketv and the 
fire o£ a battery, was in tum charged and broken by the 
Frcnch horse. Venegaa ralIied bis troops on the mst1lshill 
behind the village; but then the king carne up with the 
remainder of the reserve, the Polw arad Qermans continued 
their march against the left flank, and nine fmh battaliona fell 
upon the centre, while aix battalions forced the  right : the 
hcigl~t ancl thc castle werc thus mrried. Venegaa, to cover 
his rctrent, nttempted a stand in tlie pIain behiiid, but two 
divisiom of French chqoons charged and the disoder b e m e  
irremediable: the Spaniards thmwing awsy their arms dis- 
persed, and were pursued for aeveral hourri. Following tbe 
French aocount, three t h o n m d  of the vanquished were slain, 
four thowsnd taken, with all tlie guns, baggage, ammunition, 
and carriages. The French loss did not exceed fifteen hun- 
dred men. Tha defcated army took sheIter in the Morens, 
Selinstinni ocmrpid +4rnnjuez, Victor entered Toldo, nnd the 
kiiig mturncd in triumph to  lfndrid. 
Still tlie Anglc-Spuuidi army lield DeIeytosa nnd Jaraioejo, 
and sir Arthur was not witliaut h o p ~  to resume offenaire 
operations. I i e  knew Ney had returned to Salamanq nnd 
erroneously bdieved llortier camrnanded only a pnrt of tlie 
Erst oorps, the remaixlrler being at Toledo. His own strength 
w a s  seveiiteen thougand; Beresford liad retidieil Moraleja with 
twclve or fourtccn thousmd Portupese, nnd five t3iousand 
British wcre fasi coming np iindcr Catlin Crawfuril md Light- 
Iiurn; wberefure if Suult inwtdcd Portripl, he cIcsigned 
to follom lum by t11e south bnuk of the T~gus, ~vhile Bercs- 
ford, reinforced witli Cramfurd and Lightburn'i tmops checkcd 
him nnrth of th& river. Hc jiiclgcd the French too weak t o  
pass 11is right Aank Ly La 3fanclin snrl i n d e  Antlalusin; for 
lie knem not of JFene,@defe~t at Almonacid, aud he stilI p o  
underratd his enemy'g forcc, as t a  contemplate re-crossing 
the Tngiw, and in conjunction witli Beresford hllhg upon 
tlicir rjg1:t nt Plascncia. For his own front hc h d  no fenr, 
and Iie wns taking mmures to restore the brolreii nrch of the 
Cardinal's bridge over the Tage,  with a viem to this opera- 
tion agninst Plasencia, when the Spnnish pvernment and its 
gencrnla, iqain fomd Iiim t a  Iook aolcly t o  the prcscrvaticin 
of Iiis own army. Re wus liowever groyiing in tlie dark. 
writing t o  lord Cmtlereagli, Iie estimated the Frencli in 
the Peninsula at one liundred and twcnty-five thousmd, of 
wliicli twcnty thousand mere in C~hlonia, fourteen thousand 
in Arrigan, nnd fievei~t~y tlioiiñnnil apposed to liimsetf, Now 
tliere urere tivo hundred and fifty-three thousand 3mpdaf 
figliting Frcnchmen in Sph,  exclusive of the ñ~iisterrolls. 
goveiments,  garrisons, and five thonsnnd roya1 
gonrcls nok included in the emperor's n m y .  In Cntalonig 
mon not tlisw wr, not twenty but fifty thousmd; in bra, 
fourtecn, but twenty-eight thousand And oppcised to the 
British tilere werc, not scvcnty, but one hnndrcd nnd seventy 
tliousnnd good troops, one Iiundrd thousend E n g  rmdy $o 
march nnd strike, without calling in a debchment or d i s  
placing ri gxwison! Ncvertheless upon tliis false da% sir 
A f i u r  acted and strccesñfully, thiis illiistrating bis own liappy 
fortune and the Iring'~ innliacity for nar. 
From the 23rd of July, d i e n  the bad faith of ilie juntn, 
the apathy of tlie pople jn Estrernsdnra, and tlie waj-wniul 
foíly of Cuesta, hha cchcckcd tlic forward movcmcnta uf tlie 
British, tlie privatiom of Uie lntter l i d  daily increased; sir 
A r t h r  while remonstmting 6 t h  Cuesta nnd the juntn, warn~rl 
them of the consequences and refuaed te pnss tlie Append;x s. 
Alkerclie; liut liis reprcssuhtions, nnd Iiis 1i:ilt 
at Talavera, were disregiirrled liJ' mcn, wlio, jiidfing Ernt!i 
tlzeir own habita, conclutkd Iiis actions would also be at vari- 
ante with iiis professions. EIe demanded foocl, nrid ww 
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ansivered by fdse statements of what had been, and falser 
promises of wlint monld be done, Hiis dorious service, far 
from exciting the pt i tude of tlie Spanish government ren- 
dered it more prverse. His soldiers were weakened by 
liunger, his gick pehhing for want of neoeemy succoura, hii 
commissaries were without means of trrnsport; md mhen he 
q p l i ~ l  for only nincty a i t i l l t ~  homes t o  mipply the pInce of 
tllo~c killed in the action, Cuegtn, an the vcry fieXd of bnttle, 
with tho stcnm of English blood recking in his noatrils, 
refuserl tliia requcat : nntl two dtay ~ f t e r w n n l a  tihnndoned thc 
ivounderl mcn to sn encrny tlint hc rsnd bis countrymen were 
Iiourly describing as the most ferocious and dishonourable of 
m~snkinrl. 
After the retreat over the Tngus the  heavy sufferinp of the 
tmops increxsed, aniI the rparmth of their general's rernon- 
#trances rose in proportion to the ill-treatment they expe 
riencecl; hut tlie repliee, nothing xbating in fdsenesa a9 to 
fi~ct, now became insulting t o  general and army. ' The BrZtbh 
zuere mt only mll bzct mer 8uppAd:'-'&y wMed t J k ~  
perótimmj, $ri.?hgarl € 7 ~  lhzpa,  i?aw-pkd #E *ish 
w o p ,  a& @y a o l i  tl~4 p a  t7m s h q f d y  acp~ird:' 
-' IIM PP&& of f h  m y  m 8 u  tJx Tqa aam unmmmy; 
Soeclt $0 J m e  h t m  dk?myd; ~ J N  3 - n g l z k T b  genmal mwt 
Am smet  mtiuss, wItic7b Jae dwe rzot amcle:~an,nd other 
calumnies of tlie like nature. Dut from Ghe 20th af July to 
the 20th of Augist, althongh the Spanittrds were genemlIy 
weIl fed, the English soldiers had not received ten fa11 ration~i, 
H~lf  a pound of wheat in the g d n ,  and, t'~+ce a week, a few 
ounces of fionr with a qurarter o? a pound of p t ' s  fiesli, 
formed the sole subaistenrx of men and offims; and tbis 
scnnty suplily wna procurcd witli much l~hour, for the goats 
weir! tci be cauglrt on thc hiIls and killcd by tha troops. It 
vas, pcrhaps, upon tliis additioml Iia~lsliip tliat the accusation 
of selling provisions WM foundetl, for in mcli casesI it is in al1 
amies tlie cuatom that the offal belongs ta tLe men mho 
slaughter the animals; but tho famine ie the camp wm plainly 
proved by this vcry fact; the goat:s offds soId at this time, fos 
three OF four dolbrnJ double the usual prioe of tlie whoIe 
animal: nnd men md officers outbid each atlier for thc 
ii.ret.chct1 fooci. 
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It has been aaid British soldicrs are les8 intelligent, and las 
able to  sustain privatioag than tlie soldiers of my other nation: 
this is onc of many niIgnr crrors promrilgnted rcspeding thein. 
SIint tliey sliould be constnntly victorious, and yet llave inferior 
military qunlifications, does not appear a logicaI condiision ; 
but tlie tnitli is, tbat, a~ving the greater sobriety of tlie 
Spaniards md Portuguesq tlie English soldiers possem ssll 
tlie most vnlunlile rnilitary qualities in as liigli, ond some in 
n much higher clegree tlian any other nation. TPiey are rapid 
and intelligent as the French, obedient as tho Qerman, 
endtiriiig ns tlie Rnssinn, more rohst tlian nny; ond witli 
~wpcct o food, no mun vf nny nntiun ca.nnwivitli less ih-lian two 
pouiids of sdid f o d  of aomc IEinrl daily do Lis work \el1 for 
any length of time, A general cliarge of pillaging is easiIy 
mde, liar11 to disprove; pt at tliis time the Spnnisli troops 
did nut unly pillnga but wantonly devnstnta tlie coniitry ivith- 
out excuse; for, tlie three d a p  suooaeding the defeat of h z o -  
bispo excepted, their rations were replw md sufficient, Z"he 
clinrgc oF intcrceptiog convoys sIioiild Iiiive bccn Appenaix 
revemed. 2% XpmbI~ G W ~ J  intwmyt~d tlte 
pwvirions amd f m g e  clwtiwrl for tlm Xnglk?¿ umy, amdfied 
upon tlre fmgms, as Ythg Jmd been aenzies. 
Before tlie rniddle of dugust, t.11ere mcrc in thc six rcgi- 
nients o€ Eaglisli cavulry a tliousand men dismuiinted, at~d 
tlie liorsea of  seven bundred otliers were nnserviwile. The 
baggage animals died in grenter numbers, the artillcry czttle 
ivcre scnrcely nblo to drag tlre p~iins, nild onc tliinl of tlie 
reserve arnrnunition >vas given over to tlie Xpaniartls, because 
the amrnunition carts mcrc required for tlie conveynnce of sicIi 
men, of whicli tlie niirnbcr clibily inereitscd. Beresford ex- 
pwsienced tlic sanic rlificulties in tlie riciglibourliuod uf Ciurlnd 
Rodrip. Yumerons desertions froin thc Portu- nrircnaix is. 
pese army, causd Iiy a dislike to enter Bpnin, 
liad delaycd his aimpnign until tlie 1wt dnys ot' June, wlicn he 
crossed tha Poctu~we~e frontier, and Sroin tht  moment tlie 
usunE vexatious s~stern of tlie fipnniads commencd. Romaiipb 
continued at C o n i l ~ ~  Del Parque, full of mighty projects, 
wfis indipant  tliat Bcrwfarrf ~vould nat blintlIy ndopt his 
mmmendntioiis; and lioth g~ncruls iT-ere ignomnt of tlie res1 
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strclngtli of the French; Ltit tlie Spipaniartl codident and 
iiisisted upon offensive movernents, rvliile 13erdodI a gened 
by no means of an enterprising digposition wlien in tlie aole 
command of an army, contented him~lelf witli taking np a 
defensive line behind tlie Agneda In. this he was justified 
lo. By his instructions, mhicli compelled him to Iook to the 
pasa of Perales and the defence of the fronticr line; 23 By 
tlie date of bis anny? which was onlj half organized, and 
ivitliout liommen OF artiIlery; 3'. By the conduct of the 
Sl~aiiish autIiorities. For the Portupese troops were not 
0 i i 1 ~  rcfused provisions, but those which had h e n  &red by 
sir Artliur in the mngmincs at Ciudatl Rodrigo with a view te 
opcr"c in tlint quartcr, wert! seiecd by tlie cabildo, M ~ m r i t y  
Enr ra ddrt pretended to be h e  ior &e ñupply of sir John 
Moore's army. The claim itself m s  of doubtfd character, 
mcI Cradock had offered t o  p g  it if the cabildo monld produce 
the vwcher for its being due, a preliminmy which had not 
been complied with. Tliere wris also an Englkft commigsarg 
ri;G Ciudad h d r i g o ,  empowered to liquidate that and any otlier 
jnst clriirn upon the Dritisli rnilitary &est; but the cabildo, 
like a11 Spnninds, midaking vioIence for encrgy prefemed this 
ílispl~y of pctty poww to thc intcrests of the common cause. 
nlennivliilo Soult pnased tlio mountfiins by Bañoe, and Beres 
ford, moving in s paralle1 d i d i o n ,  croaserl them &t. Pernles, 
and reaclied Xoraleja i,bout tho 12tIi o€ AuguFit. There he 
rallied tlie t roop~ md convalescents cut off from Tdavem, and 
took post the 17th bchind the Elga, covering the r o d  to 
Alirantes. 
In tbis shte of &aim the suprerne junh ofFered air A*hw 
'IVcllcsley the rmk of mphin-general, nnd aent him a present 
of lioraes. Accepting the m k ,  he refnsecl the pay) as he had 
hefore rcfused that of the Portugueee gnvernment,.aiid the junta 
thcn p r m s ~ l  Iiiw to renew offcripive oycrrttions; yet, acting ss 
if t h q  tllo~ght lwc lionoutw woitld compensate for the siifFer- 
ings uF tlie troop~, tliey niarfe no chniige in their sptern. Sir 
Ariliiir was, liowever, now con~inced tliat Spiriain ww no Ionger 
tlie place for a British army. De relinquished further oper* 
tions in thíit country, sent &S cavalrp +,o the neighbourliood of 
Caceres, broke down another etrch of the Cardinal's bridge to 
p e ~ e n t  the enemy from troubling him, and, tlvough the 
Britisli nmbn.%sador, informe¿¡ tlie Junta he would retire into 
Porb~~gal. This created the wildest consternation, for in their 
mollen gelf-srifficicncy tlic junta had dimgarded a11 wmnrninp; 
and nom acting hs they hnil before mted <2tli sir John Mooro, 
eut len~oud to avert tlie congequences af their own evil doinp 
by vehcment rernonstmces and the most a h r d  statements :- 
'Tite F m h  m m  ~~ tlae m m m t  p+tk fw driwing 
&m b q j d  tha Ppnwhi:'-% t~mdkdfw retreat of lJle 
&IUJI!&JL d min tJie c m # : '  and so fortli. But they Iind 
to den1 with a general as firrn as Moore, and in the nritigh 
ambassador they no longer found an instmment suited to  
tlreir purpases. Lord Wcllealey, a man wit.11 too many wcak- 
neslie8 to be called v t ,  yet o€ nn extended mpacity, nnd a 
genius at once subtle and irnperionq had come out on a. speciai 
&=ion,-and Mr. Frere, whose lazit communication with the 
junta hd been t o  recommend another military projec6 ~wis 
hnppily displnced: yet even in l i i ~  primte rnpacity lie imde 
an effort to hsve some of the generals supersdei., and the 
junta, with R refined irony tmly Spanish, cmted hita the 
mmpia of Umox 
At Cndiz the honoura paid to lord Welle~Iey w m  extrava- 
gant and unbecorning, and liia journey from thence to Seville 
wais a t r iumpha~t  procevsion; but tliese ontward demonstra- 
tions of feeling did not impose upon liim beyond the moment; 
liis Iirotlicr's corrcapondcnce nnrl his a m  prnctmtion soan 
enahled liim to make a just mtimate of the junta's protmta- 
tions. Diadtaining their intrigues, and lrgpreciating a generar@ 
riglrt to direct the operationa of his o m  amy, Ite secondeti 
sir Adhnr'a remonstrances witli firmness; and tilrtiiig tlie 
latter'~ statements as a p ide  and basis for liis own viom, 
u ~ e d  them upon the Gpanigh go~crnment with bccoming 
dignlty. Tlie jjnnh, protesting the welfare of t1ie Britiab 
nrmy was the principal al~jwt of their care, did nnt ftlil to 
prove very clearlp upon paper, tbat tlie troups h d  been cver 
since their entry into Spain amply wpplied; pet, to  satisfy the 
Eaglisli genernl, they imested don Lorenzo Calvo, a mernber 
of thcir bndy, with fiill powem to draw forth and npply nll thc 
r e soum of tha caiintry to the nourisliment of liotli amies. 
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Thicc gentlemrnnt promises m11 nssumnces !vera more full 
and formal t.hm M, de Gray's, anrl equelly f&e. Ele declared 
tliat provisiona and forage in vast qumtities were actualIy 
l ~ i n g  deIiver4 into the rnagaxines at TmilIo, when in fa3 
ihere mas not even an effort made to collect any. Be mid 
the British sliouid be served dthough the Spanish ,troops 
should tliereby sufer ; and at , te  heme time he mmpelled tbe 
alddw of a distant t o m i  to scnd into the Spnnish camp pro- 
visions which had bctn almdy punchased by an English com- 
missary. In finc lord Wcllcslcy l id  nrrivcd too late; al1 the 
miwliief that pctuiance foUy bad f&h violcncc rand Egnormce 
uuited oould Iiiff ict was alrearly acoomplished : and wliile be 
NTAS vninly ur,$ng a vile, if not a treaclierou~ government, to 
provide suritemnca for the soldiers, sir Artbnr withdrew the 
Iatter fwm a post wliere the vnltur~s in tlieir prescience of 
death were a W y  congqating, Tlie 2Otli, the main body of 
$he British mmp qdtted Jaraic~jo, and marchd by Tmiilo 
upon M e r i h  light brigade under R. Cmufurd, being 
rel!evd at Almamz by the Spaniardq took tlie r o d  of Caceres 
to Valencia de ~iicantara, aand the ptass af Mirabete bore ample 
testimony to its previons suFcrinp These tmops which, 
only thrce meclrs bcfore hnd trnvcrsed sixty miles in a single 
mnrcli, wcro now mith dificulty nnd afkr many halts abIe to 
rcncli tilo mmmit of t l ~  Mirabete, dthough only four miles from 
tlleir camp; aud the ~ i d e  of tlie rnountnin wns covered with bng- 
pgg7 nnd the c n m m  of many Iiundred mimds who d i 4  in 
tlie etiort to wend. 
Wheu Be retreat commenced, t l ie junta, mith the mdevor 
lence of manfier engendered by fe=, calnnmiated the man to 
whom only ten days before they liad ddressd  the mast ful- 
mme compliments, md t o  wbose courge and skiIl tbey owed 
their own existente. ' l t  wtw m€ 11. want qfp&ms,' they 
mid, s m  otJm m ~ P v a  tJmt c d  tlie Ef7agI&h q m d  to 
r&eat.' T h i  was openIy and inmItingly strited by Qarap, by 
Epi~b, nnd by Calvo, in t h ~ i r  corrcspondence with lord Weiles- 
ley iwid sir hrthur; md at the same time the  jnnts indnstri- 
ously a p r e d  a report. that the tme reason was tliejr own fim 
resistance to the wigenemus demands of the Engli~h ministen, 
aho had required the cesaion of Cadk and the isIand of Cuba 
as the price of furtlmr msistnnce, Rut the only firmness they 
had sliown was in resktance to the jaat dcmands of their ally. 
At Talavera, sk Artliur liad been forced to give over t o  tlia 
S p a n i h  the artiüey taken from the enemy f Meza d'llior; 
hc liad swificed m part af Iiis ammunition to obtain convny- 
mhnce fur the wounded men; and to effect tliis movement from 
Jaraicejo witliout Ieaving his sick beliind, he abundoned his parc 
of ammunition and stores; but then the Spnnish generds, 
who had rdwed the sligliktrt aid to conver the sick nnd 
woundod men, found amplo mezns to cnrry off al1 tliw gtorw 
t o  their own mqazines. In this manner, dmost bereft of 
bnggage and ammanition, those soldiers m110 liad withstood 
fhe fierw cffortn af the enemy, were clriveri ss it wre  
ignominiously from the countrg they had protected to their 
own Ioss. 
The 34th, Iiendquartem being at: Herida, o, desptch from 
lord Wellesley mas receivd. He paintetl in strong co1ours 
the terres o£ thc juntrs, thc distraction of tlio pcople, thc 
univ~rsnl codusion; antE with ra naturd nnxiety to initigata 
their distress, he proposed tlie Briti~L l i y  aliouId, notmitli- 
atanding the pwt, endeavour to cover AnNusia, by t aking in 
conjunetion with the Spnish army a defensive post beliind 
the Guadiann, its Ieft to be on fhe hontier of  P o r t u d .  To 
facilitate this l ~ e  11ad prcsented n plm to tho junta for tlie 
future aupply of pmvisions, and the vicinity of the frontier 
rrnd of Scville mould, he hoped, obviate any diiculty on thnt 
point. But lie rcstcrl thia project cntirely upon political 
grounrls. Re wlio for mnny y e m  Iind witli deapotic power 
controlled tho movements of immensa ttrmies in India, now 
carefullp avoided any appcnrance of meddling with the generah 
provjnce. '1 am,' said he, lfully sensible not only of the 
indtilimcy, buk o€ tlic lnutility of nttcmpting to offer nny 
opinion. of mine in a. situntion mliere your o m  Judgment 
must be yonr best  pide.'-^ Viewiping, Iiommer, so nearly, the 
painful comepuence~ of your immediate retreat into Portugd, 
I have deemerl it my rluty to submit t o  your oonsiderntion thc 
pos~ibility of arlopting an intermediate plan.' Let this Ietter 
be cornpared with Nr, Frere'~ to sir John hfoore on a s i m h  
occnsion. 
This despatch mused sir Aithur to balt at Merida for some 
chp, He m &le there to obhin provisions, and he &hed 
to ailay the excitement occllsioned by his retreat;; J.et he 
refused t o  co-operate apin witli tke Spaniards. ' Want,' he 
s d ,  'Iiad driven him to separate from tliem, bnt their shame- 
ful ffight nt Arzobipo woulcl done have justified hii for 
doing so. To take up a defensive poait.ion behind the Guac 
[liana monId h weless, because that river was fordable, and 
the ground behind it weak, The line of the Tagus, occupid 
at the rnoment by Eguia, was BO atwng that if the Gpaniards 
could defcnd anythimg they might ddend that; and hc advisod 
tlicm to mnd their pontoon bridga to Badajos, and on 
tha defensim at Deleyto7~ and Almmrm. But, it might be 
nskcd, wns thcro no cltnnm of renewing the offensive? To 
miiat pnrpose? Tlia French were aei nurneroua if not more so 
tlm tbe allies; and with respect to the Spaniards at lwt, 
superior in discipliie and wery milihry guality. To adwnce 
tlgain was only to play the same losing prne as before. 
Bnfios and Perales mast be guarded, or the force in CastilEe 
mould qa ln  ponr thnough apon the renr of the allied army. 
Who was ta p r d  these pwses '4 !€he Bntish were foo few to 
d&&, the Spaniads could not be tmsteíi; rtnd if they wuld, 
Avila md the Guarlaramrt p n r ; ~  remined, by which the enemy 
wnld reidoroe tlie army in front-for tliere mre no Spnish 
troope in the nortfi of Ppain apable of mrbking n diversion. 
(Bnt there waa tt more ~erious conhiideration, mmely, the 
constant and sluuneful misbehaviour of the Spanish troops 
before the enemy. We, in England,' srtid sir Aithur, ' never 
hear of their defeab and flightg y& 1 have heard Spanish 
officera telling of nineteen or twenty actions of the description 
of that at the bridge of Arzobispo, accounts of which, 1 bdieve, 
h ~ e  n ver been published. In the battle o€ Talrtver4' he 
oontinueti, iu which the Bpanish axmy, mith very trifling 
exception, mas not engagerl-whole corps threw away their 
arrns aud rtnn off when tliep were neither attacked nor threat- 
oned with sn nttaclr. When these dnstardly soldiera run 
awny they plunder everykliing tliey mset. In their flight 
from TaInwrn they pliindered tha baggage of the Britisli muy, 
mhich vas at thrtt moment bravely fighting in their canse. 
Accrsr, IPO~.] ROOR V1n.-CRAP. 4. 203 
For tliese reacons he would not & s i n  co-operate witli the 
Spnniards; yet, hking post on the Portuguese frontier, he 
would hnng upon the enemy's flxnk, and thu~, uniess the latter 
carne mlth very pea€  forces, prcvent him from crossing tha 
Quadiana' 
Tbis reasoning was eonclusive, nnd ere it reached lord WeI- 
. lesley, the latter f m d ,  that so far from his plans relative tu 
' the snpply having been adophl, he could not even get rrn 
m i v e r  from tlie junta. Thnt misedle  body, nt one moment 
shrinking with fwr, at the next liursting witli folFy, now trrlked 
of tlie enemy'a being about t o  retire to the Pyreneea, and even 
to the interior of Trance t And, asmming the right t o  diposa 
of the Portuguese a m y  as well as of  their om,  importunntely 
prmserl for nn immerliirta combind offensivo oymtion by iylio 
troops of the tliree nations to Iiamss the enemy in his retreat! 
yet, ak the same time, tliey erdered Epia t o  withdraw from 
Delefioza beliind the Guadiam 
X p i n  rcaehed Ln Sercnn tbe 31&, aand Venegas who 11d 
mllid his fngitives in tlie Moren% bbmng reinforcod fmm tlie 
depbta in Antlaliisia, the  tm amies arnounkd to about fifty 
thousand men, of mhich eight or ten thousnnd were horse, fot 
tbe Spanish cavdry hing swift seldom snffered much. But 
the tido of popular discontent -.as now setting fiill npinst tbe 
central government; the memlricrs of tlie ancient junta o€ 
Xeville worked incesaantly for tlieir overtlimw ; Roxnsna, %as- 
tafioa, Cuesta, Albuqucrque, 811, ancl tliey mere =y, d i o  liad 
stiffcrerf dislinnour at  their liands were ngainst them, and the 
local junta of Estremdurn insisted that Albaquerque should 
commnnd in tl~at province. Tbua pressed, the aupreme junt,n, 
tliinkig Tenegu a man devokeil f o  their Rishw, ieaolved to 
incrcaac Iiis fosces, und for tliat p~irposc gavc Albuperque the 
cornmand in Estremndum; yet nllowcd only twelve thuusaud 
men, anrl sent the remrtintler of Eguia'~ army t o  Veaegas: at 
tlie same time a Iast effort mas m d e  to enpge the Eritish 
general in tlieir proceedings. Tliey offered to place AIbu- 
' qncquc rinder his odew iF lie would underk~ke nn offensive 
movement; but trieir plans, being founcled oa vilc politiciil 
intrigues, coiild in no mise nitm sir Artliur Wellesley's deter- 
mination, ~vliich was tlie result of enlarged milPcrg viewu. 
He was redy md watchful to aid Ciudad Rodnp if it waa 
a ~ s d e d ,  hecanse the safety of that fortress was nmsanry to 
the s e d t y  of PoFtugal; but he refused to cooperate witli the 
A p p n k  15. 
Spanish troops in Estrednra, and the 4th of 
Scptembet l i i  head-quhcrs were estrililisbcd in 
Btidajoti. Romana del ived hh army to  del Pmrque autE 
repaircd to Seviile. Venegaa admnccd. into La Manclia, ~ e t ,  
at thc nppronch of a vcry inferior forcc of the cncmy, rctircd 
with tlie confusion of a rout t e  the Morenm Thc English 
tmoprc H.ere then distribwted in Batlajos, Elvas, Campo Mayur 
nnd otlies plmri, on botli. liaxtks of the GFuQcliana; tlie brigfi:les 
already in Portugal were brought up to the amy, md tlie lost 
amunition and eguipments were replmd fimn the magazine3 
at Lisbon, Abran&, and Ssntarem. Beresford, leaving some 
ligllt troops and militia on the frontier, retired to Tliomar, and 
this; eventfd campaign of two montbsi terminated. 
The general loss of tbe BrXtish m oonsiderable. Above 
three thousand five hundred men liiid been kiUed, or had died 
of sichess, or fallen into the enemyk hands. Fifteen hundred 
horses liad perislied from want, exclusive of those lost in battle; 
tlie soldicm were dcpmgerl, and a liart-biirnig Iiatred of the 
Spunirirr!~ w ~ a  engeiidered by tiie treiitnient dl Iind endured. 
To fill tlia mp of diswter tlie pestilcnt fever of tlie Guacliaun, 
wsailing bodies wliich fatigue and liad nourishment had dready 
predisposed to disease, made frightfd mvages : dysentev, that 
sconrge of amies, ragd, and in a sbart time several thousand 
men rlid in the hospihls. 
CHAPTER v. 
D m a  thiri uhort campnip, thc armiros on IioZli sidm mtmf in 
vjolation of the maxh which condemns ' d d l e  e x k d  linw 
af operatbn,' and the rmu1t.s vindicated the soundness of the 
rule. Nothing pemanent or p t ,  notbing proportionate to 
t l ~ e  nnmbcr oF thc troops, the vrtatnm of t l ~ e  combinntions, 
the reputntion oi the commnnders, wtas achieverl. Yet neitlier 
air Arthur Wellesley, nnor the dnke of Dahatia, nor rnamhal 
Jourdan, can be justly c e m m d ,  seeing thnt the two last were 
controlled by the king and the first by circumstances of a 
peculiar nnture. Tlie h n c h  mnr.shds were tlirvarted by 
Josepl~. Tlie Englisb generaI h d  to regulate hie movernentq 
not by his o m  rnilitrry vi- tint by the actual s h t e  of tlie 
SpPlnida' operntions, nnd with refemnce to thcl politia nnd 
teruper oF tliitt peaple. 
La Rffinclia wm the trae h e  by mhicli ta nct npinst 
Madrid; but nlien tlie British were an t h  frontier of Portupi 
thc junta rcfused Cadiz as a place of n m s ;  ~ n i i  withoi~t Cadiz 
or somc otlier fortificd sen-pod, neither pmdence nor hin 
instmctions would permit sir h h u r  t o  operate on that side. 
He adopted then, not what was fitt,iig in a military sense, bnt 
ivliat was lea& obje.ctionable among the few plans that muld 
be concerterl tvith the Spmish generale and govcrnment; they 
were resolved to act mitri abro= amies in Estremdur~, antl 
IA hTmclia; Iie could onIy maintain a miserable defcnslve 
eystem in Portugal, or unite mith Cnesta in the rralley of the 
Tiipirs : liis territnrinl Iine of opemtions wm tlierefore one of 
neccssity, anrl critidsm must be con f iad  to the axecution. 
TIiat he did not grently err in his conception of the campaign, 
is to be infemd fmm tlle fa& that Napoleen, Soult, 'Victor, 
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and Sodan,  simultaneously expected Iiim upon the v c ~  line 
he followed He was tbwarted by h e a t a  at every step, Vme. 
es failed to aid him, m d  tlic fntal error relative to Soult's 
forces, under wliich he Inboud thmug?iout, Gtintetl rtu fiis 
opemtiom! yet he shook tha intrusive monarcli roughlgr ira 
tlic midat of fifty thou~rtnd men. 
Let Iiim be judged, not liy mliat did, but mhat wonld 
have happened if Cuesta liad been active and Sreneps h d  
perfumeri his part lojdly. Tlie junction of the British rtnd 
Spmith forces at Xavg.1 Nora1 11appened tlie 22nd of July. 
Victor was then with twenby-one thousand men in position 
beGnd the dllierche, tlie fourth corlps was nenr Biadrilejos in 
La Mancha, Joseph at Madrid, where Foy hd just arrived to 
concert Soult" smcvement upon Plasenck Th king and 
Sehastiani could not reach the m n e  of action bcfore the 25th 
or 2Gth of July; nor couid Eodt  idiuence thc opcr~tiona 
5efoi.e the 1st or 2nd of Aupst, If then the aIlicd nrmy, 
bcing nixty thousnnd ~trong with ra hundrcd piccca of mtillcry, 
had attwketl Victor on t11e rnorning of tho  23rd, hc wonld 
hava b n  bmten, and driven upon Madrid ar Toldo ; nnd a3 
the countr;p iinmetliately in his rear wm open, ten t l iou~nd 
horsemcn mnId have been launched in the pursuit. MTilsoii 
would have h e n  on bis flank, if, negleeting a junction &tli 
the fourth he hd talren the ioad to Madrid; if lie toolr 
the Toldo road, he and Xebastiani wodd have been separated 
from the king7 who did not reiich V a q p  until the evening of 
the 25th, and who would not in this case bave been able to 
ndvanee bcyond Naval Carnciro. Now7 admitting that snpc- 
rior diaciplinc and experimcc had enabled the French troopa 
to effect their retrciit on citlicr line witbout any serious 
calami ty, wlint would liave followed l 
10. If Vietor joind the king, the latter could only have 
retiied by Guaddaxm upon the tliird oorpri, or have gona 
tiJ' tha Gundnramtb toivarcls SouLh. 
3". If Tictor joined S~ebastiani, the two corps must have 
retrmted to Guadnlasarn, and tlie king would h a ~ e  joined them 
tliere, or have pusfied for tlie Gnahrama to  meet Xoult. No 
doubt tliat rnarshal, having so powerful an nrmy, would in 
eithcr ense hnve reatored Joaepli to his c:ipitaF, and cut ar 
Arthur's commnnication witb Portngal by the valIey of tho 
Tagus; ncvcrtheIcss, s grmt moral imprmian would hnr-c 
becn iiroduceil by the temporary loss of Mdriil, ~vhicli  vas 
moroover tlie genemT clepfit of al1 tho fiench armies. Vmc- 
gas, Cuesta, and sir h t h u r ,  would also have been united on 
one line of operations, tlint of La. Nanchn, mhich mould pro- 
bably hnvc foi-ccd tlie junta's consent to tIie occupntion of 
Cdiz. IR thia view it must bo admitted the plan wns con- 
~ i v e d  mitli genius. 
Victor's position on the Alberehe -.as atrong, he comnianded 
twcnty-fivo tlroiisand vcteinns, n&l tlie Spnninrcis wero bnd in 
t t e  field; heme it may be enid a movement of the whole m g  
t o  Escalona, anrl froin thence to Maqueda, would have been 
prefcialsle to  a rlircct attmk at Snlinas; becnuse tlie nllics, 
fhus snddcnly placcd iu tlie midst cif tlie Frencli miglit 1inr.c 
lienten tliern in dehil, antl would ccrtninly have cut tlie kiiig 
off from tlie Gtnadmmn p w e s  and f o r d  him b c k  upon tlle 
Quadalwrn. But witli Cuesta for a collcague, hom couid 
genemi undertnke an opemtion requiring celerity snd the 
ni& mlmiIation T Tlie false dealing of thc juntn no prudcnca 
couId pard  against ; yet experisnce proves, Oint witliout 
ebraardinnry good fortune, Borne accident will a1lwa~-S bappen 
to m r  the oombinatioas of  armies acting upon ' douTile mtw- 
n d  liw.'  Anci so it wna witli respect to Venegns; for thnt 
general, with a f o m  of twentysix tlousmd men, was lield in 
check for five rlBys by tbree thougand French; and the iiattle 
o£ Almonacid proved he linew not nlicn to ndvancc nor whcn 
to retreat. 
Sir Arthur WeIIesley's patienoe under the fooSih imnlts of 
Cuesta, and tlic untlaunted firmness with wliich he protected 
tlie Spanisli a m y  require no illustmt~oa %en Cuesta fe11 
braek from St. Olluila on tlie SGtIi, t l in En'tisli eouId not retrent 
with lionour; md tlicre in  notliing more msmornble in tlie 
history of tliis var, notliing more creditalile to tlic pcrsoml 
diarnetcr of tlic Engliuh cliief, tIinii tlie bnttle of Talswrn 
consitleted as an isolated evcnt. Pievertlieless it proved tlie 
alliea were uiiabla to nttuh tlieir object; for notwitlistandiiig 
Victor'ri iil-jurlgcd partia1 attacIrs on the niglit of tlie Y 7th and 
morniug of the ZSkh, notwitlistaudiiig t!ic fin$ repulse of the 
French, al1 the advanhps of the movements aa a whole wera 
6 t h  the 1at.atter. They were on the 31d of Jnly, including the 
garrison of Toledo, still above forty thouimd atmng, and 
maintaiaed their central positian, altliough it was not until the 
1st of r l u p ~ a t  that Sorilt'ei approach cauaed any ehange in the 
views of tlio allid generala. IPhia bringg 11s to tlic Sundmen- 
tn1 error of  ir Aitlinr'a opemtions. That he should mgap 
liimself in tlie nnrrnñ valley of t l ~ e  Tiigua witlr twenty thou- 
sand British nnd fort~r thm~and Spanisli troops, whea fifty 
tlioueand French were waiting for him at the further end, and 
above fifty thousand ottiers were hanging on lis flank and 
mr, ahom tbe greatest masters of the art may m: he who 
mars walks in a mist, tbrough mliich the keenest eyes cannot 
Jmys cliscern the right path. '#peak m of a gmwal 
aaho Im 4 8  M m k t a h  ia m,' ~ a i d  Turenne, ' and you 
q m k  of om whe hm seldom nzade m.' 
Sir Mhur  WeIlesIey tlius excnsd hirr error:-'When 1 
entered Spain 1 had m o n  to hliere I sliould he joined by o, 
Spaniuh army in sucli a mpeotable state of diecipIine and 
efficiency, as that it hha k q t  in check during nearly three 
month after a defeat, a French army at one time superior and 
at no time mnch inferior.'-'1 had likewise remon to believe 
t h e  FrenGh corps in the north of Spain were fully employed; 
and dtliough 1 ltad h m d  of &e arrival of mmshal Soult at 
&mora on the 20th of J n q  with a view to eqnip the ieremaim 
of his corps, 1 did not think it possihle tliat thrco French 
corps con~isting O£ tllirty-fm thoustind mcn nnder thi-ea mar- 
shals, could I~nve Zieen memliled at hlamanm witlioiit the 
knoi1'1eilg~ of tlie governor of Ciudad ElodFip, or of tlie junta 
of Castille; that these corps m t d  hwe been moved froni 
their stations in Gallieia, the -4Fturias, md Discay, withont 
s d t h g  free for general operations any 8panish troops which 
had been opposed to them, or without any other inconveniente 
to the enemy thrin tliat of pmtracting to a later period ttie 
settlement of bis government in tliose provinces;-and that 
tlicy conld bavo pcnctrabd into EaZremadw% without B, shot 
beiiig fired nt them lq tlie troops ileemed suficient t o  defend 
the pnsses liy ths Spanish geiiemls.' TIius lioii-erer tlie facta 
were, tlien and almays. Tlze militnry preparationa of Sp&, l i e  
figures in s, plifintasmagoria, howwer meiiacing in sppeamnce, 
werc invarinblp found to bc viiin muid illirsory: nnd that sir 
Artliurqs error ww not Patttll is t o  be nttrihuted to tliree 
causes :- 
lo. The reluctante of Ney to qiiit d s t o ~ ; - 2 ~ .  Jfortier's 
rnarcli upon Trilla Castin instead of 5dnmznca;-33 Victor's 
vchcmcncc in urging tlie battle of Tnlavcm: in fine, jealoirsy 
nmong tha maislials ond the undccided ternper of thc Iring. 
If 6oult Iiad not been tl~warted, lie would hnve concentrnted 
the three corps nenr Xdlamancta before the 2 0 tli, and would h v e  
reachcd Plasencin before tlie 28th of Jtily; tbe dlies must then 
Iitlve forced their wny into La Xanclis, or been cmslietL huid 
they htive done the former ivitheut anotlier battle, without ths 
loss of  al1 tlie ~vounrled men! could tliey hitve done it at  a113 
Tlie Eritish,i~cluding Robert Cmufurcl'a brigride,mcre scvcnteen 
tliousnnd Eigliting inea on the 29t.11, yet ~vasted witli fatigue and 
hunpr; the Bpaniards were above thirt y tliousnud, but in them 
no trust could be placed for nn effort requiring fine discipline 
rand coiirngc of t.he highcat order. The intmsivc king wnri at 
tlis bend oE forhy tliousand good troops. Venegiis, nt once 
iporant tbnd htunpered by tlie intr iges of the junta, mas LIS 
nought in &e operations, mhite 8ault's stcp, stenlthy mhen Ilie 
~ituat~ion of daira wns ol,scrirc, would lirtvc hccii impctnous 
wfien B ligllt Iiroke on tlie field of httle : it is scarcely poa- 
sible to conceive tlie alIiea forcing tlieir way in front befort! 
that marshnl would have failen on thek re=. 
Joscph w a s  Rnrilly seccessful; yct it mny hc nffirmed, that 
witli tlie excelitiun uf unitirig Iiis tl~ree corp  behind tFie 
Gudarama on the cvening of  tha 25tli, Iiis procecdins wcrc 
an unintermptetl series of errors. IIe wouId not sufer Soult 
to Iiesiegc Ciudad 1todrig.o w01i seventy fhoiisand men in the 
end of 5uIy. To protcct Mntlriil from thc nrmy af Vcnegq 
ove~lialanced in his mind the d w n t a g e s  of this bold ancI p,tlid 
project, which would inwitrrbly have dmwn sir Arkhur from 
tlie Taps-mould Iiave intemptcd al1 military mmmunica- 
tion bctwcen tho northerii niid soutlicrn provinccs-mould 
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have ensured posse~sion of CastilIe and hon ,  and Lave opened 
a bmad way fo Lisbon. Cuesta md Venegas could it is sud 
have marched against Mdrirl! Cuesta and PenepaI acting 
on externd Iines and whose united force did not exceed aixty. 
five tlionsand mcn! The lciing, holding ri crntm! position with 
fifby thousand Frcnch vctcmna, \.aa nlarmed nt  thia prospoet, 
and rejecting Boult'~ plan drew Mortier to Villa Castin : truly, 
this was to ayoid the fniiktree frem fear of the nettle at its 
stem ! 
Si Arthiifls admnce to Talavera was the result of this p t  
error, bnt, having thus incautiously d o d e d  Soult an oppor- 
tanity for striking a fatal blow, a fresh combination wa-s con- 
oerted. Tbe lring, with aqual judgment and actiGty, then 
united al1 his own forces iiear Toledo, separated Tlenegs from , 
Cuesta, pushed bnck the Intter trpon the Engli~h ihmy, annd 
forced both te stand fin tlie ddcnsive, wiwitli eyeM attentively 
directed Co theh fmiit wlien tlie red point of danger ww in 
the rear. This wm akilful, h t  the battIe which foUowd was 
a pslpable, ran enormous fault !Ihe dlies eonld neither mme 
foward noi  bacIrmard mithout being worse situated t h  in
that strong position, which eeemed marked out by fortune 
Iiersclf for their aeciirity. Until t l ~ e  3I& T e n e p s  was not 
even felt; hencc tilE t.hat d q  tthe French position on tlie Alkmhe 
miglit havc leen mluntaind w!tIiout dnngcr, and on the 1 s t  of 
Augrtst tlie l i a d  of Soult'fi oolunin wus at Rasencía Suppixie 
the fiench lid mercly made d e m ~ ~ k n t t i ~ n ~  on the 28th, and 
retired behind the Alberehe tlie 29th; ivould the allies have 
dared to attaclr them in that positiont the mnduct of the 
Spaniards on the evening of tbe 27th ancwers the question. 
Moreover Joseph, with an amy compact active and experi- 
encd, could with ease bnve baffled nny efforts of tlie conibined 
forccs to bring Iiiin to  nction; lie rnight hnve covcred liimself 
by tlie Quarlarnmn river and tlie Tws in mccession; nnrl tbe 
fi~rtlier he led Lis opponcnts Gom Talavera, without uncovering 
the h e  of LR blanciia, the mors certriin tlie effect of Soult's 
operatiw. These operations furnished another proof that 
double extemal Iines are essentially viciow. TIie h n c h  com- 
bhed movement, desira'lile frrim thc greatnegs of tlie object, 
waa safc because of &e powerful force ah eacli poht-; and tbfi 
occmion nrts so Favoiirable thah, notwithstnnding the impmdent 
hent of Victor tlse relucti~uce of Ney nnd tlie iinstendy temper 
of tlie king, tlie fate of tlio alliss ww, iip to the wening of tlie 
3 4  l i t a 7  in tlic sale. Nevertheless, as tlie central position 
held by the d i e s  cut the line of  correspondence between 
Jos~pli anrl Souit, tlie kiig's rlespatcties were interceptcd anti 
tho rrhole opcmtion cvcn nt tlie Inqt liniir mns bnflcd. The 
first ele~neut of snccess in mar is, t h t  everything should emn- 
nate Erom a single Iiead; and it would lmve been preferatile that 
the k i n ~ ,  clrawing tlie wond ~ n d  fiftli corps to  him by the pass 
of t1ic Gundnramn, or by tlint of Aviln, ~hoiild with thc cighty 
thonsniid mcn tlius uiiit~d linm falle11 upon thc alliea in front. 
Sucli a comliination if not so IiBllinnt of pronise as tbe one 
adoptcd, n-onld h a ~ c  hecn more silrc, anr1 tlic lcss a pncral 
t m t s  to fortune t11e Iietter:-die is cq.liricious! 
When one Spanish amy was surprisetl at Arzobispo, another 
benten at Almonacid, nntI Wilson's irreglars were diversed 
i ~ t  Bnño~, tlie jiinh 1 1 ~ 1  just cnmplctd tlie rnenmre of tlieir 
fo1IyI.y quarrdling mith tIio British srmy, tho only force left 
t h t  ooulrl protect tliem. The French were therefore rnasters 
of thc Peninsiila, yet they terminnted their operations at the 
vwy moineiit wlien t , hq  sliould hnve pursued tliem mitli 
reduubled wtivity, ~ incc  tlie p-encral aspect of affairs and the 
ptlrticular circumstances of tlie campaign rere  alike fwoar- 
alilc. Fnr Nnpoleon wns victoriauri in Gcrmnny ; aiid nf thc 
British expeditions against ltaly zrnd Bolland, tlie fomer h d  
serircely struggled into Iife, t t e  latter was drendy compting 
in denth, Joscph ww msurcd bc moitld reccive reinforce- 
menkq, none of any consequenca could rencli Ls tl(1versrsries; 
snd in the PeninsuIa there was nothing t o  oppose him. 
Navarre, Biscay, Aragon, and the Castilles were subdued, 
Gcronn closdy belcagurrcrl, nnd the rcst of Cntnlonin, if not 
quicscent., unable to succour tliat noble city. Valencia 
inert, the 9stiirias still trembling, G~aIlicix was in confiision. 
Romana, commxnding fiftccn tliousxnd infnntry rvithout 
cavnIry er ttrtill~ry, 1vtls tlien at Corula, and dared. not quit 
the mountrtina Del Parrlue Iield Ciudad Rorlrigo, liut could 
not mnlre lient1 apinst more: thnn a Frencli Jivision; tlie battle 
of hlmonncid lintl clenred Ln Iianclin af troops; Estremitdw 
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and Andalusia mere wedc, distmcted, fina incapable of solid 
resishnce. There remained only the English md Portuguwe 
armies, the one at J~araceijo, the otber at 3fomlejleja. 
In thia &te tbe line of ~ i s t a n c c  may be said fo have 
extended from thc Sierra Morena to Com5a-wedc fmm its 
lengtb, weaker that the alIied wrpa, aepnratcd by rnountaha 
rivcrc and vmt tracts of cnuntry, nnd linving different hasea 
of operation, mch as Lisbon, Seville, snd Ciudnd Rodrigo, 
could not act in concert except offensively; and with how 
Iittle effect in that wway the campaip of Talavem had prwed. 
The Frencli aere concentrated in e narrow space, 8nd having 
aaly Madrid fo ower were adrrtntngeously sitiiated for oífcn- 
sivc or defemive movements. Tho nKed forces were for the 
most part imperfectlg orgrtnizeil, and would not dtogether 
Imperlni b a ~ e  amonnted to ninety thousand fighting men. 
n r ~ ~ t ~ m r i a ,  The Trendi. were nlinve one liundred thousnnd, 
nrss. dungerous from their discípline nn$ experiencc, 
more dau,mons that they held a central porttion and their 
nurnbers were anknown t o  their opponents: moreovcr, baPing 
in four dnys pined  one general and tlvo minor battles tlieir 
coumge mas bigh and eager, The Spanids even 
&aeripnd- 
of acknomledged that the fate of the eonntry de 
~ ~ e I l a i c ~  pended thm entireIy upon the Eritiah troops, and 
nith Culw 
a,,,d Gxix., doubtleae tliey were ~ioldiem of no ordinnry fit~np: 
yct therc is a l i i t  t o  human power in war as 
well n~i n otlier mnttcrs. 
Sir Arthiir ~ 2 1 s  ~tt  he head of aome seventeen thousand 
men of al1 arms, and nbout f i ~ 8  thousand more m e  Jietween 
Lisbon and Alcantare : but tha whole Trench amy couId in 
two days Iiave been concentrated in the wlley of the Tqps. 
h u l t  aione, of al1 the associatsd generals, appears t o  have 
viemed this crisk with the eye of a pent commander. Had 
hc bsen permite4 to follom up the attnck nt ilrz~bispo rin 
tlic 8th of  Aupst, dia t  could the seventeen ttioueand atan-  
ing Britidi tmop, encurnhered witli tFie terror-stricken 
spaninrrls, linve effected ngninst tlio ~eventy thousn~id Frcncli 
thah would l ~ v e  stormed their positiona on tliree sides at 
oiice? !!he liardy, enduring English infantry rnigl~t Rave 
Iield their ground in one battle, but could th ep bnve foujli t s 
aecond? Toiild not n movement of tIie first corps by Guada- 
lupe, would not famine alone, liam forced the ten or twelvo 
t l iou~nd men remaining, if so many were Ieft, to abanrlon 
the banlcs of the Tagus, to nbanclon their parca of ammunition 
and tlieir mounded men, to retred, townrrIs Portugal, nnd wit1i 
littIe liopc when hernssed by sia thousaxid horsemen, fur  Soult 
had eigliteen regiments of cavalry. 
Suppse the streng-kli of Rlezrn d'Ibor xnd Nimhete had 
bnMed nll tlie enemy's efforts; thnt sccing tlie rillics fixctl in 
those potiitiom, the ~ixth corpq in piirsuancc o€ Soiilt's secoud 
propoml, 11ad crosried the frontier of Portugd. Sir Artllur, 
~0ntempl~ting sucli nn cvnt, rncrant to follow Uicm in any 
movemcnt tlicty might rnal~c appiiist Lisl~in;' Ziut tliero ivert? 
tmo mays of following; thc one by tlie ~ o u t l ~  bank, tlie otIier by 
tlie north banIr o!? tIie Tngus. Now if lic designcd to cross 
tlie Tngils nt the Cardinnl'~ lirirlgc, nntl so connccting 31is 
right rvitli Beresford, .to hang on t1ie cnemy's reas, it w~il<l 
only ham been .whiIc he mm ignorrint of 17enep'  defeat, niid 
whm he imginetl tlie French t o  hnve but tliirhy tliousand 
mcn in the vnlley of the T~gus; but thcy l id nbove sevcnty 
thousand, and xithout endangering XEadrid coiild hsve invnded 
Portugal dtli at Imt fifty thousand men. If he desisipetl to 
movc Xiy tlre soutli ~ i d e  oE tlic I l h p q ,  thc Frcnch linc of mnrcli 
upon Abrnntes &n¿i Lislion wss shorter than bis; md Bercs- 
forrl, who ody reaclied Moraleja on thc Ilth, w d d  havd 
beea cut aff ~ n d  tlirorvn bacIc upon Almeida. It is true Ney 
allegcd thc dificulty of fcerling in tlic corintry Jioiit Plnsencin 
and Caria, md khe piutlenm of Soult's projcct might in tlirit 
respcct hzve been womcwliat questiomlile. Rut Ney m s  averse 
to nny iiimion of Portiipl, nnrl te nn iinrrilling mina diffi- 
milties enlfirgc beyond tlieir dua proportian; inoreever li iñ 
taIents wcre Inorc rernarkal.de in a Lattle than in the disposi- 
tions for a campaign, and Soult's opinion must on this occn- 
sion be allaived gwntar ~vciglit. Tlie Vcrrs de Plnsencia nnd 
t t e  vnlIeys of the Dejar niid tlie Gnh mountaina were exceed- 
ingly feriile and liad been iittle injured; and the objec'. mas 
not to fix rs bnse of operntions, but to olituin rnomentnry auh- 
sistcnce until n rielicr eountry could lie apcnerl. 
Admit tho march on Lisbon ivas not feasibIe af; that mo- 
ment; or that Beresford 6 t h  his Porttiguese and the five 
tliouaand Rritish troops on tbe Iine of imasion, mnld hayo 
delayed tlie enemy until sir drtliur, rno~ing by t h e  left of the 
Tngus, was enabied t o  cross tliat river antl interpose betwecn 
tiie French and Lisbon; thcre still rcmnined thc sicgo of 
Ciudort Xudrigo, whicli 8oiiit ngnin propo~cd. The cmperor'u 
jndructioiis wcre indeed plended, but tliose were genernl, nnd 
fuuiidad on tlie pnst errom of tlie camliaign, wliicli mnde lim 
doubtful of tlie futur~; they ~ r s w  not spplicable at tlie mo- 
ment and would tiwe h e n  disreprded by a general d t h  
a tithe of his own genius. librtunatdy for Bpain the intiusive 
king m not a great commander, when he mi@ hme entered 
the temple of victor;~ with banners flying he stretched himself 
at the thcshold and ~lept .  The departure of the English 
army from Spain mas a remarkrible epocli in the Penllznib 
war. Tlie policy of  combining operations with tlie Spanish 
amies, and of strilring di&ly at the gmt msses of the 
French, hatl been mted upon and fafled; the Iong-cherished 
rlelusion, relative ta  Spanisli enthiisiasm nnd Spnish cfficicncy, 
wns tbus dissipnted. Tlie trnnmuictions of tlie cnnipnigm of 
1809 form B nenes of prncticd canimeuts upon tlie cnmpiaip 
oE 1808. A11 tlis abjections ~vhicli had been made to sir John 
Moore'~ conduct, being put to the tes t  of exprience, proved 
iliusory, u~liile tlie soundncss of that general's v i m  were con- 
firnied in eaery particular. The leaíling e~ents of the two 
c a r n p a i ~  berar a gtrilcin~ resernhlnnce to each other. 
Sir Art110.r Welleslel and sir John Moore ndvanced from 
Portugal to d th Spm's7~ m&. The fimt general wm- 
nianded a h n t  twenty thoueand, the Iasf ahnt  twenty-three 
thomnd men, but. there wns tliis diferente in their situation; 
h 1805 Portugal NRS so disoipnixed ras to regnire la British 
form to k e v  dnwn aniirchg; in 1809 Portup.al furnished a 
gaod bnve of uperatians, nncl a Portuguese army waa rtcting in 
co-operatien witli tlie Rritish. 
Air John nfoore WQS joinerI by iyix thousnnd mcn nnder 
Romana, nna tliere was no other Xpanisli army in dstenm 
t o  aid him. Sir Arthur Wellesley w ~ s  joined by thirty-eigbt 
tlionsand Spaniards under Cuesta; and he calcuIated upon 
twenty-six tliousand under Tenegas, whiIe from twenty to 
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tkenty-five thoucand others mere acting in G~iiiciw and 
Leoii. 
Sir Jolin Moorc wn,s uqed to throm himself into tlis Iimrt 
of 8painI to aid a people representd as abounding jn courage 
and every 0 t h  milital virtue. Judging of ivliat he could 
not see by that mitliin liis view, he [Iouhted the tnith of these 
rriprescntations; zníl tliinking a powcrful army commnndd 
by a m n  of tlie grenímt militnry genius waa lilrely to  prove 
formiclable, ho mas unnilling to com~nit liis own small force 
in rin uncqiial contest Neverthdes~, fecling some practicabIe 
dcmonstrntion of tbe difimiltics to bc cncoiintcred was rcqulred 
by the teinper of the times, he m d c  a n~oveinent too deli- 
cate and dangerous t o  be sdopted nnless for a pea t  political 
object, To rclieve the southern pmvinces, and convince the 
Englieh governinent, anrl tlrc Englisli pulilic, tliey liiid taken a 
fdse vieiv of ~faiirs, were tlie ol?je& of !lis ridvance t o  tlie 
Carrion river, snd he ment formad with a boldncss mariing 
the conscioirsncss of siipcrior tdentg  : Fiiit he newr lost siglit 
ai t1ic dimpr lie w s  incurring by expusing Iiis flaulc tu tlie 
Frencth emperor. To obviate tliis daiiger as much as possible, 
he eshblislied a ~econd line of retrent upon adlieia, and kept 
a mteIifu1 eye iipon the clo11.d gatlicring at IIaclrid. Wlrcn 
in front of Soult's oorps  antl rcarly to :ittiwlc tlie expecterl 
stom burst, y t  by e rapY mrch Moore savd liimsdf from 
being hkcn in ff ank ntid rear and rlestroyed, Benevente wtia 
uiiteualile agniiist tlic forces lirnuglit up liy Nitpol~on, nnd tlie 
tetreat iteing continued to Coniiia, the army, after a battle, 
emliarlied. 
It wna objectcd-19 That Moorc should Iinvc gone to 
hIrul~id;-2". Tlirit hc slioiild have fought at Astorg., I I ~  
VilIn Franca, ~nantl nt h g o ,  in~tcnrl of nt Coi~íin;-3~. Vint 
he overrehted tho strensh of tlie enemy, undemnlued the 
strenghh antl enthusimm of the Spnniards, antl bcing of a 
desporiding tampcr lost t;lio a~ipnrtrinity of rlriving tlie Frericli 
Iieyond tlie Ebro : z battle pined, mid it wxs assumed thxt a 
battlc must Iixve been gnined I i ~ l  Iie attncked, would, It mas 
said7 have ~ s i i r d l y  lirokcn t2ie enemy'a powr rrnd ctilled forth 
al1 tlie encrgies of 81iiiin. Sir Jolin, ~ici\v~vcr, snirl Spnish 
entliushm was not great, tliat it evaporated in liunstiug and 
2IG P E NINSULA WAE. 
promises wliich could not be relied npon,-that the Brítish 
muy wm sent as an auxiliary not as a principal foree,--that 
the native armies were al1 &versed before he muld come to 
tlieir amistance, the enemy too strang to contend with single- 
hananded. TVherefore it was prudent t o  rsembnrk, and choose 
some other h e  for operations to be condacted upoa sounder 
v i e w ~  of the date o€ o,ffrUrs, o t  to give ap thc contest alto- 
getlier; seeing littlc hopc of finnl auccm4 coutd be enterknined, 
unti1 tlre countilci anrl dispo~itione of the Epninrdu chmgerF 
for tlio better, He d i d ,  m d  the English ministem, ~dopting 
tlie reasoning af his detractorg once more sent an nuxilinry 
amy to Spain, although t h ~  system stilI existed wliich he hnd 
denouucerl aN incompatible with aiiccess. 
Sir Arthur WellesIey, a p e r a l  of tlieir o m  choice md a 
better could not have been rnacle, wri~ placed at tlie head of 
this amy, After giving Sonlt a h w v  blow on the Douro, 
lie also advanced to deliver Sp~in ;but like sir John Moore, 
he mq m p e d  for wmt of money; and like Moore he ms 
pestered ivith fabe rcpresentations, and a vmiety of pl~ng, 
fouiiderl upon diork-~iglitd views nnd displnyirig grmk igno- 
rnnce of \va-. Nevertlieless lie doptcd, nntl ns fnr ns tFie 
inTetmte nature of tlie peop1.e he Id to dsel with would 
permit, executd ii projsct, wliich lilre Monre'a had for its 
object to overpower the French in hipl fiont, and by £o&g 
them to concentrate, relieve t1ie dishnt provincw and give 
full play t o  the enthusiasm o€ the Spmiards. 
Fhen hloore admnoed tl~ere were no Spanish ctrmies t o  
amist liim, the Freneh mere a h e  tliree h i t n h d  and twcnty 
thowend ~trong, and of tliose tm-o hiindrd and fifty thousand 
were diaposnhlc to move aptinst any yoint; rnoreovcr, they 
werc cwimniided in pmon by F#ipoleon, of whom it hns bcen 
suid by ttli d d e  oP Teüingtoa, that his prescnce done rvas 
equal to forty thousand good troop. Wlien sir Brtliur 
WeUesley advanced, tlie French fmcs  in the Peninsula did 
not exceed imo hundred and sixty tliouwnd men; of them 
only QnB huiuntlred thousand could be brought t o  bear on his 
op~rationa, and he was assisted by aixty thous~nd gpaniards 
welE nmed snd kolcmbly disciplinorl. He iinderrated tlic 
Frencli numbers by at lea& one liwidred thousand men, sn 
rimrcring error for so great a ggenrral t o  mnko; yet his plnm 
mere certninly laid ~14th p a t  ability upon tlie data furnirrhed 
t o  him; but he trusted to  Spanisli promises and to fjyanish 
energy antl did not fd to repent liis crcditlitg. He delivered 
nnd gnined Zhnt Iinttle mhich i\Zoore h d  heen reproached for 
not crisaj~itig; nntl tlien it IW founrl tlint n aveternn Frencli 
m y ,  even of inferior nnmhers, ms not ta be dcstroycd or 
a-en much dispirited by ona defeat. And ivliile tliis battle 
mns fighting, Soult carne down upon the flank and rear of tlie 
Enaliah nith fifty tlruusand mm; inrivcment prcciscly 
similar to tliat wyliicli NtapoIcon lind m d e  from 3farlritl ~upoii 
t,he flank and renr of sir Joliii Xoore.  Tliis Irist genernl 
savcd himsdf by cmssing tlle Eslx in the presence of tlie 
h n c h  patroles; in Iike mnncr sir Brtliiir erderl rlcstntc- 
tion Ly ci.ossing tIie TA~UB witliin view of tlio eiioiny'~ scouts: 
so closdp timed wns tlic escape o€ botli. 
When Moerc retrentcd, tlie Spnnisk government, reprmch- 
ing him, mscrted tlint tlie Frencli were on tlie point of ruin;. 
and oren at Bstorga Xtomrinsa contiliued to urge offensivo 
operations. Wl~en sir Arthur retired from J a m i j o ,  the 
junta, reproaching hini, asserted that tlie Frencli mere upon the 
point of rctirinp fram Spain, und general Eguia proposeil 
olfensive o~ierntiens. 
I n  explaining Lis motives and dismrssing the treatment hehnd 
rnet mith, sir Jolin Noore w o t c  thus to 11is olvn governmcnt: 
2% BritiaIh w m  s ~ n t  bo aid 17~3 XpwnkIb mim, 1i7t.t b7q/ 
mt to e ~ ~ ~ ? a l w  t ? ~  PwII, w h  have at h t  ei& 
flwmcaand m+ and me llave notliiiig t o  expct from tlie 
fip~niards, mha nrc  not to ba tn i s t~~ l ;  they are npntlietic, 
lethar$c, quick t o  promise, backwrd to act;, improvident, 
insensible to tlie ahame of flying before tEis enerny; tl~ey 
refuse nll nssicbce, nnd X m obliged fo  Ieave ammunition 
rito re^ and maney hehind. TIie Spnnish armie~ hnvc shomii 
no resolution, tLe people no enthusia~m nor drtring spirit ; mJ 
that mliicli has not bcen shom hithedo, 1 know not why it 
sliaiilrl bc cxpectcd to Le displayed liercnfter.' Sucli merc his 
expressions. 
When sir Artliur Fcilesley liad proved the Xpaniarcls, ha 
also mriting to Lis government, s g ~ : - ~ Y ' e  are here W O ~ O  
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40ff  than in a hostile m n t q ;  nover was an army so ill uwd; 
-tlie Spaniwcls Iiave made al1 ~ o r t v  of pro mi se^;-WB had 
absolateIy no nasjstance from the Spanish m y  ; on tlie can- 
trrary, we were obliged to  lay c l o ~ m  our ammunition, to unload 
the treasnre, and to employ the cars in the remonl of our 
sick and wounded. Tho wmmon dictates of humanity have 
been disregarded by ttliem, and 1 htive been obliged t o  l e a~e  
amm~mition, stores, aria money hhind. JVl~atezw 12 to 6s 
rnwit be done by IIR B ~ X L  m y ,  h t  t h t  b 
mt mpalik, &ng&y, t% ~e8iat a Y r A  m y l  of at Eaast mmúy 
17& m' 
3Ioore's lnst radvice t o  Iiis governmcnt wns ogfiinst sending 
an auxil9ery force to Spnin Sir Arthur Welldey, in tlio 
same spirit, withdrsw his troops; md from that moment to 
k h ~  md of tlie struggle, fie warred iirtleed lor Spain md in 
Spain, never in conjunction with 8pair~ have íislied in 
many troubled matera, but SpnisL troubled mnters 1 wiIl 
never t~ a&' wa3 his expres~ion when speaking of this 
campaip, and he kept lis wod. That country became 
indeed a field on which the French and Engtisli amies can- 
tended for the destiny of Europe; bnt thc defeats or victoties, 
the promisea or the performance~ of fhe Bpaniards scarcely 
influenced the movemenS. 5 p i n  being Jtft to her omn 
devlcea, mns beatcn in cvery encoitntcr, foilcd in every projec6 
yet d t i  no changc in hcr policy; snd d i l e  Porhupl 
endcnvonred ta mbe her energy t o  a Ievcl with thnt of Iier 
slly, Spain sougl~t o drag down Englantl t o  the dqth  of fully 
and rreal~nesa in whicli she herself was plunged. flie one 
modd not aacrifice an atom of fdse pride to obtain the 
peatest bene6ts; the other submitted, not with abject de- 
pendence, but with a magnanimons humility to eveq  morti6- 
catiition rather thm be conquered; and the effects of theix 
different modes were mch as might be expecterl. Portugnl 
with EngIish guidmce and dd, dthough assaulted by an 
infinikly geatcr number of cnemies in proprtion to her 
strength, overthrew her invadew the moment they set foot 
upon Iim soil; wliilc in Bpfiin, t o m  after town mns tnlcen, 
amy afier amy disperse4 every lirtttle n defe~t, and evey 
defeat sensibly clíminihed th hent af resistmca 
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W m  Qallicja was delhered by Sir Arthnr Wellsslcy'~ m- 
pdgn, the Asturias became the head of a new line of operation 
against tlie pent Aench clain of comrniinicatiun; btit tliis 
ndvantage wa.9 feebly used by the Spanimls; Kellcrnan's 
division 3 Valldelitl and &onnekls nt h t a n d e r ,  suficed to 
hold batli Gnllicinm and Asturians in checlr, nntl tli~is rentled 
the ~ a n g u i n n y  operations in tlie vnlley of tlie Tngus colkk-  
ally m well as directly of iittle advantnp to the dlies. In 
otliar parta of Spah the war WEW pro,pssireIy in favour of 
tlie ' invasion, tliougri mbject to  mxny crossinp md almays 
painfut Thus in Eisclty wbich htid been hitherto tranquil, nnd 
2n Navarre, which liad been so submissive thnt the p n s  
employed against Zaragoza were mn~eyed nithout nn escort; 
by tlic comtry pe~pIc from Pampelnna, to Tudels, the gcrilla 
ayatcm was now springing rip. And mhcn the bnttIc of 
Reldiito tminzitcd the regular ararfare in Amgon, thc padidns 
obkaining eame petty succssws at. tlie moment Blmlre hnd lost 
reputation hy tliat defeat, were mddenly md largeIy aupented 
liy dmertera fram tlre tnrmy, who flocked t o  them to hide past 
dlsgnice and live in greater a s e ;  for €he regulara, iii-provided, 
suffered J1 the restraints mithout the benefits of discipline, 
wEle tlie implm l i d  licentiousfy m¿i purveyed for them- 
selves. 
Znwxa is snrronnded by rugged monntnins and mey 
rnnge bmme tlie motlier of a perilla broad. On tlie Ieft 
of tlie El:liro, the Cntnloninn ooloncls, Bnget, Percñrt, Paitroze, 
and tlie cliicf Tlieolidrlo, Iiroudit t l i~ ir  migueletc~ to tlie Sierra 
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operating on both sidcs of the Cincx they vexed &E communi- 
cation bctwcen Zarrtgoze nncl the Prench oubposts, and mrtin- 
taincd intercourse with tlic pvernor of Leridr+ who dircctarl 
the rnovements and mpplisd tlie mnts of al1 tlie banda in 
Aragon. On the right of the Ebro, Gayan, operating from 
tbe mountaba of Blontalvae, the vailey of the XiIoca, and the 
town of Damcs, fortiEed the conveat of Nuestra Señora del 
Agt~i ia~,  situatea on s, roclr neor Carineb, md pusherl his out- 
posta into the plnin of Zarngozra 
On Gayan's left general Villa Campa oonipied CaIatagad 
with tn-o regular regiments, and Ievied a large force ~ t h  mltich 
he cut tlis line betmecn Zaragoza and RIadrid. Beyond hia 
position, otherbands lseswading from tlic 3loncnyo mountains 
infested Taranzona, Borja, and the communications bctrreen 
Tudela and Zaragoza Ninrt,calledthe student, vexed tliecountrg 
bctween f i l ~ l a  nd Pampcluneb. !J%e inhabitants af the liigh 
Pyrenean rellgs of Roncal, Salazar, Anso, nnd Echo, took arms 
under Renovalles. Tliis oficer, captured at Znragozn lind Iiroken 
his parole, but he pleaded a previous b m h  of the capitulritlon; 
his principal post WM tIie con~ent of Xnn Junn rle la Peña, 
built on n roclr remnrkable in Spnnish history ns a pInce VF 
refuge majnhined with ~uccess ngainvt tlieMoorish conqucrors; 
tlie bodies of tmenty-two l r ing  of Arqon rested thcre, and 
thc -onmc mperstitiouslp believed it invulnernlile. From 
tlija post, Sartaza, acting uudw Eenavalleq inennced Jaca, and 
communicating 16th Baget, Pedrom, md ntleobnldn, completed 
as it merc tlie investment of the thiid corps, Al1 thcsc bnnds, 
mmounting to twenty tliousnnd nrmetl mcn, commcnccd tlieir 
operatioious at once, mitting off iso1ated men, intercepting con- 
vol? and couBera, and attacking tlie weakest parts of the French 
m y ,  whiIe Blake, having mllied same troops at Tortozri, aban- 
doncd Arngon nnd eatablishd IiimseIf nt T~nrngonrt. 
Sudiet pii~hacl scouting parties t u  Tortozn and ?iiorelIa, and 
liaving thus ascrrtained Clake's final retrat, placed RIeusnier's 
division on t1ie Gundalupe, repaired the cnstlc of Alcnnih on 
the right bwk of Ghe Ebro, and with tlie rect of the a m y  
menaced Meqtcnenza and Lerida. Tlien leaviving Hnberb's 
division on tlic Cincn hc rcturned in June to Zi~ingoen, nnd . 
being sensible thnt nrms aIone cannot rcnder conrlucst pcr- 
manent, projectecl a systcm of &vil admiuistmtion mltlwhteted 
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Mina continued to intercept the communication with Pam- 
peluna, nnd Villa Gampa havlng rallied G ~ p n ' s  people, and 
gatlierctl othsra, aeizerI the rocly mountnin of Trcmcndal, 
mbere n lnrge convent serred nq a citadel tu nn entrenchd 
wmp. Culond Henriod marched from Daroca with two 
thousrtnd men and three p w  against this convent, mhicli was 
on the upper pnrt of  a. ridge sshooting out from a mounfain 
crest and overlianging the town of Origuela Tbe flanks were 
protectetl Lry steeyi rocks, rtnd Hcnriod seeiny that ran open 
attack must fa& skirrnislid to\r.arrls eveiiing witli six com- 
panies as if to turn tlie Xpanish rigIit; the Span iad  imrne- 
diutely gntlicrcrl on tlrnt ~idc, nnd by tthe liglit of tlie bivonnc 
firea saw the Frencli Iinggngc and lnnin body retiring, altliough 
Ilenriod mas still enpged in tlic skiimish; hence, when tho 
a&ion ceased, ViIIri Camw thinking it a rctreat, wns thrown 
off Lis g u ~ i d  Then Hcnriod wlio liar1 kept liis ~1Grrnishing 
compnnies conceded close to tlie psition, secretly scaled tha 
rocks, riished amongsh his sleeping enemies, killcd five hun- 
rlrerl, niid put tlie rest to flight. 
On tFie otlicr aidc o f  tllc Ebro thc vnllcy of  Vcnrsquo was 
now successfully attacked, oand tlie peuple disarmwl; ancl 
tliougli petty combats were fought in many placa tbe obsti- 
nwy of tlie Arngoncse gradumlly gnye way. I n  December 
Sucliet, iheiiig a s ~ i ~ t c r l  from Natlrid by FL moveaLle column 
u d e r  general Milliaud, took the towns of Aihracin and 
Teriiel, the insnrgent junta fi ecl to TTalencia, and the sribjec- 
t-lon of Arngon .i>o,s eflectcd: the intcrior wns disarmcd, tlic 
particha, hhoi~gli still haugirig oa tlia fronticr, were forced to 
recrnit from other pravinces, and the Ariipnese were so 
robberl by the smaller brinds that a smuggler of Bmbastro 
rriised a munter partida, witlt whieh he cliwed and snppressed 
mnny of thcm. 
hinforcements from F m c e  mere nom poured into Bpain 
and Sucliet mas soon enaliled to extend his operations. The 
original Spnnisli nrmy of Amgon m s  reduced fo  eiqbt thou- 
sanrl meii ; part were wanderiiig nitli Villa Campn, pnrt wcrs 
in Tortoztt, the rest nbout Lerida and Mequinenza, ami dhose 
fortresscs mre khe only obstrtclcs to a junction o£ the tliid 
lvith tlte seventh torpe; in tliem the Slmnisli truops wlio 
still kept the deld took refupe when closcIy prossed by the 
inwldetrr, Thc policy of tlie suprcme juntn wm always t i  
form freglilr c o y  irpon thercmnanh of tlrcir beut~n amies; and 
heme Villa Campa, keeping in tbe mountains of Alhracin, 
remited bis mnkg and still infested the western frontier of 
Aragon;' Gwcia Nowrro, making Tortoea Es bme of opers- 
tions, Iined the b m k s  of the hlpg and menaced Aicanitz; 
while Pereña, tmsting t o  herida for suppo* posted himseif 
hetween the Nopera and the Segre. Bnt Sucliet's positions 
fomned a circle round Zaragoza, Tudela, Jaca, and tlie castle 
of Aljnferia wem gmrisoned, and his mnin Jiody bcing on tha 
(Tuaddupe and tha Cincn, occupicd AImnitz, h p e ,  Fraga, 
llonzon, Bnrbsstro, Benev~rrea, and Tenasque. Of t.hese, 
tlie first, third, and fourt11 were places of strength, and lis 
situation was miIitari1y and p l i t i edy  very imposing. One 
year liad sufticed to reduce Uie tam, break the =mies, con- 
ciiiate the Amgonese-at that time the most energetic 
portion of the nation-and t o  pIace the t h id  corp, with 
referente to tlke general operatious of tlie m, in s forinidable 
~~osittion. 
19 Th e  mt1e of A l c ~ i t z  formed a head of cantonments on 
the right bank of the El~ro, at the entrance of the pasaes 
Eeatliling into Vdenck; thus furnishing a base from which 
Sucllet oould invade that rich provinoe, or place the Cata- 
lonian amy b e t w m  two Eres whm the sc~enth corpa ~lionld 
q n i n  nchnce beyond thc Llobregnt. 
2'. Cnspe secured tlie communication between tiie Gngs of 
the third corps, while Fraga, hvlng a wooiien bridge over the 
Cinca, offered &e meam of passing that uncertain river at al1 
sewolls. 
3O. 3Ionson, a regular fortification, in some measure 
bnlsncccl Lerida, its fiying bridge orer the Cincn enali1ed the 
Frencli to forn,-e tlie country hstween Eeridil and Yenmques, 
and tlie cooperatiun of its garrison with the troops at Bar- 
Iiastro rtnd Eene~arrra could nlways curb Per&a. 
4'. Trenasques enabIed Suchet t o  communimte with tlie 
rnoveable columm appointed to gnard the French frontier, 
ancl dnca renrlered him independent af Pampeluna and St. 
8ebnstiun. 1n fine, tlic position on tlie Cinclb and tlio Guada- 
h c .  1809.1 noOK IL-CHAP. 1, 225 
lupc, menacing alike Catdonia and VaEenci., aonneeted fha 
ol~crations of tlio thinl with the seventh corps; nnd t h ~ e  two 
armies will be fomd grarluaily approximating unta they 
formed one force, acting upon a distinct ~iysteni of invasion 
against the ~ontl i .  
Buchet's p r o j ~ i  wcm homever retsrded by inmmctione 
nnd embarrli.wments in Kavarre, wliicli at this period asmmed 
a serious aspect. The student Mina daity increased his 
forces, and by hardy and sudden entcrprises kept the Navamese 
in commotion. Tlic dnkc of Mahon, onc o£ Joscph's Spanish 
ndlierentg appointed viceroy of Nawrre, was at vnrimca with 
the militnry authorities, and al1 the disodem attcndant on 
a divided. dministration and sa rapacious syst~rn ensud. 
Gcncrrtt D'hgonlt, tlia governor o€ l'ampelnnra, wna nceused 
of being in Mina% payI and his suicide during an invectigation 
seems to confinn tlie auspician, but the whole administrabion 
of Navare was oppm9ive venal and me&. To 
Jan. 1810. 
avert tlie seriaus danger of an inwrrsction sa 
close t o  Fmnce, Sucliét was by tlie emperor directed to repnir 
there with a part of tlte tliird corps. He goon restored 
onlcr in l'nmpclun~ and cvcntaally cnptuiod Minn himaelf; 
yet Iic ~ ~ \ t . n s  uriitlile t o  suppress tlie system of thn pnrtidns; 
9 q o z  y diima' took his nepliew's place, and to tlie end of 
thc ivnr the wmmunicntions of the French were troubled, and 
conqidrrablc losses inflictcd upon thcir nrmiw by tliis cele- 
brrlteil tiian-~tndoulitedly the most conspicuous pmon amoiig 
tlie partida chicfs. 
Here it may be obscmed how inefficient this g-erilla system 
mas to drlivcr the cnuntry, and how, e-i-en m nn aiixilinry, i t s  
adwntnges were nearly Lixlanootl by Its evjls. It was in tlie 
provinces lylng between Fsnce and tlie J3bm thiit it com- 
menecrl; it was in thme provinces i t could effect tlie greatest 
injury te tlie Freucli cnuse; and it mas in tIiose provincea 
condiictert witI1 t h e  peatest energy alttiongh less assistetl by 
tlie English tlian any other part of Spnin; ra fa& sbowing that 
r c a d ~  nnd copio114 siiccoiira mny be hurfful to a, peopla 
~ituntcil ns tlia Spnninrds werc: whcn RO msistd, mcn are npt 
to rcly more upon theii rilliw than upon tlieir o m  exertions. 
The pxrtidu oof Ei~cay, Nnvarre, Arapn, and Catdonin, 
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mustered at one time ahve thisty thonsand men acciistomed 
t o  arw, attd often commanded by chiefs of  undoubted enter- 
psiac nnd courape; yct thcy nc.ver ocmipied half their o m  
nunlier of Freud~  tit one time, ncper u,bsolutely dcfcataterl a 
single rrivision, nwer pmented any comiderablo enterpiso, 
never, with the exception of the surprise of Fiquerns, to lis 
bereaftv spoken of, performed any exploib seriousIy nffecting 
the opmtions of a single ' corps d'armée.' A wliole nntion 
thus mtilig rnztst in time dentroy the  most nimerow nmies, 
but no pcople will tEius pcrscvcrti. Thc ngcd, t h e  sick, tha 
tirnid, thc li~lpless, an: hinrlcrers of tlic bold anrl robnst, nnd 
it i~iimt bc bclifficult to p~ociirc a m s  antE stores ; For it i~ not 
on wery ncmsion thah so ricb and powerful a people as tlie 
Englisii wjlZ bc found in xllimce with insurrection. When 
the invaden follow ap their victorieri by sucb prudent condnct 
as Snchee and some otliers of the French generals adopted, 
the rwiilt is ccrtain. Tiis desire of erase natural to mankind 
p m i l s  a ~ i n s t  lie suggcstians of honour; and, tbough the 
appei*tunit,y of wvci-ing pcrsonal nmhition witIi t11c gfirb of 
patriotism mny cause many attenipb t o  throw off the yoke, 
tlie buIk of tlis invadeci pcople will graduay become ~ub-  
missive 3nd tranqiiil : notwitlistanding tlie violent measores 
resoi-tcd to by ttlic pai'tidn cliiefs to  fiil tlicir ranks, oae thircI 
of t;iieir hnds  mcre Prencli and Britisli deserters. 
To rnise a ~vliole people agninst an tnvader mny be a y ;  
t o  clirect tbeir energy wisely is far more diffieult, nnd if mis- 
riircctcd tJic rcwF t will IIC more injurioris tlran a~Iv:intageous ; 
it wns misdirectd in Spnin, und to reprcaent it otlierwise is 
to givc falsa lefisons to postedty. W ~ e n  Porttrpl was thrown 
compIetely into the h d s  o£ lord Wellington, tlint p a t  man 
enforcerl a military organization npon fotally dierent prin- 
ciples. rl?ie peolile were indeed compelled to rcsirit the enemy, 
titit iintlcr a rcyilnr sy&m wIiicll reqtrninetl nll clnsaes within 
just liouiids, anrl thr! wl~olc pliysical ontl moral powcr of thc 
nation mas renrlered ~ubservi~nt o t11e plan of tlie genmal-in- 
chief. To act differently is to confess ~veakncss. It is to say 
the goremment being uneqiinl to the direction of affnirs per- 
mita nnarcliy. Thc partida opRtern wns tlie ofl:kprinz af di+ 
orrtcr, whicli i a  in w2i.r tvctilrness, accoiriliu~icd 1iy ills sufiicient 
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ocwsions, when they would llave been eminently saccessfnl, 
they were not to  be had  Their good wilI had been sñi often 
abused by t le  foliy of their leaders, tbt many times their 
assistance was called for in vaia The peasantry, of wliom Re 
much had been demanded, be,- fo demand in their tura 
They insisted that the solrliew ehould fight aIwaya to tlie hst 
psp, WerB angry wlien tha Idter  retraat~(1, nnd robbed and 
ill-used them when broken by defeat. They liad been so 
excited, so exagperated qainrrt the Prench, tht they became 
habitually ferocious, and tbeir ferocity WM often as ifangerous 
t o  their own party m t to the enemy. Theatrocities committed 
against their o m  chiefs dispsted the most patriatic, abated 
their zeal d cansed tlie middle cIassea to desirc peace es the 
onIy remedy of a, system so replete with disoder. Nrimbers 
of rliitinguisbed mcn, cven those who had vehmiently oppmed 
JosepJi nt fimt, hegm to  nhandon Fertlinancl; and 3. is cednin 
tha$ but for tlie expedition to Rus~ia, tliak bmnch of the 
Bourbons which reigm iu S+ would never hme reinounted 
the throne. 
' The cruelties exercised q o n  the Fmnch mitary were as 
little conformable to the inferest of  the Spaniards. Those men 
wcre but the alnres of thcir duty and o£ the ptate; ceh in  of 
rlmth s Iittlc sooncr ar n liltfe later, thcy like the Spanhrds 
merc victims o£ tlic s m e  amliition. The soIdicr nnturally 
becomea cruel in protracted waríare; but die trmtment expe- 
rienced fsom the Chtalans brought out t h i ~  disposition pm 
maturely; md that unhappy people were thernseIves the 
vietims of a crueltg, wliich, either of their own will or exeited 
by othera, they had exerci~cd upon those troopa wbo fe11 inia 
tlicir porver; and this without nny ndwntage to thcir canse, 
wliile ~b contrary sysbm would in a little time have bmken up 
the seventh corps,+eeing that the Iatter m composed of 
foreigners natudly  inclined to desert. But the murder of 
al1 ivounded and sick and heIpIas men, created ~ u c h  horror, 
tht thc deeertion which at first rnenaced htd destrnction 
ccascd cntircly.' 
Such were St. Cyr's opinions, nnd yet the stmggIe in Cata- 
lonia, of whicli ik is time to resume the rellation, was not the 
least mesafnl in Spain. 




IT will be remembered that St. Cyr having established his
quarters at Vieh received intelligence of the Austrian war,
and that Barcclolla had bccu relieved by tllC squadron of admi-
ral Comaso. His ......hole attention was then directed towards
Gerona, and to hasten Reille's prelmrntion for the siege of that
placc he sent lL second detachment under Lcccbi to the
Ampunlalll. During this tilllC Coupigny continucd at Tam-
goua, and make made his fatal march into Aragon; but those
troops which, under MillUls and Winlphen, had composed
Reding's [eft wing, were continually skirmishing with the
French posts in t1lc val1cy of Vieh; uud the partisaus, espe-
cially Cbr08 and Rovira, molested the communications in a
more systematic manner than before.
Lecchi rctunJed tllC 18th of :May, with intelligence that
Napoleon bad quitted Paris for Gennany, that Verdier had
replaced Reille, and marshal Augereau was at Perpignan on his
......ay to sUJlcrsede St. Oyr himself in the command of the
sevenlh CQrps. This gave St. eyr infinite discontent; for not.-
withstanding his assertions that Napoleon wished to destroy
him, he desired to keep his command. In his Jounlal of
Operations, he declares llis Ruccessor cnrnestly sought for t11e
appoiutmcnt, and he trcats him with sarcastic contempt; but
oflicilll documents sbow that Napoleon superseded St. Cyr for
his want of zeal.
Augere:m had 6erved in Cato.lonill. Juring the war of the
revolution, and imagined he had then acquired an influence
which might bc revived on the present occasion. He framed
a proclamation vying with the most inttatecl of Spanish mani-
festocs, but the latter, however tU'1,-id, were in unison with the
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faelinp of tlio peopls; wlrcrens tliis proclamntion, thaugh sent 
to Gtdonia escorted by a buthlion, wm on tlie very Erolitier met 
by colonel Porta, ~vho defeebted tlie troops, nnd tore down the 
few copies whicli had been posted. Angereau, afflicted with tbe 
gout, remained at Perpignan, md St. Cyr continued to commmd, 
yct reluctantly, bbecausc, as he affirms, the ofticm and soldiers 
werc neglcctcd, rind himsclf rxposcd to vurioiis indilignitiea, 
the cfccta of Nnpolcon's ill-will. Tlie most scrioiis nffmnt 
meiitioned ivw the permittiiig Verrlier to cnrmpnnd directly 
with the rninistp,~ of war in Trance, and tlie publishing oE his 
reports in preferente to St. Cyr's, For tfiese reasons, the 
latter s g s  he contented himself with a aimplc d ischqe  of hie 
duty, mvhich, rightly interprcted> meanns a ncglect of  tlint most 
importnnt of al1 duties, eenl for the public mdf~re;  bnt 
Napolcon cannot be blamed for coldness to~vartla nn officer, 
who, Iiowevcr frce liiin~elf frorn mcournging tlie Oporto 
cnnspiratom, was certninly rlcsignsrl for tlieir IentFrr: It irc 
mther to ba admired tliat the emlwor discovered so littie 
Jwlousp. A man wwha has mised Iiimself to the highcst power! 
must inevitably give offence to 11;s formcr comrades; for aa al1 
Iionoum and re~vards floming frorn him are tiken as personal 
favours? so seli ehedcs and slights, or even the cessation of 
hncfits, nm rcgardc(1 as personal inju"cg; t l ~ e  ~auction of 
timc i~ ivnnting ta identify the snvercip witli tho coiintry, and 
the discontented easily convince tlieinsdves that revenge is 
patriotism. 
Wiile St. Cyr was preparing for the siege of Geronsb, 
Joseph, as we lime seen, direded Iiim to  enter d ~ g o n  md 
kop Elakc's rnovement against Euclict ; tliia order he refused 
to obcy, aand witli rcrtson; it mould havc bccn a grcnt crror tb 
~ e r m i t  Iiln1~c"s fnlso movemcnt tu occiipy two ' corps dhrin&e,' 
lrnd $0 retaril tlie of Geronn, t a  tlrc irifinitc iictrirnent of 
tlie French affairs in Cahloniri, Earceloaa wns never safe 
d i l e  Hostdrich rtnd Gerona we i -  in tlie Spaniardd possession, 
and St. $r mns well amare of thiq Iiut tlie evils of a dii~ided 
commwid are soon fclt. Hc d i o  lid been successfiil in al1 allis 
opcrtttions, an(1 now wislietl to  forestal Aqere:tii, was extremely 
urgcnt t o  c.omrncncr! tlio sicgc witlioiit dcfny ; ivl i i lo Vcrdifr 
Iiaviiig fuiled at Zerngozzt, mas cnutious of attacking a, towa 
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which hrsd twicc lioiñed Uuhcsme. Whcn prmserl to bcgin, 
he mid, 11e could no$ after plncing gnrrisons iu Rosm asd 
Fipcras, Iiring ten tliousnnd mcii lieforc Geronq wlhh from 
the great extent of tlie worl~s were irisuíñcient. 
íSt, Cyr repiied that the gamison did iiot eoiceed tllree tliou- 
nmd men, that it eoiild not weIl be increasd, mand expedition 
was of more eonsquence than n w h r s ,  Nevertlieless, cm- 
sidering that & depjlt of provisionq estnblishetl for tfie service 
of tIie siege at Fiperrt~, must by dcluy be el>nnsteti, ns se11 
os tlit! srzplilies wliirdi Iia liiirl llimsdf eullcctcd nt Tricli, he scnt 
nll hia orm mnnoniers, snppera, and srtillery horses, t \ ~ u  
gqwarlrons d cavdry, antE six battalions of infantry ta tlie 
Arnpudam ; and Iiaving thus aug-mented Teertlier's troops to 
ciglitccn t l iou~~tnd men, ngnin urgctl Iiim to bc cqerlite. 
TI icse rcirirurccmeritci mhrclierl tlie 2 3rd of Jhy ,  mntl tlie twelvo 
thousand men rernsining undsr arms continuctl to hold tlie 
valiey of Pich until the middle of Juna During tliis time, 
thc mipeletes often clllrmished with the ndymccd posts, and 
tlie inlii~bitrtnkg of thc km rcmnined in the monntnins, undicl- 
tered 2nd shrving, yet resolute niit to dwell with f ie invad~rri. 
Tliis may be attriliuted partly t o  fear, more to  s suscel>tibility 
of grana sentirnents distingbhing the Spai~isli ~iensants. 
Aitliougli little remarkalile for hartlihood in tlie field, th  e 
Moorisli Mootl is nttmted by tlicir fortit~ide; tlicy cntlurc cnla- 
mity, men and vomen dike, witli n sinp1:~r anrl unosten- 
tatioas couraga Dnt tlieir virtues are pawive, tlieir faiilts 
active, a d ,  instigztcd by a peculiar arrogancc, tliey are pcrpe- 
tually projecting enterpriseri whicli tliey have iiot suficient 
vigour to exccute, dtlio~igli ah dalt timcs thcy nrc confiüent and 
bowting moro tlian bemines cither wbo or bravo mcn 
Emly in June, having coasumeti nearly RII Jlis C O ~ ,  St. Cyr 
rmol~ed to approacli Gerona md secnre tht? hnrvest mhich 
ivm almost ripe in that district. Re first sent lirs sick and 
wounded unrlcr a ~ trong  cscort to R~reclonrs, nnd disposcrl Fiis 
raerves in sucli a mnricr  tliat tlie o~icrution wis eff~cted ivitFi- 
out loss; the active troop. loacled witli m mucIr grab as tlis 
men could arry, then pnssed the mouiitains scparating PicIi 
from tlie Gstricta of Zfcrona and Hostiilrich, and tlie hecd- 
quartei-s were fixed at Caldas de JIalavelEa on tthe 20th. TIie 
fort of 5t. FeIien de Quixols on the const TVIM stormed tlie 
2ht, the Spanish privateers ~ought nnother hrbour, and tho 
Frencli occupied a Lalf circle extending lrom Bt. FeEien to the 
Oña river. Intermediate posh were esbblislied a* fit. h c e ,  
Vidreraa, Mdlorqulnna, &eu de Arenas, Sunta Coloma de 
Farnes, Castaña, and Bruñolz, thusi cutting off the communi- 
cations between aerona and the &ri& ocmpied by Coa- 
pigny, Wimphen, the hliloins, and Clnrm. During thc rnmcb, 
Biree Spanidi bntt Jions were defenterl, and tb convoy coming 
from hlartore! ntid destine4 for Gernm w%s mptured. St. Cyi 
calls this force tlie forerunuer oE Blake's army, s curi~us error, 
for Blake m on tbat rev day being defmted at Mchite, two 
Iinnrlred miles Tmm Smh Colomia There mas at this period 
no Catalan amy, the few troops in the field acted indepen- 
dently2 and Coupigny, the nmind  commander-in-chief, re- 
mained at Tmagona; where he and the other authorities, more 
oemipid witli personal quarrcls m d  politiml Intrigues than 
witli milit~ry riffairs, were thwmting e ~ d i  otlier. Thua t l i ~  
Spanish nnd Freneh operations were alike weakened by inter- 
naJ clivisions. Verdier was slem, and mws attentive to the 
faditiea aforded for resistance than to the number of replw 
soldien witliin thc works; he, or rnther Keille, had appeared 
bcfom Gcrona an the 6th of Jtay it was not ti11 tlio 4th of 
June thnt rcinfo~ced with Lccctiib division he complcted tho 
invcstment on both sidw of tlie Ter. Un the 8th p u n d  wiw 
bmken, and tlins, wliile BlzIre w a ~  rdvancing a,pinst. Zar* 
goza, in other mords seeking to wred Aragon from t I i e  French, 
Catalonia waa dipping fmm l ia  own handa. 
When this memoxabIe ~icge commenccd, the relafin sitna- 
tions of tlie contentling forctng were as folloips. Rightemi 
thonmd Freiieli held tire Ampurdm nurt in~ested t11e plthce. 
Of this nnmber fow thousand were in Fernando de FipemI 
Rosas, ancI tlie smalier posts of communimtion; md it is 
remarkabIe thak verdier found the firhnamed fortress, no& 
witlidlbtiding its greltt importnnce, desti&& of a garrim 
when he fimk arrived Com France: a fa& com8j8tent with 
lord Colling~~ood's description of tlie Cat&n warfare, bnt 
irreconcilnlile with the eiiterprise and Ggour attributed to 
them by otliers. St. Cp, the distribution of  wIiose forces has 
hecn aTrendy noticed, covered the sicge with tmelve thous~bnd 
men, and DuEiesmc, Iiaving nliotrt ton tliousnnd, bperid inclurlin~ 6 i ~ k ~  continued €0 hold Barcelona. Iluritec mlls, 
Forty thousand French were therefore disposcd nrss. 
hetmeen thnt city and Fipems, wliile on the Spanieh side 
thcre wns no prepnrntion. Blnlce wn. atill in Arngon* 
Coupipy with R ~ X  thousand of tilo woi-st troop was a6 
Tamgona, the liilans watched Duhesnie, Wimpheo with a 
few thousand held tlie country abouE tlta upper Llobregat; 
Junn Clnroa and Rovira kcpt, thc moiinhina on tlic side of 
Ohi and Ripol; and in tIie liigher Cnktlouia m a l 1  handa of 
migueletes were dispersed under diierent chiefs. rCbe soma- 
tenes h d  their own qstem of warfwe; disregarding the 
gencrnls, M in the time o€ hrling, they robbd tlic rcgtlar 
troops 1ivhenerer a favouralile opportunity ocmured. The 
Spanisli privateen dislodged from Bt. Filieu, resoded to 
Falarnos-tiny, rand tbe English fleet under lord Collin,~ood 
watched thnt no French uqiindmn, or cven single vasele, 
ahould convey prorovisions by t l ~ o  coast. 
F m a  &ron+ Marirno A l m e a  called loudfy on the 
genernlq and men on the 8zqrtm.e Ce~,trd J&a for sumur. 
Wis cry was disregar1.1ed. When tha siege commenced liis 
garrison did not cxceed three tiiousand rcgalrar troopn, E0 
mgazines and liospitals mcre scaatily providd, md he had 
no m o n y ;  yct liis lofty fipirit wm in no mnnncr dauntd nor 
Lis fortitude ahtett The worka mere litt1e dangecl since 
the fin€ ~iegc; liut, as in Znrngoza, a mixture of snperstition, 
patriotism and military rcplntion mas cmployed te cal1 
furtli tlie mornl M well as physienl force of tlie city. Rero 
liIrew5se a aickness, common at a pparticular aeason of the year, 
mas looked for to thin the ranh of tlie besiegers; and here 
algo women were enrolIed as tlic ' Compannj of S&. ~ m h w  a, 
to carry off tlie wounded nnrl wnit upon tlie Iiosliitals: at 
every breath of air, saya Xt. Cyi, their Alibons were seen to 
Roat amidst the Iiayonets of tlie soldierx ! To evince hia o m  
resolution, the gorernor forbad tlic mention of capitdtion 
d e r  pain of dcztli ; Iiut scvcra punisliment was only 
annoounced, not infiicted. Alvsrez, cripnble of cornrnandig 
without frenxy, h d  recourse to no Xiarbaroiis metliods of 
enfordng autliority; olistinate his dcfcnce was, and one of 
d c r i n g ,  yet unstaitined by crueltp, and rich in honour. 
On thc  4th of JUQC thc siegc commcnced. Tlie 12th, onc 
mortnr-bnttery nt Cnscn Roccn on tlic left a f  the Tm, nnd two 
brcncliing-baftcrics cstnTilis11crl ngaind Fort M~~njoiiic, being 
ready t o  p I q  the town was summoned in form. Tlie answer 
waa an intimation tliat al1 f lag  of truce would be fired upn. 
The 13hh the mal1 mburli of Pedreto was taken, and the 
14th tLc hatteries opencd apinst Monjouie, wliile the tom 
 vas bornbarded from the Cnscn Roccn. Tlie 17th the besieged 
dmve GIie enemy from Pedreto, but were finally repulsed with 
the loss of aborre a liundied mcn. 
On the 13th the stone towem of St. Nnrcis ~ n d  Sk. Loriis, 
o~~tworks of llonjoliic, 1)eing nssnriltcrl, tlic Iirxicqcil, ~ i n ~ i i c -  
stricken, al>~uidriiietE tliem i~iid tlic triwer of St. Urttiiel, md 
tlie fiencli erected bmliing-hattcries four hundred yards 
from tlic nortliern bastion of hionjoriic. Tcinpestuous 
weatlier retarde([ tlicir morlisJ Iiut n practicable opening waa 
effected tlie 4th of July, anrl tlie assatilt wns ortbed, tliough 
Ihe flnnk fire of the aorlcs lvns not silcnccd, tlie glncis not 
cromned, nor t,hc countcrrimrp ínjureil. A Irnlf moon in n 
lieríoct stnte, covcririg ttie ~lpprri~clieu to tlie lircacli, was 
pruved on the nigh of tlie 4th, and tlie nsmult u-as then 
ordered; get tlie storming-forcc dmwn from the several 
qnarters of investrnent was on1y assembled in tlie trenches 
on the nigbt of the %tli; and clliring these four d,?p, as 
the batteriee ceased to playx t.l~e Spaiiiards retrenclied md 
liarrimdocd tlic opning. Howcvcr, nt four o'clock in the 
rrioniing of tlie Hth, Ilie Prcndi coluinn lenpcrl out of tlie 
trcnclies, clenrecl tlie cipen spacc, rl~ceiidarl tlle ditcli, nnd 
motintod tlie breacli; but tlie defencm were strong, and tlie 
assailants, takea in flank and rnqr 1iy the firc from tlie half- 
inoon, the oav~red wayt and the eastcm bnstion, were driven 
hnck: twice they rcncwcd tlic ~ t t c m p t  and ft~ilcd witli a loss 
of ra tliouwnd mcn lrillerl nnd wounrleil. Tlie siiccean wna 
Iioivever niitipvted by iyan accidental explosion, whicli dactroyed 
the gnrrison of the sinnll fort of St, Juan, between AIonjoiiic 
and the city. 
Atiotit tlie period of this assaiilt St. CJT, finding tliat CIaros 
nnd Rocira intemptcd the convoys coming from Fipierns 
tu  Gcruun, witEiJrew n, l~riguclo of Sriulinni's divisiori Srorii 
Rzntu CoIornn de Fanies, aud posted it ou tlie left of the 
Ter at Bxfiolns. Tlie fiench troops on tlic side of RostxIrich 
were tliiis reduced to  cight tliousnntl meii utider arrnq, dtliough 
nn cffort to  raisc thc sicge m s  cxpcctc(1; for Alvnrcx's lettcrs 
to Elake were intercepted, antl klitlt ,qctici+al i m s  coIlecfing 
men iat Tiimgona. Kevertheless 8t. Clyr, aiixioua to secure 
the const-line froin Xosns to Quiuole beforc UInbe coiild rencli 
tlic sccnr: o l  raction, rletnclied gcnern1 Font,ancs froin Siit. FiIieu 
~vi t l i  an Itnlinn higado, six guns, ancl panlo quadrons of 
dra,pns, to take fnlamoa. Iii passing tlilie flat ncar 
Torre Vnlcnti, Eontanes wa4 czunonnded by g i s  gun-bontq, 
ii.liicl:li Iiia nrtillery ñoon crinsed to ~11ecr off, nnrl he thcn uyi- 
p r o d e d  tlie place and t a i c e  summoned t!ie gol-cmor, but 
ws treated witli contempt erich time. It ivnq iinportnnt 
to rediiec l'i~lamos Gcetiusc it h ~ d  n gootl rolidstcsd, rinrl mis 
Iiut one marcli from Geronu, nnil tlie wrirlía tliougli partly 
injured mere cnpable of clefcncc and tlicre werc twcnty p1ns 
mounted. Situated on s, n a m m  rocky penins~tla, it liad only 
onc Innd-front, thc approneh t o  whicli wits ovcr n p1nin com- 
manded: on tlie left by aomc mgged liills, mlicrti tlie soinntenea 
h d  assembld; Pontanes drove tliem f i ~ m  tlicnce and a tliird 
time siimmoricd thc plnce, bnt tLc! Sliiti~i:irils briitn!ly Irilled 
tlle Iienrer mnd the Itdiuiis iuutantly sturnierl the wn~lix, 21110 
Catalans fled t o ~ a r d a  the silore, from wlience tlieir vesscls put 
o f  in frnr, and then Fontrtnea' troops, turning the toivii, inter- 
ceptcrl tlic frigitivcs nrid put nll to t l i c  swortl. 
Xcaicely bd Falarnos fallen when IViniplien and tfie Jiilam 
srr i~cd  nenr IIostalricb, and bepn t o  liarnss Xoulinin's out- 
pmts nt Santa Coloina, hoping to dram St. S r ' s  nttrntion to 
thnt sitlc, whilc a rciiiforccmcet for t21c prrison of Qcmnn 
shoiild p s s  tlirougli tlie lcft of Iiis liiia into t l i e  city. In  
pursumice o£ tliis project, fiftecn liuntlrctl cliouen rnen, under 
tlie command of one 3Iarclial, an EiigEisliniat~, entieavourcd to 
pcnctrnte secrctly tliiougli Lis posts at LIngostcra; they wwo 
accompnnied by an nide-de-mmp of Alvarez, calIed Rich, 
apparently an Engiiilmn dm, and they succeeded on the 
9th in passing general P-0'0 posta unobserved. TTnfm- 
tunately a ~traggfer w a  a e n ,  md St. Cyr beiig thns 
infomed of the rnarch, judged the attempt to break, through 
would be m d e  in the night by the roaad of Ctwa de Selva; 
wlierefore he placed one body of men in ambush ntar that 
point, and sent another in pumit of the mccouring oolurnn. 
80 it Iiappenal. The Spaniards eame tlirougli tlie hilIs at 
dusk, and mceivd the fire of the amlinsmde; they escaped by 
a Hastg retreat, yet tho next day fe11 in with the other troops 
and lo& a thousand men; thocre who got away were 511-used 
and robbed of thek arms by the somateneei. St. Cyr declares 
tbst Mamhal ofFered to c~pitnlate, but fled during the negotia- 
tion and abmdoned ha men; tlie S p i a h  pnem1 Conpigny 
said the men abmdoned aiImh1 and refused to fight, that 
R.ich m away before he liad seen tlie enemy, md tlint both 
Iie md the t m g s  merited amere punisliment, Mnrsiiai'~ 
fliglit hon-ever was to Qerona, d e r e  he afterwards felb figl~t- 
"E: gallmtly. 
Tliia failure mas sensibly' fdt by A l m a ,  Sickness and 
battle had rednced his garrison to fifteen h d r d  men, and he 
waci thus debnrred the best of al1 defeneeoi, namely, frequent 
mllies as the enemy nearecl. the malla. His ~ a l u t i o n  m 
unahdren, yet he dirl not fail to remonstrate warmly with 
Chpigny, and even deaouncd hia innctivity to the Rupreme 
junts. Conpigny pleacled Blake's ahence, want of provisions, 
ruid the danger of c q i n g  the contac$ous sickness of Tmagontb 
into k n a ;  and he also dduced Narsbalk attempt, M proof 
of due esertion. He could not deny that h r o n a  had been 
invmted two months, had mshined forty days of open trencha 
a bornbQrhent and sn tifisa,ult without tiny mccour; m d  tlint 
during thnt time, he Iiimsclf remrsined at Tnmpna, instead of 
Iieing st HostBlrich with al1 tho troopa Iie eoulrE cuTlcct From 
the prisoners St. Cyr amrtained that neither Coupigny nor 
Bl&e desiped to mcmur Geronti until sichess md famine, 
which precsed as heady  on the besiegers aa on the besieged, 
should w e h n  the French; this plan receives nnqualified prisa 
from St. Cyr, who seema to have forgotten tbat, with m open 
breach, a t o m ,  ieqniring aix thousand men to man tbe worh 
and havjng buk fifteen hundied, might fa11 at m,ny moment. 
Aftcr tlie failurc nt Jfanjouic, Vcrdicr rccommcnced formal 
iappronclie~, oppeed galleriea for a mine, mci intermpted tlie 
communication with tlie city by posting men in the r ~ i n s  ot 
the little lort of St. Juan. His operations were mtarded by 
Claroni and Rovím, who captured ti convoy of powder clme to 
£he Frwcb frrinticr. To clicclr those cbiefs a brigsde wm 
puslied from Dafiolas t o  St. Lorenzo de la Muja; md the 
fortified convent of  St. Daniel, sitnated in the valley of the 
Gallignn, between thc Constshlc fort ~ n d  Monjouic, being 
tnken, tlie commuuimtioli Iietween tlie Intter place and tlie 
city was cut off. The 4th, tlie glacis of Monjouic maN crowned, 
the countemcnrp b1on.n in, tlie ffank defenccs rulned, the ditcli 
pesml, nnd tlic hnlf moon bcfurc tlie curtriin airried by storm, 
yet no lodgnient wns effectetl. Alvara m& an unsucce~stu! 
eRorb to  retake the miue of Rt. Junn, and two huncired Epn- 
nimls comíng from the sm-coact with provisions, penetrrited 
to tlie conveut of St. Danicl, thinking tlieir countryinen ~ t i l l  
hdcl it, and were mado prisoners. Tlie 5th the enginecrs iicer- 
tajned, that the northcrn bmtion nos hollolv, and tlie trmpa 
after stormiag it would h v c  to  dcsccnd a acnrp  of Melvc or 
fourtren fwt ; the line of nttnclr mns tlierefore changeed for one 
against t l ~ e  eñdern bxction, where a second practiml breacb 
wns soon opcned, and prepartrntions mndc fur nsmulting on the 
13th, biit iii t l ~ i n  rrigIit of tlie Il tli tlie gnrrison lilewerl up tlie 
~riagxziiics, sliikerl tlie p n s ,  and regainetl Gerona. Thus 
Molijouic fell, after thirty-seven daya of open trenches and one 
assault. 
CHAPTER 111, 
T E R D ~ E ~  elatated by his suwess, boasted of the cliffieiilties he 
I i ~ r l  avercomc, xnd thcy wwerc unq~iestionfibly great; for bhe 
roclcy naiiirc of t.he soil liad foriscd liim to rnisc trenches 
instetul of ~inking thcm, anrl Iiis appronclies l i d  bccn cliiefly 
mrried oii Eiy tlie flyiiig srap. Rut lis likewias exprsad  Iiis 
Rcortt of the garrison, held thsir future raistance chercp, ancl 
said fifteeii d:iys would si16ce te toalce the town ; xbmupon tlie 
Spaniitrda, intfignxnt at llus nndesewed contempt, redoirbletl 
tlieir eiíertions ancl falsified al1 Iiis predietions. Memsiwhile 
Clnros nnd Fiovit~b, hnving two tbousancl five hundred mi pele te^, 
attiicked U n s c n ~  n fortiffed post bctwecn Fiperas and Berona, 
A convoyescort,cd Jiynliattnlion h d  nrrivdtlicrc fromBclprdo, 
ancl tlioiigl~ tlm conirnxntlant of Figuerq uuitiiig somo ' y m  
dumw' nnd conv~lescents to a detachent  of liifi garricroo 
succoured tlre post on the Fth, the escort of the COnTOy, h1li 
briclr on Prance, ~rpread mch terror, that Augmeau applied to 
8t. Cyr for t2iree thoumnd men to protect the frontier. The 
lntter rcfuad tIiEs ilttimed demmd, and in his Nemoirs takes 
oecwsion to censure the sydern of moveable mlumns ss more 
liltcly to  ermtc tlinn siipprcsa insurrcctions; ns hnmnsing to  tho 
troops, \vciiI~eiiin~ tlie mnin force, and yet ineff~ctanl, seeing 
the pcxsnntry must nlmys be moro movezble tllon the columns, 
and bettm infomed of their rnfirel~es and strength, IE an 
m y  is $0 mvtizlly disorpnb~d tliat tlie &cers cornmanding 
the coliirana wnnot be tnistccl, this anpment is unansmerabIc, 
nnd tlie systcm mas innpplicnblc to thc situxtion and composi- 
tion of tIic acrcrith corps; biit witli good officcra and good 
combinations rnovcable coIunins siipported by sm$l fortified 
1)~st.q nrr: cfi:ctive. xn~iciit:on W ~ S  tlle crcntor of t h t  ~ystem, 
and Iiis views, oliiiiions, nnd actioiig will in dcfiance of al1 
attempts to leseen t h  go down with a monderf- antriority 
to posterity. 
soon after tiie affnir of Basmra, cight h d r e d  vo~untEers, 
Id sccrctty tliroiiglr tlic moiintiiins 115' t~vo oficers named 
Foxa and Cantera, arrivcrl in tlie cveiiing on tlia Ter, and 
attempted to  pass thnt river nenr Angeles; being linfletl they 
descended lover iii t l ~ e  niglit, crosscd tlic watcr at St. Pons, 
nnd cntcrcd hronn nt day-lircak. Tliiq daring cxpIoit gavc 
fresh courngc to tlic gnrrison, liiit i t s  strengtli was ivastd by 
pwtilence, tlio Prericli ivorks advanccd and tlie Bprtnish gene- 
m i s  outside remnined incrt. Blvarcz ancl liis council protestd 
atrongly against thc cold-l~loorlcd neglect of those who o w d  
tliem succou~; nnd blie junta of CI:ttnlonia foi~vnrded their oom- 
plaints tu tfie centra1 junta at Seville, with the fulloming 
rcrnonctrance. 
Our romm~nders have no efficienf pTm for the relicf oof 
Cxeronn; iiot one of tlie tlirec Iieutenant-gencrak liere has k n  
eliarged t o  conhc t  an expedition to its help; they nay tliey 
act in coiifomity to a plan approvcd Elp your majesty. Can 
it bc tmc tlrnt YQUF majesty approves of abandoning Geronta 
t o  Eicr o m  fceblc resourccaf If* so, licr dcstruction is inevik 
nbie; und sliould this ca1.lsniit.y l iehl ,  will tlie other placea of 
Critalonia and the Peninsulri llave thc conrage Go imitate lier 
fiüclity wlicn tliey sco Iier tcmplcs xnd Iiouscs mined, Iicr 
heroic defe~~ders deatl or in ~Ixvcry? AMI if such calamitiw 
alrould tlirmten tomnfi in other provinces, o u ~ l l t  tliey to reckon 
upon Cratrilonirtn nssistnncc ~ A c n  this most intcrcsthg plnco 
cau olitain no liclp from tl~crnli-~ Do you not see the conse- 
quences of tliis mehcholy rcflcction, d i &  is mficient to 
freeze the nrdour, to deno1atc tlie hearts of tlie most zeaIous 
dcfcnders of our jiist enuse5 Lct tliis hu11varIr o£ our fronticr 
be triken, and tlie province is 1:iid oyien, our barveda, twures ,  
cliilrlrcn, ourselvcc, d1  Fdl to  tlie eiieiny, and tlie country hm 
no longer ~ i i y   cal cxistcrice.' 
Tliis nrlrlrccs prorluccd n d~crcc to nffn~cl Cntnlonim mncour, 
money wns ~ironiise{l, anrl Clnlie recsived ordem t o  mise tho 
*ice. Dtit ncwr did tlie l a w ~ a , n e  of tIte Spaniards agreemitli 
tlicir actioiis! Prlsltc rnzcle oiily tivo feclile efforts to  save the 
Leroic, and suiiering city; tlic centrnl junt% thcn intciit 
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upon thw¿I~kiIIg and i m k i n g  the English gcnerni aftw tlic 
linttle of Trslwerri, tl~oupht no more of Gcrena; md tlie junta 
of Cutaloriia, 80 eloquent so patriotic iritii tlie pen, was selling 
to foreign mercliants the armg suppIied by Englmd f ~ r  the 
defence of their ooiuitry! 
Towards the end of Angnst, when tlie Fmnch fire had 
opened three breaches, antl the bombardment lind reduced a 
grear pmt of Ceromi to d e s ,  Blake merched frem Tarmgonns 
Gth a f o m  af cight or ten tliousend regulara, Hiwt lirocewl- 
ing by Mnrtorel, El Vnlka, and Gmnollem, b Ti&, he then 
p ~ u d  tlm rno~~ntsins to St. Rillario, and mris joined by 
Wimphen and the Milans. As lie had free wmmuuication 
mith Ilovirñ and Claros, snd could direct, t~renty thoumd 
men agrtinst the circlt of inveshent, his rtrrival zIarrned €he 
F~ench; for the pestilente w s  also rimong them, the hospitah 
of Figuems and Perpignnn contnined mnny thowand patientsl, 
and tlie bnttalilioris ir i  tIte fieltl could ~carccly mu&r n tliid 
of th ir  nominal strengtli; tIie genemla rose from siel<-lierls to 
tnke the cammand of tlicir I-irigrides; anrl the corering amy, 
inferior in numbers, wm extended along thirty mi la  of moun- 
tsinous mootled countrg, intersected by rivera, and every way 
favoiimble for BIake'u opentions. Verdier wm fiUed with 
app~ehcnsion, but St. Cy-r's b& qquafities wcrc clcvcloped. A 
leerned md pmctised soldier, firm in execntion, decidcd nnd 
prompt in council; wanting porhps in original md dnrinx 
views, yet able te struggle wikli difficulties, he said ' an imme- 
&ate battle mas to be desired, because bis men were of con- 
firmed couragc. Elake's inrtction wais rather to be drearled, 
for not more than two dap' food conld be p~ocured t o  supply 
the troops wlien together; md it would be necasnry so to 
scnttcr thcm q n i n  tliat scarccly two thousrand wouIcl bc dis- 
pmlila at any fiiven poiot. Aliesdy tho 8paninnls were 
alcirmisliing near Dniñoln, Blalce eqected no reinforcements, 
md would proliably act immecliately ; henos it wm fitting to 
concentrate as mnny men as possible in tlie coiirse of the 
night, and next dny deliver battle : there were &Al tea thoii- 
sand good ~oldiers nndcr ama, ~ i thout  rcckoning what might 
bc spmd h m  thc invmting mrpa.' 
Bldce, with an n m y  numerous bnt nat spirited, wss fm 
Antinm, 1809.1 BOOK IX-CRAP. 3. 24 1 
frequent def& bemme cautious withont being more ~kilful. 
He sought onIJr t a  thow supplies into the town; forgetting 
that a relieving army ahould not protract but raise a aiege, and 
that to saPe Gerons, was to nave Catalonia. He had collected 
tmo thowand beasts of burclen, Ioaded with flour, in the 
monntains of Olot, with rtn escort of foar thonsmd infantry 
nnd fivc hundred csvalrg. Gnrcia Conde, an ambitious and 
fiery jounp; man, undertook to conduct them to Beroa by 
tlie Aat ground between the Ter and the Oiia, precigely oppo- 
eíte tta tlie Iine of the French atta&. Te facilitate tliis 
at.ttempt, BIake caused Henry O'Donnel t o  fdl upon Souham'~ 
posta near BruñoIa on the evening of the 31st of August, 
auppartbg .him with a detacbent under general Lopyri ; 
colonel Lnnder waa to collect the migaeIetcs nntE aomntenes 
on tlie side of Falarnos, and tiske posaession of ' P. S+ th los 
Aydos,' B wnvent, situafed on a high monntain behind 
Monjouk; C k o s  md %vira were to harasa the French on 
the aide of Caeen Rocm, and thus the enemy wem t o  be 
assaild in every qnarter, except tliat on whiah tha convoy 
bad to pasa 
O'Donnel commenced tho opemb:on by winning thc posi- 
tion occupied by one of hxbnrn'~ bettalion~ at Bmhola, liut 
the latter, with an impetuow charge, recovered tlie ground, 
and thongh general Logoyri renewed the skirmisli, he wuld 
make no further impreysion. 6t. Cyr harl now tmnsfemd 
bis quarters t o  ForneIs, and was urged to concentnito on 
the left of the Ter, partly because it was tliought Blake would 
a t h p t  that side; partly that being so close to the Eprtnish 
nrmy, the French divisions mi& if ordererl to rissemlle on 
their actual centre, be cut off in detail durIng their marelt. 
He replied that Blake mast be timid, or he would have fnlleii 
on h ~ ~ h a r n  with al1 hia forces and broken the mvcRng linc at 
once; wilerefore, seeing that opportunity neglected, he tlill 
not fenr to concentrate on the Oña, by a flank march, nnder 
the licard of mch an unal~ilful ndversary. In this view Souhm,  
marching at night, took post tho 1 s t  at daybreak on thc 
heights o£ San Ddmeñ  and Hostnlnou ; and at ciglit o'clock 
P~UO'Y I t a l i s  prolonged Eiis line by tlio lefi in rerir of tlie 
rillage of RieudeUot, while four miles in rear, on the miiin 
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road to  Gerona, Vcrdier supported them with a atrong detach- 
mcnt h m  the besicging cxirps, Lecchi waa sick, but h i ~  , 
division under h~illosewitz parded tlie bridge of Sdt nnd thc 
ht ground about Bt. Ugenio, having odem to crosn the Ter 
md attack h& and C l m s  if they shoüid press the Wesb 
phdian dividon left at Bt. Pona. The trenches ander Mon- 
j ouic were gurirded, the m o h r  btittery at Casa &cm WM 
disamed, and the Westphaliana if attacked were ta retire on 
Sarria and protect the pare md trenches. 
As a thiek fog and heavy rain intermpted the view, both 
armies rerneinecl ~pparently quiet until the middle of the: dny, 
when tlie wwtlier denred, and St, Cyr rode t o  examine tlie 
Spanish positionri. Blake's coIumns were disposed as it Iio 
would have penetrated at once, by B d o L ,  Coloma de Farngs, 
Vidreras, and Mallorquinas ; but scarcely had the F m c h  
gene4  quittd Fornels, when Garcira Cande, d o  under cover 
of the mist h d  been m o v i q  down the mountains, crossed 
the Ter at Amcr, mbnd descended the heights of h ñ o l ~  4 t h  
Iiis convoy. Raving thus pined t l ~ e  flilt ground he ww iu 
rear of Millosewit~, Verdier'a troop, tlie nesre~t support, 
being six d e s  d i s h t  md sepamted by rugged Iiejghts. 
odillosewitz liad placed no guarrls, and thus tlie Spaniarcle 
ptting clme up t o  the main body wiwith one home charge put it 
'm íiigl~t; the fugiti~es in their panic at first w n t  townrds the 
tomI ami being fired npon, turned tomards: tlie- lieights of 
P&u, making foc Fornels; md they wonld have gone Eiltri Blake's 
cnmp if thcy haíI not n e t  St. Cyr oon his return from viewing 
that gcneml's pcxiitions. hlFying nnd reinfming them witli 
s battaliun from Pino's division, he sent them back to k l t ,  
and mada Terdier foIlom Grrrcia Conde with the reserve, Iiat it 
was tw l&e; the latter liad entered the place, Alvarez h d  
destroyed the works near St. Ugenio, and thinking the siege 
raised seut f i ~ e  h d r e d  sick men to the cxinvent o£ St. 
D ~ e l ,  wllieh hnd been abnndoned by the French two days 
lieforc. 
Vcrdim pasaea the bridge o€ Snlt iand marchcd down tlic 
left of tlie Ter t e  save liis p~rcs, which mere tlireatened by 
lbvira and Qaroa; for tlie Westphalian troops had bastilg 
retired a m a s  tlie Ter before these partizan cliiefs. me place 
WM thus succourerl for thc nroment, but Blitlre mnde no 
further moveinwit and Alvares I Y ~  little benefitd : tlie 
convoy had not brought more t h  seven or eight days 
provisioos, and the reiuforcement, enongh to devour the foo8, 
was insufficicnt to raisc the ~ i e g o  by ~nllies. And whilc 
MilIosewih's troop were flging on one ~ i d e  of the Ter, Claros 
aud Rovira, exaggemting their success on the other mide, Id 
Alvarez to thiiik Blxke's army victorioufi; whfiefore he did 
not destmy the bridge of Salt, and Verdier used it as we h a ~ e  
aeen to recovei hia wmp at Snrria. Rnt for tliis crror, tlic 
garrison, reinforced by Conde's men, might have filled tlia 
trenches, rmed the battcries, and retaken Monjouic Liefore 
Verdiex could havc camc to tlicir support. 
8h. CJT baving now only one day'8 provf~iuna teft, resoIved 
to seek Blake and deliver battle; but tha Xprtnish pneral 
went up the mountaina, when he saw the French nrlvancing, 
nnd ennbld St, cyr agGn to dis~cminnhe bis trciopti. 
Tliis effort to relieve Ueronn, madc on tlie 1st Eeptember, wns 
creclitnltlile to Garcia Conde, yet so contemptibIe with refercncc 
to tlic mmna at Blake's disposa1, that Alvarex believcd 1iimseIf 
hctmye(1; trrusting tfiencefortltli onIy t a  his own Leraism, he 
permitted Cande's troops to go back or to remain as they 
plemetl, exacting from those mlio cbpped an oafh not to sur- 
rendcr. Rcnewing tho cdict agaiiist ~pcnlring of  a crapitulti- 
tion, he reducd the rations of tlie garrison, fimt to one-half, 
aftermards to a fourth o f  the fuIl allommce, wl~icli caused some 
desert.ions; thc p t  body of aoldicrs and citixenn ivcrc homevcr 
firm m their cl~ief; antl tlie hivnsmen, slinring tlieir scanty 
f o d  wítll thegamison, matle common cause in eveqthing. 
Conde's succesa m s  due p d y  t o  tlie negligente of tlie 
Frencli, yet tlieii extended antoiiments, on tlic cvcning' of 
the 31 st, gave Blake an opportunity of raising tF~c sicge ivith- 
out much difticuIty. Nor wcre Xt. Cyr's dispositions for the 
next dny pcrfcctly comtinctl; giving 13lnkc crcdit for mnntl 
vieirs, lie wns so expectaut of ii gren* hiitttEe that lie furgot to 
p a r d  againat minor operations. Tltc flat coantry betmeeri 
the lcfi of thc Oiia and tlie Ter wns tlie nntura! Iine for xl con- 
voy to  penetratc; hence it n-ns afault to leave only tmo tliousand 
mco tliere, froriting tlie ~wmisrin, aud ofFering their rear te ri 
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relieving amy wGch e d d  stwi1 m n & d  t h g h  the moun- 
tains until cIose npon them : camlrg posts at 1wt ~ h o d d  have 
been established at the different inldil t o  the hillq and beacom 
raised on convenient eminentes. The main body o!¿ the rtrmy 
appearre dalso to have been at too gmat a distnnoe from the 
town, the firing in the plain of Salt wsa dimegnrded by Qer- 
tlier's reserve, and the h t  information of the attack m brought 
to Forneh by the fugitives themselvea 
8t. Cyr says, his generalg of divi~ion were negligent, and 
hiideEd by s i ckne~  from visitiag their ontposta; t h t  he had 
recommended t o  Verdiet the rabing of field-works at tlie 
bridge of Xalt and in the pasees of the billa; that bt hivice 
was hegarded md he forbore t o  exereise anthority from the 
pecnliw situation in which he had been p l d  by thho empemr. 
He, howmr, ~knowledges that hia  soldiers mwercd honr?stIy 
to mery al1 he made, nnd he was bonnd to enforw tverg 
I n m m l i B  neoessarg to mdntain their honour : in 0 t h  reapects 
bis prodence md vidance be~eerned Iils reputstion. It wm 
oot so mith Blake, the whofe of his operationa prwed thd he 
waa inmpable of any great enterprise; he shouId bape come 
ap ~nth a resoIution to raiae the aiege or perieh. He conteated 
h i d f  with s fcw slight skidshes, md the htmduction of a 
ama11 mnaoy of provisions; mbnd then, nofmithatanding the 
deep Buffering of tliis nohle 6% turned away with a coid look 
and a donatien that mocked its wante. 
When the siego WM rrxnmed, Xt. Cyr withdmw the k c h  
p o h  from Palau and Monte Livio, le~bving the way apparently 
open on that side for the return af Bmia Conde, who, daoeived 
by t h i ~  de, carne out at daybremk on the 3rd with fifteen 
hundred men and thc be& of buiden. Ho haltecl for a time 
at tlie @te to examine the county in front witli liis glnes, 
snd as everything appeared favouralila he waa Iieghhg to 
move, d e n  tlie noise of d r m  beating to trrms gave notice 
that an ambuseade was plmed behind Pdau. St.. Cyr bad 
indeed posted a brigade there in the hope of surprising the 
Spaniarcls; but the Freneh, forgetting the ambush, were per- 
forming the ~egular serpice of the camp at daylight, ami witb 
s cry of antonisliment the Spanish column liastily retreated 
again into the t o m  B d e d  by ehis ridicnlona m W g  and 
concluding the next ettempt would be by CasteIlar and 
&a Bispal, St. C$ drem Namuchelli's liripde from behlnd 
Palau to the ralley of  the Oña, to  faIl. on Conde'g rear when 
he should n g ~ i n  come forth. He likewise put a Liat,hlion an 
tlie Iiills tu h e ~ d  tlie Spani~h column and drive it bnck, 
either upoa ñfazzuclielli's brigade, or upon La Bispal, where 
he also postcd three battalions and a rrquadron of Pino's: 
diviairin. 
On the 4th, ene thoussnd infantry, f i ~ e  liundred cavalry, 
and eleven hundred mules again came out of Gerona, and 
aecending the heigllits on which t he  fort of tlie Capuclun mas 
aituntcd, piis!iccl in single files d o n g  a by-patli lmding to CM- 
telIar da Selva. &Tm.zuchelli saw tliem plainly yet did not 
attack, waiting for tlie fire of tlie bnttialion a l i a d ;  and tIiat 
battnlion did not firc bccnuae, ns Mmxachelli did not athck, it 
wns supposed thc Spaniards were pad of his lirigatle. Giircia 
Concle quickly pereeived their double errar, and with great 
readiness fiIed off te his Ieft, turnerl the right of the bmttalion 
in Fiis front nnd gaincd Gwtcllnr without hrt, nltfiough the 
Freiich in hionjouic oherving al1 t1int pnssed plisd tlieir p s  
agriinst tlie rerar of bis column. Informed by tlie peasants at 
Castellar that troops were also waiting for liim at La Bispal, 
Conde modc for Cnzs de Sclvm, wlicrc Pino hnx-ing notice o€ 
his approticli direckd two liiittalions t o  seizo tho sunimit of a 
ridge crossing Iiis line of rnurcli. These bathliona took s 
mong rlirection, tlic CSpnniarde movcd stet~lilp on, and 
altliougli their rear was nthlced by Pino'n personal @COI$, 
wl~icli t o o k  fifty mcu and somc mula, the main body esceped 
with Iionour. 
Thcrt! were now four opcn brcnchcs in Gcrona, hTazxueliclli's 
brigatle nnd tlin tcoops nt Ln B i q o l  were adrIed t o  the iavest- 
b g  corpq and tlie immedinte fa11 of tlie city seerned inevjbble; 
Lut tlie Frene11 store of powdtr fniletl, and ten riap elapsed 
bcfore n frcsh supplp could h obtnincd : ATvarex profiterl of 
tliis interval to rctrench aiiil barricarle tlie biemllea in the 
inost formidable manner. VerJier bad retaken the con~ent 
of se. Daniel in tbe valley of Gnllig~n~ iind forced tlie five 
hundretl sick men Oo retiim to tlie town on the 4th; but 
Laiidcr, the offimr sent by Elnke on thc 31st of Anpst to 
seixe the con~ent of M&m dg 108 Aqtg&, had forticed 
that building and introduced small supplies of provisiona 
This revived in the mind of Al~arez a plan for taking pos- 
session of the heights beyond those on wliich the Capuchin 
and Canshble forta were situnted, by wwhích, In conjunction 
with tlie post at Mndonnn (€e  lo^ Angeles and d h  the assist- 
nnce of Blake's m y ,  he Zioped to maintain an open coaamnni. 
&ion with the country. This bold md skilful cunception be 
vas nnahle to effect, becanse in a sally from th Capuchina oa 
the 6th he wm beaten by a single French regiment, and the 
same day ~~aamchelllb Italians stormedMdonnadelos Ang-eles 
and put the garrison to the sword. 
During these e~ents  Verdiet marched against Claros and 
novira, who mcre poeted ut St. Gnegorio, near Amer, ht 
lie was rcputaad witli loas and the Frcnch general Jobs, w s ~  
lcillad. The 13th the batteriea recommenoed their fim, nnrl 
Alvarez making a general d l y  by tho p t e  of Bm Pedro, beat 
ths guarda from tha trenches, and spiked tlie p n s  iu one of 
tha Iireaching btttteries. The l8t11, Verdier, thinking the 
breaclies prnetlcable, proposed to @ve the sss~tult, md requid,  
assistance from Sem Cyr, The respective engneers of the 
co~*ering and besieging forcea did not agree; the latter 
dcclsrcd tlic brenehm practicable, tlic former denied it; adding, 
tlint ~vliile fort Culvnry mns I.ie!d by ttlie Spaniards, no nwault 
slsoulrl be rtttemlited. MennwIiiIe, from negligente or the clis- 
putes between 8t. Cyr nnd Augereau, five tbousand con- 
\-alescents capable of duty were retained at perpigmn, wlien 
Verdier could not produce so many under arms for the 
~ssault ;nor were tliere offieers t o  lead that number, so mting 
was tlie aickness: the covering army ww smrcely better off, 
and BIai~e IYM apin in position at; st. Ril&; nevert,htlws st. 
Cyr, ~ c i n g  no bctter rcrnctly, consenwl to the stom provided 
Ciilvnry ~vcre lirst rcdnce11. 8oulinin wntchcii Hake, Pino wns 
to mnlíe a fulse attacls, and on tlie 19th Vcctlic9~ tmops 
atlvuiiced in tliree colamns down the vallcy of hllignn; liut 
tlie Glvary had not been taken, and its fire wept tlie whole 
line of march. Two huntlred men fe11 befare they reaehed 
the W I S ,  and when the suinmlt of the larpest brench m= 
gained, the Frencli battorica, mntinuing tlieir $ay, bmughi 
dom a Iarge masa af wall upon the attaeking st, m8 
column, f i c h  was repulsed from al1 the brenches Journai ol 
and lost six hundred mcn. Tcrdier accuscd Jiis ~ a " m B n  
solrlicrs of cawardice, bliimed St. Cyr for rcfirsing to  bring tfie 
covering amy t o  the assault, and afirmed that he desipedly 
caused failure, moved thereto hy personal jedousy. mua 
complaining iie returned t& Fmce. St. CJT ~sserted th& 
tlie troops h i iwed well, anrl in counciI propsed to con- 
tinue the attack, bnt, beiag resistecl, turned tlie dege into 
a Iilocknde. 
Bhke now dvanced, hnd from the 20thto the 25kh feiped 
to mise the blockde, bia desigo Jieing t o  introduce nnother 
convoy. St. Cyt, divining this objcct, and judging he would 
make the attempt on tlie 26th, resolved t o  let him pase 
the covcnng linc ancF then fnlI on Iiim beFore he ieuld rcncli 
tlie town. ;.ioiiliam wria therefore placed behind Pdau, Pino 
at Cnsa de Selva, and Imhi 's  division of the investing brmp 
mas to meet tlte Sprtninrds in front mhiIe the fwo fomer 
a m e  dowa upon t l i~ir rear. Nnke, assembling 11;s troops on 
the sidc of Uostnlrich, made a eimitous route to h Biqal 
and the lieights of St. Sadurni, from wlience he cletached ten 
tbousand men nnder Wimphen to protect tlie passngc of tbo 
convoy. Eeiiry O'Donnel led the escort, and at daybrenk 
on tlie SGtli, breaking through the Prench troops at Castellar, 
renchd the fort of tlie Constable with the lima of tlie 
convoy; but tlio Iinttnlions Iie Iiad ilriven before him rallied 
on the Iieights of San N i g e l  and retnrned to t6e combat, 
ivliile St. Cj?; coming with part of hulism's division upan the 
lcft flnnlc of the oonvoy, forcd t l ic  grenfer pftrt t o  IX~~O@B. 
Pino nlso mn up frorn Cnan de Selra qninst Wiplien '~ rmr- 
guard, a rout ensued, and mnlre m d e  no &o* to save the 
distresscd troopa O'Donnel mith a thousand mcn and two 
Iiuurlred muIes got into t hc  town, the remninder of tIie 
convoy taken, tlie Itnlinns p ~ e  no quarter, and three 
tliousnnd Spaniards merc slain. 
After this actian, Borne tmops mere aent to menace Elakc'e 
communications with Hoetnlricli and lie rctird by the side of 
St. Filieu de Qukols. Thua Gerona was sgain alisndoned 
to Iier su&*, nom dmost insupportable. iVithmt money, 
without medicines, wjthont food, pestilenm within the malIs, 
the brcache opm. ' If the cuptain-general,' aaid AIvnrez, ' be 
nnablo to make a vigorom &rt, the whole of Cstnlonia muet 
riae to our aid, or Geronw mil1 soon be s Herap of careases 
and mins, the memory of which will d i c t  po8teriB i' Mem- 
while the state of the French was p t l y  impmved; for SE. 
Cyr had repaired t o  Pe'pipan where he foand Angereau in 
pod heaIth, and forced him to assnme the command. Tlien, 
he mp, cveykhing needful was bestowed wiib a free hand 
upon tlie wventh corps, h n s e  he himsclf was no Ionger in 
tlie my; but a better m o n  is t o  be fonnd in t,hc stnte of 
Napoleon's affaira. Pmm bnd been mnc1uded with Austri% 
tlie Eglisli expeditiom h d  failedJ di the ~esources of France 
were become fisposahle, anil not only the menth, but every 
corps in Spain was reinforced: moieover Verdier expressIy 
aíñrmed, that the tnmperor had before hrnished rtmple means 
to take Geiona, and that St. Cyr ha6 wilfdly irnpeded the 
operations, 
Aagerernu, eslmrtd by five thoiimnd condesmnts from 
Perpignau, m h e d  Gerona the 12th oof Octoiier. The follow- 
ing night, O'DonneI, ismnilng on the side of the plain, liroks 
throngh the p d s ,  forced LSoubam's qnsrtem, made that gene- 
ral Ay in bis: shirt, and finally effectd a jjunction with BIilana 
at hnta Coloma. Tbis m as daring an enterprhe as nny 
performed durjng this memorable siege. Augereau continued 
the blockade, yet o&ed an a d s t i c e  for a month, with free 
entry of provi~ions, if AIvarez ~vould p m i e e  to mmnder 
unlese relieved before the expiration of tht period; yet aio 
stcadfagt ~ p a s  the mrm sud his folIowm this offcr was refusd 
notwithstmding the grievous famine; and on tlie 29th B I h  
qpin took poawslon of the heights of J3ruñola. Xauham put; 
Iiim to flight, whereupn Augeraau detrtched Pino against the 
town of Hostalrich which fortifiedwith an oId d l  and bwem 
defended by 6wo thousand mm, and mpported by the fire of 
tlie &le w atrong; nevertheIess it was carried by istorm, 
and the pmvísions nnd &res laid np there ctlptwed, althougIi 
BIake m only a fem miles of. 
At thia time mar-admiml Bsudin, sailing with thra  slips 
of the h e ,  two frigates, and ~ixteen Iarge atore-ship;s, for 
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Barcelona, mas iotercepterl by d m i r d  Martin, wlio burnd OF 
drove on shore the sinuller vessels of mar, and forcedl thr! crews 
t o  bnrn tmo of the linesf-battle ships. The stomships and a 
few armed vessels hok refuge at Rosaa, pput up boarding net- 
tings, protectad tlisir Rnnks by Fio~bosna isntl tlie Trinity-fort, nnd 
presented a formidable front, hv ing  above twenty p u s  on 
board dispowd for defence besicles thc &ore batteries; captain 
Hallowell Iiowevt?~ clestroycd the wliolc n f t c ~  a vigoroiia 
rwistnncc, mliic1i cost the British more than seventy men killed 
and mounded. 
MeanwIiile the diiress of Gerona increased, desehions 
became frcquent, and ten officem having fuiled in a plot to 
force Uie inRexi2ile Alvarer, to ~urrender, went over tn the 
enemy. hr ing  November, ithe French mere innctive for want 
of po~vder, bat famine md sicheas were doing their wotk with 
tcrriblc rigour, and the Gth of Decemher nrnmt~nition hnving 
arirrjwd, tlio suburhs of Marina and Girondellta, tlie fort o£ Cal- 
wmy, and JI the towers beyond the rainpark rvem mrried by 
the besiegera. Alvnrez was thus confine[! t o  the eireuit af the 
wdls, and cut off from tlie Cap~~chin a cl Constable forts; he 
lid been ill for some dnp, yet rising fer a, loat effort mnrIe n 
general sally on tlie 7th, retook Ghe suburb of Uirontldla and 
tlie redoubts, and opening a may to tlie ontworks of tlie Con- 
shblo carried off tlia gnrrison: tlie next rlny ovcrcomo by 
suffering he became delirions. A council of war olssemliled, 
mr1 after dx montlvr of open trenches Gerons ]?e!dd on the 
10th. She gnrrison mnrched out with the hononrs orwnr, 
tlio t r o n p  wem to be exclinngorl, UIC iniiiibitanta to Iio 
respected, rtnu none but soldiers to be considered prisoom. 
Such was the termination of a defence which eclipced tlie 
glory of Zaragcza. 
Frencli and Spnnidi writem altke nffirm, tlirit Augereau 
treated Alvorea with a ripur and contuinely wliich excited 
every peirion's indignation; and that, in violation of the wpi- 
t ulation, the monks were, under an especial order of Netp01eoq 
sent t n  Frnnca mis last accirsntion rdmits o€ disputc. Tbe 
monlrs lid fomed themselvw into mpInr co rps  nnmed tlia 
Cmsaders; they were disciplined and dothed in tb sort of uni- 
form; and being to all iatents soldiers, it can hrtrdty be =id 

do. The nssault on the body of +he place was aot welI con- 
ducted. Henoa, iT the jealousy and disl~uutes between the gene- 
rals, the mixture of Germans, Italiana, and Fmnch in the 
nmy, the maladminiatration of the hmpihls, by which so 
mnny mcn mcre lost and rro mmy more kept fiom their 
duty, Iie considered, it is surprising tthat Qerona waa bken 
at dl. 
5". Tlie foregoing cont?lusions affect not the rnerits of the 
baieged; tlie difficulties and emm of their adversaries ady 
prolunged t l~eir  rninmy. Thcy foiight biavely, thcy endured 
unlieard-of sufferings mith constancy, and their refusal to  
accept the umistice of fed  by Augercau, is as noble and affect- 
ing an instnnce of virtue as mp fhat history has recorrled. 
lrct liow mixed are good and evil principia in m n ,  Iiow 
dependent ulion accidental circumstances is the development of 
h i ~  noble or base q~~alities? hlvarez, so mrrgsnirnonri, so 
firm, ao brave, so patriotic at Gcronn, wna tlie same AIvnrez 
wha one year before wrrended tlie hrdona Montjouic 
at tlie hsolent summona of lhhesmel The iduence of a 
baso court l i d  tlim degmded piililic fceling and what waa 
weulr. in hia c lmmt er came to  the surface ; but in times more 
congen;al to virtuoaa sentirnents the nobility of the man'a 
nature broke forth. 
tiD. W h n  tlie siegc of Gcrnnn is contrasted with that of 
Zaragoza, it may shake the opinion of tliose wbo regad the 
wild h t i l i t y  of tha rnultibtic as superior t o  the replated 
warfnrc of ~oldicw. Thc men wlvlio cnmc agninst Znrngoza 
were Iess numerous tlion those wlio carne qainst Grana; the 
regular gamson af Zaragoza was thirty tliousand, tliat of 
Gcrona threc thousnnd. Thr a m d  multitud0 in the one 
amounted to twenty-five thousand, in the otlier thoy wcrc leas 
than six thonsnna, Cnrelty md murder rnnrked eveq- gtep in 
tJie defence of Zarapea, nnd the most horrible crimes were 
necessnry to prolong tlie resistanca; above forty thousand 
persons pcri~hed miwralily, ibnrl the t o m  was ttnken within 
tliree nionths. In Berone them wns notliing t o  bluñh for, the 
fighting was more mccessful, the actual losa inflicted npon the 
enemp p t e r ,  the suffenng within the walls neither wantonly 
produced nor uselew; Uie period of its resistance doubled that 
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of Zaragoza, and everg proceeding tended f o raise i n M  of 
ginking the dignity of human nature: there wari Iess of bnrtaI 
rnle, mora of renson, md cenaequently more rml heroism, 
more mocess at the momcnt, and a better example giwn to 
excite the ernulntion of genmus non. 
79 With referente to the general postare of affaira, the fa11 
af Gemw was e repmwh to the Spaniah and Englisb cabinets. 
The lafhr hving rigents in Catalonia, and auch a man aa lord 
~lingwood to refer to, were yet so ipomnt, or so careless of 
what was asential t o  the miocesa of the war, as to let Gerona 
rptmggle for aix months, when Mf the troops employed by sir 
John Stuart to dam Naph, if &ed i-Q the collst of Cah- 
lonia and landed at Pdamos, would have raXsed tlie ~ i e p  : it 
was not necessary to equip thig amy for a mmpaip, a aingle 
march would havc eflectcd tlie objoct. An mginecr land a Tcw 
thousruid pounds would bave rendered Pnlmos a formidable 
post; md 3 that placa has been occupied by Bnfifih troops 
and suppmkl by a fleet, grater m a n a  then the French could 
h v e  collected in 1809 wouId not have r e d u d  Gerona, The 
Catalana were not more tmhkIe nor more disposed ttim othera 
to act cordially mith their allies; but the sterility of 
the country, the condmsed manufacturing population, the 
numhcr of strong poeta and large fortified bwns in their poa- 
=#ion, the long difficult lines of communimtion wliich tlie 
French must litave guaded for the pssage of their convojrq 
would have rended the invadem' task most diiSzcult. 
89 From the commenoement of tlie Epanish in~urrection, 
the policy of tbe Valenciana bad been cbaracterised by a singular 
indifference to  the caiamities that overwhdmatl the other parta 
of Bpipaiu. The local junta, not oontent mitli assertingan exclu- 
~ i v e  authority, irnagined it poesible to mainhin Valencia hde- 
pendent, cven thougli the rwt of the Peninsda slinuId be 
conq~~ered: hence tlic siege of Xnrngoxa pnssed unhded,  nnd 
the wffciing of Gerona made no impression. WitIi n, regular 
srmy of ten thoussnd men, more tLan t1iirty thousrsnd armed 
ineguliaxq md a large fleet at Cart,lmgena, the junta of thia 
rich provine, so aílmirably ~ituiited for offeasive operationfi, 
did nat even pnt the fortified tome of its o m  frontier in a 
&te of defenm; and careleasly beheld the seventh and third 
coqs  graduallp establisbiagI at the disfance of s few da$ 
rnarch from 'ITalencia itself, two soIid b&ses for f&l~erinvasion. 
Bnt the opations of the G d  Sqmmiae Jwa* mnst n m  
be resumcd, to ~ l i o w  how t t e  patriotism, the condancy, the 
lives, the fortunes of the Spanisb peopIe, were a p o ~ e d  with by 
thocre who lid so unbppily acquired a momenhq power in 




WUEN sir Arthur WcUcslcy retired to thc fronticr of Portugal,
thc calumnies propagated in Andalusia relative to the Cl!.use of
that movemcnt were so far successful tbnt no open revolt
took place; yet the public Illltred being little diminished, l\
design was formcd to establish (l. better {,"Overlllnent, Rud mea-
sures "".eM secretly t.ukcll to scil:e tIle membClli of the jUllb~
and transport thcm to MRllil18. The old junta of Seville being
tIle chief movers of this sedition, no good could be expected
from the cl\8nge, otherwise, such RI! explosion, although sure
to be attended with slaughter and temporary oonfusion, Wflll
not unlikely to prove advantageous to the nation at large, some
violent remedy being necessary to purge off the complicated
disorders of the state.
'Spain,' suid lord Wcllesley, 'hM proved untrue to QU1'
alliance because 8lUJ Y tmtrl«l [Q lwrsdj'-' Until 801JUJ g7fXl.l
dw,lIge sludl be WJected in tlM oondlUlt 0/ tlUJ military re<l(fUrt:es
0/ Spain, w~d in tlUJ state of lu:r armies, 110 Brili3l. army can
attempt safdy to~with Spanish troop8 in the rerril.ories
0/ Spain.'-' No alliance can protect l.er from the re$U/ts oj
internal disorders a/Id national infirmity.'
This discontent of the British ambassador led the conspira-
tors to impart their designs to him; but he, being accredited
to tile existing government, apprised it of the dunger, eoneenl-
ing however the nalllCS of those engttged ill the plot. 'l'he
jUlltn immediately ~ought to mitignte the gencral hatred, yet
still nverse to yield power projccted 11 counter schemc. They
bad, for the Jlublie good according to somc, for pril'ateemolument
according to others, hitherto llermitted trading under li~nces
with the towns occupied by the enemy; this regulatioDand some
peculiarly heavy exactions they now rescinded; and, lIS a finat
mellSurc of couciliation, allpoiutcd, with mauy protestations of
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patriotism, commiasionem to prepare a scheme of govemment 
mliicli sliwld serve uutil fbe fit period far con~eking ths 
Cortes arrived. These mmmissionera, principally chosen from 
amonpt tIie rnemliere of &e junta, Boon mnde manifeirt tlie 
real designs of tliat M y .  They proposed tlint five Iiemons 
should form a suprmc cxecutive wuncil, every member of the 
existing junts, to have in rotation n place; the colonies to be 
rcpresented IL~ un integral pnrt of tlie empirc; tlie council, so 
composecl, to mle nntil Ohe Cortes should meet., nnd then to 
preside in tliat aasernbI~. Tlm by a simple cliange of form 
the present and future authority of the junta werc to be tan- 
firmcd. And tha proposd in fnvonr o€ tlic colonies, wna, 
following tht! oliinion of lord Wellmley, meraly te obtain 
momentary papularity and entirely unconnected nith enlarged 
views cif govcrnmcnt. 
Tliis project WM foiled by Romana, Being of tlie wmmis- 
sion he diiented fiom his colleagues, and Ctew up the accusa- 
tory paper quoted in another part of tliia history, Yet the 
baíl acta fhcrein speclfied wcrc not the oniy clinrges marle at 
this period. It was objeeted tliat tlio memliera gcuerally were 
ven$ in tbeir pntronap, diíñcult of access, insolent of demea 
nour ; tliat tsorne amongst them hving ns merchants contraeted 
for siipplying the mmy, did jn their public cnpncitp mise tlie 
pite to be paid hy the treasury for the artidea, Romana pro- 
posed a regency of five persoiis, not members of the junta. 
It wns ta  he nssiskd Ly a freñli cliosen junta of five memhrs 
and a prommtor-general, €o be styled 'Th Permnent U@a- 
t b a  of &e 8&m."ne af this body t o  be n 8011th bmeric~n, 
and thc whoIe to represent thc Cortes until tlic mecting of tliat 
~sernbly,  which he tliought could not be t o o  eoon. 3Ii~ plan, 
introduced by misplncerl dedaration~ in favour of wbitrary 
ponter, and terminated by otIiers equaily strong in favour of 
civil liberty, n a s  ill-considered. The 'Pernaane7bt Dcpt1rtli.o~~' 
Iieing ta represent tlie Cortes, n-oialrl Firtve P ~ S S P F I P ~ ~ ~  tlle riglit of 
mikoliing tlie regency; ancl tlie nunilicrs anrl dignity of 
both being equal, tiieir interests opposed, a strugglc would 
liavc comrncneed, in mhidi tlic Inttcr, Iinviiig tlic sole dis- 
tritution of lionoui~ nnd emoluments, corild iiot foil ta conquer, 
and no Cortes would lmve been assemli2ed. 
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Some time before %a, when frightened by sir Arthur'~ 
retreat from Spdn, hfartin de Gray had ariked lord Wellealey'~ 
adGce as to the best form of pvernment. He recommended 
a C d  of Regmq; and Like Romana pioposed s sewnd 
oonndI; yet with thia easential Werence, that the Iatter were 
only to amnge the detds  for electing the membern of CoM, 
for whose convomtion a proclamntion was to be immedrately 
publilihed, togefher with 'ct M of s.igÉlss' founded on an enlarged 
conciliatoy policy, md haGg equal regard for the intwesta 
of the coloniea as for those of the mother comtrp. Garay 
approved of this while 'danger m c n a d  the junta; but when 
the command of the amies hnd been e&ltd, and the fimt excite- 
ment sbated, his solicitnde for tha improvement of tbe govern- 
mmt cerned, Lord W~llealey, hhowever, condemned the exi~t- 
ing q t e m  QA mrreh for its democratic form as for ita in&- 
ciency ; the Engliah r n i n h w  thought of Spain only as tending 
to uphold the aristocratic system. 
To evade Rernana'~ proposition, the junta momced tht 
*he national Cotteg ahould be convoked on the l& of January, 
1814 and assernbIed for businese on the X s t  of Xarcli follow- 
ing. Raving rro fw met the public wkhea, thcy made a 
vim1ent atGack on the project of s regency, affinning, not 
without mme foundation nai r e p r d e d  Romana's plan, that 
such e govement wmld disgu~t he coloniea, trample on the 
kings rights, would never assemble tbe &&S, and be coi- 
mpted by the Freneh. Then enlarging on th& o m  merita 
in tt turgid declamatory &$e, they defended idheir p& con- 
duct by a, tissue of niis-repmsentationei, which deceived nobody; 
for to use tbe wods of lord WcIlesley, <no p h  ?m? bm 
mbpted fw any ef lmtd  recEress of p*evmm, cmecthn of 
u h w ,  or relkf f ~ m  ~~; aRld the admiw&trath qf 
$nLic~, tb rtydalim of l.evmzle,-> cormmwc~,  tí^ mcwity 
of pm a& pqwEiJ, m d  mmj ot?m grmt & m c h  of 
1~mm m as &fecCive CM the nailiimy sstdlisI&.' 
Plowever, the promise of assembling the Cortes suffiml €o 
lull the public math, and the junta resoIved to remmmence 
offertgi~e militrq opemtions ; whih they fondly im@ned 
would m h  the enemy d establish tlieir o~vn populan'ty 
and power, Eocouraged by n fnlse but general impremion 
tliroiigl~out AndnIuGn, tlint Anstrin hnd brolren off ncgotin- 
fions witli France, tliey niiserl frevh levies in Estretnadura aiid 
Andalusin, incorporated tliem witlh tlie rern2i.i~~ of Cuesta's 
army, una thus forrnetl a iody of sixty tliousmd soldiem, 
nmrly ten tlio~isand Iieing cavalry. Nor wois tliis matter of 
tIificulty; for, ozving to tlie fee11Ic resiñtnnce m d c ,  tlic wnr 
liad Iiitlierto dmwu little on tlie ~iopufation, tlie Iioorer sort 
never ecded a al1 for personal service, and the enormous 
ncc~iniuIntion of Engliali stores nnd moncy nt Cikliz and 8cvilln 
werr: ~uflieicnt; for every exigency. 
In Octotier .gis ndmncd with tbia amy a shod m y  
into Lx IIIanclin, but w3im tlic Frencli, unwilling to lose tEie 
remiirces of tlint fcrtilc proviucc, moved townrds him, ha 
rcpiiicd tlie Murciia. TIie first and fourtli c o v s  then occu- 
pied La 3finclia, tlie sccond anrl fifth corps mere establislied 
iu tlic vxllcy ~f ttlic Taps and Toledo, tbe  reserve waa at 
Brnrtri(1. niiring tliesc niovemcnh, Rnmeco?ir, wlio com- 
xnandwl in Estremdura, detric1ied the prince of Anglona with 
eight Eiunclred horsemen to reidarce del Parque, and took 
post himself beliind the Giradiana. In tlie lntter end of 
October E q i a  cuvcrd Beville with aixty tlioasnnd mcn on 
ttie Zn Manclia line; D ~ s m u r  witlz ten tliousnnd c o v e d  it 
on t.Ile Estrcmndiira line, and six tiioiisand wcre kept by tlie 
junta ns pcwonnl giinrds bcliind thc Morcnn. En thc riorth 
tIie SpmisIi army of the left iras concentsnted nwr Cifirld 
Rodrigo; wliere del Parque Iiml been joined by the prime of ' 
Anglona, nncl by tlie Gnllician diviaions of Currem nníI Mcndi- 
zabel, tliirteen iliousnntl strong, and completely eqnipped from 
the Eiiglish supplies at Coruña. Thus stren$tene¿l, del 
Pnrquc entered tlie Siem do Frnncia and peiit his scouting 
partics to Rnfios, n~lii2c Santocildcs, moving from L~igo, took 
~iosses~ion of Astorga with tro thousand men md menaced 
tlie rear of the silith COVS, mhich, iifter forcing Wilson at tlie 
Baños, liad been qiiartererl between the Tomes and tlie Esla. 
In tliin aitiintion n Frcncli detaclimcnt nttcmpted t o  ~rirprise 
Astorp, liut  vas rcpulscd, nnrl Bnll~tcrori, Iiriving n p i n  
collectcd eiglit thotrsxnd men in tlie Asturias and amed and 
equipped tFrem from tlie English stores, carne d o m  to thst 
placa anrl attempted to  storm Zarnora. Failing in thi, he 
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enterad Portngd by the road of Mirande and h m  thence 
proceeded to join del Parque, Thus the oTd m i e s  of CraUicia 
and the Asturias be+ broken up, those provinces were 
ordered to raise freah forces; but there wrt.i in Gallicia a 
general disposition to resisi tbe authority of fhe central 
junts. 
Del Pfirquq eager to act e n &  thc sixth corps, had 
demnnderi in Scptcmbcr, throug11 Feres Cnatru tlie 8pnisli 
envoy rst Lisbon, that tlie Portugese a m y  slioufd join him. 
Tlie demand waa referi-ed t o  sir Artliur Wellesley who gave 
it a decided negative, grounding hig refusd upon the follow- 
ing rewons, which give a clear and interesting view of the 
military state of &irs at tliis period. 
' Tlie encmy, he said, were gl~perior to the ~llies, inclnding 
Letter from those which R~resford might bnng into tha ficld, 
srr A. WPI~M- not only in nnmbcm, bnt {dvcrting to tho com- 
ley, Sept. .13, 
isus, ESS. position of the Spanish amies, tlie want of cavalry 
in. some, of m t i l l v  in othera, of dotliing, ammu- 
nition, and arrns, wnd the deficiency of discipline in alf) 
superior in efficiency even t a  a p a t e r  degree than in 
numhers. !l%cse circumstances, and the absolute deficiency 
in mcnng, were the causes wliy, after a great victol  nt Tnln- 
vcrn, tlic ~rmies l i d  lieen obliged t u  recur to thc defenive, 
and nothing Irmi alterecl Eor tlie hetter since. But, besida 
these considerations, the enemy enjoyed peculiar atlvantaw 
from his central position, wliich enabled Km to frustrate the 
duke del Parque's intended operatiom. He could march a 
part or the whole of bis foroes t o  any quwter, wiiereas the 
operation of tlie different corps of the al6es must nccessrtriIy 
he isolntd, and cach for n timc expoticd to clefcnt. 'IIhns 
tlicre wm nothing to prevent tlie enetny from throwing Iiim- 
self upon del Parque md Beresford, n.ith the c o y  of Ney 
ivliicii was at Salamanca, of Soult, wliicli was at PIme~cia, 
snd with the force uncler BeIleman, whrcb was near Balls- 
dolid; in which m e ,  even if be, sir Aithur, had the inclina- 
tion, be h d  not tlie mana of mamIiing In time to sme them 
from destniction. 
'In the @ame mtlnnes tlie B~itish nmy, if it took rin 
ad~anced position, would be liable to a fatal disuster, so lilre 
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vise would the Xpaniah army of La Mancha I t  followed 
then, tliat if any one of these armies made a farward move- 
menb, the wvhole mu& M-opcrah or the single force in activity 
u~onld lic ruinetl; Iiut Uie reIntive sficicncy and strength of 
tlie hostile forcarr, as laid doum in tEie commeneement of tba 
arpnieiit, forhail a genemi co-opemtion with wny hopes of 
solici miccrss; anrl the onlg consequence that could follow 
wot~ld be, tfint, nftcr ia bnttlc or tivo, somo brillinnt actions 
perfiirmed by a ~iiirf n n J  some defeats sustaiud by otliers, 
and icifter tFie Ioas of mmnnp vnlitable officeiri and soldiers, thc 
aliies would be forced npin to imnme tliose defensive posi- 
tions wliicli tlicy oiight itevcr to Iinve quittccl. Sntisfictl tliat 
this mas tlie onIy jiist ~ i e m  of sffbirs, he, altliough prginred to 
make an effrirt to prevent Ciuclad Rodriga fron falling into 
t l~e  enemy's hnntls, ms rcqolv~d not to give thc diilce riel 
Parque any assistance to muinttlin Iiia fomard position; ruid 
lie addsecl tlie Porhigxese government not to risk Beresfoda 
nrmy in a situntion wliicli could only lead t o  miscbief. 
' SIie proposetl apcrntion of tlie dulce del Piirqiie mns not 
the mode to save Ciudad Roctrigo. The only effedual one 
mas to post himself in sucli a sitnation as tliat tlie enemy 
coiild not sttnck and dcfent hini mitliont R long prcvions pro- 
paration, diicli  wuuld give time for aid to arrive, anrl a march 
in wliich the enemy Iiimaclf miglit bc expos~ l  t o  defent. To 
expoae tlioae t r o o ~  to defcnt w1iich wcrc tiltimntcly to co- 
opcrate in rlefence o€ Ciudad Fmdrigo, wnsi not tlie way o£ 
lireventing tlie suacess of nn attempt on that fortresa, Tha 
Iiest m y  mns to place the 8panish force in mcli a post that it 
could not bc nttacked without rislc to thc cncmy, nntl from 
ivFience it cauld easily caaperate with tlie other corps, which 
m n ~ t  be puE in motion if Ciudad mm to be saved; and 
nlthougli Iie would not talre upon Iiimself to point  out the 
csacG ~iosition wtiicli the tluke del P i q u e  ought t a  occnpy, he 
itns certnin thnt in his preent f o r n * d  one, altliaugli j o l d  
by iycresford he could not nvoicl defent. Ciitilaii Roclrigo 
rvoiild be lost, ancl othcr rnisfort~~nes wonld follow, nonc of 
wliicli cniiltl occur under nny otlier lrrtihnhle or even possible 
coric:iirreuce af circumstantnces, In fine, he liad long been o£ 
o~liilioii tlie war must neccssnriIp t ic  dcfensive on tlie part of 
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Losndrt commondecl tlie Sliaiiisli riglit, Belvedere the reserve, 
Nartiii Carrera tlic ldt, ivliicli bcing on tlic most riccessil~le 
pnrt of tlie mountnin i v ~ s  crivererl nntl Ilrnnlierl ly tlie cavnlry. 
3lnrdixnd, desirous of  figllting befure Bullcsteros could arrive, 
reaclied the foot of tlie mountnin early on tlie lStIi, and 
immcrlintcly fcll iipon rIcl Piirquc's lcft. TIlc Spjpnnish cnvalry 
flect, nnd tiieir infuntry, surpriseil in Bie initIst of an evolutioii 
by tlie Prench Iiorsemen, were tlirown into disordcr anrl tlis 
artillery mas tnken. Homevcr, Cerrcm, Mentliznliel, antE tlie 
dulce, rallierl tlie troops on tIie IiigIicr groirnri, r c i i i f o d  tlicni 
from tlie reseme, aiid comiug down witli a fresli iinpetiis, 
rccovered tlie gnsi and discomfitcd tlie Frencli with tlie loss 
of nn e~gle,  one cnnnon, anii severa1 huntlred inen. Diiriny: 
tliis tirillittnt conil~~lt oii the left, tlie rigl:lit nild ceiilre mere 
fclt by tlie Frencli ~kirmislicrs, but tlie grortnrl ~ v n s  too  strong 
to mnkc riny irnprcssion. Marcliand, sccing I i i s  mcn rcpulseil 
in nlI qunrkrs mith Incs and fcaring to Fie cncloscd Iiy Rullcs- 
teros in tlint disodered stntc, tlien retrenterl to Salnmanca. 
Del Parqae did not venture to follow up Iifs victory until 
tlre 21st, wIien, beinp joind by Rrtllcsteros, he puslied witli 
iienrly tliirty Uiousaiirt msn for Ledcsnia, crossod tlie Torrnes 
on tlie 23r4 turned Salamanca by a niglit mai~li,  and mrly 
in tlie morning of  tlie 24th croivriecl tbe lieiglita of San 
Crislovril in ranr of tliat city, lioliing to cut on' Riarcltentl's 
retreat j but tlint p e r a l  bad timely information and aas 
already at Ton, beliiud tiie Douro. hIeanwh!iiEe, the news of 
tlie dafeat n t  Tnmnmcs hsd rcnclicd Jlndrid, DaqñolIe~i' divisiori 
was detnclied tlirougli tha Puerto Rico to reinforce tiie sixth 
corps, and ICellerman vas clirected to admnce from Valladolid 
and hke the commnnd of  tlie mhole. Del Parque liearing of 
tliis rcinforccmcnt fcll bnck by tlic wny of Albn dc Tornies t o  
Gej3,r, wllich htter ldace lie reaclierl on tlie 8th of Xovember. 
Aiid whi?e these eveilte were taking place ia CastiiIe, the 
wiitral juntg litwing finnlly eoncoctetl their ~chernes, mere 
coninicncing nn sntcrprise of unpnrnllcled mliaeas on tbe 
sidc of La h11lilcli~ 
Lv the arrangement of ml ike  &da diidties m always 
ovcrlooked by tlic Spaninrds, wlio me carried on from nne 
plliautnsy to nnother so swiftly, that tlie first conceiitirin of nn 
enterpriso is immediately followed by a confident nriticipation 
of complete sucoess; tlijs continues until t1ie haur of liattle, 
and then, when it might be of use, generally abandons tliem 
Now the cen td  junta, ha-ving, to deceive the people, afñrmecl 
that sir Arthwr retreated to tha fmntiers of Portugal at t11e 
very moment when tlie French might h e  Iieen driven ta 
tlie Pyrenees, carne very soon t o  believe their awn fibsurd 
cnlumny, and resolv~l  to send the nrmy nt CaroIinn headIong 
apinst Rr&itl: nay, siich w r ~  Eil~eir mnfidencc, thnt, fom 
numing tEie civiI and miIihry autliorities, tlicy amnged o 
provisionary aystem f o ~  the fi~tura adrniaistration of  tIie 
capital, with a a r e  mhich they denied to the army tbtit waa 
t o  put them in possession. 
Epia wras mnsideied mfit t o  wndnct this mterprise, and 
Albuquerque was diitasteful to the junta; wherefore, casting 
their eyes upon hreiaga, they chosc k m ;  having only tlie 
recommcndation that at the pctty liattle of íUmnitz Blake 
n o t i d  his oonragee He was then at brida, hut reaclisd La 
Carotina in the latter end of October, and Iieinf: of a quicli 
lively turn, and as confident as the junta could desire, readiIy 
undertook to drive the Prench from Madrid, Thls movement 
was to commenm early in November, and Villa Cmpa with 
khe bnnds from Aragon were to assist; and when Areizagg 
after meeting tlie enemy, b c p ~ i  to  losc canfideiicc, Albu- 
queque, having suoceeded Bassecour in Estrematlurn, alalso 
recei~ed instructions to cause a d i ~ t l ~ i o n  by mnrching on 
Arzobispo and Talavera de la Rqma. Del Parque, coming 
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nertrly ninety thousana man merc t o  be pnt in motion agniast 
Madrid, precisely on t h 3  lilnn nhich sir Arthur had just 
denounccd ns ceriain to  provo disnstrons. Every charicti was 
in fwour of £he Prench, and Areizraga'~ irruption ww nn 
extreme erample of military mRness. The pxoject of nniting 
del Pnrque's forces nitli hlbuqrierque's nt Talavevera wes eertain 
to fniI, Iiecnuse the FicncTi mnssw -n-cre nlrendy in poascrisirin 
of t11e point of junction, and tlie sixth wrps could fdl on del 
Parque's rmr. 
Partly ta doceive, prirtly becnuse they wouId nevcr d m i t  
of any opposition to n fnvotirite ~chcme, thc junh sprcd n 
report tlint tlie nritish army was to eo-operate, and permitterl 
Arc izap  to march under the impremion that it 
was so. Notliing could Iie rnorc untnre. Sir 'pwnm 4 1- Artliur Wellesley went t o  Seville, heId repeatml 
conversationn with tlie Spanish ministers and the members of 
tlie junta, rciterated Iiis formcr ahjectiona to offensive opera- 
tions, and wnrned Iiis ntiditola tlwt tolli8 peculiarly ill-jurigc:cd 
projeet would end ili tlie destructien of their army. BUL tlie 
Spanish ministers, far from attending te lils advice, dicl not 
even atñcially inform him of Areizagds rnarch until the 18tlr 
of Novernlier, tlir: vwy day Fiefore tlie fntnl termination of tFie 
cnmpign.  Set, on tlie 1 Gtli they hsd repeated their demand 
for assishnee, and with a vebeinence deaf t o  reason, requirctl 
tliat tlie nritish sliould insttlntlp co-opernte witli Albirqiicrque 
alid del Partlue'~ forces: sir Artliur, firm to his firat vieivs, 
never gave the sliglitest liopes that his army mould so wt, and 
he nssirrrd tlic junto thnt tlie diveraion propsd would bave 
no eilk~4 wlintever. 
OPETLiTIONS IX Li JLLVClXA. 
Areizn_p, aftcr pul>lishing nn ~ l d r e s s  to tI~c nrmg mnrched 
on tlie 3rd froin Ln Cnrolilin, with sixty picces oE nrtillery and 
fifty to s i ~ t y  thousand men, of whicli eight thonmnd were 
cavall.  Revernl Britisli oficers and private gentlemen, antl 
tlte liaron Crocsnntl, nii kustrinn militiiy ngent, nttcntloil tlle 
lieadquasters; wlvicli wns a scene of gaiety nnd bonsting, for 
Arciz:iya, nevcr dreaming of rnisf~~tiine, gave ,ve freee scope to 
b social vivacity. Noving by the roa& of ñfanzanares aud 
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Damiel, s i t Ir  scarcely any commissariat pmpamtion and 
without m i l i t q  equipment saye armg the men young, 
robust, fui1 of Bfe and confidencg and nitliout impediments 
of wny kind mude nearly thirty milw each day; thep moved 
ho\vever in a straggling maniier, quartering and feedmg aa 
they codd in ehe v i l lnp  on their route; and d t h  so little 
oder, that tlie psantry  of La Manche univermlly nbnndaned 
tlieir dwdlinp end c h e d  off tlieir eEcds. 
At first thr? Frcncli werc increduloiw of this Btmnge hmrr. 
sion, yet soon liemrne B ~ C  t11d Borne great rnovement w ~ s  
in agitation, thougli anwrhin from wliat point and for whnt 
~peeific object. doudm hd returned to France, Xoult warr 
inajor-general of the Frencli amies, m d  under his ~idvlce the 
khg, wlio waai inclined to abandon Madrid, prcpared to  me& 
tlie coming blow. But tlie army ~1-m priiicipdly posted 
towards Talmera, for the fnlse reports hnd in some 
S. 
J,I mFasare deceived the French as to the a p p m h  
npcrotion* of the Englisli, and it wm impossible at once to 3183. 
conmive t.lie fui1 insnnity of thc juiih. Tlie 
second oorps, now commmílod by I-IeudeIet, occupid Oropesa 
antl Ar~obi~po on the fitrlr, hnving en adwneed gonrrl rat bIsada, ' 
wliile scouting partiw wafclied Naval Moral and tlia course d 
the Tietar. Mortier's mrps rwiti concentrated at;  alav vera; 
half a division of the fourth corps garrisond l fd r id  in the 
absence of Dessolles' troops; Ghe ot1iw lzalf, d c r  Liger 
Eelair, waa behind tlie Tajuna, guardirig the m k m  apyiroaclres 
to the capital. The remainiíig divkions, commrtnded by &hs- 
tiani, wcre, tbe one nt Toldo, thc nther ivitli MiIhand's clsvalrg 
nt Ocnfin. Victor'~ force, twenty-one tl~onatmd strong, wrts at 
Mora and yebenes, a day's mardi in dvanco ef Toledo ; but 
bis cavalry under Latour Mwuhug occupied Conmep and 
TadriIejos on the road to the Sima Morena, The wh01e 
army including tlie fiencli and Spanish guards, wrts abom 
eighty thouamd Eghting men, witliout reckoning Ikseolles' 
division, which wns on tho other aide of'the (Tuadnrama 
rnountina 
IU tlle ni$+, of khe Gtli, infomation reached the king, that 
six thotisand Spauisb homemen, supported by h o  thousand 
foot, hact come d o m  upon Consuegra from tlie side of Herencia, 


wliilc R secontX colurna, pncsing tlie Puerto de Piclie, liad fallen 
upon tlie outposta at Mndrilcjos. Al1 tlie pri~oners raid the Spa- 
nisli arniy was al-iove fifty thnusantl, and Victor immdiatdy 
concentmted tlie first corps at Pebenes, lreeping his mva1ry 
at Mora : Iie thus barred the  roads lending upon Toledo. On 
kllc Pilli ttlicrc mwc no Bpnninrds in I i i ~  froiit, yct tlie cxploring 
offioers seut t o ~ ~ a r d s  Omia were cliased baclr by covnly; lience 
h u l t  judged nrliat was indeed tlic truth, thxt Areizap, con- 
t i n u i q  his reclcless mar&, ha¿i pudied by Tembleque tomaras 
Aritnjuez, leaving the first corps oa his lcñt flanlr. Tlio 
detnclied division of tlie fourth corps wnu immetIintcly movett 
from Tolerlo liy Arnnjncii to Ocniía, rnalring up eiglit tliousnnd 
infantry and fifteen huiidred cavalry on tlmt point the 9th, 
and T7ictor on tlie sarne d~ fcil bmk to Ajofiin. 
0 1 1  the IOtli, Gazan's division of t l i e  fifth corps moved from 
Td~vem to Tolcrlo, and Victor mlio hnrl rcnclictl ihe lrtttcr 
town. moved up tlie riglit linnk of  tlie T n p ~  to Arnnjuez to* 
snpport Webtistiani, who, lioIdirg fnsG at Ocaña, liad seiit sis 
fiquadrona t o  feel for tlie enerny towarris Guardia. Tlie 
Zjl)ani&rds, continuing their movement, met those squdions 
snd pursucd tlicm toivnrds Ocnfia. 
COXiüAT OF DOS BARnTOS. 
Areixngn, ignomnt of wlmt ivris pnssing rironnd him, and 
w i n g  oiilg Selrrtqtinni's cnvnlry on tl ic titble-lnnd bet~vccn the 
town of Dos Barrios and udm, co~cludetI it \vas uiisuliliortetl, 
and let the Xpanish horse charge; t h e  Freiicli went behind 
tlieir infantry, wliich was closti at liand, nnd opened s brislc 
fire on tlie arlvancingsqundron~ m110 wcrc throwu into confusion? 
nnd being chargotl in tliat ak~rrtc Iiy tlic ~vtiolo mnss of tlie 
Frencli cavalry, ivere beateii mitli tlie losñ of t ~ v o  Iiiindrd pri- 
zsoncr~ and tmo pieces of cannon. Areixqak m d n  body tlicn 
carne upr Sehstiani feli hack, and next uiorning took position 
on aome bciglits covering braujucz. TIie Spniiiards entercd 
Dos Rsrrios, and there their impet.iious movement m e 1 1  ; t,l~licy 
hwl come d o m  f m  tlie Norene like a ~tceoin of Iiiva, niitl 
bursi into Ln lfnnclin, witli o, rnpidity thut scarcely gwe time 
for rumour to precede thein; yet t l i i  swiftnesa of execution 
m bat nn outbrenlz of fdly. Vithout any knowleilge of t h ~  
French numbera or position, nnd without a plan of action, Arei- 
zaga hnd rnshcd likc a rnrtniac into the midd of Iiis f q  and 
tlien sucldenly stood still, trembling and bewildereil. 
From the 10th t o  the 13th he halted lat Dos Barrios, and 
m o t e  to Ls go~emment  of Sebastiani's stuliborn 
Amonal& re48tnnce, m d  of tlie doubb whieh now for tha f l. first time assnilcd his omn rnind. It was then the 
junta engerly demanded the nssistance of the British army, 
md commanded Albuquerql~e and del Parqne to unite a t  
Talavere; tlie fomer commenced his movement inimeiliately, 
nntl tlie junta did not I i eJh te  to toqsitre tlieir geilernls rtnd tlie 
pulilic t11at simi krthup IYBE &o corning on. d n e i g ~  thua 
encoumgecl, made on tlie 14th a Rnnk march Iiy Iiis rIglit 
t o  Santa Cruz la Zarza, intending to cross the Tagus at 
Villa Maurique, turn the French left, and penetrate to the 
capital by t h ~  eastern side; but during ]lis dday at Dos 
Barrios the French f o w  had been concentrated Trom evey 
quarter. 
To tlie riouth of  Ocnña tbe gmund is opcn nnd unduIating; 
hit on tlie north the rnmificittiona of thc Gocnca aountaina, 
lending lI0lYn tlie left liniilc of the TWs, prcscnted nt %nta 
Cruz i-idges whicli, ritrong and rough towardsdranjuez, nirorded 
gmd positions for Sebadani to cover t h t  place. Goult mas 
awake to lii advemary's projecb. Ete did not believe iodeed 
Iie would dne such a movement unIess ced in  of snppod from 
the British amy, and therefore kept &e different c o y  quiet 
on tlie l l th ,  awaitiag Heudelet's report from Oropesa; and 
in the night it arrived, atating, ihat t m o u m  of a combined 
Sp~nish md Englisli army being on f he mnrch were rife, yet 
tlie scouts could not discover tlint tlie allied fo~ce was netunlly 
within severnl rnnrches. Soalt tlien piit nll Iiis mnsseEi in ncti- 
vity, judging, if the nimonrs shaiild be true, tliat KB centrd 
poaition would enable him t o  defeat Arehaga and return by 
Tdedo in time t o  meet the allies in the valley of thc Tagiis. 
Victor hnstend Iiis rnarch to Armjuez, Mortiex concentrnted 
at Toledo, Heudelet repInced Nortier at Talavera, in readiness 
to clase townrdg tlie army. Fintilly, information being receivcrl 
of del Pque5's retmt from Falamanca tu Rejilr, ond of the 

liic brjdges, called in bis dehchrnents, and clrew np for WtIe 
on tl;e lieiglits of Santa Cruz de la, Zar= 
Hitlierto his continua1 movements rrnd unsettled plan8 ren- 
dered it difficult ta fix ra field of brtttle, but now the mardi to 
X t ,  Cnrn lnid his line of apemtions bnre, and tlie French rnmsea 
were close togetlier; Yictor could press on tlie fmnt with thc 
fiat coiys, m9 tlie kiiig, cnlling the foirrth corps from hyonn, 
couId tlirow twenty-five or tliirty thousand men on the rmr 
by the r o d  of Arnnjusz and Ocaña. No dantnper couId mise 
from tliia doubIe line of operations, because a single marcli 
moulcl bring both the king wnd Victar upon Areiaagn; and if 
tlie latter sheuld assail either, ench mould be strong enougli to 
~ustain the shock. Hence, when Xoult kneiv the Spanimds 
werc encnmpd at Santi Cruz, he c n u d  Morticr, thcn in 
rnarch for Madrid, t o  move d~tring the niglit of the I?th upon 
Arnnjuex, and Sebdiani received a like order. Tlw king 
arrived at h j u e z  on tlie evening of tlie 18 th, with tlie myal 
Frencli guarrlrc, two Spanisli battalions of the line, uní1 s liripJe 
of Dessolle's dividon, in al1 ten thonsand men; and the same 
day Victor ccinmntrated the first corps at Pillarejo de Salrangs, 
intending to cross tlie T s s s  ah Pilla blaurique rand attack the 
Spaniali position on the 19th 
A goatoon imin, previously prepared at Madrid, enabled tlie 
French to repair the Sroken bridges near Aranjuez in two 
hnum ; nnd abont one o'dock on tlic 18tb, n rlivision of cnvalry, 
two ulivisions of infiantry o€ the fourtli corps, nnd tlle achnced 
guwd o€ the frftli corps, pwserl the T n p ,  prtly at tlis bridge 
of La Xeynn, partly at a Torrl. llilliautl with the leading 
squadrona immediate1y pumned a smalI body of Spanish howe- 
men, and was thus lad to the tablebnd between Antiguela and 
Ocaña, where lie suddenly carne upon a front of fifteen hundred 
cavdry suppoxted by three thousttnd more in reseme. Raving 
only tweIve bundred dwigoon~ be waei going to ~etire, but at 
that rnornent general Pnria amived with another brigade, and 
mnri immediately followod by the liglit mmlry of tlie fiRh 
corps; ths wliole furni~hing a reinforcement of rsliant two 
tliou~and men. With tliesa troops a m e  Seb~tiani, wFio took 
tlie command at tlie instad when tlio Spaninrds, seeing the 
inferioriiy of the Frencli, wcre advancing to the chilrge. The 
Spaniards carne on at a t.rot, and Sebastirani directed Paria to 
fa11 with a regiinent of light cavnlry and tlic Polish lancem 
npon tl~eir riglit flank; this chnrge exccuted with grent vigorir, 
especially by tFie Peles, mmed considerable confusion, mliich 
tlle Spanish general endeavoured to remedy by closing t o  the 
ass~iled flank. Etit to  effect this he formed his left centre in 
one w t  column, whereupon Sebastiani, seixing tlie criticnl 
moment, cltarged Iieatllong into tlie midst of it witli lil~ merves; 
the enermow mass pelding to the shock gave way In disoder, 
many were slain, several hundmd mounded, and eighty troopeis 
and five hunclrerl ltoraea mere bken : ttie Frendi Ioss bore no 
proportirio, but general Paria wna ki l ld  and several superior 
d i c m  werc hurt. 
Tliis unexpected e n m t e r  led Soult to believe Amz~ga 
was enden~ouring to rccover his line of opemtions, and tlie 
examination of the prisonera confirmed this opiniun, In tLe 
night Tictor sent mord that only a rear-guard mtia to  be seen 
at Santa Cnia do le Xarzn, and this also wns reported by tlre 
scwts; it was therefore sum tliat ther Spmiad~ were in march, 
and 8 battIe would be fought next dny. Areizaga had in fact: 
retraced his stepa by a fl ank movement through TilIa Rubia 
Noblejna, with the intention of falling npon the kin@ foroes 
as tliey opened out from Aranjuez; lie rrrrived tlie 19th at 
OCRE~, and judging from the mvalry action tlie French could 
nttack first, drew up Iiis whole m y  on the same plain in two 
lines n quarter of a milo nsundcr. 
Ocnñs is covered on tlie north by a &no commencing 
half a milo enstmartl of tke town, and continually deepening, 
bends on O cnrve to the west, until it connects Itself with 
certnin nigpd pl l i ca  mhosc mtcra nin off tu tlie Ttlpa 
Beliind tlie deeliest parh of tliis ravine the S~imisli left was 
posted across tLe main road from Arnnjues to Dos Dnrrioa. 
Une flank restea on the pllies, tlie other on Omñn; t h ~  
~ c n t r c  w n ~  in fiont of tlie town, whicli m occiipicrl ns a post 
of reseme ; the riglit wing stretched in the direction o€ 
Nolilrjas slong the edge of a gentle ridge, having tlie shallow 
p r t  of the ravine in sear. The cavnlry wtis on the fl ank and 
l ~ h i n d  the right Gng. In  renr of tIie m y  tfiere wns nn 
immcnse plnin, wliicli closed in towardB Noblejas and W ~ B  
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there fringed with rich olive wod% which were occupied by 
infantry ta protect the passage of the Spanish baga66 then 
filing by the road from Zarza. 
Joseph pssed tlie night of the 18th in re-mpnizing his 
forces. The cavaly, consiating of nine regimenta, TM given 
t o  Sebastinni Four divisions of jnfantry, witb the cxception 
o€ one regiment Ieft at Arnnjiien t o  prard tlie bid- ve , uFete 
plsced under Mortier, wlio \va4 nlso empowerorl if necessary 
t o  direct tlia movements of the cav3lry. Tiie artillery wag 
cornmanded by EenarmonL Tlie roya1 p d s  remai.ined~4th 
the king; Soult directed the whoIe o£ the movements, and 
before daybrealc on t.lie 20th, al1 the a m y  marched with the 
intention of falling upon the Spaniards wherever they were 
found. At Ant,igiiela Joseph turned to bia left, gaind t t ie 
table-lana of Ocaña somewhat beyond the centre of the 
Spanish poaition, and discovered Areisaga's army in order of 
biittle; tlie French cavalry inatantly formed t o  the front to 
cover the advrrnec nf the infantrv, which drcm up in succes- 
aive S i  as the divlsiom arrived on tlie plain, Z'he Spanish 
out-posts fcll back, md wcro folIowed by thc French slcir- 
mishers, wlio s p r d  nlong ths front nnd opanetl n sharp fire. 
There wera about fortp-five thoumnd Bpanish infantrg, mven 
thous~nd cava1 y, and sixty piece~i of artillerg in lhe; the 
fiench hiad only twontg-four thousand infantry, five thousand 
#abres and lances> and fifty p s ,  including the h t t e y  of 
the rogal pard.  Ardeaga's position was niiserahly defeo- 
tive. The whole of Lis left ming, dfteen tliousand strong, wm 
p d y z e d  by the ravine; it conld neither atta& nor be 
attacked; the centre rpas scamely bettes situnted; and the 
cstremity of his right wing wna nncovered, savc by the horse- 
mcn, who mcre dispiriterl by the &ion of tlic preceding 
meiiing. Tliese circumshrtces dictated tEic order of attaclr. 
At ten o'dock, Sebastia,~ii's cc-a l~ ,  phing gmnnd to the 
left, ti~rned the Spanish right.. Leval, with two divisions of 
iiifuntry in colirmns of regiments, ench having a bnttalian 
iliulifoyed in front, follv~vcd thc mvalry nnd dmve Znym from 
the olivewoods. G i d  follenred Levd in second line, and 
Dessolles menaced tlie centre with one portion of his troopq 
wliiEe another lined tlie edge of the ravine ta  support the 
slrirmishers anrl ane tIie Spmish left wing. Thc kiag re- 
rnnined in reserve with his parch. Thus tEio French order 
of battle presonkd two masses in attaclt, the principal one 
ñanIred by t l ~ e  cadry was to turn tlie Spanisli rjght, the 
second to keep the centre in check; rind each ncre supported 
by reRerveR. Tlie tliupositions ivere com~ileted u t  eleven 
akclock, rat which hour Bcnnrmont united tliirty piecea of 
artilIcry anil opened a shattering fire on Areizqa's centre. 
Six ~ I L S  cletachd to the French right, plnyed at tlie mme 
time m o s s  tlie mvine ngninst tlio Spanigh lcft, and ~ i x  o thm 
swept down the Jeep hullow to clear it of  the light tmops. 
Tke Spaniartla, though vndisciplined and badly commancled, 
discovercd no fenr; Olieir wiw were lourl nntl strong thcir 
nkirmisliing fire lirisk, nnd from the centre of their liue s k -  
teen p s  opened with a muderous effect upon LevaI's and 
Girarca coIumna as tlie latter pressd on tomlads the right. 
To rnitigatc tlic fim of this bnttery, a Frcneh bettnlion, niali- 
ing out at fuU ved, seixed a smnll emlnence close to the 
Epmish guns, and a couuter battery was Emmediately pIanted 
tliere. Then the Sptaniards grave hck,  their alurmisher~~ wero 
mept out of the ravinc by a Ranking firc oE gsripo, nnd 
Senmont  h d i a t e I y  drzwing tlie artillery from the French 
right, took O&tn as his pivot, and prolonging his fire t o  the 
left rnked Areizagn's right wing in ita whole length. 
During tllis cnnnonadc, h a 1  connknntty prcssiiig farwnirl, 
forced the Spaniards t o  chango t h i r  front by witiidrawing 
their rigLt m h g  behiud the sliallow part; of tlie ravine. By 
this climge, the whole rirmy, stiIl forming two Iines a qnarter 
af a milc munder, m pressecl into n convrñ form having the 
town of Ocaña in the centre, and Senmmont's artillery tore 
their ranka mlth a greater destruction than before. Never- 
tlielesq enoouraged by obseming the comparatively feeble 
b ~ l y  of infsnkry approncliing tliem, they siiildenl y rctook 
tlie ofknsive, tlieir au,penting fira dismouuted two Frencl~ 
p n s ,  Afortier mns ivounded sliglitly, Leval severel!, m<l tlie 
lcadii~g French dlvisions wavered and gave back. The 
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moment was critical, but Mortier Iike a great comrnandcr 
brouglit ap Girard1s division through the intervals of the firsC 
line nnd displayed a front of fresh troops, keeping one 
regiment in s q m  on the left flanIr ; for he expected tliat 
Arelzaga's poweiful ca~dry,  which still rernained in the plain, 
would chnrgo for the victory. Girard'a firc soon threw tlie 
Spuiish first linc into diaader, md meanwhile Deaolles, ieho 
had gnind groirnd by nn obliqne movcment, aeeing the 
enemy's rigl~t hus shalccn, seixd OcaTa itself and jssued fortli 
an the other side. The li+t citvaIry of tlie king's guard, 
f~llorveti by the infmtry, liikewise poured thmugh the tom, 
and on the extreme Prench left, Eebiastiani with a rapid charge 
cut off six thousand infmtry and forced them to surrender. 
Tlie Xpaniah cavalry, which had only mffered a Iittle from tlie 
cannonde and had never made an effort to hrn the tide of 
bnttleJ now drew of entirely, and the second line of infaatry 
also gave p n d  when tlie Tront fell back npon it in oonfu- 
sion : Areizaga, cntircly eonfonnded, then odered the le& 
wing wliich liad scamly fired a shot t o  rdmat and quittd 
thc ficld himself. 
For IiaIf an hour after this tha supe~ior ofñcem wlio r+ 
mninerl end~avovred to keep the troop~ togetlier in tlie ~ilnin, 
striving tu reach the  main road leadiig to Dos Barrios; but 
Girara and Dessoilea' irnitea after pmsing Ocaña and pressed 
on with rapidity, whi1e the Polish Iancerri and a regiment of 
chasseum, outflankIng the Spanish right, contlnnaIly inerea~d 
the confusion : finally, Xebastiani, having secnred liis prisoners, 
m e  up agri4n l i i e  a whirIwiiid and &a@ full in the front 
with five regiments of avalrg. Then the whole masa broke 
and fied, ericli mlin for himself, m o s s  the plain ; but on the 
right oT the routcd mnltitudo, a decp rwine, leading from 
Tepes to Dos Barrios in fin olilique dirrction, continnally con- 
tracted the space, and thc purcuing cavaly, rmiviug first nt 
Bnrrioh l~ieaded nearly ten thousnnd FreiPildered men nnd f o r d  
them t o  siirrender. The rernajnder turned their faces to al1 
quarters, and such was the ronte that &e French were also 
obiiged to disperse to take p r i s o n e ~ ~  but t o  their credit in- 
f l i d  no rigorous execution : huiunrlneds a f t e ~  IieXng deprived 
of their ams, were desired in raillery to rcturn to theirhoms 
rind abantlon mar as a trndc they mcrc unfit for. This fntal 
linttle commcnced at  eleven dclock; beforo two, thirty picces 
of srtillcry, í~ liundred and twenty cnrrimges, trventy-five stand 
of colourc, three generalg six linndred inferior oficers, anrl 
eighteen thousnnd privntes mere taken, and the pursuit mas 
sti!l liof. &ven or eiglit thoumnd of  t l i e  Spaniards mnde for 
tlic moitiitnin of Tmncon, otliers fullowed thc! vnrioua ronten 
111rougli La 3Iniiclia to the Giem Morena, and many saved 
ttcmselves in 'Craleiicia and Murcia 
Diiriirg thc figlit, V!ctcir, mho hnd pnssed the Tnpa by a 
forrf, re-cstdilislied tlio lirjdne of Villn 3Iaurique licfore ten 
dclock iii tlie rnorni~ig, znd finding Xanta Cruz de la Zarza 
ahnndoced, following Areizap'a traces. dt \7illatohas his 
l i ~ l i t  cm~alry capturcd twe1ve hundrexl cnrringcs, nncl n little 
f:irtlier an took u tliousrind of the fugitives imking for 
Tarancon. Geing tlrus apprised of tlia result of the bat'tle lia 
l ia l t~ l  at Tillat~lifi~, blit sent his ctivalry Tormrtl te La 
Gunrdifi, wliere tliey joined Sebnstiani's horsernen, and to- 
getlier continued tlie pmuit  to Li110, capturing fjve hundred 
men auri tliree liundred horsea. Thliis finirslied tlic operatiom 
of the day. Ody cighteen hundrcd cannon-shot liad bccn 
fird, gnd an nrmy of morc than fifty thousaiid men Lnd bDen 
ru~nerl. Tbe Frmch host seventeen hundred men 
killerl nnd mounded, tlie Xpaniards five thousand; ~oi r rnn~  of 
anil lit ,fotire niglitfiill, nll tlie li:iggr~~c nntl niil it:iry ~ ~ S f s f R t i o n &  
urri:r:es, threo thousand auimals, Eorty five pieees 
of artillery, tiiirty t1iousand mudcds, and twenty-six thousand - 
captives were in tlie handa of th conqnerors! 
Arciztqa rc~clietl Tcrnbleqiic duriiig tFic niglit, ~ n r l  La 
Ciirrilirita tlie tliirtl doy nfter. On tlie nind, Iic met general 
&nxz witli a thoumnd clragoons, mlio liad !icen dchclietl to tilo 
rear before tlie httle commcnced; this body he dirccted on 
3Tadrilcjos t o  cover the retrcnt of tlic fugitives; but so far Iiaa 
tlic pniric spred, ttint ivlicn Sehstitini ~yi~iroached tltrtt pogt 
on tIie 30tli, Benaz$ men Red rritliout scciiig nu eriemy, as 
fearfully as any d i o  camefrnm the figlit: everi BO 
Inte as the IBtli, only four hndred  cavnlq be- z:'f:Eep 
longing to  nll rcgimciits corild bc nsscmblcci at IWI, ~ o y . a c .  
3Triii~aii:iwr~ antl still fcwer at; TAL C;~rrulirin. ' 9b$, ::>S 
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JOSFPII litilt~d at Dos Barrios, but spread his armp over 
La Manclia t o  the fort of thc Morcnq and then setunied with 
his pinrrls nntl lleasollcs' fimt bigñdc t e  Mndrid. Thrcc dnys 
liad suficetl to dissipate tho storm on the side of LB JIanclis; 
but del Parque atill inenaced tlie sixth mrps io Castillo, and 
tlie reports from Talavera again spoke of Mbuquerque and 
tlie English being in motion. The second brigade of Dessolles' 
diGIon liad returnd from OId Castille on the 19th, and 
Joseph'a unccrtainty as to thc Eritish rnovcmcntg, eompellcd 
Iiim to  kcep al1 Iiis troops, in hnnd ; nevcrtheleaq fcming if dcl 
Porque gnin~l any arlvantage uver tlie ~ixth corp  an insur- 
rection would talre place in Leon, he sent Gazan's division of 
tlie frfth c o r p  from Toledo, through the Puerte Pico, t o  Mar- 
clitlild's assistance; Keilerman being directed to *e the com- 
mand of the whole. 
During tlicse events, sir brthiir, now loirl Wcllington, 
wmnined quiet nIiont Badajos, for tliere was na m d s  in ivhích 
he could lielp tho Spmhrda mitli a pmspeck of success, or 
snfety fnr l i i  own amy. Albuqnerque, following Iiis odws. 
liad seized the bridge of Arzobispo, in expectation of being 
joincd by the duke del Parque; blit the Ixtter d o  had thirty 
tliousnnrl mcn, tliouglit, mhcn Dcssollsd division wns rccalEcd 
to JQndrifl, tlint lie coiild ci-t~sh tlic sixth corps, nnd hnd thcrc- 
fore d ~ a n c e d  bom Bejar tomarcls A l h  de Torrnea tlie l'ith, 
t5r.o h y s  I>eforc tlle bxt,t!e of Ocuíía. Elence when Aibuquerqne 
espectd him on tlie T a v  lie vras engaged in serions opera- 
tions bcyond tlie Tomes, md hnving remlied Alba the alst, 
ñcat a clivision to tiilcc passession of hlomiincn, which RTarchnnd 
l i d  aznin nbandonerl : the 22ndlie marcliecl towar& Tdldalid, 
ap.3 hi5 ndvznced bvuard and m d r y  e n t e d  Fresno and 
Cnrpio. 
K e l l e m ~ n ,  Irnving coIlected arl the troogs o€ his go~crnnient,, 
waa joined by Narchanci, ~ncl moving by 3fedina de1 Campo, 
fe11 with n body of horse iipon tlie Gpaniards at Fresno on flie 
2 3 ~ 1 .  Their cnvrilry fiwI n t  once, y& tlieir infetntry stxntlig 
firm repulserl. tlte nssailants, wnd 81e 24th (le1 Parque wtrried 
his w1101e anny to Prcsno. Bis intent mns to 
give bnttle, but on the 26th fresh and Imperative to loni Livcr- 
orders to join A'lbnqnerque rendid liim, and he "O'' BISS. 
cornmenced a retronrade rnovement ; Kellerman, witiiont 
miting for the amval of Gazan's division, instnntly pursuerl, 
nnd Lis ~ l ~ a n c e d  pnrd  of cavnlry ovcrtook ond cliargcd the 
Spniiirih nrmy, nt the moment tvlien n pnrt of hhcir infmtry 
and aU tlicir Iiorse I i d  pessed t l i~ bridge of Allie (le T o n n e ~  
Tliis attack mas repu1.d and tlie Frencli fe11 back npon their 
supporta; h t  the duke, iiceing nn nction mas inevitable, re- 
mlled tlie rernainder of liia troops, rPitl1 t11e exceptiorr of one 
division, over to the right baiik. 
Smrcely wns del Parqrre'~ line rorrned, whcn Rellerninn cunia 
up nitli two divisions of drngoons and some nrtillery. He 
sent one cliviaion to  oiitflnnk tlie right, whiIr! witll the other Iie 
cllnrged fisrwly iipon tlie front; tllc Xpnnidi liarsemen, ilying 
witliout a blom, rode strriight over tlie bridge, and tlie infi~ntry 
nf the riglit were broken and saliwd; those on tIic left stood 
fiist nnd rcpiilscd tlic encm-y. Tlie clulre rnllying Iiis cavnlry 
on tlie otlicr side of tlie river, hought tlieta bnck to the figl~t, 
hut ttie Frencli mcre nlso reinforced, and once more the S p i s h  
110-e fled witl~out n blow. Uy tliis time it mas dnrk, nnd the 
infnntry of tl~s left ming itnrlcr ?iicndixnlieI nnd Cnrrer% being 
nnliroken, u i d e  good tlieir retreat across the river; yet not; 
wittoilt difficalty and unrfer the fire of some Frencli lnfantrg 
which nrrivctI just in tlie duqlr. f i r i n p  the night dcl Parque 
r&rent;etl ilpnn Tamames unnidestecl, but at day-lircok n 
Frenclt patrole carne up with liis rear, mlimeapon tlie mliole 
anny thrciwing nmap their arms fled otitright; KelIeman 
entererl S~lnmancn and did not pursuc, yet the diepersion wati 
complete, Dcl Pnrgzie bomcvcr rnlliwl liis nrmy in tlie mouti- 
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hins behind Tamames, and in ten or twelve dap again oollected 
tmenty thmannd men, but witbiout artillery ; fem of  them hd 
prcsmed thcir arns; nnd mch wns thcir distresci fur provi- 
~iiow, that two monbhs aftcmrtls when thc Britlah nrrivcrl on 
tlie nortlicrn fronticr, the pcnmntry still spolcc witli Fiorror of 
tba sfleriiip of those fnmislietl soldiers: irirany at4unlly died 
of want arirl every village wm fiIled witli d~k. Yet tlie rnnss 
rtcither disiperaerl nor rnurmured ! Xpaniards, i,Iioagb h a t y  
iii revenge and feeble in bnttle, Eire patieni to khe ht degea in 
suffering. 
This result of del Parque" ooperations amply justzed lord 
WcEn&onYs advics to  the Portuguese regency ; in iiie manner 
tlie bnttIe of Ocaña, and the little effect produced by Albu- 
queque's advailce to Arzobispo, justified that which he gaye 
to tlie wntral junta. It mlght therefore be imagined the 
littter would hnve ieceived his iifter-connscls mith dcference ; 
WeU in&n 
bnt tlie course of th t  bodp was nwer d'ected by 
to iorci uver- cithcr rcason or cxpcrience. Just beforc thc ront 
pmlb D m  71 of Alba be pmposcd that ten thousand men, to 
1809, XSS. 
lie talccn from del Parque, oliould ~eimfmce A h.- 
pmp~ tu m Z k e  E l ~ e  btta to wmiahiw t7tc s t r q  p o d h  oJ 
11f~sa &fiw md m w  E ~ P ~ W T C C  Sor t/cs winlw. Del 
Parque's force, thus reduced one-tlULCE, could, he said, be more 
essily fed, aiid might keep aloof from the enemy wtil the 
Eritish a m y  sliould amive on the nortliern frontier of Portugal; 
n movbment long projected, and, a* he informed them, only 
&laycd tto proteet Estremadura until the duke d Albiiquer- 
que liad receivd tlie reinforcement The reply of the junta 
\\-as an orcler, directing Albnqueque immediafely to quit the 
Iinc o£ tlie Tzgiis, anrl take post at Uerena beliind tlie G w  
diana. Estrcrndiirn wns thris nhnniloncd t o  thc enemy, and 
Albi~q~crqiic plmcd in a hrl position; iiis front being opcn to 
an ~tt: icl~ frum Almnraq lii rig1it flank and mar t o  onu From 
h Xaucta. 
This fooIish contemptuoas proceetling was followelt by det 
Parque's defent, whicIi endangered Ciii&d Rodrigo, and Wel- 
lingtou at once commenced liia march for t l~e  north. Ho 
,<iiew tivcnty thoiismd Epanish infantrgr and six tliousmtl 
n~uunterI ciiviJry mcrc i~griiri. collectecI in La Carolinn; niid tlint 
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eight tliousand men wLo l id  escnpecl from Ocaña, w the side 
of Tarancon, were at Cuenca unrler Echevarrk. Tlie numbers 
reassemblcd in the Morena were thercforc, the innctinty oF 
tlie Frcndi nfter t l~e  hittle of Ocaira considered, suficient tu  
defenrl the pnssefi and cever SevilIe for tlie moment ; and tliere 
ii-as no reman why tlie Uritisli a m y  should remitin in unlienltliy 
positions t o  aicl people wlio mould not aid themselvea. Albu- 
rlnerque's retrogradc movement lis jurigcd a dcvieo of thc 
junta to force Iim to defcnd Estremdura, but it bnly hastened 
his departure It did not compoit mith his plans to engap 
in serious operatiom oii thnt side, yct to have retired wlien 
tlint proviuce )vas actually nttaclred, woulrl Lave bcen clisreput- 
&le; wl~ereiore, ~ei+ting this niilia~ipily fnvouid~lc momeiit to 
quit nndtljos, lie crwsed tlie T a p a  and m r c h d  into tlie 
trnlIey of tlie XonJego, leaving Hill ivith a mixer1 foree of te11 
tliousnnd men nt Alirantes. lndeed tlie Qutbdinna pcstilc~ct: 
liad been so fatal, tlirtt many officers tliouglit lie bad atopped 
too long, but it wus liis lwt hold on ISpain, aiid tlie safety of 
Olio soutlisrn provinccs wns involverf in Iiis procedings. 
Xt W&S not the hatile of Thvem,  it was tlie position mnin- 
tained by him on tlie frontier of E s t r c m n d q  wbich, in the 
latter pnrt o£ 1809, ssrrvcri Anclalusim from subjcction. Tliis 
is  eaqy of denion~trntion. Joscpli liaving rejccted Soult'n 
projects a@nst Tortupl md Ciiidad Rodrigo, d a r ~ l  not 
invade h d a h s i ~  by Est~einndurn Mth tlie English army on 
liis rigl~t flnnk; ncitbcr coiild he bope to invndc it hy thc wny 
of Ln Manclia, witkuut drawjng WelIington into tlre conteut; 
tut Andalusix m at this period tlic IasG place whcre tlie 
intrusive king desired to mset e Eritisli army. He liad rnnny 
pndisnns in tlmt provincc, wlio wouIrl nceessarily Le orernwcrl 
if tlie c o m e  of the war ctbniecl TVcllington b q o n d  tlie Miirenu; 
nor cotild the junta in t h t  case have refused Cndiz ns a place 
of arms te their ally; and tlien the  hola force of Anddusia a d  
hiurciri, woiild hxvc ra!licd round the English nrmy bchind tlic 
liorcna. Arcixnp liar! sixty thoiisanrl riicn, Albuqucrquc tcn 
tliousand, nnd it is thereforc no exaggerntion to assumt? tliat 
a huiidred tliousand coulrl have been organized for defeace: 
rnoreover al1 the Portug~iese troops in the muth of Portugni, 
would luirc bcen ayailalile to  nitl in thc protcction o£ Edre- 
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madura. From Carolina t o  Mdrid is only tcn marchcq and, 
postetl at tha former, tlie allietl army eodd llave protected 
Lislion M me11 as Seville, becauae a fomrd  movement would 
force the Frmch to concentrate round the Spani~h cnpitai 
Andalusia wouId thus have become the principal object of the 
invaileis; but the aIlied mmies, holding the passcs of the 
Morena, having tlieir left flank protcctcd by Estremadm nnd 
Portugal, rind their right by Murcia ~ n d  Valencia; havjng 
ric)~ provinccs and l q c  citim bchinrl thcm, a frco communica 
tion with tlse sea, anrl~bux1hce of porta, couId have fought a 
fair fidd for B p a h  
It waa a perceptjon of thme admtages thst caused air 
J o h  Moore to regret the rninisters h d  not chosen the 
southern i n a t d  of the northern line for Es operations. Lord 
IVelIealgr alao, impressed witb the imprtance of hnhlusih 
u g d  hig brother t o  rulopt some plan of tbiri nnture; nn(1 the 
lntter, scnsiMe of its niimntngm, wouId h n ~  done m but for 
tl ie impossibility of dealing with ttlio c~ntral junta. XiIitary 
posaespion cif Csdk and &e uncontrolIed commancl of a 
Spanisli force mere tbe only conditions upon which he would 
u n d e d e ;  the defence of Andalusia; conditions tbey mould 
iiot accede to, and without thern he mald not be secured 
against tbe caprica of men whose p r d i n g s  were ane con- 
tinued stniggle winat reason. This mey seem inmnsistent 
with n former wsertion, tliot Portugal wm tlie true base of 
aperations for the Engli~h, but politicol anil rnornl conrritIere 
tiuna weiglied most iri tht arbrtlment. Tt ~vm for tlio pro- 
tection of Andalada and Estromadura dnring a dangerons 
crisis oE sffairs, that Wellington persisted at such an enoimous 
sacrifice of men to holcl his poaition on t.he Guiidiana; yet it 
~vns reiuctantly, antl more in deferente to his brother's wisbes 
tlizin liis o m  juclgment tlint he remained after Arekagsr"a 
ariny wag nssembhrl. Hnvingproved tlie junta by expericiice, 
h a  wns more cIear-sigEitsd as to tileir perversetiess t?im lord 
Welleslq. TThe lattcr being in chily intcrcourse with the 
members, liistening to  thek ready eloquence in excuse for p s t  
errora, rrnd more ready promisa of future exertion, dung 
longcr t o  t.he notion, tbat Spain couId be put in tbc nqht 
patli; and thnt Englaad, in conjunction with the nntions o£ 
the Peninsula rnight mr largely, instctad of rcstricting hemelf 
to tlie oomparatively oliscure defence of Lisbon. I l o  waa 
finally mdeceived, md tlie mar& from lSadajos for ever 
relmed the Britid~ generd from a vemtious depndence on 
tho Spanish govcnmcnt. 
Meanwhile the French, in doubt of liis intentiom, appeared 
torpid. KelIemn remained at Sitlamuuca ta watch the 
mavements of del Parque, Gaxm returned to Madrid Nil- 
luiiid waa dchched with n divi~ion of tiie fourtli corps and 
some cavalry againd Eclievxmia, but on liis arrivai at Cuenm, 
found tlie latter had retreated by Toboado to Hellin in &furcia : 
he then coiicerted opcrationa mith Suchet, anJ, I h v e  
before relate4 misted to reduce tlie to1ma of Albaracin nnrl 
Teniel. Other movements there were none, but, ns the 
Spani~h regiments of Joseph's gumd Iiad fmglit Gcely apinst 
tlieir countrgmen, and maug of the grisoners tnken nt Ocañm 
bar1 offered to join tho invnders' colours, the Iiing conceiiwrl 
hopes of raising a national n q .  Frencli writera assert that 
the captfves at Ocaña made a marked distinction Iietween 
Napoleon and Joseph; they merc milling tu xcwe tlic Frcnch 
emperor, nof tlie intrusive monntcli of S p i a  Eprinitilt 
authom aasme that oone entered the enemy's ranks save by 
coercion aad t o  escape; and that many did so mith tliat view 
and wcre s u ~ u f u l  muut be supposcd, or tI~c numbem srtid to 
Iiave reawemliled in t h -  Morena, and at. Cuenca cannot be 
reconciled with the 108s sushined in tlie action. Xowevei, 
tlie battles of Omña md $Iba de Tormerr teminated the 
~Tcnsivc operations, wbicli tlic Aiistrinn wor nnd tlic re-tappenr- 
itnce of a Britisli army in t t a  PeninsuIa liad enabEsd the aIEiefi 
t o  adopt in 1809. TIiose operations tad lieen unsuccessful, 
the enemy again took the l e d ,  and the fourth epoch of the 
war coramenced 
OBS'En,VATf 0x3. 
19 Althongh certain the British army would not co-opemte 
in this ehort campaign, tlie junta ~iulilicly ~nid  it would join 
Alliuquerqne in the vaUey of tlie Taps ; tha improhbility of 
Areizapaia acthg without sud añsishnce p v e  currency to  this 
fiction, aud an accredited fiction is in rvar often more uuaeful 
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tEmn the truth; for klGs they may be cornmendd: but d e n ,  
deceiving tlieir own general, they pcnnit td him te u n d a  
the impression ha wodd be EO assisted, they eommitted not 
an error but an enormous mime. Nor was Areizas muck 
less criminal for acting upon the mere assertion tliret &liw 
movcments mere combined with &, when no comniunictltion, 
no concerting of tha mnrehcs, no nndcmt~nding with thc allicd 
comriinnrler as ho thcir mntunl rcsourccs nnrl intentiwa, had 
Grken place. A rusliing wind, rr blnst from the rnoiintainq 
tempestuouq rnomentmiy, suc!i was Areieaga'e movement on 
&S Barrios : it ii~ould be dificult to find ita pdld. !hem 
LFJ no post go strong, no toim so prcled, that may not by a 
fortunate stroke be camkd; yet wlie, even on tlie mdlesh 
acde, acts on tlUs prineiple unless aided by some accih tx l  
circumstance applicable td the moment l Areimp obeyd 
the ordcrs of of S pvernrnent. No general is bound to obey 
orders, at leaat witliouh remonstmm> which involve the anfcty 
of his nmyi tq tlmt he. should sacrifice mcrythingbut r ic to l ;  
and mnny p e a t  commnnrleiw havc refused victory mther t h  
appear to undervalue tIiis vital principie. 
So. At Dos Bssiios tlie 8panish ,pneml firstrnet with o p p  
sition, m¿i halted for three clays, without a plan, ignorad &e 
of tthe dtuation of the first corps on his Ieft b l r  and of the 
real force ia h n t ;  yet tliis was tbe only moment in .which 
he couId hope for the sliglitmk stucms. If, instead of a feeble 
skirmisli of eavalry, be liad borne fomard with hia whoIe m y  
on the 11 th, Sebnstiami must lmve been oveqowcred md rliiycn 
ncms tlie Ta,*lrs; Arcizap would thriri htavc plami fifty tliou- 
snnd infantry and ta powerh~l cavnlry on tlie 12th in tlie midst 
of the sepnrated Frencli c o r p ~ ;  for tlieir conc~ntration wae not 
efFected until the nigllt of the 14th. 13ut mch a gtroke was 
not for an undisciplined army, and this was anather reason 
apinst moving from tlie Morena aG d; sceing that the calcu- 
lable chancee were al1 erlveme, and the troope not such as 
wuld improve accirIentd iad~antagesi. 
3'. Thc flank m m l i  from Do9 B d o s  by Smh C m  to 
turn the h s n c l i  left mrl pin hfdrid,  wzhs a circuitoua route 
o£ a liundred miles; md ac tliere were tliree rivers t.o cross, 
namely, the Taps  the Tajufia and Benarq only peak rapi- 
dity could give a chance of sncccas. Areizaga was slon; so 
Inte RS ttlie iifteeatli he bad passd tlic Tw3 with but tmo divi- 
~ i o n s  of infxntry. 3lennmliib the Frcncli, moving on thc inncr 
circlc, gnt bctween Iiim miid iWn(1rid; nnd ivlieii only one corps 
out of thc threo opposcd to hiin xpproacrietl, lie recroserl tlie 
T n p  and concentrater1 a$ on tte atrong ground of Santa 
Cruz dc la Zarza. Josepli by tIie \ a y  of A~imnjuez bad, 
Iiowcver, nlrmiy cut his linc of rctrent ; nnd t l~en he who on 
tIie 10th liad shrunlt fmin an action with Seliastiuni wlierr tho 
lntter had only eiglit thoiisand men, sougIlt a linttle oa the 
snme ground mitli tlie king wlio was at tlic l i e d  of thirty 
thoiisnnd; tlie timt corps Geing also in fuI1 mnrcli iipon thc 
Cjpnnisli traces alid distanh uiily a fem miIes. Here it may be 
remarkcd tlint Yictor, who wm nam to tlie emuitwartrrl of thc 
Sprininrtls, lird bccn an t t ~ c  9th to  tlic ivcstwnrd at 'Jrevencs 
nnd Nore, httvirig moved in ten dnp, on ia circle of n Iiundrcrl 
nnd fiftg. milea, cornpletcly round tliis Splanish ggeerul wlio 
pretcndcd to trmt l i i ~  advcmnrjea as if thcy were blind mcn. 
4". Bwon Cmswncl, it LY snicl, urgcd Areixap to cutrcncli 
Iiirnself in t11e muuntnins, So raise tEle peasantry, aand to wait 
the effcct of Albuquerquc's antl del Pm-qitek sperations. If 
so, his milita7 ideas do not seem of a higher ordcr tlinn Ami- 
zagit's, and tIie proposa1 t ~ l s  but a rcpctition of Mr. Frerc's 
forrner pIan for Nbuquerque; a plan fonnded on tlie suppo- 
sition tliat tlie rich plains of  La Xanche wcie mggd moiin- 
tPins. In ttalring a pcrmnncnt position nt Santa Cruz or 
Tanncon, Art=izns must hnve resigned u11 dire& communictltion 
with AndaIusia, and opend a fresli line of comrntinicntion with 
Valencirt, which would however have been still expoced to the 
thínl corps from hagan. 8uppose the Spnnish genernl aild 
Iiis nmy  ivcre mpnhlc of  sud^ ra diffrmilt opcrt~tion ns talring 
an accidental 1 i e  of operations, tho dvice, if given ak dl, 
mas onlp giren on the 18th Eut on the 16th the f i r s t  corps, 
the  fourth, tLe @@test part of tle'fiftli, tlie reserve and tlie 
roya1 gunrds, forming m m= of more than fift?y tlioiísrtnd 
figliting men, were in a oonrlition to teach hreizaga that men 
and not mountain~ decide the fhte of a Iiattle. Iu fnct there 
were no mo~~ntains t o 1ioId. Eetween Zarza and tlie borden 
of ITdcncin, thc whole county is onc vmt plein, snd on tlio 
18th tbere wsls onIy the alternative of fighting the weakest o€ 
the tTPo French m i w ,  or o£ retreating by forced marchea 
klirough .ha Mancha: the fumer was choscn, Areiznga's nrmy 
ivas deatroyed, and in the battle he iliacovered no rdeeming 
qunlity. Bis psition was ill chosen, he mude no use of b i ~  
cavalry, l i s  left wing never fired a, shot; and wlien tlie men, 
urtdismyed by the defeat of the rigl~t, demmded to  be led 
into action he commanded a re t rd ,  quitting the field himself 
at the moment when his presence was most wantd. 
6". The French combinations were weU-manged, effectual, 
antl it mmy semn misplwcd t o  do aught but commend movo- 
ments eminently mccessful; yct tho chanccs o£ mar nrc mani- 
fold enougli t o  ju~tify the drawing nttcntion ta some points of 
this sliart compigu. Arfiizas's rush from tlie mountaine 
!ras eo unexpected, rtnd rnpid, it miglit well m~ke his dver- 
m i e s  hesitate; tliis wa8 perhaps tlie reason wl~y the f i s t  
corps circled round the Spe,nisIi amy,. and waa singly to have 
atta&e¿l it in front iit Zarza oa the 19  th; a curious a m p  
aent, because it migltt in conjunction mith the feurth corpq 
tlien at Toledo, have fallen oon the flanlc and rear from Mora a 
meek before; that is during tlie three days Areizas remained 
st Dos Barrios, from wh~nce Mora is only fouc Iiows' mma11 
Tlie llt11, the IUng h e w  the English army liad not ap- 
proachd the valley of the Tagus, Areiznga clid not quit Dos 
Barrios nntil tha 13tIi, and remained a% Zarza until tlie 18th 
During eighi dayg therefore, the Spmish general m per- 
mitted t o  lead; md liad he been a m m  of red eilterprise be 
rvo~ild have mshed the tmops betwecn nos Earrios rand 
Aranjucz on the 10th or 1 lth. Indecd thc bolrlncss d t h  
wliicli hbnstinni maintnined his offensive position lieyond 
Aranjuez from tlie 9th to the l4tl1, wncl a mmterpiece. It 
must liowever be mlcnowledged, tliat SoulG could not at once 
fm a general who marchcd iifhy thousand men ahout lik8 a 
patrole of ca~dry, without the dightest reprd to liis adver- 
q ' 8  positiom or his own Iine of opcrationg. 
69 In tlie battle, tlie mode in wliich the French closed 
upun nnd defcated thc riglit nntl centre, wlr-liilc t h g  pzrdy~cd 
tlie left of tlie S~ianiiircls, waa very slcilful; tlie dispwity of 
numbers engagd, and the enormow amount of prisoners, 
artillery, and other tropliies of victory, p r m  the talenti, But 
dndatusia ma laid prostrate by this sudden destniction of 
her troopg; why thcn ww the fmit of victoy ncglected? 
Did tIic king, unalilo to percebe Iiis atlmntngcs, control tha 
kiglier miiitiiry genius of liis advising general? was he &S- 
trracted by disputes ainongt tlie dierent  commanders? did 
the British army at Badajoti dasm hitnl or lind lie ulterior 
projects of aggrelirliz~mc~it n Lis hliouglits whic-11 prcvented 
him from doing justice to the interests of Iiis brotlier'l The 
latter has heen. affiamed; and accurate knowledge upon such 
pointa is ms~ntinl in mtimating the renI sliare Spin I d  ín 
her own defivaraneo. 
79 Lord Wellington absolutely refused to co-operate in 
tbis &ort  and violent campnign. He remaineci eh quiet 
epcctator of events e t t  tho most critica1 pcriod of t31c wnr; 
nnd yet on paper the Epanisli projects proIiiised well. Arei- 
wp's army exceeded fifty B o u ~ n d  men, Albuquerque's ten 
thousand ; thirtp thourrmd were under cIel Parque, ivho had 
just ovBrthrom at Tamame~ the lieat troops in tho Freneh 
mmy; ITil1a Cmpa  anil tlie partida Iiands an the sido of 
Cuenca mere estirnated at ten thousancl; in fine there mere a 
hundred thoumd Spanish solcliem renrly. Thc Brithh rtrmy 
at tliis period, althaugli mudi iecluccd by sicknesq l i d  still 
twenty tlioltgantl men flt to  baar m s ;  and tlie Poi.tujiuesa 
under Beresford m e  near thirty tliousand, mnking R total  
of a Iiundrd nnd frfty tlious~ncl nllirs. Tliirty tlioiisiintl te 
gmd the passea of th Siem de Gretlos and walcli tlie skth 
corpg, a hunrlred and twenty thousand t o  atta& tlie seventy 
thousnntl Prench cwering Madrid! ITby tlien was tlie mrin 
wEio only four months befere so engerly undcrtook n liko 
enterprise with fewer forees, now al~sulutcly dcnf to the p r s  
poshb o f the junta? ' a e c m  mlal fwce &S to pIbys-kd fm, 
m t l ~ m  fa om m.' He harl proved the military qunlitieg 
af Spaniarda antl Fr'rcnch, and fowsaw, t o  use his own cxpres- 
~ i o n ~ ,  ' t?mt aJm m or 121x1 batth, aarud ose w Ldcttcr to loio 
tzrf~ h i l l k d  & by m e  and Afeas mata id  Liverpool, 
by allima, dlwow?? Jdnue to r e h t  aya&:' yt tIiis 
man, so cautious, so sensible of the cnemy's siiperiority, m 
Injeing the fouridation of mensures tlint finally cmied hiru 
triumphant throug?~ the Peninsulz. Fdse then are tha 
apinions of thoae who assert tliíat Napoleon might have 
been drivcn over the Ebro in 1508-9, and blame sir J o h  
Xoorek anduct. Sudi Feasonera would ae certninlj* hhave 
cliarged the ruin of Spin on srr Artiiur WelIasley, if nt 
thia peririd thc d~anecs of war had ~ e n t  him to  his p v c :  
liut in al1 time8 the wise and bmve rnnii" toil bm heen tllc 
nport of fools ! 
So. The bnttlo of Blba de T o m  ended the p i ~ t  militnry 
trmsactions of 1800. In the beginning, Napoleon broke tu  
atoms and fiupersed the feeble stmcture of tlie XpanisIi insur- 
rection; after hi~l cleparture the invasioa st11pntd amidst tha 
bickeringa of hia lieutemt~1. Sir h-thur ?TellesEey tturned 
tlie war bwlt ulion tbe inwders for a moment, but the 
jerilousy and folly of his nlly soon forced him t o  retire to 
Portugal. The 8 p a n i d e ' t l i e n  tried their sin& strengtli, 
and wexe trrtmpled under foot at Ocaña; and notwithstaading 
khe asmstancc of England, the offensive pnsaed entirely from 
their hands. in thc ncxt book wc slidl find them e~cryrvlicra 
ricting on thc dcfcngivc, nnd evcrywliere wcnlt. 
E00E THE TENTH. 
NAPOZROK, V ~ C ~ O ~ ~ O U R  in GIrmnny, WHR rcnrly to turn Iiiu 
unclirirled strength once more agahst tlie Peninsula; biit he 
coinpj~ined of the past innctiviky of the king, nnd Joseph 
prcpi~rerl t o  commencc thc cnmpaigti of 1810 with vigour. 
Uis first opei.ationa, however, indicated g e a t  infirmity of pur- 
p.ose. 'CFTlen del Parque's defent on one side und Eclievarirt's 
on tlie otlier Iind frecrl I i i ~  flnnlrs, nnd wliiIe tFie Rritish 
army waa fitill nt Railaljos, lie sent tlie foiirtli corps toivnrds 
'Sralencia; yet imin~liately recnlIerl it, rrs well as tlie first 
corps, which aince tlie battle uf Ocaíía had been near tLe 
Norena. Tlie mnrch of  tliia last corps tliroitgh LL Manclia 
wapl reinarhllle; for the Cir~t time sime tlic comiiieucement 
of the ivar, tlie ,peitsautry, indigmnt at tlie fiiglit of tlie 
sntiliers, guided thc pursuers to  tlie retreata of tlie fugitiva. 
Tlic Iting's vncillntion w partly wcnsioncd by ihc insurrcc- 
tion in Naíñrrc under ILeno~dIcs and 3liaa; ~iahly betituse 
lord Wellington lid informed tlie junta of Ddnjos M a 
mattcr nf ceurterry thnt Iie wm nhout t o  rctnorr? nntI liis con- 
fidentitil lcttar Ixiiig ptiblislicd mí1 ostciitritivusly criliierl into 
tlie Eerilie papers, made Joseph thlnk it a clnnlc ta some 
ofensive project. Ho~i-e~er, the false moveniciits of tlie first 
and fourtli c o ~ s  clistracted the Spxniarrls, nntl embolrlrncd 
thc Fmncli linrtisnns, wvliri wcre vcry niimcrrnia liotli in 
Valencia antl AndxEusia; and ivhen tlie trotibles h Nnmrre 
mere quieted by Gucliet, anrl tbe estalilisliment of the British 
army un &he hCondego becnrne linoq JosepIi serioiisfy pre- 
pnrcil fur tlia coiiqi~cst uf Autlslusia. Tliis ciitci-prisc, 1-9 
difficult. than an ?nvmion of Port u-gal, promised 
irnniedinte pecrininry advniifages, iio aliglit con- "PpendfR $1. 
sidcmtiun, for his minisiera wcre rcrluccd to aliso- 
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IutB want from the non-payment of tlieir salarÍes, and his 
troops were thirteen months in arream of pay, Napoleon, a 
@-id stickler for the %man maxim, that 'war B ~ D U I ~  sup  
port mar,' pxicI onIy the mrps near the frontiers o€ France, 
anrl rarely recmited the miIitar~r chest. 
Roth thc militnry and puliticnl affnirai of Andrtlnsia were 
now rtt tlie lowest ebb. The calni prdueerl by tlie promise 
tu convoke tlie nationaI Cortes hrtd been short-livd. The 
disaster of Ocaña revived al1 the passions of tlie people, and 
dorded tlie old junta of Xeville, the counciI of GastilIe, md 
other enemiea of the central junta, an opportunity t o  pul1 
d o m  a government nniversdly obnoxioua; and thia dkcon- 
tent wm incrmsd by tlie measurea adopted to meet the 
appronching crisia. The mnrquis of Antorge liar1 becn suc- 
ceedd by the nrchhisfiop of hodicem, nndcr whose p~mirlencp 
t,he junta pnbliriliecl a manifesto, sssuring the peolile tliere 
was no danger,-th& Arehaga wuld defend the Morena 
against the ~vhole power af France,-thnt Alhqnerque wodd, 
from the sirle of Btremdum,  Ea11 upon the enemfs rem,- 
that a second Biaylen might be expected. But wliile thus 
attempting t o  deluclc the public tliay isaned a decree for R 
levy of one liunílred tIiouunnc1 men, and for a forced lonn of 
lidf tlie jewcls, plate, and money Monging to privt~to per- 
sons, approprintetl suma lefi for piouei puqoses to the s e h c e  
of the atate, and sent property to Cadiz being prepad ko 
traasfer tlie seat of government to tIiat tom.  To weaken 
tlieir adversnrieq tbey offered Romana tbe comnmd of the 
rarniy in thc 3forcna, imprisoncd the conde de Montjjo and 
Francisco Palnfux, and confincd tlie rnmrqiiis of h m n ,  nccuaed 
of being in lewe with liia brother, in f ensicola. The conde 
de Tilly, detected in a cunspiracy to seize tlie public trewure 
and makc far America, was thmm into a dungcon,  here re it is 
believd liis infnmous existente terminated. T h e  celebratd 
Padre Gil ww ~ c n t  on a mission to SicilyJ nnd on the pa 
snge tlliis spokc to nn Englilicli gcntlcman, ' TImj Aave amt m 
m I h , k  ~ ) ( M N V J  lo gol d qf m?/ mw ce&,q ~ m r m s t r u m ;  
and l hme sechitkd to t l h  b a n d ~ m t  for few 1 miglst he 
got ?.id of in a m f l i ~ ~  wny I' 
Romaiia refused to sewe, md Blrtlre, recalIed from Cata- 


lonin, mas appointd t o commznd tlie troops r~assembled at 
La Carolina; most of the 0 t h  geaernTg kept doof, and in 
Qallicin, Noronlia, iesigning liis comniand, issned a madfeeto 
8gninst the juntn : tlic p~iblic liatred then increased, aarl the 
pnrtisnns of PiiFnfox nnd Ihfontijo, mrtnin the pcople woirld 
be against the government uniier aay circumstrances, only 
waiM for a. fmourable moment to  commence violente. 
Anrlaluuia m but one remove froin anararchy when the intni- 
riivc monrirch reached the foot of tlie Morena witli a great and 
well oqnnizerl nrmy. Meanwlli le tlie rnilitary prepiiration of 
ihe junta linrrnonizod with tlit?ir po1iticnT condirct. Tlie 
deme for levying w linnilrcd thousand men, issued mhen tlie 
enemy was but a fcw niarcl~cs from tlie seat of gavernment, 
was followed by nn ordcr to distfihttte a hundrerl tlioumnd 
poninrtls; as if asuassinrttion were tlie modc in wlich n grmt 
nation could or ought to defend itself, Areizag liad still 
twenty-five thonsand men at Carolina in tlie Jforenn, Eche- 
&5 hnd dght thoumd clt Hellin, dvc or six thonmnd mere 
spred over hdalusia, nnri Alliuquerqne Iiatl fifteen tliousrtnnd 
be11ind tbe Guatliana. The troops at Carolina mere Iroivever 
dispirited anil c l isorpni~ed~ Blake liad not mrived, find 
~llliuqucquc, diitracted mith contradictorp orrlers trausrnitted 
Jmmt  rlnilg 1iy t l ~ e  juntn, coulrl contrivc no rensonnble plnn 
of action until the rnovements of  tfic enemy enxbled him to 
disregnd nll instmctions. Thus amidst a mhirlpod of pa5  
siona intrignes mi3 rabsirditlfi AndaI~~sia, mas destineil t o  
sink, althoirgb a mighty vesse1 and containing al1 thc mcane 
df B B ~ ~ Y ,  
That great pr~vinca, composed of four kingloms, nameIy, 
Jaen and Cordoba in the nortli, Grenada and Xeville in tlie 
soutli, mas protected on the right l ~ y  Murcia, on the left by 
Portugal, both in possession. of tbe allies. Tlie northern 
frontkr only m 9  accmsilile to the Frencli, rrho coiild rtttaclr 
it either hy Ln hfnnciiab or Estremndura; but between thom 
pravinccs tlrc Toldo ~ i i d  Guadalnpe monntairia forbad riFI 
military communiwrtion until near the Morena, where, abuting 
somewliat of tlieir mrly pnn~leur, t h q  leave a s p w  through 
mhicli t r oop  could move from one province to tlie other in a 
clirectkon narnllel to the fronticr of Andalusin. Tomar& 
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La Jfanclia, tlie Morena IW so savqe, that nnIy by tlia val 
watl to BovilIe could gms pasa, and through a terrible defile 
called the Dapenas Perros, from whence the r o d  descenrleled 
by La Ganilina snd Eltylen to  Andujar. On t h  right, indeed, 
a way leti throrigli the Puerto del Rey, yet it and other 
bridle routcs fell into the fiwt at Navas Tol~za, n little 
beyonrl thc Dcspcnas Perros. 
h t n  Criiz de Mudela, being jnaf in fm of tlie Despenas 
Pcma, ivaa rt positian menwing the principal pnsses of tlio 
Jlorcnta from Zn Manclia; tbnd cnstward of tliat placc the 
h m n  of YiIla Nueva de lori Jnfanks prwcntcd ra sccond point 
af ciiiiccntratim~ for the inders .  From tlience, roads, pras 
tienlile Sor cnvali-y nncl infmtry, penetrnted tlie l i l ls by 
La Ventia Quemada nnd the Pucrto de B n  Esteban, leading 
to  Baem, Uherla) antl Jaen. 
On the westward of Santa C h z ,  roa&, or rakier pathq 
penetrntcd into tbe Iíingdom of Cordoba. One entering the 
mountains by Fuen Cdiente, Ied upon Montoro; a semnd, 
cal!ed La Plnt~t, passed by La Conquista to Bhmua; beyond 
these roads thc r i d p  scparnting Ln SiTanche from Estre- 
madura bcgin to sofkn d o m ,  pwmitting militay i r q m s  to 
the lntter by the prisscs of ?ifochuello, Almttclcn de Azogues) 
and Agudo. Rcncc an m y  cnterjng E s t r d u r a  t o  invade 
hdalusia, mrist pnss tlie .Morenn, mmoving by ona or al1 of 
three great roads ; namdy, irom Medellin antl Llermita to 
Guadalcand, from Bdajos to Seville by tlio defiles ef llonss- 
terio and hnquillo, or, by Xeres d e  10s CabalIeros, Prepnal 
and Amceña From Aimaden, there mas xlso a wa y through 
Belalmzar to Cf~dalcanal. Ail tliese mntes, except ttliltt; o£ 
Araceiírt, whether from h Mancha or Estromadura, lcd, after 
crossing tbe mountains, into the vailey of  tlie Gunddquivir, 
wl~osc ivntem rit fii-st rol1 \vcstwnrtl, witsliing tlie foot of the 
M ~ ~ r c r ~ a  RS fiir tIie city DI Corrtoha; tlicri Iicntling griululilly 
tuwards t.Im aontli, tliey flow by Seville aiirl are finally lost in 
tlie Atlmtic. 
To deferid the pssage of tlie Morena, Areizas  posted his 
right in the de6les of San Esteban and IIontizon, covering tlie 
city of Jraen. wliose old wdls were amml. His lcft occuliied 
tlic pnascv of Fuen Calicnte md 3loclinell0, covering Crirciolia, 
Ea centre m etitabliahed at La Carolina, 8nd in tlie defiIs 
of tbe Despenas Perros and Puerto del Rey, which were en- 
trenched, but with so Iittle akill and labour as to excite tlie 
ridicule rntiier tlian the circumsption of t l ~ e  nemy. Here 
it may be well to notim an mor ne to mountain-defiles, 
common enough evea amo* men who with aome experience 
of war have yet taken e. contrected view of theit profession. 
From mcli persona it is usual tu herar of namow paaaca in 
vXch the greated multitudea may be resisted. TJut loes1 
strength i~ nothing if the Aanks cnn be turned by atlier roads, 
and few positionn are so diffidt as ta render superior numbe~s 
of no avnil. iV1iere one man can climb anot1ier can, and a 
nummua itúantry, crowning kke acclivitle~i on the right and 
Ieft of a dispukd p a a ,  will soon make the defendem retreat or 
fight upon equal -s. If this t&%s pIace at  anp point of an 
. extended fmnt of defilm, mucli m those of tha Sierra A f m a ,  
the dangerous comequences to the wbole of the beaten armp 
are obpions. 8ucb passes should only be considered m fixed 
peints, around whicli an amy may operate in dcfencc d mor0 
exposed situations, foor def1Ie8 are door~, the keys of wEdl  aro 
on the swnmits of the billa muna tliem : a bridge is a defile, 
yet troops are nevec psted in the micldle, but behind s, bridge 
ito Sefend the psage. By mknding t t i a  principie, monntaio- 
pmes can be best marle most available; and though the 
practice of mme gmt generala may be quoteri against this 
opinion, it s e m  moro consonant to fhe t n i c  principIca of war 
t e  plam detachmerita in the defiles of mountaina, nnd Icmp the 
main body bebind, redy to reinforce the detachmwts when a& 
tacked, or t o  fslI on tho enemyh coIumns aa thcy hsuc from 
tlie gorges o€ tlie hill~. 
Pierced by many roads and defended by feeble diupirited 
troops, the Morena presented no great obritticle to the French; 
y&, ati tliey carne up against it by the way of La Mancha only, 
there were means t o  rcnder fheir p w q e  difficult. If Albu- 
querque, placing h i ~  army either at Almaden de A~ognes or 
Apdo, bad operated against their right flank, he must bave 
been beaten or m ~ k e d  by a strong dehchmentbef0t.e Areiza@ 
could have been safely attmked. Nor was Anrhlusin itself 
deficienk of interior local resource3 for an 02iatbt.e defence. 
YOL. 11. V 
Paralle1 to the Morena, md ak the digtance of about a hundred 
milwj the Sierra Nemda, *he Apuixaras, antl the Sierra Ronda, 
extend fram the borderg of Nurcia Go Gibralhr. TTheae ridges 
cut off o n s m w  tract of oountry dong the wast of the Medi- 
terrenettn, while the spnce bctween them and t h e  Morenn ia 
broken by less extensive ridgw, forming d l e y s  wliicl?, gra- 
dualfy descendihg nnd widening, are findly lost in tlie epsn 
connt ry about Beville. Andalusia may therefore bc considered 
as preeenting three gtand dirisions of country: 1". The upper, 
or rugged, between the Sierra Morena ancl the Sierra Nevada. 
2". The lower, or open eonntry, &out Seville. 3'. The coa& 
tract, betmcen thc mountnin nnd the RIcditemnean, which ia 
atuddd in ita wholo length with sm-port towns and cnstlcs, 
such aa Mdam Velez-MaIagg Motril, Arúr4 Marbella, 
htipona, and un infinity o€ smal~er plplaces, 
No important line of defence is offered by the Guadalquivlt 
An army, after passing tlie Morena, wouId follow the couw 
of its waterri t o  gain the lower parts of Andalusia, and thus 
desoending, the advaatage of poaition would be with the in- 
~ s d e k .  Eut to m h  tlre Mediterranean bnast the ridgea of 
the Wevadn or Ronda must be m o d ,  and most of tbe minor 
parnllel ridges enciosing the vdleys whose waters mn towards 
fhe AtJnntic. Now al1 those val ley^ contain grent town~, 
sucIi as Jwn md Cordoba, Ubedn, Grennda, and AlmIa, Renl, 
most of wliich, formerlp fortified and st21 retaining tlieir 
ancient wd14 were capable oE defence; wherefore the enmy 
could not b v e  rtppmached the Jdediterranea-n, nor arenada, 
nor the lower county abovt Seville, Tvithout firat a n g  Jaen 
or Cordoba,.or buth. The difficulty of besiaging tboec p lms  
whiie w Spanish army ww htioned at Mala h I  or Ecija, 
whilc thc mounfoins on both ffnnks and in thc rcar wcm 
Si1Ie.d with inmrgenta, a ~ d  rvliile AIb~~qucrqua hung iipon tlie 
mar at Aimda, Es appment. Pompqb BOns, wthg npon this 
qstem, nearIy bafletl Cssar, although tht rnighty man liad 
friend~ in tlte provime, and witb Ziis accustomed celerity fe11 
upon his youthful advemaries before their armngements were 
matured. Rut in this, tlie thid ymr of the war, the junta 
were unprovidea witli any plan of defence beyond thc merc 
occupatioii of tha p w e s  in the Norenra. Those once foroed, 
XJeville wnEi open, From thnt greertt city the Frencli mulil 
penetrate into al1 parts, and tlieir cornninnicationwitli Madrid 
- 
becanie of sccondary importante, because Andalusia abounded 
in t be materds of  mnr, and ScviIIe, tlic capital of the province 
and from ita political position tlie moot important toim in 
Spipain, wns furnished with arseniilii, cunnon-founderiw) and dl 
eshblislinientsi necessary to a great military power. 
The number of fighting mcn employd for this enterprise 
was about sixty-five thousnnd. Soiilt dkccted the mtivcments, 
liut tlie king wns riisported t e  tnke a moro promiiient part in 
B e  mi1itai-y arrai~gements than a due regad for his own intemst 
would justify. Ta cover hfadrid nnrl to w~tch tlie British 
army, the aecond ~ 0 9 s  ms postcd Iictwecn Tulctverrt snd 
Toledo, nith ~trong detzclirnentn puslied iiito khe valley ooF tlin 
T s ~ e  ; two thousand men, drwn from the reserw, garrisoned 
the capital; ns many were in Toldo, and two Iattsilions m- 
pied rninor posta, sucli Argnnda nnd Gunrlnlnx~rrb. Gnmn"a 
dindon wiis recdled from Castille, lfillinutl's frum Amgon. 
!he h t ,  fourt l~) snd fifth corp8) the king's gunrdg and the 
reseme, increaaed by mme reinforcemcats from Fiwnce, wme 
dimteil upon Aridiilusia, Tlie nrrny by ensy rni~rclies pined 
the foot of the Morena, where Milbnutl'~1 division, coming by 
the wny of Eenillo, rejoined the fourth corps. A variety of 
mentrcimg demtinstrations, made along the front of the Ppnnish 
Iinc of defence lictiveen the 14th anrl ITth, mused Arcix~gn to 
abandon 3iis nrlvanced positions and confina himsdf to €he 
pmses of the 3Iorena; and the 16tli, Toseph arrivecl a t  Snntn 
Crux de Aiudelta, tlie whde a m y  bcing thrn col~ectetl in three 
distinct rnhqscs, 
In tlie cciitrp, tlre ertillery, tlio king's gutirds, the reserve 
and tlie fiftli corps, under Mortier, wcrc establisEictl at Ssnta 
Cruz rand Elriso, clusc to tlie mouths of the D~speiias Perros 
and thc Purrto dcl Rey. On tila Ieftft, Scbmtinni occiiliied 
Villa Nileva [le los Infantes wit,li the fuurth corps, anil p m  
pared to penetrate by Venta Quemada and Puerto ZSan Esteban 
iuto the kiiigdom of Jwn, On tlie riglit, Vlctor, ptcing a 
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detachrnent in Agudo t o  watch Albnqnerque, occupied Almaden 
de bzogues with the first c o y ,  pnshd an advmced guard 
into the pwa of Mochuelo, and sent pahles tlirough Bendcamr 
and Rinojosn towards Guadalcanal. By thme rliapositions, 
lireizagals lino of defcnw in the Morenn, and Aibaquerpe'g 
linc of rcGreat from Estrcmatlurn, wero nlilrc thmtencd. 
On thc ZOth, S~bnst~iani, after n alight skimidi, forced the 
clefilea of Esteban, anrl made a number of pri~ioner~; and when 
tlie Spaniarcl~l rallied behind the Guadalm, one of the tribntay 
torrents of the Guadalquivir, he again defeated them, and 
aclvanciug inte the plnins of Ubeda secured the bridges over 
the Guadalquivir. In tlle centre, Dessolles carried the Poert~ 
del aeJr without firing a ahot, ~ n d  Gaizan's division, crowning 
khe hcights right, and IcR o€ tho Despcnas Perro#, tnrned al1 
the Spnniuh works ; the prrss was then abtrndoned, and Mortier 
panring througli with the main body and the ahillery, reac11ed 
LB Carolina in the niglit; next dny he took posseesion of 
Andujar* 11aving passed in triumph over the fatal field of Baylen: 
more fatal to the Spaniards tLan the Kench, for the foolish 
pide engendered by that vicfory was one o!¿ the principal 
causes of their aubequent losses, Victor then pushed detach- 
meets t o  Montoro, Adamuz, and Pozzoblmm, his patroles 
apperared cloae to Cordoba, rind hia flanking parties communi- 
csted with Qie fifbh c o y  nt Andujar. Thus two deys, and a 
few ñkilfnl comhinations upon rtu extent of fifty miles renderd 
vain the l&y harrier of the Morena, and dndalusia beheld tlie 
Frencli masses portentowly gathered on the interior slope~ of 
the mounhim. 
In seville wll wafi anatrchy ; Pdafox aud Montijo's partkans 
were secretly &y to strike, the ancient junta operaly prepared 
ta resame their former power, the timid and those mho had 
portable property endeawured to remove ta Cadh; but the 
populacle opposed this, ancl tlie p a n t r y  m e  into thc &y so 
fiist that above a hundred thousand persona wcre within thc 
wdls. Thii maltitude, scnrcely howing whnt to expcct or 
wish, only wantd a signai to break out inta riolence, and the 
central junta, fearing alike the enemy and €heir own people, 
prepmd to Ay. Faithful however to their system of delusion, 
even while their packagea were being embarked for C d z ,  
thep assured the peopI8 that the enemy had indeed f o r d  th6 
pwa of Almaden learling from La Manch into Estremaduq 
bnt no danger could thenee ariae becttu~le del Parque was in 
full rnrarch to join Alhuqnerque; 'nnd thme geueral~ being 
stronger tlsan the enemy would M1 upon bis flank, while 
h i z a g a  wonld co-operate from the Morena and gain la peat  
oictory ! It waa on the 20th of Janumy when the Xorena waa 
being forcerl at aU points, thnt this deluding d d w s  wna pnb- 
lished; it mw not nntil the day iafter, that the junta despatched 
orders for del Parque, who mas then ia tlie mountaias beyond 
Ciudad Rodrigo, to eñect thnt junction with Albnqucrqne from 
whicli such great thinga wew expcted E 
Del Parque received the despatch on the 24th, and prepared 
t o  oby. Albuquerqne, alive t o  al1 the danger of  the crisig3 
left Conteeras at 32eddlin with four thousiind f i ~ c  hunrhd 
men, deetined t o  furm a garrison ior Badajos, and mrched 
h i i e l f  on the 22nd, with about nine thousand towards Agudo, 
intending to fdl upon the flank of the frmt corps; he hd 
scaroeIy eornmenwd bis moverncnt when he learncrl that A p d o  
and Almaden were occupied, and tlis Fiencli patrolea already 
at B~nralcazar and Hinojosa, within one rnrirch of bis own line 
of retreat upon Seville. In this conjuncture, nentFing Contreras 
to Barlnjos and hin own nrtiIIery tlirough tlw defile of Monas- 
terio he moved nith his infantry t o  Guraddctmal, Durkthe 
mar& he received contradictory and absud orders from tbe 
junta3 8ome of which hc disregrirdcd, othcrs Iie eould not obey; 
but ~vhen the Morena wm forced he de~cenrled into the bmin 
of SevilIe, crossed the Guadalquivir & the ferry of Cantillana, 
reaclied Carmona on the 25th wnd immediakly pushed with 
bis cnunlry for Ecijn ta wliaerve the enemyh progess. 
N o ~ v  tha storm, so Iong impendirig over the central junta, 
liurst at Beville. Early on tlie 24th a great tumult arose, 
mobs traveming tlie c i t y  called out for tlie <Isposition of the 
junta nnd the Iienrls of tlie mcrnbere. Frnncitrco Pnlnfog anri 
Montijo \vere relcas~l, the junta of Eeville m rsestablished 
by ncclamatioo, and tlie central jun& committiug the defenee of 
Andalusia to tliat body, endeavoured to reach Cdiz, each 
rnc~nber aa he could, but al1 with the full intention of re- 
uniting and sesuming their autliorjty : on the roatIJ however, 
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some of them were cast into prison by thc people, and some 
m e  l ih  to be sIain at Xerez, Slie junta of XeviIle had 
no intention that the mpreme central junta sliould ever revlve; 
Sawedrs, the preaident of the fomer, calmed the tumult ia the 
city, restored B o m m  fo the command of l i s  dold army, made 
some otlier popnIar appointments, md in conjunction xith his 
eoIlcnpes sent fomd proposition t o  the junta nt Rdtijos, 
inviting tliem to take into considerntion the nocessiiy of con- 
stitutiq n,regcncy. This ww rendily noceded to, liut the 
event~ of war cro~vded on and overlttid their scliemes. Three 
d a p  &ter tlie flight of the central juuh, treason and faction 
were so b n g  amongst the members o€ the Beville junb that 
they dsa disbmded. Some remained in tlie town, othera, 
aniongsh tbem Smvedna, repaired to Cadiz; tlie tumu1ts wcre 
then renewd with greater rioience, and &mana was called 
upon to asaumo the command and defend t,he citp, but he 
cpaded this dnngerona honour and pmoecded h Majos. 
Thus nbandoneii to themselves, tlie people of Seville eIected 
s milihry junta, and diicovered tlie same disposition m tlie 
peopIe of 0 t h  towns in the Feninsulra Iid done upon liko 
occasions. IE men like the Tioa af Zaragoza liad then msumed 
eommnnd tliey might have Ieft a memorable falo ~tnd a riiined 
city; but there Tvere none BO firm, or so ferocioua; a feeling 
of helplessness produced fear in alI, and Seville mas ieady to 
~ubmit a the invaders who wcre close at band; for Areieagn 
had been driven from Jaen by Sebmstixni, that place had sur- 
rendcrerl wiih fdy-six guna monntcil on tlic wnl'ts, and 
tboud~  tlie SpaiiisL general rnaile one more etand, he wns 
again beaten with lws of all his artillery and hia army dis- 
prfied. Pive thonsand infantry and some sqdrons  of 
c~,ralry tRrowing amy tbek arms cscaped to Qiliraltar; 
Areimga fled with a remnant of borse into Murcia, where he 
was superaedd by BlnIce; Sebastiani entered Orenda, and 
was rcceived d t h  rapparcnt joy, so cntircly hnd the govern- 
mcnt of the centrnl junta extinguislied tlle fomer entliusiraam 
of the people. 
The; mpture of Jaen secured tlie Icft flank o£ the French, 
and the lring moved with the centre and right to Conloba, 
whsc dso  the i n ~ a d m  were receired witliout anp mark af 
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aversian. rChus tbe upper countrg was entirely conquered. 
But the projects of Soseph were not confined to Andalusia; 
Iie h d  opened n seeret cornmunimtion wIth Valencia, where 
his partisana undertook to raise a wrnmotion whenever a 
French force sbouIr1 appear before the city. Judgihg now 
that no serious opposition wouId be madc in Andalusia, he 
dirocterl Schstimi t o  cross the Sierra Nevarln and seixe the 
arenadan cnast, witL a view to facilitate tbe a t h k  on 
Valencia; and t a  insure success, he desired Suclret to make a 
crimbined movement from Amgon, promising that n atrong 
detachment from Andalusia sliould meet him iinder the wnlls 
of PitFencia Dessolles meanwliile occnpied Cvrdoba rana 
Jaen, but the firct and fifth corps ltnd the king's guards 
proce~dcd tawnrtIs Ecija, wlicre, it will be rcmember~d, 
Alliuquerque'a w n h y  liad ileen poskd since tlie niglit af - 
tlie 24th  
As the French approaclied the dulce fe11 back upon Cm- 
rnonn, from ñ~hence tie coiild rctrcat eitlicr t o  Gcvillc or Gdiz, 
tha  way to tlie latter being tlirough 7Jtmra; but fram Ecijrt 
ttiere m a arod tlirough Sftiron to Utrem aliorter tlian that 
Ieading through Crrrmona, aiid along tLs r o d  the cavalry o€ 
tIie fimt mrps wns puahed on tlio 27th Albuquerque tben 
despiring for Soville resolved to mnke for Cncliz, and to 
forestal the enemy gained Utrera with great expedition, 
journcying niglit nnd dny unti1 the 3rd of Fchrurary, wlien he 
reaclied Cudiz. Somc French cavnlry slrirmislied witli liis mar 
at Utrem, but he wns pursued no furtlier, save Ziy scouting 
pwtieq for tlie king h d  now altered the original plan of 
opmtiens. Tlie f irst corps, i n s h d  of pugliing for M i n ,  
marched by Camonn agaiinst Beville, wllere tlie admoed 
parir arrived on thc 30th. Some entrenchmenta and batk- 
ries h d  been rnised for defenee, seven thonsand soldim, 
cliieíiy fugitivcs from the Morena, sere in gmison, and t h ~  
populace, still govsrning qand announcing a lofty determina- 
tionJ fired upon tlie k r e r  of a snmrnons. Neverthelm, the 
city, after aome negotiation, sursendered mith al1 itti storea 
foun*ries and. ars~iinls mrnplcte, and on tlia 1s t  of Febrnnry 
tlie king entered in triunipb, Tlius the lower country wtiii 
wnqucred, rtud tliere was only Catliz and the mast tract lying 
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httween the MecTikrranean and the Sima de Nevads to 
subdue. 
Victor m# now tient a@n& Cadiz, Mortier apinst &tw 
niadm4 and Eebastiani had alrearly placed fifteen hundred 
men in the Alhambra, seized Antequwa, and incoryorated 
among hiil troops a Xwiss battalion, composed of thoae who 
hd nbandoned the French setvice at tbe httle o€ fiyIen. 
Re m desirous to establish liimself iirmly in those parta 
berara he crossed the Nevda, but his m m e a  were precipi- 
tated by unexpectd mente, At Xdam tlie people, Ied by a 
Cbpuchin fnar, imprisoned the loca1 junth and colIected in 
wt numbers, m e d  in. al1 mannem, ahve Antequem and 
Ailiama, where the d from Grenada entm the hills. T'bis 
liimirrection, s p r d g  along the mountains and emn in the 
Viga or plain of Grenada, was not to be neglected. S e b  
timi feared that the insurgenh, having Gibraltar on one 
fiank Murcis on the other, nncl many seaporta xnd fortreasm 
in their country, would organize a reglnr wnrf~tm. Tu 
stop thia he penetmtd the hills, and drove the Spnninrds 
upon Halaga, nem which place hia advanced guard, under 
Milhaud, defeated tbem witIi a lmw of five huntlred men and 
entered the town fighting. A few of the vanquislied found a 
refuge on board some English shipri of war, the rest sub- 
mItted More thart one liundrd p i m  af  heavy, md tmcnty 
pioces of fidd nrtiiiery with ammnnition, atareat and a qaan- 
Qenerñl tity of British merchandixe, beme  the spoil of 
G~rnpbcIl'm the oonquerors. Velez-Mahp opend its pbs 
Comapond- 
, ,, tlie next by,  Motril ww occupi4 and tlie insur- 
G l b d ~ ,  section was entirely qnelled, for in every other 
nrss. part hoth troope and peasant y were terrified zbnd 
mbmissive ta the last degree. 
Victor followed tlie trama of Albuqnerqne wit6 ~uch dili- 
gente aa aso reach Mticlnna on tlio 4th, and it is gcneralIy 
s u p p d  he miglit liave renrlered himself master of thc Isla 
de L o n  ; for tlie defensive worlcs were in no way improved, 
buG rnther deteriorated aince tlie +orl of ofr George Gmith's 
negotiation, The b d g e  of Zuazo was indeed broken, and the 
appenw 19, canal of Santi Petri a great obskle; but Albu- 
querque's troopa wera h e c l ,  dispirited ild 
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clothed, liadly amed and in e v q  wap ine5eient: t b ~  
people of Cadiz were apthetic, and the authonties n~ i  wud 
occupied with intrigue9 and private interestg. In this stake, 
eiglit tliownnd Spmnish aoldiem could acarcdy bave defended 
8 line of teti milea apinst twenty-five tbowand French, 
if a mficient number of bata could have lieen coIIec~ed 
t o  crosa the cand. Tenegari m governor oT W i z ,  but 
when it was h o m  the central Junta had been depowd nG 
Beville, a municipal junta, chiefly composed of merclmts, mns 
elwted by general ballot, anrl bcing as inflatd as any prmding 
goveriiing liorly, would not suRer tha fy$t i~e  members of the 
central junta to assume authority, E~ewever, by the adPice 
of dovellanos tlre &ter appointed B regency not taken from 
among themselvee; rtnd tliough tthe Cadiz juntab vebemently 
opposcd tlik proceeding ai fisrrt, tha jvtlicioua intervcntion of 
Mr. Bartholomew Frere, brother of the plenipotentiary, finally 
induced them to acp~~iesce. On the 29th J a n u a ~ ,  the bi~hop 
of Orense, general Casmw, Anhnio de Escnílo, hvedra ,  
and Fernandea de Leon, were ~ p p i n t e t i  regents nntil the 
Cortes coultE lie assernbled, but Lcon wna nfterwnrtls replaced 
by one Lardimbal, a nntim of New 8pain. Tho mnneil of 
CastilZe, ~vhicli had been reinstated before the £al1 of Seville, 
then charged the deposed junta, aud truly, $6 nmrpation- 
the public voiee nddcd pecul&ion and othcr crimm-the 
mgeny, whicli tiley had themeelves appointed, seized their 
papeiui, sequestratd their effects, threw some of the members 
into pri~ion, and hnished others to the provinces, thus wm- 
pletely extingaishing tliis at ~ n e e  odiow, ridiculow, and 
unfortunate otigarcliy. Arnongst the peraons conlpolng it, 
there mere undoubtetlly some of rinsullied lionour and fine 
talents, ready and eloquent of apee& and dexterous in a r s -  
nient : yet Spain ia not the onIy country wherc men possessing 
al1 the grace and ornament of worcla, hme proved tu be metia 
d eontemptibIe Ateamen. 
AIbuquerque, dected president of the municipal junta and 
cornmrtrider of the forces, nom cndeavoud to placa the lsls 
de Leon in a state to resist a suden attaclr; and tlre FrencL, 
deceived as to it9 red strength, after an ineffectual summons 
prooeerled to gird the whule bxy with morh. 31eanwliil~, 
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Mortier, lenving a brigde of tlle fiftli corps at Sevillc, pumcd 
a body of faur thousecd men) under h e  Viconde de Gnnd, 
which had rctired towards the Morena; they evaded him and 
fled t o  Ayamonte, where they might have Seen destritroyed, 
lemu8e the bishop of Algarve would not fmm nationsl jedousy 
BTr. Stuatt'a suffer them to p w  the Portupese frontier. ñlor- 
Qrr-nri- tim hewever negleeked them, to  pws the hforena 
enm, 3ISS. by Ronquillos nnd Monngterio; he aummoned 
Bndajoa the 12th ~f February, but Contreras nas in the place, 
anrl tbe French marnhd findiig it, contrary to 1iL apectat.ion, 
Pn a shte of defence, retired to Merids. Thia terminated tlie 
fimt seríea of operations in the foarth epch of the ivar; 
operations which M En three weeh put the French in 
possession of Adaluiiia and Soutliern Eatremadura, with 
the exception of Gibraltar and Cadiz in the m e ,  and of 
Bahjos, Olivenxra and AZbaqnerque in the other prwinoe. 
Theae were great resulta, yet more might llave been obtnined, 
and the capture of Carlia would have been a fatal lilow to tlio 
Peninsnla. 
From Andujsr to SeviilIe is only a hundred miIes and the 
Frencli took ten d~ys t o  tmreme them, a tardiness fnr ulhich 
there appears no adequate cause. The king, apparently elated 
tit tlie acclamtions and seeming cordiality with \rhich tlie 
towns and even the ~illagcs grceted bim, moved do--1y; he 
imraginctl Serille would open lier g n t c s  nt once, nnd t,l~iliinking 
the possession of tlint tomn wouffi produce the grentest moral 
effect in Anrlatu~iti and al1 over Spalu, cliauged the first 
judicioua plan of the wmpaigm, to marcli tliitlier in preferente 
t o  Cadiz. The inoral infiuence of SerilIe had heen homever 
traasfemd along Mth the go~ernment t o  Cadiz, and doseph 
WM deceived in his expectations of entering the former city as 
he had entered Cordoh. When he discovcrcd his error there 
wari di11 tinie to rqnir  it hy a apid pursuit of Allsuqucrqiie; 
but fearing t o  lenve a uty with a Iiundrecl thonsnnd people in . 
a shte of excitement upon hi flnnk, he resolved fimt t o  
reduce Seville. I-Ie met witli no foimid;ihlo resistanca, yet 
so much of opposition as teft liim ody the alternative of 
stormíng tlie t u ~ n  or entering by negotiation; t.he first hk 
humanity forbad, tho latter cost liim time wEiicli was wortli 
hia mwn ; fur dibuquerque's pproceedings ~ e r e  only secondq,  
the epliemeral rcsishnce d Seville m the p r i m q  cause of 
the safety of Cdiz .  
The march by wliich the Spenish dulce secared the isla delaon, 
is only to be reckoned from Camiona; previous t o  Lis arrival 
there, bia movements, dthough judicíous,were more theresultof 
pmssity tban of skilI. hftcr tbe  hattIe of Oaña, hc expected 
that Andnlusia wouId be inmded, biit fettercd by his orders or 
ill-infomed of the enerny'~ movements hia march upon Agudo 
ww too late ; and bis aSteL-mrch upw Uuadalcanal the 
forcd re~ult of liis pwition : he couId only do that;, ox abaadon 
Andalusis and rctire to Badajos. Fiom Guatldcanrtl he 
advdincerl townrtle Cordoba on the 23d, and he rnighk hava 
tlirnwn liimseIf into that hwn; yet the pmdence of taking 
such s decided part was dependent upon the sbte  of pubIic 
sentiment, of whlcli he must liwe been a good judge. Albu- 
queque, ldeed,  supposcd t,he French to bc nlrcady in posws- 
  ion o f  ths  place, wliereas tliey did not reach it nntil four duyi 
later; liut tlicy conId easily haw entered it on tlio 24th, and 
as he Iielievd ttliey liad done so, it is obvious be liad no m&- 
clence in the people's diaposition : in this iew,  his determina- 
tion t o  cross tlic Guntlnlquivir nnd hkc pod at Carmons 
WOA fittest for tlie ocwion. It ww at &mona ha first 
appeara t o  have coiisidered Beville a Iost &y, ancl when the 
French apprnrtclierf, we find him marcliing with a mrprising 
energy t o ~ ~ a r d s  Cdix. Tet he wns n,r~in ltltc in deciding, 
for the cncmy'a cavnlry rnoving by tlie sliortcr roncl to Utrcra 
avertook Lis rear-guardj and tlie infantry would msuredly 
have e n t e d  tlie island of Leon with him if tlia king liad not 
directed them upon SeviIle : the epl~emeraI wsistance of that 
city therefore sa~ed AIliuquerque, and he saved Cadiz. 
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LORD iVm~rna~o-r$s plana were deeply affected by the i n d o n  
of Andalusia. The atupendous campaign he w.w then medi- 
tating invohed relations with every pmt of tbe Peninsula, 
nnd it is necesrcary to  t a c e  the Spanioh opemtionu in oiI1 
quarters pmioua to d k b i n g  it, Iest frequent referencea 
should destmy the unity of narrative. 
mile quelling the diaorders in Nam~~a, Sucbet hsd directed 
, an active pursuit of the student Mina, who, a~ail- 
P. 52U- h g  himself o£ the quarrel between the military 
governor and the Piceroyz was actnaIly master of the count y 
tietween PampeIuna and 7hdeIa He watl then rtt Sanguessa. 
Harive, with soma bnttarions, marchcd ngriinst him from Zar& 
gom, detachments from Tudela nnd Pampluna endeavoured ta 
surround liim by the flanksJ and n fourtli b d y  moving into the 
vallcys of Ainsri snd Medianoz cnt him off from tha Cinca river. 
Harispe quicklp reached Saiangumy but the colurnn from Pampe- 
luna being retarded, Mina, with snrprising beldness, crossed its 
line of mar& and aktacked Tafda, thw cntting tbe great Fiencli 
line of communimtion; the garrkon however made a atmng 
miptance and Mina dkappea,recl the next day. At this period 
reinforcernents from France were pouring into Navarre, and a 
division u n h  Loiaon wns n t  Logroño; aherefore Earispe 
liavlng, iin concert with that general and witl~ tlia garrisen of 
Pampeluna, occupied Sanguasa, Xos, M o s a ,  Puenta de Reyna, 
and sil the passages d the Aqa, Aragon, and Ebro rivws, 
launclied a nurnhr of movenble columns mliich eliased Mina 
Into the hfgh prts of the Qrenees, where cold alid bunger 
caused hii band to disprsc. Tlio mtcrpriaing e1iic.f himself 
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tmly Spanish, repaired to Olite in dispise, thot he might see 
the new general ~ i a ~ s  an his wap from Zaraguxe to Pa~n~ieluna, 
Ent Suchet, wIiile seemingly ocmipied with the diqutes 
between the French officerrt and Joseph's c i d  authoritiea in 
Pampeluna, was secretly preparing guns and materials for a 
rnethorlical mr of invdon beyond the froriticrs of Amgon; 
itnd when Reynier, coming from France with troops intenrled 
to form an e i~hth corps, was appointed pvernoi of Nnvwre, 
he returned t o  Zaragoes. During hia absence, some pekty 
wtions hltd takcn place, but his general arrangemeah were no* 
di.st~~rbed; and the empemr haifing promised ta increase the 
tliird oorps to tliirty thousand men, with thc intention of 
directing it at once against PaIena al1 tlie atores befitting 
anch m enterpnse were collected at Teme1 in the course of 
January. The resistance of Qerona and other events in Cata- 
lonia hfffcd Napoleon's calcnlations, and thio first destination 
OT the tliird c o p a  was changed. Suchet was fhen ortlered to 
k i e g e  Tortoza or Lerida, the eighth oorps, forming at Logrofio, 
m directed to cwer hi~i rmrI and the seventh corps wa3 ta 
dvanee to the lower Ebro and support the siege, But 
neither wm this arranpment definltivc; frcsh orders sent the 
cigbth c o ~ s  towards Cagtille, and at that rnomcnt Joscph'~ 
Ietter calling npon Xucbet to mar& against Valencia amived, 
and &ve a n m  tum t o  the a f f h  of the French in Bpain. 
d decree of the empemr, dated the 8th of Janun.p, comti- 
tnted Aragon a pa~ticuhr ggovernment, rand rendereá Suchet 
entiiely indcpendcnt of tho king's ordcra. This d c m ,  tuge- 
ther with a renewed d e r  to commence the siege of Lerida, 
h d  been intercepted, and Suchet donbtful of h'apoleon'a real 
viewa, nndertaok th0 enterprise agahst Valencia; yet whhing 
fimt tD intimidate the partisans hm@ng on the borders of 
Aragon, he dchched h v a l  a&~t 'rTilla Campa, who was 
defeated on the side of Cuenca and bis troops dispersed. A f k  
thiiis aucccss he fortified a post at Temel, to seme as a tempo- 
ray base of operationq and drew there tweIve ibnttalions of 
infantry, a rcgiment of mirassiers, seved squadrons of Ziglt 
mvalry, and sume fielrl artillery; nt the same time he caused 
six Iiattaliona and tlree squndruns af cavalry to be wemblerl 
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at Alcanitz, under l l~bert.  TIis remaining troops were distri- 
hnted on tlie line o€ the Cinca, and the right bmk o£ the 
Ebro; tlie castles of Zarapea, Alcanitz, Monzon, Trenasque, 
Jaca, Tudelg antl otlier townq were placed in a b ~ t e  of defence, 
and fonr tliousand men, newly arrived from Fiancc, were 
pushed to Daroca to  link tlie active columna t o  tliosc Icfti in 
Amgon : these ammgementa occupied tlie u4iole of Pebruaq 
On the 1st of Mar& a duplicate of bhe intercepted order te 
commence tlie siege of Lerda rcaclied Termd, but as Balsert'a 
column, which had alrcady marcbed by tlie road af Morella, 
wm actually in the province of Valencia, the operation 
went on. 
Suchet was smn in presente of the VaIencirnn amy- Ten- 
tura Caro, captzin-general of the province, ims in march to 
attwk liim at Termel; and the Xpwnisb advanced guard of five 
or six tlriousnnd ~egulars, accompmied by armed peasants, was 
drawn up on dome high gound behind the river Mingarea 
The bed of thia t o ~ e n t  was a dcep mvine, so snddenly sunlt 
as not t o  be percei~eed nntil dose upon it. Rre village and 
wtla  of Alventozn situatetl aomewliat in dmncc of Caro's 
centre were occupied, md be commmded ane bridge; his 
riglit rested on tlie villnge, and nnotlier brjdge mlled tlie Puen- 
seca; liifi left was an tlis village of Muiiznnera, where tlle 
g~ound wmts more practicable, Tlie Frcnch general judging 
Cara would not figlit so far from Valencia wliile ñabert's 
column ms turning liia right, sent a division before dayliglit 
to tum the left of the positian also, and so cut oR tlie retrent 
of tl ie van-guard. The French crossed the ravbe after a skir- 
mish, hut tl:e fpaniards fe11 bnck ~ t h  little loss upon tlieir 
maln horly, rind tlien the whole retired to the city of Valencia 
Sucliet entered Begorlie, nnd oa tlle 4th weg at Biurvicilro, the 
ancient 8agunturn, four lsngues from Valencia. Hahert, wlio 
b d  defatsd a small corps at lforella, nlso arrived at Villa, 
Real on tlie se&comt; and though the wuntry hetween tliese 
lines of march was mountaiious and impracticable after pnss- 
ing Sapntum, the columns ~niterl in tlie Huerta, or gaden of 
hlencirn, the richcsk nnd most drlightfuul ppnrt of Spnin. 
Xuchet ooming before the city the 5th of Mnreli, seked the 
Scmnos siiburb, and the hnrbour, called tha Grm, His spics 
at first confimed t he  hopes of nn insurrection witliin tlie 
wnIls, but tlw treaaon ww dekctecl, hlie leader, bacon Toxrfi 
Blanco, m s  giiblicly execu ted, and the archbialiop ~ n d  many 
otliers: imprisoned; tlie plan I d  fn i ld ,  tlie populaee were in 
arms, and tl~cm TYB.6 na movement of  French troops on tlic 
side of Murcim. Five d y s  Suclid remained beforc tlic city 
vainly negotiatiag; tlien, intrigue ftriling, and liis army inade- 
quate to force the defences, he retreatcd in the nigl~t of tho 
10th by Xegorh and Terrnel, But the Bpanish partisnns had 
p t b e r d  on hi renr, nnd ab Liria nnd Cnstellon de la Plana, 
thero wew comliab; Tjlla Campia, also, who had reassembl~lecl 
his dispmed troops, captured fottr guns with tlieir ammuni- 
tion wnd escort between Terruel iind Daroca. Be cnt ofT 
anohher detacliment of n hundrerl men left at Alventaza, nnd 
nendy wiin ilie castla of Teme1 by a Iioltl aiid reacly-~vitted 
attempt ; liut on the 12th the head of Suchct's colurnn carne in 
sigl~t,  Villa Campa retired, md tlie 17th the Prench general 
renched Ymgoza. During his absencc PercFín l id  invested 
Monzon, and mhen ihe prrisoii of F r a p  marclxed to i t a  
relief, the Spaniarda irom Lerida entered the Iatter town and 
dagtroyed the bridge and entrenchments. Mina, also, wns 
agnin fomldable, and thoitgli severnl co1urnns wcrc sent in 
c1rnae of blm, it is probable, they would have done no more 
tlim diverse his band for the moment, If nn accident had not 
throm him into tlieir hmds, a prisoner. 
hchet's fnihre at Vdencia was more hurtfiil to tlie French 
thnn would nt fimt sigIit appeai: I t  linli~ienetl nt tlie rnomeiit 
wlien tiie National Cortes, au long (lesired, w a  at 1 s t  ddirectecl 
t o  s~embla, and, as it ~eemerl to  balmce the misfortuues o€ 
Andnlusia, it was haild by tlie Spaniarcls as tlie commcnce- 
ment of a better ern. TE~B principal rnilittlry dvuntnge wn9 
tbe delnying of tlie sic-ges of Lerii-ln nnd Ilequineníra, wliei-eby 
the subjection of Cntalonia was rctnrded; mcl nltliough Sudiet 
labours, and successfdly, to show tliat Iic mas drriivii into tliis 
enterpise by thc forcc of circumsta~iccs, Napolcnn's nvowerl 
rlisootitent was well founded. Tlic olicnltiona in Gntalonin 
wers so hampered by tlie nnture of t l i ~  country, tllat it 1i.u 
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onl y at certain conjunctnres any progrem conld be mde, and 
one of the most favourable of those canjuncturea waa t h  
lost for want of the m-opemtion of the third mrps: but to 
understand thia the military topography of CataIonia must be 
well considered. 
Thst province is divided in its whoIe length by &oob from 
tlie l'yrenees, wliich with some intermption run to the 
AtInntic sliorea; for the s i e m  aeparating Vaiencia Murcia 
and Andalmia from the centra1 parts of Spain are but con- 
tinuatione. The Ebro, forcing its wrty Gransveraely through 
the ridgee, parts Catalonia from Valencia; tlie hiUs tbue 
broken by tlae river push their rocky herids soutbward to the 
sea, cuttinq off Tamgone h m  Tortoza and enclosing what 
r n g  be crrlled the etsstcrn resien of Catalonia; tlrah i~ to =y, 
the districta conhiningr Roam, Geronn, Hostalricl~~ Ticli, Bar- 
celona, Marreza, Tmagona, Reus, and many mora t o m  
The tarrents, tlie defiles, and other military featurea of this 
region llave been before descrilwd, md it only remainrr to 
notice the western portion of C~talonia lyjng beyond the 
princilinl spine. Tliis is bounded f l y  by Arngon, pnrtIy by 
Valencia; and Iike the eastern region it ia nn wsemblage of 
smdI plejns and mgged valleys, each the bed of s river 
descending tomrds the Ebro h r n  the Ppeneea ltt contxins 
the fortrew of Balaguer, Lerida, Mquinenxa, Cernera; and 
nar the mouth of tha Ebro, TorhmI which, howevcr, bdongs 
in a rnilitary view mtlier to Valcneia than Catdonia. Now 
the rnountnin ridgc, mparating the edern from tlie mtm 
region of CahEonia, could only be paased by certain ways far 
tlie most part imprdcable fox artilIery, artd tboae practicable, 
Ieding u p n  wa1led t o m a  at both ends of the defiles. TLUP 
Cervera is sikuated on the principl and direct line from Leridtr 
to Barcelona ; Balaguer, Cardona, and M o n t m t ,  are on 
another and more circuitoua ruad t o  the m e  city. Betwew 
Lerida ancl Taragom stands Mombianch, and between Tara- 
gona and Tortoza t l ~a  Fort St. Felippe bloeks the Col do 
Ralagucr. All these pImes wera in Gho hnnds of tho Spniards, 
and a numher of smaller fortresses, or castles, such as Urgel, 
Ilerga, and Xolsona, served as rallying points for the warlike 
nomatenes of the bigher valIeys when pressed by moaeble 
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oolnmns, and from thcnce khey ~ ~ l l i e d  to h a m s  the ff anku rand 
rear of both the Frencli wrps. 
In tlie eastem region, tlte line of operatioas for the seventh 
corps m8 between fhe mountains snd the sea-coast, paralle1 
with both; hence, the Spanish irregular forma, holding aU the 
communi~tiotions acroos, nnd the high enlleys on both sides of 
the gseat dividing apine, m l d  desoend npon tlie rear and 
flanks of the F A ;  whiIe the regular trcups, opposed t o  
them on a narcow front and mppoportd by tlie fortresses of 
Cerona, Emtalrich, and Taragona, could dvance or retire as 
circumshnm clictnted. Upon tris principio, the defence of 
Crttalonia was aondnckd. Detachmeatq and ~ometimea the 
main b d y  of the Xipanish m y ,  passing by the mountdns or 
by Bea from Tarrigona, continually haras~ed the French flanka ; 
mhen deferitd they retired on Vicb, Manresh hlontscmnt, 
Cernera, and Taragona From thia Iast placa the  general^^ 
commuaic~ted with Torteza, Valencia, Gibraltar, the  Ealearie 
t11mc plwes, whüe the banda in the monntains continued to 
vex t l i ~  Fmeh comunica8tiona; and it was only during tbe 
brief p a r i d  of laseitude in the Ppanbh muy9 owioned by 
p t  clefeab, that the mventh corps owld chase those rnoun- 
taineera. Nor, unti1 Gemna and Hostalrich fell, was it eatiy 
t o  make any but sudden and short incumione tomrde Tara- 
p a ;  seeing that t l ie mipeletea from the higber valleye, 
2nd detachmenh from the army at Tamgona, passing by tlie 
hilla ancI by aea, codd join the garriaons, interrupt the 
communication d force the French to retire, beeawei 
tZie counw beyond &e Llobregat codd never feed them 
Pong. 
But when Barcelona conld not be mmured by Eiea it waa 
indispenanblo to conrluct oonvoys by h d  ; and ik- in~uia tbeir 
arrival the wbole amy was compelled to make frequent move- 
ments in advance, retiring w i n  when the object was efFected. 
d 
This being often renewd furnFshed the Cahlana opprtunities 
for cutting ofF minor convoys, detachments, nand even conaider- 
nble bodiw isoIated by the momentary absenm of tbe m y .  
Thus, dwing the siego of Gerona Blake passecl through the 
mountajns and harassed the besiegers; when the place feU he 
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retired aph to Taragona, Augereau then t-tttacked the mige -  
lete5 and somateneei in the high valleys, bnt in t h e  midst of 
this operation Baudin'e squndron of succonr for Barcelona waa 
intcrcepted, m d  the insatiable craving of t ha t  city forced 
Angcrcnu to nsaañcmbleliis srmy and condirct aconvoy tliere hy 
1nnd: rand ho WM compefled to return immedintely, lwt he 
sliould liimself consnme tlie proviriians he brought for the place. 
Tliis retreat, as usual, drew on the Spaniardg, who were again 
defeater!, and Augereau once more a h n c e d ,  in the intention 
of co-operating mith the third corps, wKch he supposed would, 
following the mpcror's design, he bcfore h r i d n  or Tortom 
Rut at tliis tima Buchet ans on tlie mrtrcli to Palencia; and 
Henrg O'Donnel, wlio liad suceeeded El& in tlia command, 
recommencing the warfare on the French commnnicationa, 
forced Augeresu ap in  to retire to Gerona at t l~e  mommt mhen 
Suchet, having returned to Aragon, was ready to besiege 
Lcridn. Tlius, like unrnly homce in a chariot drng,ging diffcrcnt 
m y ~ ,  tlie Fr~ncli  npedeci each other's mavemeob, 
Tbe evenks toucbd upon nbove &al1 now be briefly described. 
Wben Gerona fell, Souham scoured the liigh valleys and 
d c f d e d  tlie migueletes of Claros md novira at E~fiaizq Olot, 
Flan 8, Ebria, xnd Camprcdon. At RipolZ he dcstroyed e 
P. ""O mmahctory for nrmq ~ n d  lieing dtetwards reb- 
forocd with Pinok division, mwrclied fmm Olot, by the r o d  of 
Mmlieu, forced the deftlea, andtook possession of Vich. Blnke 
hxd Gem called t o  Andnlusia, and tlie provincial. juntrs, reject- 
ing del Parque, gave the coommnd to Eenry O'Donnel, mhose 
courage cluring the siege of Gerona btad gained liim R high 
rqutxtion : he vadi with the remiiins ~f Rlake'g timy at Irich, 
nnd n.q tlie Frencli approacliecl thnt toWii he retired to tlie pnss 
oi Col de Scspinn, frorn iv1ieiicc hr! I i d  il free reireet upon 
hloya and Mnnresn, Soul~nm's advmced pard pursued, muid 
at Tona captured some bsg-pge; but the Spnniard tnrned on 
finding liis rear prcssed, anrl whcn the pnrsuem asssiledl the 
hcights of  Seq~inra clinrged with a slioek that gent tlicm b d -  
long d o m  ngain. Suiilinm raIlied Iiis benten tmops in tl1e 
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plilnin nnd tlie next dn y offcred bnttle qain ,  but 0Z)onneI con- 
tinued bis retreat nnd tl~e Frencti wturned to Vicli. , 
During these events, Augereau, Icat-ing a dekwhment in 
lTo&alricli to Mockade the cnstle, rnarched to Barcelona by the 
rond of CRnIndeu. Ee hncl previon~ly onlcrcrl Drilicsmc to 
post tliwe battuliom md five atlndrona of cuirns~iers witli 
some guns, near tlie junction of tlie ronds of Cardarleu and 
Mames% to rvatcli O'Donnd; tlic commander, colonel Guery, 
plwed one bnthlion at Granollers, a second zt &nta Perpctrin, 
occiipid hfollct., and took no military prccnution~. O'DonneE 
sent Campo Vede to fa11 upon tliese French postg, and 
he put t o  thc amord or captured dl ttie troops at Santa 
Perpetua and NoTlet; those nt Cmollers tlirew tbemselves 
into a I n r p  building nnd dcfcnrld it fur tlircc dnya, at ths entl 
of wliich Augereau auccoured tliem. Fiiding the streeta of 
Mollet strewed witli French carcwses, t l ~ e  marshal ordered up 
the rlivisiou of souliam from Vicfh but pmsed on liimsdf to 
Bnrcelonn, rand mliile tlicre, dicting to Ix convinced Iiow 
oppressive Dulie~ma's contluct Lad k n ,  sent hirn to France in 
disgace. After tl~is act of justico, or of personal malice, for 
it has becn cdled botli nameg, rlugereau, unable to procure 
pro~wions witfiout exlitinsting t he  mngiisines of Unrcclonn, 
resumeil bis former positioil at Gerouo d Suuham returned 
t o  Vich. 
All tlik time the liloclrdc of Hostnlrich continned, bbut the 
rctrent of  Auprenii, nncl Cnmpo Vcr:rdek sricccsa prodneerl 
extmrtlirisry ,ioy over al1 Cutnlotiin; tlie prisonera wEre 
nirarched fromtom to tom,  the action cverymhere exaggernted; 
the d m e e  for cnrolling a fifth of thc mde populatian wns 
tlicn cnforced, sntl the esecution cntrustcd to tlic bnron d'E~olcs, 
a native of Talilrn, wliu afierrvads olitninecl consideirlile cele- 
brity. T h e  army, in mliich tliere n a s  stilI a large Iiody of Swias 
troops, T Y ~ S  thus reinforced, the eonfidence of tlie pcople 
increaserl, xnd a loml junto was estahlnhed nt llrenys dc alar, 
to orgfinixc t l i ~  S ( I ~ ~ ~ C ~ P R  fin t l ~ c  nnst, nnrl rlirect tlie applicn- 
tion ol strecuurrr Srom tlie sea; tlie pxrtisans &o, re-assemliIing 
tlidr dispersrd linnds in tlie Iiiglier ídleyli, again sexed tfie 
Arnpudnm ami incommoded tlie troops blocknding the citade1 
of Hostalrich. Q'Donnel ment tu Afznresa, cdled the migiic- 
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l e k s  from ths Lerida side to KB assistance, and with twelvo 
thousand iiglitiiig-men, took post at 31oyih in the beginning of 
February : from thi point he liarassed the Freneh in front of 
Vich, while Rorira occupied the heighta above Roda in rear of 
that t o m .  Souham, seeiag the crests of the hills thus s m -  
ing with enemies and having but five thousand mcn of nll 
anns to apposa them, rlemanded reinforcements; Augereau 
paid no attention to him, ibnd C}'Bonnel descending- t h ~  mountsin 
o€ Centellas on the 2 Oth, so suddenly entered the plains that 
the French general had only time to draw up his t m p s  a little 
in h n t  of the town, ere he m attaeked mith a vigonr hitberto 
unusual wiwtli the Spania*. 
Rovirw c o m m e n ~  the action by ariving the French posta 
from tha side of Roda. O'Donnel then carne dose up ta the 
French line, opcned tal1 his. p n s ,  and tliroiving out &ir- 
mishcrs dong tlio advema front fild his cavalsy undcr oom 
of their fire to the right, intending tu ouffiamlr 8onliam's lea, 
Tlirit general, leaving a battalien to bold Tlovira in check, 
enaoumged his own infantry, and sent kis dragoons q h t  
the Spanish horeemen, wbo were at the first chaxge driven 
baclc in coefusion. The Bpaniah foot fe11 in on tlie French 
centre bnt failed to  make any serious im$ression, whereupon 
O'Donncl, whow grcat supcriority of numbem cmbled him to 
keep 11enry rnnssw in reserve, encleavoured to ture both flmb 
o€ the enemy at the same time; Soulim waa then hard 
preesed, hia infantry were few, his reserves al1 engaged, and he 
wi-as severely wounded in the head; but O'Domel Iiaving rallied 
his cavalry and brought up his Swisei reg-iments, was full of 
confid~ncc, md fierccly led the whoIe maHs once more against 
the l c k  At thia mitical period the F ~ n c h  infantry, firdy 
clo~ing their runks, sent tlieir volley8 more rapidIy into the 
Lostile rmks, and the cavdry, xensibIe tliat tlie fatte of 811, 
for t11ere was no retretat, huag npon the issue of theu chsrge, 
met their adveaarie~ with such a. fdl caxeer tliat horse and 
man ~vent dom befoie tbem, when the Gwisa, being separaked 
lrom the rest, surrendered. EoPira was dso driven amy  
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from the mar, and the Spnnish ~ r m y  returned ta the biiis, 
having loat ra full fourtli of its own numliam, and 1~illed or 
wourrtled tmelve huntlred of tlie eaemy. 
O'Donnel's dvance had been tlie s i p l  for a11 the irregular 
tiands t o  act against the vrsrious quarters of tlie French; they 
wcrc bowe~er with the cxccption of a slight succonr thrown 
into Hoshlrich unsuccessfu1, and being clogely puraued by 
tlie movenble columns dispersed. Thus tlie higher valley3 
were agnin suhdud, the junta ffed fmm Arcnya de Mar, 
Campo Vcrdn rcturned to the country about C e p v q  and 
OIDonnelj quitting the upger Llobregat, retired to tlie mmp 
of Tarsgona, leaving onIy an d m n c d  p a r d  at Ordlal. It 
waa at thie moment, when Upper Catalonia m08 in a mnncr 
abnndonnl by thc Epuiiish gencml, tliat the cmperor dirccted 
ttie serentli corps upon tlie lower Ebro, ta support Suohet'a 
operationa aginst M d a  and Me~uinenza~ Aupmu, there- 
fo~e ,  laving EL detachment undw Verdier in the Ampnrdaq 
and tmo tlioiisaníl mcn t o  blockade Hostdricli, orcicred bis 
brotlier ond Mañ7;uclielli, who harl taken the eomrn~nd of 
Souhm's and Pino's &viaioas, to mrch upon Manresli, while 
with the Wwtphaliane he went once more to Barcelona and 
from tlienee directed al1 tho subsqncnt movements, His 
brother pnwing by Col de Sespina entered Xanresa, the 16th 
of Narch, nnd wta there joined by ?ifaziuchelIi; al1 tho 
inhabitxnts abanrlond the place, and Swarta wns sent with a 
bripde from hfoneada to tako possessioii, wliile tha two 
diviaions cantinuerI tlieir movement by MontRerrat upon 
Molino del R e .  The 21sE they advrtnced t o  Villa h n c %  
whereupon tlie Bpaniwda retired h m  Orclal towrards Tara- 
gona. The Frencli, acting under orders from Barcelona, thcn 
left a tliousnnd men in Villn Fianm, nnd nfter acouring the 
couniq on tlie riglit and left, pnssed tlie Col de h n  Crjstintb 
and estnblished tlieir qumters about Rws; by which the 
Spanish n m y  at Tamgoruh rits piatxd bctween them nnd the 
troops nt Villa Fnrncn, 
O'Donuel, \vLosa energy and military talenta wem suprior 
to liis pretlecessors, saw, and instantly profited from this false 
position. By liis  arder^, Juan Caro rnarclid with six thou- 
sand men ngninst the French in Villa Fmca, hnd oa tlie 
2 8th killed many mrl cnptured the rsst, togctIier mjtli Rome 
artilIery and stores, but bang moundd Iiimself resignd the 
commnnd to Gapca, Augermu, alarmed for Mitnresg de- 
hclleil colurnas both by Olesa and Mont~errat to reinforroe 
S&z, and tbe first renched ih destination; but B e  otlier, 
twelve hundred strong, mas intermpted by Uarrca and totally 
defeated at Esparaguera on the 3rd of ApriL Campo Verde 
coming down from the rBde of Cervera then took the com- 
mand, nnd procccdcd against Mnnresa by Montserrat, whilo 
Milnna de Roch nnd Rovira licmmcíl in  Ghe French on the 
opposite side, and tlie somntenes gatlerd on the bills to aid 
the opemtioas. Swartz, tllus menaced, evamiated the town 
in the ni& tliinking to baffle the Spaniartls by taking tha 
road of Taraza and Gbdd, but being followed closely by 
B o h  und Xilans, .was so pressed thc 5th of rlpril, thnt 
wit l~  peat diffidty and the Ioss of all his bnggage he readled 
Barcelona 
Thcsa operntions having isolntcd tlie French djvisions at 
Reus, nn officer ~ Y M  despmklied by pea wihh orrlers to real 
tham to Ihrceloiia, Sex+eroli, who bad taf~en tlie commnnd 
tliere, and whose Instructiom vere t o co-operate mith Suchet, 
had feared to  pws the mountaina between Eens and tlie 
Ebro, lest he shonld expose Es rear t o  an amck from Tara- 
gma, and pwliaps fail of meeting the third mrps at la& 
JCeeping, tlierefore on tbe defensive at Xleua, he detached 
colonet Villatte at tbc head of two httalions and soma cavalry 
across the hills, by Dos Aguas and Fnlcet, t o  opcn a commu- 
nication with the B~irrI corps, o pnrt of wliicli l i d  just seizd 
Mora and Flix on tl10 Iower Eho. 'Villratto ricoornplislied 
liii object snd returneíl with p a t  cderity, figliting his way 
throngh the somatenea who were pthering round the rtefla 
in liis rear, and regained Xeus just ss Severoli, 
~ ~ ~ i & ,  having rweived the oder of recal, was cornmcn* 
tnrc tic~i. ing his m m h  ~ O F  Barcelona. IR tlie night of the 
Italinni in 
, 
Gtli, thia movement took place, but hs such con- 
Caion that O'Donnel perceived tlic disorder from 
Taragonn, nnd sentling a dcttld~ment under colonel Orry to 
hams the PrencIi, followetl liiimelf with ttie rwt üf liia iirmy. 
Neverthelas, hveroli's rm-par¿! co~ered the retreat Biiccess- 
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fully until 6 position rras attained near Pilla Franca, where 
0iY, ppress& on toa closely, mas mounded and talren, nnd 
his troops rejoined t h e i ~  main body. Campo T e d e  then fe11 
bnclc tu Cernera, 8cveroli rmlied Bnrcelonn, and Augwettu 
retired to  Qcronn, l iavin~ lost more tlinn three thousand men, 
by a serie8 of most unslrilful movenienh. 
The siteakion in which Ile had voIuntariIy placed himelf, 
was preciwlj such rm n p n t  generra1 mould avoid. For 
Rsrcelona, the centre of Lis opemtions, mm encircled by 
mountnba to be  sed onlg at certain defiles; Reua and 
hfawcsn wcTe beyond tboae defiles md tleveral dgs' march 
from each other. Rovirn nnd hfilnns, lying nhout San Culgnt, 
cut tlie oommunicntion Iietween hianrese and Barcelona. 
O'DonneI nt Taragona was nearer to  the defila of Cristinn 
than the French diviaionri at Reus; liis communicationa were 
opcn with Cmmpo Verde by VnIls, PTn, nnd Santa Coloma do 
Quera~ilt, mil with Milms snd RovEra, by Villa, Frsnm San 
Sadurni and Tpalalnda, The Frmch marshal had, indeed, 
plwed a tixttalion in Vilh Fmnca, y& this only rendered hitr 
situation worse; for whnt could ~ i x  hundred men effect in a 
mountainoua oountry agninst tliree eonsideral~le liodie~ of the 
enemyl TIie resuIt mas inevitable, The tiattalion at Villa 
Franca was put ta the smord, Smrtz saved a remnant o€ his 
brigncle by -FI timcly flight, nnd thc divisione at &UB with 
diiiicufty mde gootl tlieir retreitt. O'Dorinel, ~ v h o  one rnontli 
Iieforc l id  retired fmm the battIe of Vi&, JiscomfiGed by 
onIy five tliousand French, now, with that vev beaten a& 
Iiafflerl Angeienii, antl forcetl him, Jtliough nt the head of 
more tlinn tiventy tliouaind men, to abiwidon Lower Chtalonim 
anrl retire to Geiona with d i s p c o  : a surprhing change, yet 
cine in wTUch fortune liar1 no share. 
Augereau's talents for handling amaii oo rp  
in n iiuttle hnvc heen recorrled by n rnrmter hanrl. 
~ ~ ~ ~ ' o  
Tliern ie n vnst difference betiveen tliat and con- 
dnctinn a eampaim But tlie trutli ig Caknlonitt liad, like 
Aragon, been declared a particular go~emment, and Augermu, 
whb mns oftlicted vith gout, remnined in the palace of Rarce- 
lona affecting tlie state of a vicmy when l i a  8liould Iiwe 
h n  at tlie Iid of bis trwp in thc field On tlie otlier 

lrillcd, tlie re~t  disperñed nnd eight hundml rcach~l  Vich 
Thw, afkr fonr rnontlis' IilocIroJe nnd ten ~veelts' hmbard- 
ment, h e  castle fell. the communication with Barcelona i ~ a s  
complekd, and Duhasme's errors were partly remdied; but nt 
the cost of two y a '  ficld operntions, mmy battlm, and f~ 
sicgcs. 
Tma srnali islmde, called Las Nedns, situated at the mouth 
of the Ter and afforcling 8 safe ancncliorage mere next seized. 
Thia event, mhich faciIitnted tlie prissage of ttlie Frcnch vewels 
stenling From port to port witt ~ F O V ~ R ~ O ~ S  or despntclie~, finished 
Augermu'e mreer ; it liad been tise reverse of Xt, Cyr's, Tha 
latter, victonous in tlie field wits humane r i f t e d s ;  Angereau 
seelting to frighten the people iato submission whom he had 
failctl to bent, crcdcd gibbets nrong tlio liigli-roda, upon 
wliich every mnn hken in arms w a ~  hung up witllout remorsn 
The Catalans, more animatd by their succcssm than dauntd 
by thia Eiarliarous severity, became incredibly s x v a ~ p  inrevcnge, 
al1 human fccllng di~appcared, nnd both padies were &e 
&epfid iu blood and loaderi with crimea, 
W ~ L E  these things happened in Cnhlonia, Suchet, sensible 
how injuriow ihe expedition to Tralencia had proved, diligently 
repaird tliat error. hinforcements from France rriisecl l i a  
figliting men to twenty-thrce t11oiisrtnd; he drew out thirteen 
tliousnnd to form tlre siegc of Lerida; tlie m a i n d c r  were 
requird for the forts of A-rsgon, nnd t o  chcclc tho pnrtiwns; 
principlly in the Iiiglier vnlleyu o€ the Pyrenw, tliougli VilItr 
Campa, with three or four tliousl~nd men, ~ti l l  idested the 
lordship o€ hlolina mil the mmintnins of Aibarach. Two linea 
of operation were open, the one short aild direct by tlle high 
rcarl leading througi Frnp ta Lerida; the other, circuitoun, 
ovcr the Sicrrn dc Alcrrbicme ta Rioneon, nnd from tlicnoe t o  
Lcrirln. The first was inconvcnicnt, bemiise the Spanirmls 
wlien tliey took Frnga dwtroyerl tlie brirIge over tlie Cinw; 
moreover Mequinenza, tiie Octogesa of CEM, situated at tlie 
coduenca of the Se,- and tho Ebro, was close on the right 
flmk and rnight seriously incommode the cemmunications with 
Zaragoza. The second route, longer but snfer, was leso 
edau~lterl of forage and proviaions. 
Nonzon waa a considcruble mil i t n y  establishment, and the 
Finttering train, ceiuisting of forty pieoes witli acvcn hundred 
rotinds uf nmmunition nttnched to CGCII, ww dirccted tbere, 
escorted by Haliertk division ivliich accu~iied tlie line of tlie 
Cincn. LevaI, leaving Chlopiski'~ brigde at Daroce to observe 
Villa Cnmpq drew nearer to Zaragoza, Mumier marclied 
mith one hrigade t o  Aicanitq mliitlier bis aecond brigade 11~d 
heen conrliicted from Temd across the Sierra de Gndar. The 
&la of Wbnstro, Huesa, Ayerbe, Zam, Hna, Bujnrola, 
mil otlier point,s on thc left of tiic miro, werc oocupiorl liy 
detaclitnents. Tlie right linnlc of tliat river wn.4 gunrded by 
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of fortified postc: there remained two divisions of infantry and 
nine hundrd cnvalv disposrable for tlie operations agninst 
Iierida On the Spanish sirle, Campo Vcrdc w n ~  wikh O'nuanel 
nt Ilniirean; Gnrcia Novaro was at Tarngona, Iinving sinall 
dehl~nients  on tlie riglit bank of tlie Ebro to cover Tortom; 
rerela vith five bnttalions occupied Bdzguer ori the upper 
Sebre. In this &te of affnirs hItisnier, torvards thc end of 
illatch, crosscrl the Gundnliipq drovc Novsarm'a dctmlimcnts 
into Tortoza, remouiitecl tlie Eliro, seized somo boa&) and 
passing tliat rivcr st Mora and at FIix, communic~tecl~ as liefore 
relxted, ~vitli coIonel~illrrtte o£ the rieventh eorps. Eabert crossed 
tlie Cinen in tivo columns; onc movcd strnight iipon Rnlnpcr; 
tha otlier passed tlia Scpe ~ a t  Cam:~rasa, aud Pereña fenring 
t o  he attacl~ed on both sirlw of that river, retired doivn the 
Ieft baiilt, passed at Leridn, re-ascended the right bank to 
Corbins, and took post bchind tlie Nogricrra at its confliience 
with tlie Sejirc. Sucliet tlien re~inircd to Monzon, plilced 8 
detachment at CIaadnsnos to protect his estnblishments from 
the gttrrison of Ifequinema, xnrf adranced ivitl~ a brigde of 
infnntry md al1 bis cavalry winst Le~idii. H~i~nliert descend- 
ing flic riglib bnnlr of tlie Scgrc forced thc prwsage of the 
Noguerra and drow Pereñn into the place, while 3fusnier 
cnme up from fl ix,  xnd Lerida m cncompnssed. mc opera- 
tions of Suchct and Ai~gcre~u wcre tlius coi~ncctcd ;bnt thc lino 
from A~nqon waq mlirirt nnd ~iipplies nbundant, bccmiisc tlie 
produce cif tlie province exceetled the con~umptioii; from 
Catalonia it nrn.q long and unsxfe, and Catalonin codd nerer 
fmd its own pop~ilation. 
Leri da conhixiiicd eigl~tccn thoiisnnd inlinbitnnta. Bcing on 
tlie Iiig-11 rontl from Xorngor~ to Rai.c~lon4 Iiavinp e. dona 
bridge owr tlle Sege, nnd at no grmt diatmce from the Ebro 
and Cinw rivcrs, its strategic importnnce i w i s  great ; ancI the 
more so, tlint it Ln a mnnner commnniied tlie plchin of Urgcl, 
cnlleil tiie grnnav of Cntnlonia Gonsdee wns govenlor, but 
Qxrcin Conde  vas sppointcd cliiaf comiunnrlaiit to nplierase: Iiis 
discontent at O'Donncl's elevation, and the truops he brougllt 
incremd tlie garrison to niiie tllousnnd replan, besides tlie 
arrnerl inliabitatits. 
The Segrc covcrctl tlic toivn on thc ~o~itli-en&; tho bridge 
pmtecteíl on tlia left h n k  by a mmpatt nnd ditcli cnclus 
ing ra aqmre done building; the M y  of tEia place on tlie 
nortli wm defended by a wall, without ditch w covercd my, 
but strengthened by bastious and towem T i ~ i a  m11 j o i n d  
on the ea& a rocky hill two hundred and fifky feet liigli, 
which eustained the citdel, an assemblage of solid edifioe~ 
cludcring about a castle of grext lieigh.ht, md wmmndd 
by an irregulnr work with good Iinstionq and ramparts from 
forty tX fifty fe& high. 
Fmm tlic citndcl the descent into the tom wns gentle, and 
the worka strengtliened by ditclies; in otlter parts tlie wdls 
could be seen ta their base, Eiut from the heiglit of the roclr 
not to be breacled, and the approaches were nearly inacces- 
&le. Between the citadel-rock and the river, the town was 
queezed out h o  or three hundred yards, the d i e n t  gmt 
being w r e d  by an entrenchment, with two baations caiied 
he Carmen and the Magdalen. To the westmard at seven or 
eight bnndrd ya&, tlie hiü where Afranius and Petreiua 
encnrripecl to oppose Cwsar, m, on the end next to Leida,  
occupied by Fort M e n ,  which ww itself c o v e d  liy a Inrge 
horn-work with ditcliea twmty feet deg .  At tlie f d i e s t  
extremity of tlie Afranian Iiill were twe Inrge redonbts cdled 
the Pilar md San Fernando, which secnred al1 the fiat sumrnit. 
The worIrri of Lerida were good and a r m d  with mora than 
one hnndred pieces of artillery; the magazine9 mere full, and 
a Iocal junta baving been formed to excite public feeling, twa 
officers of artillery were irnruediately murdered and their henda 
miled to the gnÍm of the town. 
Thia sicge m to have been m d c  by the k h i d  and sevcnth 
oorp~ in conjunction; But eolonel Tillatte's reprt, and: tlie 
appemnce of lianrls on the lower Eliro, Ied Sucliet to suñpect 
tlie seventh corps hd dready retired and cast the wbole bur- 
then on him. Wherefore lie retained hiai liattering train at 
Monzon, intending to wait until O'Donnel's plans ~ h o d d  be 
more clearly indiwted; yet he esta1)Iished a T e  f e q  across 
the Gegre, one league above Leda ,  and after clwely exa- 
mining the defcnccs, prepred makriala for the con~tn~ction 
uf batteriee. 
Two bsttalians of the investinp troop~l iad h n  left at Mon- 
zon and Bnlaguer, the remainder were thus distribrited. Qn 
She lcft of tlie Segre four tlioucinnrl men, incliiding a regirnent 
of cuimsiem and one of liuasars, vero stationed at Alcoteletge 
in obserretion, md Harispe with three battalions invested the 
bridge-head of Lerida: tlie ferry-boat mas thus protected, 
and danger from the surlden rising of the i S e p  olivi~ted, 
bennuso tlie s t ~ n e  bridge of Bialaguer furriislied n eertain corn- 
mnnication. She rest of the troopa occupied points on the 
roade to Monzon, Praga, aria Corbiiis, but being too fem t o  
carry tlie investment round Fort Carden that part vas sooured 
by pntrolm. 
Scarcely mas t h i ~  oompIeterI when a Sp~nish oficer, ptend- 
ing to treat for an exchange of priaoners, n p p e a d  at the out- 
posts and was detnined. Sncliet judged his red object ms t o  
gain information; for there were rumours tliat O'Uonnol mas 
collecting troops at h~omblmcl~, that Campo Verde was doing 
the aame at Cernera, m d  that the iiomatenes were in arms on 
the npper &p. Ta nscertain the tnitli, ñarispe m 6  rein- 
forccd nnd the corps of obserwltion was pushed 'm Bdaguer; 
the governor of Lerida immedititely sallierl, ht mwi reliulsed 
with los% and on tha 21st Suchet broke the bridge of Cama- 
m a  above Balaper, and advanced to Tarrega, forty mila  
on the rmd to Unrcclona. He wag still uucertain of Ange- 
mu'u movements, d like every other general, Frencli and 
Englkh, faund it difficult to obtrtin authentic informakion. By 
an accident he aacertained that O'Donnel mas at Momblanch 
with twe divisiona prepmiring ta succour Lerid~, wherefore 
returning te Balaper in m e  march, he m d e  hiusnier r e m e  
his former position 'at dcotelctge. This rapidity was me11 
timed, for U'Donnel hrsvlng alreodypwd thc defiles of Yom- 
blnnch with eight thouairnrl infnntry anr? six Iinndrcd m~rtlry, 
h d  enmmped at Vinaxa, tiventy-five miIes from brida t h a  
22nd. Tliere a note freno Garcia Conde infomed bim the 
French reseme maa drama off tZie inveating force me&, and 
1113 immerlintely pushcd formrd, renclicd Juncday Foudeen 
milea fmm hr idr t ,  by ten o'cIoclr in tlie rnorning of tlie 2 3 4  
niaxle a haIt of two Iionrs, md tlien resuming Iiis mar& mith 
 he camlry and one division of infanty left the other to foIlow 
more leisurely. 
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Fonr miles from Jnnda  B t o d  the ruined víIbge of Marga- 
lef, nnd from thence to  Lerida, was ,an open country in which 
O'Domel conld perceive no oovering force. 'Ihisting Iio~vevcr 
implicitly to Conde's information, alreudy falsified by Suchet'a 
wtivity, tlie fip~innicrFi general descended t1,lie fiiFIs nrid crossed 
tlie p1t-h jn tliree columns, one iollowing tlie higli rod ,  tlis 
otlm k m  mmIiine; on tlie r i ~ h t  B I I ~  left. Tl~o centre out- 
stripping the fl ankers drove back IIaispe% pposts, but tlmt 
general cliarged rvith his three hundred hussars ugon the 
centre Spnriish colurnn so suddenly tbt it vas tliroan into 
confusion nnd fled towarcls Margalef, to mhich place the flank 
colnmns ulso retreznted, yet in good order. During tkis skirmish 
the pnison ~nlEicd wcr tlic bridge, Iiut aa tlic &nch infantry 
stood fim, mnrl tlic rout of O'Donnel's people wns complete, 
they soou returned to the town. Musnier, Iiearing tlie fuzng 
and pessing the stah of uffdrs, hliad marchd with liis infan- 
t.7 antl fonr Iiundred cuirñssiers from Alcoteletge across tbe 
plain towads Nmplef, hoping to mt off t h e  Spipsniads' retreat; 
yet ere he got up O'Donnel iws again in line of liatt.le, h a h g  
hie firhillcry on tlic right and his cavalry aa the leR. Bis 
semnd division was still in the renr, the French cuirasriiem md 
a liattery of light nrtillcry cnme up nt e quick pace, n ncnnnunade 
commenced, nnd tlie Spanisli czvalry rode forwnrd; but the 
Aench cuhsiers, under general Boussard, drove them hck 
on the line of F-itlttle so rudely that the latter dso wavered, 
and the cuirassiers fe11 upon the h n k  o€ the infantry. Tainly 
the Wailoon guards endeavoured to form square, the diaorder 
h e m e  extreme, nnd finnlly the Spaniards tlirem down their 
axms or were sabrcd. Boussd,  elaM with guocess, tlren 
overtlirew R Swiss regimant fonning tlie ~ Ivunced  p n r d  of the 
seconrl Epniiisli division, yet tlic mnin hotly clieclced Iiis fury, 
and O'DonncE retreritacl iii good order witliout furtlier Ioss to 
the defile of 3fomblnnch. This aetion, altliough not cliscredit- 
alile to O'Donncl, mas v l  iinfortunnte, thc plnin WM stremed 
rvith c r i s c ~ ~ e s ,  and tliree Spanish pm, cine geneml, eight colo- 
nel.ri, and fivc tlioumncl mcn ívere cnpturctl. Ncxt dtby tbc pri- 
soners, lieing fimt ostentntiously rnnrcl~ed under tlie ~mlls of tlie 
tomn, were sho~vn to tho Sprtnish officcr mlio Iid been detliined 
un tlie 19111, afkr whicli he m dismissed, %y the road of Gr- 
vera, that he migIit spreatl tlie nem of the defeat. 
Suchet, to profit from tlie effcct of tliia victory, on the night 
aftcr the battIe sssanlterl the redoubts of San Fernnnrlo nnd 
Pilar. Rti carrictl tlie Intter, aiid gninerl tlic ditcli of h n  Fcr- 
nado,  from wlience the Spani:~rds, only fdty in number and 
unprovicled with Iiand grcnarles, could not drive them, d 
parley ensued, and It zvw agreerl the 'wnch sIiould retire with- 
out being molcsted; tlirrri tlic Pilar w a ~  n l ~ o  nnvcd, for being 
commnnded by San Permida it wafi necessarily evacuated. 
Previous to tliis attempt, tlie city Iiacl been summoned mith itn 
offcr to let oornmissionem count tlie deacE on the field of Mar- 
galef ancl review the prisonerri, I r u t  Gn~cia Conclc rcplied, 
that Lwkh Imd a m  loobxi for mcw in inw 
& ~ ~ 8 :  
AItlioagh Aiigerenu's retreat ~v,vas now ascsrtained, the 
victory of Margiilef and the apatliy of the Valencimns encou- 
mged SucIiet to commence tlie aiege. The prisonerri ame 
sienti to Frnnce, thc bzttcring tmin \va3 broughk np from 
Mornon, tlia Spnnisli outposts were Jriven wit,ltin tlm wiills 
betmesn the 26th and 27th, nnd in tbe night ground was 
brolcen thrce hunrlred yxds from the bastions of thc Carmen 
ami1 hfagdden. Thc beaegcrl thrcw firc-bnlls nnd opcnerl a 
few guns, but when day broIta tlie besiegers were ncll cevsred 
iu tlie trenches. 
In  t,he nig1it o€ the 30th the first par3,lIel ms completed, 
and brenching nntl miintcr hntteriea wcrc commcnced: eix 
aixteen-poiinrlem to batter tlie; lcft fm OS tho CWIIIC~, four 
long twlve-pounders to min the defenccs of the IlagdaIm, 
fonr mortars af eiglt inches to tliraw sliells into tlie citarlel. 
TEie wcntlier mns miny, tiic lnbour Iicnvy, yct on tlic 2nd of 
Mny> n fourth bnttery, nrmetl ivitli two rnortars and t~r-o six- 
teeii-poundets, mns miwd apniu~t  he Gnrmen. Tlie Xpanish 
musketeers incommotIsd the trcncl~es froin tlio left bank d 
tlie Regre, ancl tlie Frcncli contractcd tlic circlc of invcstrncnt 
on t l i~t ~ idc ;  hut in the e~rning of tlic 4tIi, sis Iiinidrcrl 
Wpnniiirtl~, wllyiiig froni tlie C:ii-tneii, carried tlie battery 
tliere anil a11 the left of the trendics, lvhilc anotlier hdy, 
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wming Erom tho Magaalen, mena~ed the rigl~t of the French 
worker. T h e  guards Iielrl tlie latter in check, and the reserve8 
drovo the former bwk into tlie t o m ;  md ko meet such 
d~ngeroua irruptions ia ditch and mmpart, serving as a place 
of a=, weie carrid from the fourtli battery down to the 
d e ,  Aa the lig-ht troops continned ta vex tbe trencha 
from tha other side of the Segre, grountl was broken dose to 
the water, and a httery of two gnna ww constructed to 
answsr six Spnnidi fi~ld-pieceei posted on the bridge itself. 
The pmllel of the m&in attaick sas also extended on the 
right to embrace a part of the aorthern front of the citadel, 
antl tmo morkm were placed a t  this extremity. 
811 €he French batteriee opened at d a y b d  on the 7tb, 
the rnortars plnyd into the t o w n  and citadel, and four 
Spaniah gunn were dismounted in tlie Cameu. Tlis connter 
fire gilenced tiwee French batteriea, the dismomkd pns  were 
replaced, and three hundred men, gtertling out at dusk by the 
Puerta Nueva, fe11 npon the rigbt of the padlels, took the 
two mortrm and penetinted to  the lapproachm npinst the 
hIagdalen. Thia sally was repulsed, yet the Frencl~ liuflered 
from the Spanth gune in the pursuit, and at night a violent 
rain darnaged the bntteries and overflowd the trenclies. 
From thc 8tl1 to tho 11th the h iegem lnbonred t o  open a 
second pralIel, one liundred and fifty yarde in advance of the 
first, designing to constmct freah battterim closer under the 
citadel-rock and Iess expaed t o  its plunglng fire. Nore 
guns, and of a larger siza, were also rnounted, three new 
b~ttcrics wero mnstmcted, rnarksmen were plantea to harma 
tlie Spnnish cannoneew, and on the 12th ths fire mom- , 
menced from dgbt htteries containing fifteen p n s  md nina 
teen mortara. The besieged repIied at h t  sharply, but soon 
stammered jn tlieir ansmers, the Aench artillery took the 
ascendant, the wnUa of the Carmen and Magdalen crambIed 
undcr tlieir anlvos, and ti portnble rnfigmkte cxpladcd in the 
citníEel. Towerds evening two bml ies  in tlie Chmen nnd 
one in tlie Magdden appeared practicable, but after dark, 
some Bwiviss desertem hrouglit intelligcnce, that the stLeetsi of 
thc t o n  behind the breaches were retrenehed and defended 
by Unttcrim. 
Snchet'a hopea of au early suoce~s then rose liigh. Be 
judged that tlie vehmence o£ tlie citízens and nrined 
peasmtry in the place would force thc governor to Rglit tlic 
town to thc In~t,  instend of mserving his efTorts for the defenc~ 
of t,lie -cihdcl. He knew thnt nrmcd mobs aro cusily excited 
sud elisily discourng~l; aurl he cSesíjind tlierefore to carry t,he 
breaclics, and with enc slwcp force al1 tlio inhnbihnts iiitci 
tlic citadel, n z s u r d  tliey ivould hamper, if not entirely mar 
the defeiice of tlint formidnlile fortrcss. Fiist lion-ever, Iie 
resolved tu carry tlis forts rif 8:m FernrtncIo aiiri tlio Pilar, 
and tbe liorn-work of Fort Qarrlen, lest tIie citiaenc, flj?ng 
from tlie assnult of the bmqclies sbould take refuge on t t a t  
sirle. To cffccct tEiis, tlircc colurnns povidcrl mith 1ndder.s 
siiiiultntieously mouiitd the I i i l  of Mranius tliat ni&; ous 
rnarclied agnin~t tIie redoubks, the otliers were to c tom tlie 
horu-mork on two sides. Thc PiIar \vas cnrried without 
dificulty, and tlio prr ison Rping townnls Port Gnrdcn fcll 
in with tlie second Freiich coluinii, ~vhicli arrived mitli tlie 
fugitives nt the tlitch of  tlie h~~n-~vorlr, and being there joinetl 
by tlic tliird column, whicli 11nd talten a wrong directiori, tlie 
wliole inass entered tlio place figllting. SIie Spaniwds saved 
tliem@elves in the Fo& snd tliough tIie people in Fernando 
reaisted dcspernlely, that redonbt was calso tnlren and ti%-o- 
tliirds o€ thc dcfcn~lnnt~s put to tlic sworrl: thc Fieilch e f f c c t d  
&ir object witli tbe loss of n liundred mcn. 
During this operation tlie ~ e n t  bntteries plxycd into tlie 
citatlel only, but aG dnylirmk ronewctl tlisir firc en tlie 
brendicri; ~ t c p s  were crrt iii tilo pnrnll~l to fiicilitntc tho 
advanoe of tlie troops t o  thc msltult, and the materia& to effcct 
a solid lwt,pent on the ndls were conveyed into tlic trenches. 
ht seven o'cloclr in t he  cvening of tllc 13t11, tllc siqrtl litiing 
rntide, four stiirining pnrtii!s jiirn~ieri uut of the trctic!ics, two 
m ~ d e  for the Cai~uen, one for tlie Nagdzlcn, xnd one movctl 
close by die rivrr. Tlie Spxniards wcre prcparing n sxHy to 
retake the llorn-n-orlc of Fort Carden3 nnd dirl so littIc expect 
t.liis nqsnult tlint tlie Frcirdi mo~iritctl tlic lirciaclieñ ivit1iui;t 
up1iositioa Sjoon hon-ever the gari3son rallied, nnd poured so 
tpriihle rt fire on tIie heaíls of tlic storinew, tliat tliey stag- 
pred, and woultl lin-rc jielded if ETaliert Iirul not i.envetl tlicir 
courcigc. Lcd 1)s Lim tbcy forced tlieir wny, and at tlmt 
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moment tlie troops on the riglit ltnd Ieft turnecl dl hhe retrench- 
rnents in tlie streets. On the othw side of the river Earispe 
won the  bridge, and Wuchet liimself, following close upon tl~e 
steps of the f o d n g  parties with tlie reserve, forwd tlie 
regular troops t o  retrmt into the citttde1. Tlien 
SUcl'et'B he put his desigri. in cxecution. Harispeh bbrjpdc Dicmoirs. 
passd the bridge, aiid tnaking far tlie p t e  u t  Sk 
Antliony, wmliich looked t o w d s  Fert G d e n ,  entirely cut off 
e p ~ s  from the tom; tliat done, tlie coIumns advanced 
from every side in s coiicentric direction upon tha citadel, 
driving with shouts and stah nnd musket y, men, women, and 
ckiIdren before tliem, ~vhile the pns  of the mstle smote 
friends and foes di1;c. FIying up the ascent tlic ahrie1cing 
i~nd terri fied cro~vds rusheti into thc fortress mitli tlic i.ctiring 
garrison, and crohrded tlio suinniit of th0 roclr ; hut al1 Lhat 
night the Frenclt dieEls fell arnongst the hqless multitude, 
anrl at dnyligl~t the firc bcing redoubIed, the carnage swelled 
until C;ci.ela Cande, unnble to b ~ w  the miea and suft'erings of 
tho misertilde peo~ilc, lioistecl the ivliitc flag. At twelve e'ciock 
tIie horrible scene teriniurtted. Tlie capitulatinn wvhich fol- 
lowed ~vaa 11onombEe in tems to the besieged, but Fort Gar- 
den being incliided, Suclict b e m e  master of hr idn  wi& its 
imrnense storcs snd near cigbt thoumnd prisoners, the g d o n  
hnving lost orily twcl~e  liundrcd mcii. 
Tlius auddenly wns tliis powerfut fortress rduced by a pro- 
wediiig, politic indeecl, yet scarcely to h adrnitted rvitluu the 
pale of civilized %+dare. Por though a town taken by assault 
is congidered the h'1vfu1 prey of a licentious soldicry, thja 
remnant of bmkism,  dispcing the military profcssion, does 
not warrant tlie driving of unnrmed lielpless people into a 
situation, whcrc thcy miist pcrisli from tlic iirc of tbe encmy 
ainlcu the govcrnor fnil in Iiis duty. Suclict jitstifics it on 
tlic gruuud tliat iit prevcntetl ra g c a t  eflirsion of Lilood, nihicli 
must necesmily bave attended a protmcted aiege. Tlic f ~ t  is 
true, ykt it vas ~ p r i n g  mldiers' blood at the expense of 
women's nnd children'a : liad Garcin Conde's nature beca stem, 
he nlso mi& have pleded expediency, and tlie victory would 
hnve J n l l ~ n  to l i m  who could longc~t  l i a v ~  nush~ncci tlie sight of 
maugled infanta aria dmpairilig motlrm. 
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L E ~ D A  being t~ken, Conde wns, ss a matter of wiimc, nceused 
of timc11ery. Sliere seems no foiind~tition for the c h q c ,  the 
cnuso statcd by SucLet sufllcedJ yet the defence was unskilful. 
Tlie ~vnlls of tIie tomn scarcely offercd an impediment to tlie 
French gcnernl, mliercfore thc citadcl should have bwn better 
prepnmd : nnrl IM the berilrgcrs' force, thc ooqs of okrrntion 
being deductetl, did not exceed the prrison in nnmber, it 
miglit have bamed Buchet's utmost effoPts. Enginoers require 
the relative strengtli of besigers and besiegerl to be not less 
tlinn fonr to one; hcre tlie Frcncli investcti n forco equal to 
tlemselves, and in a sI~ort ime r e d u d  a gcat fort.ress in the 
niidst of B U C ~ O U ~ ~ ~  armiee. For Let-ida had communications, 
1". With the armed populntlon of the Iiigh wlleys; So. mTitli 
O'Donnd's corps of fourtsen tliousnnd; 3". With Cervem, 
wEiere Cmpo Verde wns posted 6 t h  four thowand men; 
4'. ?Tith Torbzn, where thc marquis of Lazan, now released 
from his imprisoriment, coommlindc<l from five t o  six thotisand ; 
59 With VaIench in mhich previiice tliere was tb disposnlile 
army of fifteen tliousand redar ,  and more than thirty thou- 
snntI irregular soIdiers. 
If al1 tliese forma liad been dirccted with skill, and in con- 
cert, upon Lerida, the riiege mould Iim been raisd ~nrl the 
safety of tlie third corpa perillcd. It ~aas to olii+ate this 
dangcr Nayoleon direded tlie seventh corps t o  taIi,líe nuch s 
position on tlie loiver Ebro as moulrl lrccp botli O'Donnel nnd 
tlie lTul~ucinns in cLocI~ bugcrcnu fnilcd to do tlu's. St. Cyr 
sxys the seventli corps wuld nevcr mfely venture to p s s  t l ~ e  
rnountnins and enter tlie vdIey of tlie Ebro, but Xucliet saya 
Knpoleon's iiist.ructions could have bccn obeycd vitlioiit diffi- 
cuIty. St. Qruntler somemlint similnr cii~iimstnnecs bIockadec2 
Tiirngoas fur n ~nuntli; dugerrnu w i t l ~  more troop ancl fewer 
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enemie~  might have done the #ame, and y& have spared six 
tliousnnd mcn $0 pnss tlie mountnins. Sucliet ~vould then 
Iinve Leen tmuquil with respec t to  O'DonneI, would lii~ve liad 
a corering srmy to protect the sicge, and the men sent from 
Catalonia, codd luve Iieen fed hom tlie remarces of Brqon. 
Auprcau has been jnstified on the gronnd thrat the blockade 
of HostallrEch would have been raised irltilc he was on the 
Ebro. This dmger eould no* havc escnped the cmperor; yet 
lija m i l i t x ~  jurlgmciit, uncrring in principie, wnri often fnlse ia 
applimtion; bewuse mcn rncnsurc difficulties by the stnnrlard 
of tlieir own captpacity, and Nnpoleon's standard only suited tbe 
heroic proportions. Cahlonia liresented extraordinary &ffi- 
culties to tlie hvaders. lChe poivexfd military organization 
of tlie mipeletes nnd somntcnes,-the well-arrangod sptem 
of fortresse%-the niggeclness aad sterility of tlie country,- 
tlic ingcnuity and rcndincss af ii mnnnfaetuxiiig popu1iition 
tlirown out of n.ork, nnd tIie nid of m Englisli fleet r e n d e d  
the conrluest of that pro~ince a gigantic tnsk: nwcrtlielws 
tlie Frcnch made lirogress, each step pIanteil slowIy indeed and 
Nith pain but fimly, ami insuriiig tlie power of makng 
nnotlicr. 
HnstiiTricIi antl Leridn fe11 on the hame day. n o  first con- 
solidatod tlia Frcnch line of comrnunicatiou ~ G t h  Barcelona; 
tlie setxind gave Suchet. Imge magasinea, stures of powder, ten 
thousand muskets, the command of severa! dangerous rivem, 
casy nccess to the higher valleys, and a firm footing in tlie 
inirld of tlie Cntdoninn strongholrls; ntirl hc l i d  talan or 
lrilled fifteen tltousiind Spunisll ~oldiew : y& this wns but tlie 
preluda t o  greater strugleir, for tlie migueleteri furnished 
O-DonneI alinndnnce of men, md he Iiad coumge and aliilities. 
Urgel, Cadons, Bergn, Cerverx, Mequinenztn, Tarqona, San 
Felip~ic Ealnguer, and Tortosa the Imk of wnnexion between 
Iralcricia ancl Cat,tnlonirt, werc stiIl to bc sulsdued ; and during 
cvcry ~ c a t  opcration, thc pnrtisiina, bcing unmoIcsted, rcco- 
vercil strengtli. Tlius during tlie ñi~ge, Limnn entered Alcniiita 
mith fire tliolisan(nd men, and would liwe carried the cmtle if 
LamI lid not despntcl~ed tvo thousand me11 from Zaragoza to 
its succour. Tills Cnmpa rit tlie same time intercepted a con- 
voy goinj from Cnliitn~ud to Znriigozrt, cscortcd. hy four Iiun- 
dretl men under colonel Petit, m-€to fougllt liis wny for h n  
miles, and one hundred and eighQ mounded men actiially 
p~ssed tllc Llon,  and finnlly repulsed tlic ~issailants. The 
remainder of tliis desperate bund were t~lren or IíiIled, anrl 
Petit liimsclf, wountlcr1, n prisoner, wns mhilc sitting in tlirr; 
rnidst of severa1 Spani~h officem basely rniirrleretl t~ ie  vening 
after tlie nction; Villa Crimpa pnt thc assnsain t o  death inclml, 
but suffcrctl his men t o  burn nlive nn old man, thc ~~llcrtldc of 
Frntino, wlio FYM talccn ramong tlie Frcndt. 
T l i i  action happened tlie dxy Lerids fcll, and CliIopisIri, 
folloiving Trilla Cnmpn's mrtrcli f r ~ m  Daroca, rcaclied Frasno 
tlie next day, hut tlie iSpnniards were no longer tliere. ChEo- 
piski, dividing I i i ~  forccs, pursued them by tlie roritcs nf Cnln- 
tayud nnrl Xnram to Ifolina, wliere he destroyed a maiiiifxtory 
of arnis, anrl so presa4 Villa Campa that liis troops rlisbandeil, 
and for tlic most part rctired to tlicir homca. An nttrick, 
made from tho side of Navane by some bnnds, mna vigoroiisly 
repulsed from Ayerbe; and time cvents proved thc stability of 
Suchet's porver in iYrngon, for his systern w a q  grntlually anpping 
tlic spirit of resistnncc in t hn t  provincc. In Lcride his can- 
cluc.t  vas gcntle antl moderate ns fie nature of tlie rvnr would 
perinit, bnt  liis situntion required decided measures. Tlie 
retrcat of t11e seventh corps liati set free O'Donnel's and C~mpo 
Vcrde's nrmieñ, um(l al1 tlie irrrgulnr linnda. Tlia somntenea of 
tlie Ziiglll valleys appcareti in forcc on tlie upper Scgre the very 
&y of the assnult, nnd eiglit liiintlrcri migueletes attacked 
Venasque tliree clnys b e r  ; while Ciirnpo Vcrtle, mnrdiing 
from Cernera to tlle muiiiitiiins o f  Lliniaiin aliove Ttalarn nnd 
Tremp, assciiihlcd p n t  Iiodies of tlie soinatenes. Al1 their plms 
mere lion-evr tlisconcerted by tlic siidden fa11 of Lerida, the 
migc leks  mere rcpidsed from Vcnasquc, tha somatcnes mcre 
defeated nt Trernli, nnd Rnbcrt ciittiiig Cnmpo Verde off 
froin Cervern, forced him to retrent. upon Cnrdona, If the 
citadel of Lerrda had held out, and O'Donnel Irad combined 
liis mnrcli nt n lntcr period ~ 4 t h  thcse aomnteaes nnd nith 
Cninlio VcnFg tlic tliirtl corps cottlil scnrccly l i n ~ ~  esmped dis- 
aster; liut now tlie plnin uf U ~ e l  iinrl nll the fertilc v a i l e ~ . ~  
opening upon Lcriclti. fe11 to tlie Prencli, antl Sucliet, rifter 
taking mensurea to  secure tliern. t,iirncd Lis arms agfiinst 
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Mequinenzeb Thie place, sitnated at the conffuence of &e 
Segre and the Ebro> just w h m  the latter k n s  to be navi- 
pble, mas tlie k g  to hrther operations, Sucfiet m I d  not 
assail Tortozn, nor use wnter-carriqe vntil Meqirinenxa should 
falI. One d&hmcnt, eent the day mfter tlie assnult of Lerida 
by the le& Jianlt of t l ~ e  Xegre, wss nlreatly liefore the place, 
and Musnier descending tlie riglit bmk of thiie river, drove in 
some of the outposts annd invested tlie pIace the 20th of May. 
hfequinenza, bnilt on stn elliow of land formed by the 
meetiiig of the Xegre and Ehro, was fortified with a Moorish 
mll, and gtrengthened by modern batteries, especially on tha 
Frqp rod, ttho only route by wliicli. artillery conld approach. 
A shoot from t l ~ e  Sima de Alcubim filled the space between 
tlie rivera, nnrrowing. llg it npprollchcd tlieir banks imtil it 
eiided in a cmaw roclr, swen hndred  feet higli, overlianging 
the torrn, d i c h  was built between its base and the water. 
On this xock waa ei castle mith a rampart, inaccwaible on two 
&es from tha crqq covered on a third by tt ie town, and 
only te be mtliled on tlie fourth rtlong a high neck of hnd, 
threo hundred yiards wido, mhieh joined tlie ni& to the 
parent Iiilla: bnt tfie rnmpart on that aide was bnstloned, 
linerl with rnasonry, antl proteckd by iy ditch, eountersmrp, 
and covered imy wi tli pdisades. No guns c d d  be brouglit 
against the cade untii tlie country people employed by 
Sucliet, hd opened a wtiy from Torriente over tlie hillills, and 
this occupied the engineers uatil the Erst of Junc. Before 
tht period the brigxde which hnd defeated h n  at BIcnnitz, 
arrived on the right bank of the Ebro nnd completed the 
inl-estment. The 30th of Nay, general ICopiat, coming from 
Franco vitrh ~b reinforcement of cn@nee~fficers and several 
companics of snppcn and minem, also readied the cnmp, and 
tnlUng tlie direction of tlie tvarks contracted tlie cireIe o£ 
iiives t ment. 
An incffectud salIy was made the, 31Rt of May. Tlie 
~1, 7, Iltid of June, tlie French artillery, considing of 
..??l. eigliteen picces, six being twent~-four pounders, 
were brought aver the hiUs and tlie Spanich ndvancad posts 

TWO honm after the fa11 of Mequinenza, general Nont- 
Marie, commanding the troops on thc right lrnnk of the Ebro, 
mrched aghinst Mordla in the ltingdom of Valencia, mEnd 
took it on tlie 13th of Juns; for the Spnninnls, witli a won- 
dedul negligente, liad Ieft that importsnt Tort, coinmandiug 
ane of tlie principal entixnces into the kingdom of Valenciq, 
without a m s  or s, garrison. TVben it waa lost, O'Donoju 
d m c e d  ivith n division o£ the Valenclan amy to retake it, 
but Milont-3Iarie defcated him: the worlcs were then regaired 
and IIorelIa became st strong and important pInce nf m s .  
Ey tliese rnpid operationri, Suchet secu~ed, lo. A fortified 
fronticr ngaitinet; the reguIrir amies of Catalonia and Valencia; 
2". Solir1 Iinses fur  offensi~e opcmtions, nntI free entrance to 
tliose p v i n c e s ;  3'. Tlis commnnd of ~ievernl fertile tracta of 
couniiry znd of tha navigtion of tlio Ebro; 49 The co-opera- ' 
tion of the fiwentl COTE)FI, mhicli afta the fa11 of hrida mnId 
riafely engage itsdf beyond the Llobregat: but to eR& tbe 
complete nibjuption of Catdonia. it \vns nceessary t o  cut off' 
its enmmunimtions by lnnd with Pialcnciri, and to destroy 
O'Jlo~inel's base. Tlie first mulil cinly Iie done liy traling 
Tortom, tlie seooncl hy capturing Taragolla : heiice tlie imne- 
dinte siepes o£ those two grat plxces, tl~e one by the th id ,  
and tbe other by the seventh corpq were urdered by the 
emperor. Suchet w ready, but grent oobstiiclcs arose. The 
difficulty of obtaining provisions in tlie eastern region of 
Catalonia mas incrwed by O'Donnd'e measares, who h d  still 
twcnty thoufiand mcn, nncl \vas ncithcr dnuntetl by pnsf defwts 
nor insensili~e to the ntlvantiigas of liis position. 'I-Iis liarsh 
manncrs and ñtern sway rcntlered liim hateful to  tlie people; 
yet he was wvatdiiul to  mnfirm the courage nnd excite the 
entliusinsrn of bis troops, conferring remaras and lionours 
on tlie field o€ Zinttle, and lwing of ~ i n p l a r  intrepidib himelf 
his exliortationu llnd great effect. Two ycms of incessant 
mnrfnre l id  rtlso f o m ~ r l  sc~crnl good ofliccrs, and tIie hII 
strength nnd importznce ef every position md t o m  w m  
by ilint of cvpcricncc bscorning knoxti. With tliwe hdps 
O'Donnd Iong prewntcd tIic aicgc of Tortoxn, and fwnd 
emplo l ea t  for tlic enemy during tlie rernninder of tlie par; 
bvt tlie conquest af Catalonia advnnced, and tlie fortxfied 
places fe11 one dter another, each serving by its fa11 to 
strengtlien the hold of thc Ffincli in the same proportion tliat 
it bPxl before irnpedcil their progeqs. 
Tlie fountlntions of resisttancc wero however derply mwt in 
Cntalonia; nnd ten t1iousnnd BritisZi solJi~m~ hovcring on tFie 
, const, r d y  ta land beliind the French or join th0 Cataltlan~ in 
an mtion, could at any period of 1809 and 1810, ha%-e para- 
lyzed tiie operations of tlie seventh corps, and saved Gerona, 
HostriIriclr, Tortoza, Taragonq and even Leridn. But while 
tllose place8 mere in tiic Iiands of tlie Spnnirtrds anrl their 
liopes were higFi, English troop f ~ o m  Gicily were reducing 
tIic Ioiiinn islcs, or loitering on tlie oonst of Itnly. And mlicn 
al1 tlie T o r t r ~ s e ~  of Crihlonia lmd fdlen, when tlie regular 
arriiies \ m e  nemly destroyed and tbe peopb worn out wiih m 
suff'ering, a Britisli nrmy, ~vliieli eeuld have been bencficidly 
employed ~lsewliere, appeared ris if in scora of common sense 
on the eastern cowt of 8pa;n. Natwit!istanding tlicir many 
ycars of Iiostility &li Frnncc, tbe Enplisli rninisters wcre still 
ignorwt oF cvciy militnry princililc, zind yet too arrognt  to 
n ~ k  mlvice of professiond meii; for it  ir.^ n o t  rintil nfter ttio 
deatli of Mr. Percevd md wEicn tlie decisivo v i c t o q  of 8111% 
manca 8hhoíved tlie giant in 11is full proportions, thzt even 
Wellington hirnsclf \vas pelmitted tlie free evercifie of his 
judgment. Beforc tliat lie was more €han once remintlcrl Tiy 
Mr. Perceval, whose nnmm view continudilly eloggcd tlie 
operntions, that the wlioIc reqonsiliiIity of failure would rcst 
on hia head, 
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Sucm's prepmtions cqilnnlly menzced Valencia and Cata- 
Ionia; and the formcr provliicg finding at last thah an ex- 
clusive sdfish policy mould finally bo dangerouh resolved to 
co-opuate with the Catalonians. The Mtircians $so, under 
thc direction of Xlnkr, mnged war on t.lic side of Grcnatlu 
axninst tlie foiirtli oorps. TIie nct~  o f  tlie Vdencians sliall be 
trwted of mhen tlia courso of tho Iiistory leads back to Cata- 
lonia, those of the hlurcian m y  beloiig to the 
During Fcbninry, Victor was before Cndiz ; Sebustiani in 
Grenatla; Dessolles a t  Cortloba Jnen and Utieda; RIortier, 
ha~i i ig  lcft six battnlions nnrl aomc Iiorse nt Scvilfe, tvas in 
C~trcii?iitliirra Tiic Iíing, ncconpanied by Soult, mover1 with 
Iiis guards and a brigadc of cardry to diff'crent pohts, and 
rcceivd from all the grcat t o m s  assurmcca of tlieir dhesion 
t o  his cause. Eut the necessities of tlie army demanded heavy 
contributione of moncy iind provisions, md movcablc columna 
ivcro cmployccl to collcct tlicm, cspecinlly for tbo fourth corps; 
anrl witli so little atterition t o  discipline, ns SODn t o  verify t11o 
obsemtion of Et. Cyr, that they wme better calculated t o  
Jo~eph's CO~- c~eatz than t o  mppress insumtions. Tbe people 
wvmdence, exrasperatd by disorriers md .Riolence, and excikd 
3Ibb by tlie mgcnta of tlieir own nnd the Britisli govern- 
rncnt, snrklenly rose i n  urrns, nnd Andnlusin Iiceam~ thc thentro 
of a ~ietty nnd Iitirirsciug ivarfare. 
Tlie Grenadnns of the Alpujarras mere tlie first to resist; 
tlieir insurrection sprcad on oile side to  Murcia, on the otl~er 
to Gihrnlt~rbr; they obtnined mpplics from thc latter plwe, 
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of thc dmt and foirrtli corps mns rnnintiGned nmoscl tlie Sieriri 
de Rondm, by a tlivision nt MetIinn Sidonia and by iyomo 
iiifantry nnd 1tuas:im qiimtered in the town of Ronda; but 
tlie insur~eiits, pprincipully muggIers, drove the French from 
the latter, nntl BIake, mzrcliing from Almeim, toolr Ardrn and 
IlfotriI while; tlie mountnineers of Jaen and Cordoba intemupted 
Dessolles' eommunicationa mith La &Mancha. Tlie khg was 
thcn in the city of &enadra. Hc seut a column sacross the 
mountnins, by Orgivin, to M1 upon Rlaice nt Motril, wliilo 
anotlicr column, i n o i n g  by G u ~ l i x  nnd Olianea. UDOn Almena, 
cut off his retreat; tbix forced the PIrircians to  disperse, and 
Dessolles defcatd tfie insurgents on the side of meda. The 
g~rri30TI of lialaga mnrched to restore tlie communiation 
with tlie first corps, ntnd l i ~ ~ i n g  rallied tlie troops beaten nt; 
Roncln, rctoolc tlint p o ~ t  on the 2lst of March. Dtiring their 
~bsencc tlie people from tho Alpuxaras entered Xalaga, Itilled 
some inliabitanta as fnvourers of the enemy, md would Iiave 
killed more if a, column from Grcnadn harl not come down 
on tliem. Tlic insurrection mas thus strangled in its birth, 
liut it stopperl the marcli of troops t.o co-operate with Sucliek 
at Vi~Icncin, caused tlie fiftli corps to be recnlled from Estrc- 
madura, imd tlie Frencli troops at Madrid, consiatin~ of tho 
p l ~ i s o n  anct a port of tlie second corpg nere directed upm 
Almngro in La Biancha. Tlle ci~pitzl mas meantime left in 
cliarge of some Spanisli battalions in the invnder's service! 
Tlie king, nom feamng tlie Vrtlcneim xnd Murcian fiarmies 
wniild invn~lc Ln Mnnclia r~pnired Uiitlicr, nnd i i f tcr  n time 
retirrnd t o  Ahdrid. Soult remained in Andalusia and pro- 
ceeded to  orgnnize a military and civil dministration, so 
eficient tliat itncitlier the Spnnisli gorernment nor the allied 
nrmy in Cadix, noi the perpetud incurcions of Spanisli troops, 
iawing fyom Portiigal and suplmrterl by British eurps on t l iat  
fronticr, cuuld slialrc h3s l i ~ l d .  
Pictor Iia~iiig sprcarl bis troops roiind tlie margin of tiio 
bay commenced morks of contm~allation hven ty- 
Febbraary. five miles in Icngtli; the toms, thc islands, castles, 
liarbonrs, and rivers thus enclossd are too nnmsroiiq and in 
their relative bearings too intricate, for minute description7 
but, looking £rom $he Frencli cmps, tlie l e d i g  features  hall 
be noticed. 
Tlio bloclrndr! eompriscd thrcc p n d  divisiona, scpmtely 
entmclicd, namely, Chiclana, Puerto Real, and Siintn Marin. 
The h t ,  resting its left oa the sea-co~t ,  m s  cnrried 
ncross the Almanea and Cliiclana rivers to tlio Zurnq~ze, lieing 
fraced for eight miles along a range of thicldy-wooderl hills 
borderiug s marsh from one to tliree miles b r o d :  bath the 
line and miarsli were t rn~t rscd  by those rivers and by many 
navigable water-cour~ie~i nnd cweks, ni1 fnliing into thc  Santi 
Petri, ri natuml clianncl conneetimg thc upper hnrbour o€ C w l i ~  
witlt tlic opcn BeL 
TLis cliunne& nine miles long, tm.0 or tliree hundred yarda 
wirie, and of deptli to float a seventy-fow; wasi tlie first 
Spmnish line of defcnce. In tlie centre, tlie bridge of Zuazo) 
by mhicli the onIy road t o  Carliz pusses, was broken and 
defended by batteries on both aidcs. On tlie right hand, thc 
Cnraccns, or Royrtl Arscnni, fiittrntcd on m ielnnd isi tbe 
bmbour mouth a l  tlie clitiiinel, and on account oE tlie mnmli 
innttackable save by water o i  by Iiombnrtlment, was covered 
mitli s h n g  bntteries and served as an dvanccd post. On 
khe left bnad, tbe castle of Rmti Petri, also built on an idand, 
defended the sea moutIi of the channel. 
Beyond tbe Santi Petri mas tl ie Ida  de Lon ,  a ~ a s t  
triangular ~dbmnrsli, but hnving olio high gttrong ridgc in 
the centre, nl~otit four milcs long, on wliicli the t o m  of Isln 
6taliils: tIiis ridge, witllin mnrion sliut of the santi Petri, 
offcred tlis second liue of defencc. 
At the apees of the Isla stood the Torre Gardo, from whence 
a 1om narronr istlirnus, fivc milcs long, connected it with the 
roeks upon wliich Cadiz ig hi l t .  hcross tlre centre of tlie 
ishltmus, a cnt, called klie Cortdurn and defended by the Iarge 
unftnishcd fort of Fernando, ofcrcrl II Riiml line of defcnce. 
Tlie fourtli anrl fiml line wns thc luníl firoiit of CiUrlix, r e p -  
lar1y fortiEi~1. 
On tlie Chiclana line tlio hostile forces w ~ r e  only eepaiated 
by the mnrsh The Spaniarrts possessed the Santi Petri, but 
tlie French, hrtvinin,rr thcir cliief d e p h  in tlie to~vn of Chiclluili, 
cou!d ~ I J V E L ~ T  eominrriid ttie iiitirsIi, and midit force the 
passage of tlie chanael. Fa tlie Cliidana, Zurque, xnd 
A T n i ~ ~ x a  creeks, mere nnvignble begontl tFie lines of contra- 
vrilliition, tlie tliick wnntls bcliind fnrniñlicil rnenns rif con- 
structing an amwl  .ti otilln, and the Snnti Petn itsclf, on hoth 
aides, could ody be approilclleci by water ofF the high road; 
or ~t bcc:tI by nnrrolv foot-pntlis lcníling bctiveen tlie snlt- 
1)niis of tlia mnrsli. 
The Frcnch centre, ceXIed tlie Ricrto Eesl divlsion, es- 
tended from tlie Zuraquc .an tlie left to  the Sna Pedro, n 
nnvigahle iimnr:li u£ tLr Gui~diilctc on tlie riglit, a distunce of 
aeven miles. This line ending x t  the town of Puerto Eenl, 
waa traccd ~ l o i i g  n rirlge skirting tlie mar&, so as to  fonn 
witL tlie pnaitiun uf (:liicliinrt a Iinlf circle. Puertn Fxd \vas 
eiitrenched; Iiut n tongue of  i ~ n d  four miles long projected 
from tlrenoe perpcridiciilnrlp to\mrda the istfimiis of h d i z ,  
Licing clovcn iii ittq ivlicilc lcngtli by the crcclr or cnnnl oE 
Troccndero. It aeparated tlie iiiner from the outmrcl Iiarbour, 
md at its extreme pohts shutI tIie t-illage of Troccaclero and 
tbe fort oT 3Zatnvrcla; opliosctI tu  ~vliicli tIicre m on the 
istlinius of Cdiz,  n po~verSul Iilittery mlled tlic Puntalcs. 
From Mattigortla to Cndix \vas above fwr tliouemtl ywrla; 
Ziut from Yii~itnlcs it mnq on 14- twclve liiindrerl, and was tlicrrs 
Eore %he ncarcst ~io in t  t u  C;tilix untl to tlie istliinuu, antl the 
must iililiortaut post of oli'ciice. Froni tlrcnce the Frencli 
co~ild serirdi tIic upper l~arliour witli their tire, or tlirow 
filiell~ iutu tlic C:inicais iiiid tlie furt cif Fernniitlu; wliile tlieir 
flotilla, safely n~oored in the Troccndero creeb, cauld quiclrly 
remli tlie istIimus, aand turn tlie Isla, with nll tlie works 
IiPtiwrn it niir1 tliti city: nrvcrtliclcss, tlic SliniiiiirrIs dia- 
mantlerl and Jianrloncd Rlatqurtla. 
Tlic tliisd or Salita IIaria divisiou of blockade fv!loivtci tlie 
m\-ecll of tlic hoy. h k o n i i i g  f'roin tlic Snii Pi:rlr.u uii tlie 
left, to tlie c~stlc of Santa Catnlinn, tlie cstremc ~ iu i i i t  uf tlie 
outer hnriiour oil the ridit, \vas :~Lolit five milcs. Z%e town 
of Santa IInrin, hiiilt n t  tlic mniitli ot' t.11~ Guntliilctc! in tlin 
ceritre of tliis liiie, inis entrcticlictf, itud t:ic gruurirl riborit 
h11tz Cahliiito mas estrcmely p11;;getl. 
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Beond these lines, wliicli were conneckd by a covered my,  
conceded by tliick woods, and finalIy annerl with three hun- 
dred p n s ,  tlie towns of Rota and San Lucnr de Rammeda 
were mupied; the fimt, situateCi on a mpe of land opposite 
to Cadiz, was the northern point of the great hay or roaíl- 
stad ; the second commanded tlie mout,ll af t1ic Guu~lnl<luivir. 
Rdiind tliege lines o€ blockaile, Latour h.inulio~wg occuliied 
&redirla Sdonia 1~5th a covering division, his left b e i ~ g  upon 
the upper Guadalete, his advand posts watching tlie passes 
o£ tlie Sierra. de R o n d ~  
Tlie fa11 of tlic central junta, the appointment of a mgeiicy 
ard the convolrjng of tiie C o r ~ ,  lime been alrcady toi~ched 
upon ,Qlbupnerque, hailsd ay a dtliverer, elected governor, 
comrnandcr in cliief, md president of  tlie lomI junta, appcnred 
. t o  have iinlimited power, but realIy possessed no rmtliority, 
nor did lio meddle with tlie ridmir~istrition. Tlio regency, 
coiistitukd provisionally, and of men ivitliout p c ~ o n d  eiiergy 
or local influence, was campelled to bend and truckle to the 
junta of Catidiz; and that imperious body, without Iiononr, 
talents, or p~triotisrn, sought only to obtain the 
A'"qu~uo"a command of tlie pubIic revenizc for dislionest Flunitfmto. 
~iurposes. Privntaly tmfficking sitli tlie puhh 
M,,h c, store~, tlie memlicm neglectd AIbuquerque7s 
~ @ ~ i o l l a ~ c e  troopa, who liad been long withuut priy, the 
o1 ulficem 
f ~ r n  C a d i ~  greater part also werewithant nrmh accoutremenw, 
iaioi Nss. mmiinition, or clotlies, and wlien he dmanded 
supplies Ghe junta declared they could not furnia11 him. The 
dulre impuping tlieis tmtli, aldress~l s memorid to the 
regency, md tlie latter wishing to rcnder tlie junta odkuq 
though fenring openly bo uttnclr tlicm, p c r s u d d  Albnquque 
t o  publis11 liis memorid. Tlie juiita relrlieit Iiy ñn csliosition 
falge aa to fa&, base and ridiculous in  reaoning; for tliougli 
t l i~y lid dected tlie duke president uf tlieir oivn botlS; t11ey 
accused him amongst 0 t h  thinp with retreating from 
Cnrmona too quiclily; and fiiiished with a menachg intirnn- 
tion, that;, supported by the populaoe of Cadiz, they were able 
nnd rendy to wrcak thcir vengcanoe on al1 memics. 
In tliis crisis tIie jiintn tririmpbed. Alliuqncrqrrc weq sent 
to  hnrlun as ainli:issiic!ur, wlici~r! Zic dicd a fiiv rtiuntlis t thr  
in B frcnzj~, occasioned it is raid t y  grief mrl nnger at the 
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unworthy treatrnent he liad received. He wm 
considered a brave antl gencrous inan, bu& wcnk $ ' S ~ d I x  '" 
antl Iiasty, easy to 1iu diiped. R.Icnn~vllilt! tha 
rnisery of the troops, tlie extent of tlie positions, the discon- 
tent of the seamen, thc venal apirit of tlie jnnta, tlie aptliy 
of tlic peoph, tlie feeblcncss iif tIic regency, tlie scnrcity of 
pmFisioiis, and thn macflirntioiis of tlie Frencb, whu 3iad 
many favourers amongst the inen in porver, placed Cadiz in 
tlie ~ e n t c s t  jcapnrdy, nnrl would havc lcrE to a surrericfcr, if 
Euglund hd uot n ~ i n  iilled the Sprtnisli stomhou~ies ; nnrl if 
the regent~, theii. arrogrance and pride abated by neccssity, liad 
not now asked far tlioue Eritisli troops they hforc 
so hauglitil y rrjrctcrl. Rut at this timo pncnil ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l l ' B  
Colin CnmpbeFl, Crrtdock'e succcssar nt Gibraltar, C u ' l c ~ ~ ~ n d -  
ence, 11bS. 
showed wlint could Iiave been eflected beforc by 
able nvotiution; for Iic olitained lenve tc put ni1 Ewlidi 
garrrisoñinto Ceuta, i,sd to destroytlie lincs of San Eoque 
md al1 tbe Sp~panicli brts round tlle hay uf Xlgcsirss. Ncitlier 
mensurc ~ v n s  n,mcalilc to Spin, Iiut t u t l i  csscntiid to 
Eng1kl83i interests; tho Iast especially su, os it mmorle Gib- 
mltm n scmre harbour, and deared its nelgllourliood of 
Jnngcroua ivorks at n critica1 timc; for  thc fortrcs  wwis thcri 
crowderl ~vitl i  a niixed niid diwiiKectd population sxceding 
twelve tliousand persone, md was filleil with mercliantlie to tlie 
valtic! of two millione whicli could Iinvc bccn cnfiily dcctroyed 
troops anrl filId ~vitli galley-slnves ruid lirisoners liad only s¿x 
dayd provisiona, nnd ~ v n s  nt tlic mcrcy of tlic fiist thousmrl 
Prench tlint coulrl cross tIic struits. 
General William Stcmait rcaclicd Cadiz with two tliousund 
men tlic 11th of Februrtry; one tliousnnd more joined liiiii 
from Gilimltnr; anil dl werc recciverl witli nn cntliu.sínsin 
allo~vi-iüg tliat sir George Smitli's 1)erccptiun of tlie red fecliiiy 
o€ tlic peoplc liad Lccn just: IIr. Frcrc's unskiEtu1 maniige- 
mciit of tlic ocntml junta l i d  aloiic ~ircvcntcrl n oinillnr 
mwure tlie yenr Iicfore. Tlre Portiigcsc troolis were equaIly 
wJ1 i.eceived, nnd soon four tZiou~snJ hnnlo- Prencli omcld 
Portu~rl~ese and fourteen tliousxnd Xl~aiiisl~ \batrnct  ui 
Olicriitiuilii u6 
w~wliiix were bcliiiid tlic Santi Petri. Tlie sliips liilOi 
rrcclrrred ot Ferrol Ead Leen trausferred to Cadiz, J1".'j- 
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md tliere were in t.Iic kay twenty-tliree men of ww, four 
uf tlie line nnd tliree irignbm Iieing B~itisb. Tlie Euth,lion 
and Untlsunted also arrived from Mexica witli six millionfi 
af dollars, and t h s  money troops and a deet were suddenlg 
cailected at Cdiz.  Yet to Iittle purpose. Rucmtination, 
jealousy, octentation, and a thousand absdities, the invariable 
a t t enhts  of Xpanish m i e s  rind pvernments, marred evcry 
useful m c s m ;  and there abs sa little enthusiasm amonpt 
tlic peopl~, thnt no cltiecn wns enrollcd, or armcd, or volun- 
teered eitTicr to Inbotir or to fight. 
Stewart's first mmsure \vas to rccovcr Nnwordn, tlio crror 
of abantloning whicli was to bo attributed nns m c l i  to a d m X  
Purvis RS tO t lw Spnninrds. Iu  thc? iiight of tlie 2 2 4  a 
detncliment comistiug cif fifty semen ancl rnarines, twenty- 
five artillery-men nnd &ty-seven of the ninety+fourth regi- 
rnent, tlie wliole under the command of crtptain WLean of the 
ninety-fourt11, pushed ncrosa tIie channel during a storm, tdok 
pmsession of tlie dismantIcd fort md dected a solid lodp;. 
mcnt : tlic Frcticli cnnnonntlcd tlic work with ficld-artillcry 
811 tlie ncxt <lzy, yet t I ic  prriwn, su~iporterl by tlic fim of 
Puntales, was immovenble, ancl the rernairider of Febniary 
pw~etl without itny event of importmce. EarIy in hlareh the 
city wmied provisions, especizlly fresb mmt, and a h p e s t ,  
bcating on tlie coast from the 7th t o  the 10th of Mmch, dmve 
three Spanish mil one Portupese sail: of the line, a frigatc 
and irom tliirty to fortg rnercliantmen on ahore, between San 
Lumr nnd Sit. fifnry's. Onc slilli of thc Iinc wns tukcn, t l ~ o  
othcrs wcre lmnct1 and part rif tlie crews lira~igl~t off by iyoats 
from tho fleet ; biit niuny men, nmsngst otliers a part of the 
forirtli Englisll regirnent, fe11 into the hands of tLe enemy, 
togetlier ~t-itli an immense booty. 
On thc 26tIi tlie eneiny's outposts at Santi Petri were driven 
in by major Sullivnn of tlie seventy-nintli, to cover an attack 
meditaied a,riinst tlie TmcciiJero, but tlie dcsigu wns bafifcd 
hy tllc qiirf in onc q~iartcr nn tl tlic difiiculíy of cros~ing R alioal 
iii tinutlier. Iii tlie samc moutli hlii H. TVcllcsley, minister 
plonipotentiriry, arrived; and on tlic 24111, general Gi-~l1m, 
wliiing from Englantl, assiiiiied the cliiel comrnmd of tlie 
British troops and immcdiakly cnused m exact m i l i t q  sur- 
vey of the Isla to be mde.  It thea rrppearod, that the foxe 
Iiitherto ussigned for its defence was quite indequate, Twenty 
tiiousand soldiera, with redoubtc antl batteries, requiring tlie 
labour of four thousand men for t h m  rnontha, 
werc absolutely neeestulryi t hc  Spaninrds Iiad only Appna$E l9. $1- 
worked hyond the b n t i  Petri, rana tIiere witliout 
jurlgment. Slieir batteries in the marsh merc ill-placed, their en- 
trenchments at tlie scn-mouth were contemptihle; tlie Caraccas, 
tlioudi arined with one Iiundred and íifty pus,  was full o€ dry 
timber antl could be easilg burned by wcasses. Tlie interior 
defcnce~ of thc Isla wrrc quite neglected. hratngodn and tlie 
TsoccnrFero lind been ibnndonerl, but tlic batteries bejond tlie 
Santi Petri I i d  been puslied to tlie junction of &e Cliidana 
ruar1 with tlie roya1 cauacmny; tlirtt i s  to any, one. mile and n 
hnlf beyond tlie bridge of Zumo, mil consequentlp expoaed 
without mpport to flaiilr attacks iic~tli by w t e r  and land. 
It was in rnin the Englisl~ engincers prcsented plana nnd 
oRercd t a  construet tlie works, tlie Spariiad~ would never 
consent to pul1 dnn-n a housc or dcstroy a garrien; their pro- 
cmstintitioii pnrdpsed tbeir alliw, and would hnve lost tire 
place, liad tlio Frencli been preyiared to press it vigorausly. 
Tliey rvere so intliffercnt to tlie progress of t7o enemy, tliat to 
use Gsaliam's expreseion, tliey wislicd tlie E~iglkii would drivc 
awliy tlie Frencli, m d y  t?t?l.L t l i q  nai!$d yo nnd eat etram- 
bemies al C7~klaw. Xor were tlie Britidi works, wheri tlic 
SpaniarrIa would penait any to be constructcrl, me11 or mpirIly 
complctcd, tiecnuse tllere was a ltaucity uf cngineem, tIic ,juiitii 
furnished bad material, and, ~ v i t b  liabitiial ncgligence, tlie 
Fnglish ministerial oficea bad not gent out the yruper storea 
nntl iinplernenta. Rnt an exmt I i i a to r~ ;  drnivn from tlic privittr! 
joiiilials of Britidr commanders driring tlie aar wiQ I:i~iise, 
rvould be neeessary to expose tlic incredilile mrele.ssness of 
prcparation cornmon to 1111 the cahin~tri, from 31r. Pitt clown- 
wnnls: tlie generals were expected t o  malre bricks ~r+itlit~iii. 
strnw, and tIie laurels of the army were continnaIly Iiligllitcil 
Ziefore gathering:-in E D 7 t  the mccess of tlie venemlilc L e ~ u  
Alercruinlie rvas more owing t o  liis ilido~nitnl,le rnergy in 
rcl~airing niiiiisterial neglect before, tlim tu liis daring oyera- 
tions nfter Iniiding. 
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feminine or hemic. A aergant's wife, named Retson, was in 
a casemate with tIie wounded men when a very young dmm- 
mer was ordered to fetcli water fiam the me11 of the fort; 
seeing the child hesitate, she snatched tlie vcssel from his 
hand, braved the terrible cttnnonsde berself, and tliough a shot 
cut tlie bnckctrcord from her hold, shc recovererl it and fui- 
filled lier m i ~ i o n .  
Matagorda point m e  mon coverd idth Iiatteries %y the 
French, but the war languished in front of Cadia. In other 
parts it mns brisk 8ehstirtnCs cavalry jnfested fhe neigh- 
Sourhood of Gibraltar, mcl in pemon ho clrove Blake from tlie 
city ot Murcia liad< to Alicant nnrl Cmthagenn. 
GenewI Meanwhils , the troops b l o c k s d i  Cadiz were c ~ ~ ~ ~ u ~  
preased by searcity, and general CamplreU aug- enz;~t 
mented their dificulties by throwing a detacli- 
ment jnto Tarih, aud drjving tlis fcirqcrs from thnt vicinity, 
wliich abmds with crrttle. The Spipaniards at &m Roque 
p d s e d  to reiaforce this detachment, yet their usual tara- 
ness enabled the cnemy t o  return with four hundred foot and 
eorne cavrilry, who wem not repulsed until elley l i d  driven off 
severa! herds o£ atttle. Cmqhell then Encreased his detacli- 
rnent to 6% hundred men, ~vith some @m, and placed the 
whoIe under the c o m m d  of mnjor Brown of the 28th. 
In h f ~ y  some honch  priiioners cut the ca!~lcs ef twe hulka 
at Cadiz aud dnfted in a heavy gale t o  the French side; they 
beat off two of tlie craft sent after them by throwing cwld shot 
from the decks, nnd about fifteen hundred savd themsclves in 
despite of  n tiro from the h a t ~  of the nllietl fleet, 
and from tliB batteriea. This Gre waa sliamefutly ;ydk"- 
and msrcilessly continued dter the vessels hd 
gmndsd, nlthough tlie miserable creatures thus atmggling for 
life and liherty Iiad bcen trcntcri with horPibIe crticlty, and 
teing nll of Dupont's or Vcdel'a corps, were prjsoriers onIy by 
a dihonourabIe brcacli of faitli. Cdiz was now a scene of 
gmt disorder. The regency recalld Cuesta ta the m i l i t q  
conncils, and hc immetlinkly published an attock on the 
central junta; but he wns nnswered so as to convince tho 
world, tliat tlie course of 011 parties Iiad been equalIy detri- 
mental to the shtte. Thw fresli troubles mem escited, the 
2 4 
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Eilglish general was Iilimpered by the perveme ppiiit of tlic 
autliorities, and tlie Spanish troops were daily getting more 
ineficient from neglect. Blake was then ealled to command 
in the Isla, md hi presente produced some amelioration in t l ~ e  
oonditioa and discipline of the troops; at bis instance the 
muni&pd junta consentd, yet relnctantly, that £he British en- 
gineera shonld commenca a regular system of duubta for the 
rlefcnce of the Isla. Englidl reinforcemcnta contimicrl to 
rand four thougand Spanianla from Murcia joined thc 
gnrrison, or rather amy, now within the limes; bnt snch was 
tlie state of the native troops, sucli the difiiculty of amanginq 
plant?, that hithedo &e taking of Matagorda bad been the 
only check @ven to the enemfs works, It waa however 
neoessary to do ~omething~ and aker sorne ill- 
Generni 
u ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' s  judged plans of the regency hrtd been rejectetl by 
I ' c s ~ t c h a  GraI~am, general h y  embrarked with thrcx thou- M9S. 
sand infantry and two hundred cwdry, to aid the 
serranos or pwank of the Xonrik 
Tliese people tad been excited to a m ,  and their opemtions 
auccessfulIy directed by captain Cowley anrl iieutenant XIichel, 
two Hritish artilley officera sent fmm Gibrtaltar. Camphell 
ala0 offered t o  reinforce Lticy from Gibraltar if he wauld attack 
Binlagn ; for iu thtlt city were twenty tliriusand rn~lea fit to 
mrry arma, nntl .tlis French wece only twe tlioumd, coopd 
in the citadel, a MooRsh csvtle having bnt twlve  p s ,  aud 
dependent for water on the town, wliicli m itself onIy snp 
plied by aqueducts from witliout. This enterprise Lacy 
rejectecl. Ile dernanded imtend, that eig11t hundied mcn 
slioiild be detriclicd from Giliraltar to mke a divenion to the 
enstwtirtl, wliile he sliould land at Algeuirns, and move agiiinqt 
tlie town rif Runrli~: tliis was msented to, and tlie Eiiglish 
aimamsnt miled uuder the command of g e n e d  Bowe8. h y  
tlien m d e  bis movement upon Ronda the 18th of June, but 
the h n c h  having fortified it mere too ntrong at tliat point, 
and he, a nian of no enterprise, waa afraid to act; and wlien Iie 
was joined by tha wild and fierce semnos, he arresteti the 
lendcm fiir Fiome offenee, wliich c~used their foFlowera to dis- 
perse. Tlie Frencli beiiig altirrned Iiy tliese opemtions, wliicli 
were secoded from the side o£ Xurcia by Ehke md by an 
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insumction at Bnczri, put dl their disposable troops in motion; 
the Bneza JisturTiaiice was then quicklg mshed, und general 
Rey, marclilng from Scvilie, entirely defeated Lncy, cut liim off 
from Gilirdtar, and forceíl him to ernbu-1t with a fe\? men at 
Estipna : Iie rcturned to  Clidiz in July. 
Here iE itl fitting to point out thc little use mndc of the naval 
pomer, and the misal~plimtition of tlie military strengtli of the 
ailies in tlte southern parts of Xpain. Tbe British, Portuguesre, 
and Spmish soldiers at Cadiz, were, in round aumbers, thirty 
tliouaanci; the Britidi in Gibraltar five thouswnd; in Sicily 
aixhen tliousnníl; forming n total of more than fifty tliousnnil 
efective t m p s  aiidccd by R g e a t  navy ; m¿í fa~ourably placed 
for liarilssing tliat immense, and except on the Valencian and 
BIurcirtn coasts, uninterrupted line of Frencli opemtiong 
ext~nrling from tlie soutIi af Itnly ta Cadiz: for cvcn from th 
bottom of Calnhria, trmps and stores mere lirought to Syiitin. 
Tet a Neapolitnn rabble under hIurtat in Cdhbrin, and from 
fifteen to twcnty tlimisand French aronnd Cadiq were allowed 
to pnralyze this miglity poiver ! It is true t h t  vigilante, 
tcmpcr, p o d  m n g e r n a n t  r~iirl fuvournhlc lomlities, arerequixcd 
i n  tha oombinwl opemtiens of s fleet and army; and soldiera 
disembarking dso aant time to quip for service. But 
Minom offered a central strition, a p l m  of arm~ for the troops, 
a spneious port for thc fi e&, nnd thc w t  of Catalonia nnd 
Pnlencia iri aafe; seldom or never, does a gale 'ilow home on 
shore; the operations would have been short and indgendent 
af tlie Spanish authorities, and lord Collingwood was in every 
nny fittcd suooerrsfully to direct mich n fioating nrrnament. 
TVIint cossbaiege widertaken by the aeventli or th id  corpa, 
oould bave been sucoessfulZy prosecuted, if the prrigon had 
beea mtlldenly augmented witli fifteen or twenty thowmd men 
fiam the ocean? After one or trvo successful descents, the 
v c i ~  nppcerance of a ship of wnr wouici have stoppeci a siege 
nntl rnutle tiie enemy concentrate; wlierena the sIight expedi- 
tions of this period were generally diacancerted by thepsence 
of ri few Frencb compwies. 
In July, Ghc Britisli force in Cadiz was incre~scd t o  eight 
thousand five hundred men, and sir Rieliard Keats took com- 
mnnd of the fleet; tlic Aench, intent npen complcting their 
lines and constmcting ff otiUas at Chiclana, Santa hfarin, ind 
San Lumr de Baramcda, made no attxcksJ ancl tlieir worka 
have been censured ss ostentatiously extentled and lmdiiig to 
nothing. This scems a m& eriticism. The Chiclnnn, cnmp 
waa ncccssnry t o  l~locltraite tlie Tdn; rrnd ns tlic true point for 
offensive opmtions ~" l t4  the T r o d e r o ,  the lines of Puerh 
Red and Smta Mwia  mere neceesary t o  protect tliat pposition, 
to the fleet, to deprive tlie citizens af good water, which 
in odinary t i m a  waa fetched from Puerto Xasia, and to enahle 
the flotilla conatructed at San Lumr to creep round the coast. 
The c h e e s  fiom storms, as experiencc p r e d ,  almost repaid 
tho lahur; ~ n d  it k to be considcrcd thnt Sonlt contcmplntecl 
a serious nttack upon C d z ,  not witli rs single c o q ~  genernlly 
weaksr than tlie Moclded troops, but, when time should npen, 
with a powerfd army. Evente in other parts of the Pcnin- 
sula first impeded and finalty frustrated tbis intention, get the 
Eines mere in this view not unnecessarp or ostmtatious; nor 
was it a slight political advaatage, that hult sliodd bold 
snny in Sevil Ic ~ O F  thc wsnrper's governmcnt, while the nntionrnl 
Cortes and regency wcre shut up in a, n a m  corncr OS tho 
pravince. Tlie prepiirutions at Filuhgorrla canatmtly rnud scri- 
ously uienaced Cadiz, md a British division was necessmily 
kept there; for the Englisli general8 were welI ansured, khat 
some fatal disaster monlr? otliedse Mal tlie Spaniade; but 
if a single mmp of obsmtion at Cliidana had oonstibuted al1 
the Freilch worb, no mischicf d d  hava becn appwhended; 
nnd Gmham's rlivision would hnvc becn sct frcc, instcnd of 
bcing cooped up without any corintcrbalmoe in tlic number of 
Frerid troups employed to 1iIockiide. Tbe Iatter aided indi- 
rectll; and at times directIy, in securing AndaIuaia, and if not 
ak Cliiclana, mnst have been covering Sevllle aa Iong as there 
was an army in the Isla; but Gralinm merely defended Cadk  
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CHAPTER Yf. 
WUILE the blockade of C d i z  proceded, Sedle mas tranquil. 
A fcw thonmnd men, left hy 3Iortier when hc moved agrtinst 
Badajo#, sflcerl to  control the city nnd spare a detdiment of 
eiglit Iiundretl men under general Bemond, te attxk the 
viacount De Qand, who rnw still at Ayamonte, vainly iai3Ior- 
ing a refuge in I'ortugnl. Hc had four thouaanci mcn, but 
frrtrinr rs tiattle p~iar,d by Gibrnleon to tlie Sierra de Arnche, 
bordering on tlie Condado de Niebla; and h o n d ,  in&d of 
following hlm, m u p i d  Noguer and Huelva at the mouths of 
tlie Odid and Tinto fivem, to cut ofl the supplies whicli Cadiz 
drew from thence. De Gmd seirred tbe ocwion to retm to 
Ayamonte and embark his troopa for Cadiz; btit he was soon 
replmd by Gpons, who carne with two thonsand mert &m 
tIie Lri14 ta gntlier provisions on the lower Guadinna, anrl in 
tlio Tinto and Odie1 rlistricts, 
On tlle otlier side of Seville, Seb&ni had an nnwy task. 
The Ficinity of Gibraltar and of tlie Mnrcian army, the con- 
tinued dcsecnts on tlic coast, and thc ficrcenesa of tlie Moorish 
lilood, rei~dered Grenada tlie most cIEsturbed portion of Anth- 
Iusia ; p m t  part of tliat fine province, viaited by insurrectional 
wnr, was ravaged and laid mnste. h the northern parta, about 
dacn anintl Gordoba, Dessollm hrid rcduced t h ~  strliggle to a 
rrlight partida warfare; yet in h Mnnclia it was so onerous, 
ancl the bands ae rnany, that onne of Joseph'a rninisters desmilied 
that province as being peopled with beggam and brigantla In  
Estremndurn, thcrc wcre mnny comlmt~, petty in tliemselves 
importitnt aa liei~ig mnnectad witli tlie defenc~ of Portugal, 
but dificult to compreliend without reference to the military 
~ P ~ ~ ~ D I ~ Y .  
South of thc T n p s  thc linc wcpamting S p h  from Portuaal 
mny be dividwl into tluce pnrts. 14 From the Tagus to 
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Badajos. 2'. From hdajoa to the Morena, 3". h m  the 
Morena t o  the sea. Each of these divisions is about ~ixty  
m i h .  Along the firrit} tiño-thirds of which is monntRin- 
ws one-third nndulatining plains and thiclr moodrt, a double 
chain of fndrcases plartlccl the rwpmtivc frontier~ Alcan- 
tara, Valencia de Alcantnrn, dlbnqnerquq nntl Rdajos were 
Epanish; Montalvao, h t e l l o  de 'S7ide, Mamao, Aronclies, 
Campo Mayor, and E lw7  Portupese places. The three fimt, 
on both sides, are in the monntains, the others in the open 
countv which spreads f r m  the Guadimw t o  Po~%!egre, a 
centm1 point from whence marls lea<? to 811 tlio nbovsnamecl 
fortrcmca. From hdrijns to thc Morcna, tbe country is 
ntgged and the cliitin of Fortres~eu continued. On tlie Por- 
tuguem side, by Juramenlira, Monrao ebod hfonra; on tho 
Spitoish side by Olivenzs, formerly Portngueae, Xwes cle los 
Caml~eros, aad Broche. From the Mmna to  the sea, the 
lower Gluadiann sepamtes the fwo kingdoms. The Spanisli 
side, extremcly nigged, prcmted the fortressw of Ban Lumr 
de Gandiana, h p c ,  and Ayamonte. The Portngu~se frontler 
furniuhed Serpa, Mertola, Alcontin, anrI Castro Marin. Tiie 
grexter number of thew pIaces were dismorntlerl, Iiut the mlIa 
of al1 were stianding, some in good repair, and tliose of Por- 
tugaI generalIy garrisoned by militia and ordeuanca 
Romana was near Truxillo when Mortier attempted Bajde~ 
Blr. Stnartg on tlie 12th of Februar~., and thc! place was so 
CO-na- ill provided flint a fartniglith bli~atknde would 
h v e  reduced it; bnt the French mmhal, who 
had only brought up eigbt thousand infstntrg and a brigde 
of cavalry, conld not invest it in fnoe of the troops as- 
sembling in the vicinity, and therdore retired to Zafia, 
lcaving hie horsemen near Olivenza. In tliis poaition Iic 
remained until the 19th, whcn hia cnwllry R I ~ S  swpriscd nt 
TfiIyerde by the Spaninrds, and the commnnrlcr h a u r q d  
slain. Romana then retuxned to Badajos, aníl Xortier, 11x4~- 
ing mme troop in Zafra, marched to Jderida to conneet 
Iiimself with the second corpa, wliich had arrived at Montfjo 
on t.he right of the Guadiana. Tliis eorps, now under p e r a l  
llerrnet, liad occrtpied the valley of the Txgiis diiring thc 
invasion of Anrlnluan, commnnimting with the sixtli corps 
by the pus of Bdos, and forming the link betwe.cn Iforticr 
aud Kellerinan, wlio liad withdri~m to Salamanca wheii the 
British army smved on the RIondego. Tiien del Parque 
Ieaving Martin Carrera with a division in the Sierra de CXhta, 
rnaiclicd with thirtccn tliotiwnd nien tliiougli the pe98 of 
Perales, croi~cd tlie Tigns rit h r c a  de Mconcte, nnd klio 
12th of Tc'cbruary, the day Iiortier summoncll Dadajog wns 
in position with hia ri$t at Albuquerque, liis lcft on tho 
Giiadisne. 
?iItm~et, ivliose dvanced mrarrl was then nt Plasencin 
llearing of tliis movement, clet&hed three thousaiid incn aci-oss 
tlie Ta4p by Serrrtlillo, to  observe del P~rq11e; ~ n d  Non 
afterwads Soult's Jirothcr, coming mith foiir tliousrind rnen 
fram TaIaver4 crossed by the Iiridgr: of Arxnliispo, nnd 
moving througli Caceres surprised some Spranish broops nt 
Villa del Rey, and puslied patioles dose to B~lajos. The 
remaiinder of tlir! s&ntl c o 6 s  rcnchcd C ~ c c r ~  by degees, 
Eeynier took t,hs wmmnnd, and was joined by hfortier, w h  
imrnediately commenwd defensive works at Mcrida, md pre- 
pared gnbions and fascines zs if to bwiege Ew.lztjos. These 
demonstrntiona attracted tlie notlce of gener~d Hill, wlio 
ni ivand with ten tIiousad men from ~ b r a i t e s  to Portalepe ; 
and Romana, finding himself by tlie junction of del Pnrque 
at  tlie h d  oT twenty-five thousand men, resoIved to act 
nginst thc communications uf tlie Frcnch. His first divi- 
~ion, uuder Charles O'DonneI, brotlier to tlie Cntiilnn gened ,  
occupied A1buquerque; the secona, nnder ~entliaabel, wns 
posted n a r  Castello de Vide in Portugal; the tliird, consist- 
ing of fivc thoiisnnd hturinns uiider hlleateros was sent to 
Olivenrra; tlie fonrtli rernained at Bditjos. Tlie fiftli, under 
Contrerots, was detaclied t o  Maiimt~rio, with orders to inter- 
nipt Mortier's communication ~vititli Aevillc. 
Contrems rmhetl Seres de los Cnvalleros thc 1st of Maseli, 
liut a detitchment froin Zafra drove him tlience, and Romana 
retired t o  Campo Mayor with three divisions, leaving Balles- 
teros Rith tlie fonrtli at Olivenza. hlortier, diiquietd by 
Contrems' movements, repaircd te Zafra, yet left the second 
corps at Merida. Thc ZOtli, Romnnr moval towmrda ,4ll)u- 
cluAque md pushed a detacliment beyond the Mor river, 
where it m a  surprised by geneml Foy op: O'Donnd enrle~voirred 
to s u r p i s o  Foy in rcturn, bnt the latter fouglit his wfiy 
through tlie P u d o  de T~rrtsquillon, and ths Spaniarde ocm- 
pied C a m s .  At thi period the ingurrection in Grenada, tbe 
movements of the he1ufcian m y $  md the general exMtement 
in Talenda caused by Suchet's rctreiit, made Josepb recall 
hfortier to AndaIusia, The marshal tlierefore destroyed the 
works of Merida and marched for Seville, leaving Gtvzan's 
division RG Mona~terio tia form a connecting post witli Ikynier. 
Tlie lnttcr gent his t o  TrnxiT/o, and tilting vthe field 
drove tlie S p n i d ~  out of Cwres, but ingtead of following 
them over the Salor, took post at Torremocha and Q'Domel 
returaed to Carnes. 
Tmo routes ran from Merida and Badajos to Seville: 
14 The Roya1 Causeway, 'PPbiCh passes tbe Morena by Z a h ,  
Zos Bantos, 31omsteriq and RonqniIlo. 2'. A shorter and 
more diicult roati, mnning westwmd of the wuacmy md 
ovcr t l ~  mountains, by Xcrca dt! los Caralleros, Fregennl, and 
A m i l e  These putnllel routes llave no crow commiinications 
in the Morena; but on tlie Eshemaduran side a mad niag 
from Xeres de los Cavslleros to Zafra; and on the Anda1nsia-n 
&le there is one from Amceña t o  Ronquillo. Hence when 
ldortier retired, Ballesteros, desiping to surprise Gazan, 
rnarched from Olivenza to Xeree de los Cavnlleros where 
Iie mas joincd by Contreras; their united forces, ten thon- 
w d  ~trong, pining the royd rrid of Zafrw, fe11 on the 
Frcncli in t1ic cvening o€ tlic 29th, hut tlie &ion wns unde- 
cicled and Ii~Eng renewed next rnorning the Spniards liad the 
womt. Contreribs then retired to tlie mountains abow Ron- 
quillo, and Ballesteros, marching by Araceña, went to Huarva 
mitliin a few leagues of Xeville; Girard, who commmded in 
that city, drom him back to Araceñn, yet he returned aggn 
by fhe Condado de Xiebh, and finally &ebIished himself at 
Zalamca dc Rcal on thc Tinto. Mcnntirnc Romnna detached 
troops to scine Kcrida and cut Cimzan's communicntian with 
Reynier, but the lntter b i n g  eiglit thoumd men xeached 
hfedellin before tlie Spankrds arrived. His deeiign WFH to 
take Gonherns, who was sitill at Ronquillo, ia reSr, wwliil~ 
Gazan attacked him in front ; and thh would have hppcned 
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if O'Donnel, advanciag from Caceres, had not menaced MeriJa 
and so &em Fkpicr bsck. Nevertheless Contreras wm 
attncketl by (Xazan at PerTroche, nnd so complctcly defeatd 
that lia rcgahetl Zafrn in tlie niglit of the 14th with only two 
thousand men. Ballesteros, also being assaiIed by a detach- 
ment Trom Beville, was driven from the Tinto back to AmceEa. 
Reynier, frccd by the defmt of Contremri, thcn rnnrc11ul t o  
l~ontijo, und O'Donnel retired from &eres; but bis resi- 
guard i r n a  defwted at  La Rocca the  21at, nnd he would Zinm 
been fost if ~lendiabel and E21 had not come to his laid, 
wliercupon Rcpier, rledining a general action, retired to 
Neridn. 
At this time Goult, having assumd command in hdalus iq  
aent Nortier back to Estrernadura. Xmm who hd supersded 
Contreras immedi~tely re-occupied &nquillo on the French 
mmlialg rezr, w l i i l ~  Bnllesteros tooFc post rat Aroclie oii 3iis 
flmk, and Hill returned to Portalegree. Romana encamped wittz 
twelve thousand men near Eadajos, wliere a Spis l i  plot to 
murder him maa discovered, biit the h i r d  ns~assin Mr, Rtnart,s 
escnped; and notwitFistnncling tlio presence of liis ~orreswird- 
army, Xtepier and tIie gounger h u l t  passed the "CRMSS- 
Guadianu belorv Badajos witli only four hundrecl howemcn 
and closcly examinetl thc works o€ thc plnce. hlorticr nlso 
advanced, and fuur tliousand men from Toledo reiuforced 
Repier. 'FVant of provisions howmer woulrl not let the 
Frencli remah concentrated, and Mortier retumcd to  the 
fiIorenn. I n  Hay by FFrmicli dctnclimcnt ugnin mcnncerE 
Badajos, and then sirddenly moving by the Olivenza road 
would have cut off Ballesteros, if 1121 bad not by a mar& 
on Elvras armted the movement. Rnllesteros, ignorant of his 
dnnger, mcnnccrl Sevillc but was clnvcn bwk a,dn t o  Aroche 
witli a loss of tliree Iiundd nien. 
To clicck tlie~e frequcnt incursiona, tho Prench threatened 
thc fmnticr of Portiigal by the lower Guadiana; sometimes 
~ppearing at Gibraleon aníl Villa Elanca, sometimcs townrds 
Scrpn, tlic posscssion of wIlich woiilrl Iinvc Inmcd RrtIle~tcrex' 
meveuielita. Yet tlia rtrlvantsges were still chequered. A 
Portiiguese flotilla intercepted at the moutli of the Gvadima 
s convoy of provisions going to the first C O T ;  and O'Donnel 
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having Gled to surprise TmxiIlo, q z i n e d  Aibuquerque 16th 
difficulty. It wouId be perplexing to continue thia detnil of 
movementa on the line froin Barlujos to Ayamonte, yct two 
eircumbnccs there were of sufñcient importante to demnd 
not.ice. In  tlie hginniiig of July, Lncy licing in tlie Sierrn 
do Ronda tlie Frencli rnnrcIicd ngainst Iiim, leaving Sevillo 
prrisoned solely by Xliniiiarh in Josepli's aervice. Aad 
wliile tliis submission to tlie eiiemy ww exhibited, tthe Por- 
tuguese'and FjlimisIh troops on the Gontier, coniplnining, the 
one of iuliospitality tlie otlier of mbbery aud violente, mould 
bit  for the iiiediation of t.lie British authorities h e  mged 
\\-:ir, nnd tltis mutiial liatred was extcndcd to their govern- 
nienh. 
Ritliertu Eill l i ~ l  not Tnddl~d in tlia sprinish operations, 
SBPC wlien R O I I I ~ U I ~  W ~ R  h d l y  pressed; for tliough tlie latter'a 
deninnds for i d  ivcre continual, most of Iiis projects were ilI- 
judged and coiitrary to lord Wellington's advice. But more 
irnportnnt nffairs were nuiv at hand. 011 tlie 26th of June, 
lteq'der pwsed tlie Guarlinna, fomged nll tfie conntry ahout 
Cnnipa Miryor, and then rctttr~cd Ijy 3hut~tijri b hferida, It 
mas bcforc I rnum tlint hc Lielunged to ni1 nnny assembliiig in 
Clnstilie Sor the in~asion of Portugiil, and tliat he liad collected 
mt~les and otlier meaans of transport in Estromtlirm, al1 tlie 
spies now said he mas going to crass tlie T q u s .  El1 there- 
fure p t h e d  Lis divisions well in band, redy  to croes that 
river, nnd by patdlel eperationa pard  the frontier of Bcisa 
froni Itepier, wliose operation~i t w e  liowever postponed, and 
tlie pcnt  combhations in which ha wns d t m v d s  iwolvcd 
hIung to nnothcr plnm 
1'. Altliough ap~nrently cxirnplimtcd, tlie rnoaements in 
Estremmlura were sinilile iu priuciple, TEie viilley of tlie 
Guailii~~~n, as fur as Cudujos, is ~cparated frorii tlie valley of 
tlie Taps by a rniige of Leights coniiecting tho Gudalupe 
mountains nltli tliose d Albuquerq~~e. The country between 
tliose hilIs aud the T a p s  mntained fertile valleys, witli con- 
nidcmblc towns, sueli as Valcncia dc Alcantara rtnd Caccrcs; 
nntl tn profit from tlieir iwources TVRE an object to both 
partiea. Reynim whose base mas at Tmii ia  could emily 
make inciirsiona as far as Caceres; beyond that t o n ,  the 
Snlor presented a lmrsier behind wliicli the Bpaniards, slip- 
portd by tlie fort of hllinycrqu~, coiild al~scrvo whether tlie 
incursion was d e  in furce and RCC accordingly: hence 
O'Donnel's frequent dvnnces ~ i l d  retrents. 
2 O .  Reyder couId only operate seriousIp in unison d t h  
Mortier by the wrlley of the Gundiianrs; anil Merida, on nccoiint 
of its stone bridge, m tlie pivot of his movements. Biit 
Mortier's b ~ ~ e  wm in Andalusia, anci hTs fmnt waii nmssitrily 
sprcad from Zafrn to lfcricla, both to mver hia communimt,ions 
niid to dmw propiñiona from tlie fertile d i~ t r i c t  of Werenm. 
Tlle road of Xcres de loa C~valleros was however almye open 
to the Spn ia~ l s ,  and tlie frequent ridvnncee of Ballesteros and 
Contreras an tlmt h e ,  were to liarnw Morticr's comrniinica- 
tionm witli Anrlalusis This $ves the cliie. hmaiia, liulding 
Badajos md being mpportd by Bill, g p o s d  tlie memy in 
front witli, the Xpanish centre, whikt his movcnrtile w i q s  ander 
O'Donnc!, Contrcw, rtnct Edillestcros, actea ~gains t  he French 
flanks; endi Iiaving Portugal to retire izyion m a plnco of 
rehge. mis genernl plm was well considered, but Romana's 
projects mere ordinarily so vague and injudicious, that lord 
Wellington forbrul Hill t o  nssist bim unlcsa for definite and 
approved objccta Eience tlie latter'a apparent activity, 
39 So stop Romana's mo~ementq Ilortier liad only to 
unitc tlie 2nd nnd 5th oorps and give battle; or, if that mas 
rcfu~ed, to b e ~ i e p  Bnnlajos, ~slvliicli from its influenoe, situatiori, 
and tlie adwntage of its stone bridge was the 
I r g  t o  the Alemtejo. Tliis Iie ardently desircd; "* 
yet Soult n-oultl not permit him to uiidestake 
nny deciuive operntion wliile Anrlnii~ñia wntr cxpoeetl to mdrlen 
iitsurrections, and desceiits from Cadiz; and to my that eitlier 
marshal m arang would be rash, becanse two great interests 
claslied. filortier nnd Repier united could linve furnjehed 
t.wcnty thousnnd infnntry, tifty gunq md more thnn three 
tliousriiid crtviilry, nll excellent troops. Romana, after gar- 
risoning Badajos Olivenza and Albuquerque, could not bring 
mgre tlian fifteen tliousund men into line, and musk have 
jnined Hiii. But the latter with a m i x d  foroe and divlded 
comrnand wuld not bme ventured a battIe in the plain 
country beyond Portaiegi.e:-a ddmt would h m  oyeried 
Lisbon to tbe victor, unless Wdlington detached largely from 
the north, snd then the king and Soult would bave inhntly 
rcinforced Mortier. 
4 On the other bnnrl, Soult, jndging tliat Anilnlusin sliontd be 
renderd a strongliold indepenclent of extraneous events, bent 
811 lbis etttention to tbat object. His exact md economical 
mangements providd for the current consnmption of hia 
troops;-he formecl vaiast reserve mqnzines without over- 
whelming the people ;-the native municipal authotltiw, reto- 
gnised md mppohd in mattem of police and mpply, acted 
zealaaslp;+nd withoat irnputrition upon tbeir ptriotism; for 
those who see and fml tlie miseries flowing from disordedy 
and wasting armie~i may lionatly assist an enemy d&rous h 
preserve refilarity. Soult also feIt, that while fixing a solid 
foundation for further mili* o p t i o n s ,  he ~hould obtain 
repntation as an able administmtor md pacificator; but the 
mmhnls under his order~ having only military objactg natu- 
mlly desired grent field operrttione, because thaa only muId 
they be diatinpisIied, The final resuIt would wem t o  favotar 
Ifortier's v i m .  Andnlusin proved mom of a 1)uiurtli~n thnn 
rtii  dvantage to  the Frencli ; yet only h n s e  Soult waa not 
p m i t t d  by Joseph to execute ths p b  pmjects for which 
he liad laid the foundation. 
4'. The duke of  Dalmatiz% vím clmhed d t h  the d h e s  of 
the k ig ,  whose poverty fotced him t o  grasp fik al1 the revenues 
of hdnlusia; and hzGng led tbe armp in person across the 
Morcna, he dnimctl lioth *S monnrch nnrl conqaeror. He who 
ppidds the sworrl will mlways be firct ~crveíI. Guidetl Fiy hn- 
polean'e orders, Boult resisted Josephh demnnds, and tliiis 
excited hia rnqer in an extraordinary manner; yet t h o  confi- 
dente d the emperor he retaind; nncl his province, referente 
being had to the nature o£ the war, m admirably well go- 
vemed. It w&g pdurally ttanquillizecl, tlie milihry rwaiirecs 
were dmm forth, lnrge botlies of natiite troops were niiscd 
aiid ~uccessfu1ly ernployed to repress the efforta of tlie pnr- 
tidas. The arsenal of construction at Seville was rendered 
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amilable, the mlnm of learI nt Linares mero morlceil, tha 
copper of the rivsr Tinto gathcred for tho mpply of t11e 
fmndries, and every P M V ~ S ~ O ~  fot the ase of a Iarge army wns 
collected Privateera were fitt.ed out, commercc mns com- 
menced witli nctitml nationa in the portir of Grennclai annd f i  
mret but consirh:x~bIe ti-affic, carried on witli Lislion itself, 
demomtmted the administrative talents of Sanlt. dndatnsia 
soon became the mmt powerful atablishment of the Frencli 
ia Spain. 
5". Zf twenty-five thousand additiond tsoops bad been sent; 
to &tremaxlum in Jme and Jdy, Portn,pl could not bave 
been defended. Napoleon did not fnil t o  jiidge tlius, for wc 
shall find liim directing ;Sncl1& ta co-operate in the invasien 
of that country with fifteen thoumnd men wben Tortoza 
should fa11 ; md the lcing's Madrid force ms in Junc 
sugmenkd t o  twenty thoiisand ; Ziut the emperor dirI not 
enforce the execution. It m a fatal error mhicli will be 
better underetood as th¢ rimative arlymces. 
AT ti& tima the French, irtretded on ona great Iine from 
Cadie to Gilion in tlie bay of Biscag were eagerly dhcwsing 
the remnants of tha Spanish m i e s  previaus to tlie tbird 
invasion of Portngal; whicb wris now eontemphted by Napo- 
lean as in the nahiral progresir of the war. It is therefore 
neceasary to  relate the eveata which occurred north of the 
't'ap, ~multmeously witli thoaa treated of in the fore- 
going chapter which wcre of the mrne rIcsuitory, oomplicsted, 
nnd feelile chamter. Martin Carrera, p o h d  in the Gata 
y e s ,  intercepted the French cornmunication between Bale- 
manca and the valley of the Tagus; Julian S d m  issued 
From time to time from Ciudttd Mrigo t t o  cut aff t h  
foragers in the county between the Apeda, the Tormag and 
tlie Donro. Beyond the Douro tbe Clallician army, ten thon- 
sand drong, ocxupied Puebla, de Senabria Puenta F e d a ,  
ViIla Franca and AsGorga, menacing the right flank md rear 
of the sixth mrp. Mahy was orgnnizing a aecond a m j  at 
Lngo, and in thc Astnriaa; D ' h c o  ~ommmdrd sevcn thon- 
sand men, t h r ~ 0  thousand of which wcre postcd at CorneIkng 
unrlcr ge.nrrnl Pontc. Thus nn irrepilar Iine of dcfcnec six 
liundred milm long, was offered to tlie invarfem; but withont 
dqhtli or aubstnnce, save at Baclajou and Ciudad Rodriga, 
behind which plnces the Dritisli and Portupwe troops were 
Y n g .  
I n  opposition, tlie French, hoIding the interior line, kgt 
tlieir mrtsses onEy on tlie principal routes, mmmnnicating by 
moveable columns, md thua menaced al1 the important points 
mitliout acattering their Forces. She influx nf fresh troaps 
from Frrince cnntinunlly d d e d  to their solidity, especidly iri 
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aupported by Kellermaii wivitli the forces of hia go~ernment, 
and by the eiglith corps under tbe duke of Abrantes. 
Joseplis invasion of rlndalusin lid boen tlie aignal for a 
genernl movemcnt of a?] thc Frcndi in Spain. Wliile Victor 
and Mortier rnenmed Qdiz and Bdajos, Xey auininonecl 
Ciudad Rodrigo, and Bonnet from tlie Aaturias threatened 
Qaliicia by the Concija d'Ibas. At tbe a m e  timc, Loison 
occupied Leon m d  M d i n n  del Cnmpo witli eiglit tliorrsnnd 
men ne~vly amived from Franco, nnd tlio arlvnnccd giiitrd of 
the eighth corps passed VaIladolid. h ison p v e  out thnt lie 
would invade Gallicia by PuebIa de Senabrin, and on tIie 15tli 
of Fcbrunry his cnvalry crit to pieccs fivc I i u n h d  Spanisli 
troo~is nt klmniuis; bitt I I ~  finally marched *inst Astorgn, 
mhile IIonnet, liaping dedroywl Ponte's foree at Potes de Xiem, 
menaccd GaIlicia by the poss of Nava de Suama. These 
movcments alnrmerl tlic Sp~~niarile. Giircia, tlircntencd fit 
onca 1~y Bonnet and by Loison, and feriring equrilly for A~torga 
rana Lugo, tlirew two-thirtls of Lis army into tEre former t o m  
and mrried tlie remainder to Villa Franca to  cwer Mahi. 
Wcy however only rnnrtc EL fcint of escnlding Ciiidntl Rodiigo, 
Loiwn was repdsd from A ~ t o r g ~  Junnt tlien conccntr~ted 
tTie cighth corps te besirtge tliat $me, biit ivns suddenly mlletl 
tomartls &&id  le^ clisorderrr aliodd arise in the capital 
during tlie kiug'ti nli~cnco in Ancldusin. 3falii anrI Farcin 
tlien tirouglit up the new levies t o  tlie d g e  of tlie mountains, 
thinking to relieoe the Asbians by tlirentening xn irruption 
lnto thc plaine of Leon; yet, as Loison di11 rcmained at Eene- 
vente, they were unalde to effcct their oiiject, nnrI nfter drniv- 
ing off the five thonmnd men leR in Astoir;a by Garci~ retised 
to Villa F m n c ~  
Bonnet did not pws Nava de Xuarnil, general Ud4rco rnliied 
the Astiirian fugitivcs nt Louarm, nntl Gnrcia, Icaving ñlahi to 
cammand in Gnllicia, mrsrcked witll the rernnrant o€ tlie old 
army o£ the left t o  join h m a  at Badajos Ifennwhilc 
Kellman d v a n d  t o  Alba de Torrnes, and rietiicliments 
from bis nnd Ncy's forec i-epeatcdly cl~ascd Carrcrn from tlic 
Gnh nncl Bejar m~unt~nins, clriPing him somcti~ties over tlie 
Alqon, sometiniw into Portugnl. It is however unnecessary, 
and dificdt, to trace al1 tliesc movementq because the French, 
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while prepming for p t e r  operati03 mere conthnll~r 
qmadig falso reports, and making demonstmtions in various 
directions to  misled the dlies wnd ta Gover their om pro- 
j&. 
These were at first obsmre, The invasion of Portugal by 
tbe northern line was not f~ndly aman,@ unta a later period; 
and it seems prohable, that wwhile Bonnet drew &e attention of 
the Gallician army towads Lup, Jnnot thought t o  penetrate 
by Puebla Senabria; not, as Lojson announced, for tlie inva- 
sion of GalIieia, but to turn the Tras os Montes and descend 
by thc route of Chavm npon Oporto, while Ncy, mllinp tho 
second corps to the sid of the sixth, shwld inwst Ciudad 
Rodrigo. But tfieir projeets, whatever they might have been, 
werc fmstratcd, prtly by the insurrmtion in Grcnada and tlie 
failure of Xoehet against Valencia; p d l y  by dkunion amongxt 
the genenila; for here also Ney md Junot complained recipro- 
mlly ; and everg.wliere it wa shown that tha Fmncli corps 
Sarmée, however formidabIe in themselrea, would not in the 
absence of Xapo'leon act cordially m a general system. 
When tlze commotion in Andalusia aubsided, Junot returned 
to Olil Castille, Loison joined the sixth mrps on the Tomes, 
KeIlerman retired ta Vdladolid, and his detachmentrr pIaced 
on the Doum rnaintainerl the conimunication~ htween Ney 
and Junot. The Intter, drawing a miinforccment from Bonnet, 
then invested Astorga with ten thoussnd infantry, two tliownnd 
cevnlry, e;gliteen ficld-pns, slx twenty-four pounders nnd two 
morhm; his covering divisions took post at Puente Femrls 
and Prields de Senabriq ta watcli thnt line and observe Rene 
vente mil tlie Mombuey rod. Mahi immeuiately canen- 
tmted tlie Gallicimn army at Villa F m m  and Fonceliadm, 
and detached fifteen hundrd rnen under filievarria t o  Mom- 
buey and Puebla, b hmss tlie flmk tina rear of 
Mr. Stuii*~ the investing army. The Qalliciran autliorities 
Corrcpporia- 
ente, JIss. had freqncntIy mwred Iord Wellirighon tlirnt Mahi 
had twenty tliouaannd me11 organirsed troops, but it 
now nppwred that only cighf, thousand were in the ficld, and 
thwe ilI provided and prone ta d m i o n .  
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SantociIdes commmdd the place; he wns b m v ~  liis pmison 
mustercd two tliousand five l iundd infnntry besides crin- 
noneers and armetl pmaot% and Clie Moorish ramparts had 
becn strengthened by fresh works; but there was little ammu- 
nition, scarccly twenty dap' mtions, and nothinz outsidc the 
waFls cnpnble of serioudy disturhing the encmy. Slie town 
shod in an open plain and lid three suburbs, Fuerto de 
Hierro to tbe north, 8t. Anrlreecs fo the east, htebra to  t h ~  
~veFit, Qn tho two h t  Junot m ~ d e  fnlse nthcks, condnct- 
i n g  h i ñ  real approaclies apinst  tlie front betrvcm Puerto 
de Riem and ReteVi; and in eight days the Puerto de Hierro 
was carried by ~itorm, tm sallies were repuisetl, and the 
trenches openerl. A breach mas then oomnrcnd, but thc 
Iiattering-guns hcame unserviceahle, nnd tlie Iine of nplironch 
mns Aanked by the bouses of Eetebia, whicli meie filled Tlritl~ 
Spanisll iinfnntry : however, the town mffewd from sTielIs, the 
wall wns brolren on tlie 20th of ApB1, and tbe msnult mas 
odered, A previous athck on Retebiti hrad fitilcd, yct Santa- 
cilrles I T ~  so distressect for ammunition ttiat he offered to eapi- 
tulate on terms mliich Junot refuselt Xn tbe evening of the 
Zlst, somc picked troops nrn up to tlic brench, wliicli wns 
well retrenched, trtochded and defencled \vi tli great olistinacy; 
a fl anlnk frre from the Eetebia stapped tlie supporting columno, 
ancl the storming-pacty, tIrw aliandoneil, wts held at bny on 
tlic summit of tlic I~rencli; mlierc, bcing pliml on liotli flnnks 
and front Nith ~ h o t  from tlie liouses of the triwn, and in 
rear by the mnskctry from Retebia, it n*ould linve been totdly 
tlestroyed hut for the scarcity of ammnnition, wllich parnlyzed 
tfie Spmisli defetice. Thrce hunrlrcrl h e n c h  iirc snitl t o  Iia5-e 
fiilIen an tlio brexcli itself, yct tlio remainder fiiially effcctad s 
lodgrnent in the mins; nnd dunng tlic night, x second attack 
on the Retebia proving succeasful, a communicntion was 
opcnetl from tlic ~inrnllcls to tlie Iorlgmcnt : strong tvorking 
pnrties then cut tlirougb the stockde, and thc governor sur- 
rcndemi. 
RIahi, %*ha had advanccd to the edge of the rnountains as if 
Iie mould have snccourcd thc plncc, Iicaring o f  thia e~ent, 
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retired to Bembibre, where his rear vas overtaken and defeated 
by general. Clausel on the 24th. He fe11 back to Liigo and 
realled Lia detachcnt  frorn Mombuq, biit tlic TrencIi Frorn 
I3cnevcntc overtook and defeatcd it nt Cnstro Contrijo. Jiinot 
p!ncing prrisons in Astorgs nnd Lcon, rcstored %nneU Lis 
division; and tlint gciierd, mlio liad retired to Snntnnder during 
the siege, re-occuliiotl Oviado and Gihon, defeated tlie Astu- 
rinns, nnrl once moi'c: menaccxl Gnllieia by tlie m J s  of Concijn 
and. Bales : sevwn1 sliglit actiona ensued, yet tlie Fsencli pene. 
trat.ed no Lrtlicr, milid t!ie junta of Oallicis reiiiforced the 
Asturiana ivith liiree tliousand men, 
During tlie siep of Astoga, tlie sixth coqx was concen- 
trated at Salamanca, and n strong detacliment uf Rellernian'8 
troops seized the ps s  of Bañori. Wliereupon Carrera quittwl 
the  IiiEls and joineci tlie Englisli light division near dlmeidw. 
In fine, the great o~perations for subduinf; Portugal wercre com- 
inencing, and the llne of communieation with h c e  m 
cncumbercd witli tlic dvancing reinforcementa. A lmge bnL 
tering-trnin, coliectct! from Scpvh, Eurgoa, anrl Pnmpelun~, 
linrl nrrived nt Xdnmnnca, and gcncrnl Ln Rf~rtinicrc rcwl~d 
Vallniloiirl mtli n ~einforcement of ten tiiousanrl mcn fur tlie 
eiglitli corps. Genernl Drouet p a s d  the Pyrenees ivith 
a ninth corp% camposed of tlle fourth bathlions of +- 
inenix aheady in Sprrin, and lie vas foIIowed by seventeen 
tliousnnd of tlie imperial pards, whom pmence gaTe force to 
tlre current nimour that ttIu emperor liimself mas coming. 
Fortunately for tlie allies, tliis rumour, although rXe e o n g s t  
al1 parties, and creriited botIi by Joseph's miiiisters and the 
Frcncli ambassador at Madrid, was not realized, and e leader 
for thc projectotl apr.riitions rvns stiil t o  be named. I bnve 
lieen told tliat Ney rcsumed tlw command of the sixth corps 
tliinking lic nns to conduct tlic entcrprise rpinst Portugd ; 
-tlint thc intrigw of Bert,hicr, to wlioni lie wns obnoxioiis, 
fmstratwl hia liopw;-tliat Napoleon, fatiped with the (lis- 
putes of his lieutenrartts, had really wolved  to repair in per- 
son to tlie Penimula, but hk rnarriage and some: irnportrmant 
political affairs clivertd him from that olrject,-findly that 
Massena waa cliosen, partly for liia milita7 fume, partIy 
-A nc was of higher rank tl~na the other mnrslials, and a 
ntrnngcr to thcir prcvious qii~rrcls. Ris nrrivnl rnm k n o m  
in Mity aniongst tIie allies, and Wellinfiton liad no longer to 
dread tlhe formidable prcseiice of tltc Frene11 emperor. 
That Nassena's base of operatiws miglit not be exlmsed to 
tlie intcrfcrence of any other autliority in Spnin, t!ie foiir mili- 
t a r ~  governmentB of Snlamanm, 'Frnllntlolitl, Asturinq unrl 
Sxntnnder were placed unrler liis ternpomry a~iiilliority, wliich 
thus became aholute in tlie northcrn provinces; yet pi-evi011s to 
taking tlie commnnd lic canfcmd mith tlie lring d Ifadrii?, 
and it woiild seem some Iicsitotion ne to tlie line o£ iiiwision 
still prevailed in tlie Frencb couneils, In tlie imperial muster- 
nills, tlie head-quarters of the arrny of Portiigd are marked 
as being rat CRceres in Fstremndure, as if tlie sortthern line 
were to lio followy~rl; rand for tlie niontli of April tlie irnprinl 
guarcls aro returned as part of tlint amy;  a circumstnnce 
strongly indicating that Xqoleon n t  one time retrlly desiped 
fo assume comm~nand liimself. The uorthcrn line mas, homcvcr, 
dcfinitivcly ratlopterl, nnd d i i l c  tlie lirincr of Esling ivns ~ti l l  in 
the capitd, tlie eiglith corps pztssed the Tomes, and Ney com- 
rnenced tlic 
FIRST SIEQE OF CIUDM RODBIGO. 
In the beginning of thc year Iotd Wellin,@n wns tio sus- 
picious of the go~emor's intention that ho liad him rcmoved. 
He waa r e p l a d  &y Andreag Uerrasti, a veterna of fifty years' 
ñerPice, wliose silver hair dignified countenanw and benign 
manncrs cxcitcd rcsyiect, anrl Eiis coiirnge nnd bonom aecorrletl 
witli Iiia venemlile alilienrnnce. Bis gnwison nmountcd to  six 
thousantnd fighting men besidw tlie citkens; and tlis place, 
h i l t  on a belglit overhanging tlie nortliern baslr oE the Apstlik 
river, uTas atnply mpplid ivith rtrtiIlery rand stores of al1 
kinds. Tiie morlrs liowevm concistcd mcrcly of nn old m- 
part, nearly circular, aboue tbirty feet in height, flnnked with 
a few projections contnining some lig-11t p n s .  A second wall, 
about twelve feet lijgh, mllcd a ' j ~ u s s e  Iirnie,' dvitl ditch and 
covercd my, surronndcd thc first, yet it mns plnccd so low on 
the liiil ns scarcely to offer any cuver to tlic iipper muipnrt. 
Thera were no Iioni1~-proofs even for tlie niagmine, anti 
Herrasti WAS forced t o  plnce his powdcr in tlie cliurch and 
secura it as he muld. Beyond the walh and totdly severed 
from the t o m ,  €he auburb of Fianckco, defended by an 
earthen entrenchment and atrengthened by two large conventg 
formed an outwork on the northaast. The convent of Santa 
Cruz wed n, lilre purpose on the north-\yest ; and between 
thcse posts t h m  mas a ridge cdled tlie Little Taon, which, 
somewliat inferior in height ta thc town, nw only a bnndred 
mil fifty yarcls from the Iiody of the place. There was also a 
Greater Teson, which, riaing belrXnd tIie lesser, ni the distance 
of B ~ H  buniid yards from the wds, overlooked the rampnrt~l 
end sttw to  tbe bottom o£ the ditch. The surrounding country 
o p ,  espeeidly on the l& bank of the Aguedri, €o which 
tbe garricon had access by a done bridge wit.hin pistol-shot of 
thc castie-pte. The Agueda itselt, ri~ing in tlio Siem de 
Francia rtnd mnning into tbc Douro, is subjcct to grent md 
sutldcn floods; md eix or seven miles below the town, nmr 
San Felices, the chanuel deepem into one continued md fright- 
fui clwm many liundred feet deep and overhung mitH huge 
desolate crags. 
Dunng Febrnary and March the French liad rnenaced 
Ciudad Horlrigo, but dcpnrted lightly as thcy m e ,  and their 
intcntions appeared doubtful uiitil the 25th of April, when 
u camp w a ~  pitclied on a lofty ndge five miles eastwurrl o£ tlie 
city. I n  a feiv days a second anll then a thircl arose ; nnd tliese 
portenbus clouds contulued te giither on the billa until June, 
when fifty thousand fighting men carne domn into the plain, 
and throming two bridgea over the Aguda, begirt the fortresa 
This multitude, composed of the dxth and eiglitb corps and a 
reserve of cnírnlry, \ras led by Ney, Junot, and Montbmn. 
Tlie sixth c o r p  inveatcd thc place, the eightli ocmipicd San 
Felices Grnnde and otlicr pointg tlie camlry swnmerl on Iioth 
sides oP the river. me battsring-trsia witli a great escort 
wm stiii two daya' march in tlie rear; for the raim, inundatinp 
the flat country between the Apeda and the T o m ,  renderad 
tlie rmds irnpassable, 
Trestle briridges were estabii~hed on the 2nd and 7th of 
Junc, at Curirlad ahve, und at Cwboiierns h low  the town. 
On the 13th ground was broken at the Greater Teson. The 
PBnd, the artillery d v d ,  and prepamtiom werc made ta 
contmct the circle of investment on the left bank af the 
Agueda, which had hitberto been bnt slightly mtched. That 
ni$ Jnlian Smchez, issuing silently out of the castle @te 
with two hundred liomcmen, crossed the river and pkrcing thc 
Iinc of h n c h  poste on the Icft bnnk, reachcd tlie BritisIi 
light division, wliich was  then behind the Azavrr, six miles 
from Ciudad Rotlrigo. This caused Neg to reinforce bis 
troops on the left bnnk, nnd a movement, to be hercafter 
notiewl, waa directed wimt general Crnufud tlie 25tlij on 
which d q  also the French bakteries opencd. 
Ney'e plan m ta brcach the body of tbe pIace without 
silencing the Spaniah fire, and salvos, from forty-six p n s ,  
soon bmlre tlie old masonq of tlie rnmpah. Tlie lie~ieged 
however codd bring tmenty-four guns to h a r  on the Teson, 
and shot no well in return, t l ~ a t  hree magazines blew up at 
once in the trenchea and killcd above a hndred of the 
ri~sailanta. 
On the 27th. Massena arrived in the camp and snmmoned 
t5e grwemor to surrender. Eerrasti amered  like a good 
soldier. The fire WM then m m e d  until the 1st 
rntereentea 
of Jul y, wl~cicn hfwena, scnsiMe th& thc modc of fi, c, 
rtttack wns faulty, dirockd tho engineers t o  rnise 
~ s ~ ~ ~ e n c e ~  
counter-btttteries, push their parallela fa tlie Lesser 
. Teson, and worlr reguIarIy f o m r d  to blow in the wunferscarp 
and pass thc ditch in fom, To fnditate thc propss  of the 
morlrs, tlie con~ent of Santo Cruz was storrned on tl ie right 
flank, md on the left the mburb was Ton; yet with great 
loss anil severd changea of fortune, for Hemsti made a 
vjgorous sa1ly. 
During thc cesmtian of fire consequent upon thc change in 
the French dispositions, Herrasti removed tlie mins Trom tlie 
foot o€ the breacti, and strengthened his flank dsfcnces; but 
on the 9th of July, the batteries establislied on tlie Lesser 
Teson re-opencd mith a terrible effcct. In twcnty-four hours 
tlie firc of tl~e Slianigh guns ww nenrly s i l e n d ,  part of the 
town mas in flames, and a reseme magmine expIodcd on the 
walls; the connterscar~, wnsi Jao blom in by a mine on an 
extent of thirtj-six fcet, thc ditch wm fiIled by thc ruine sand 
a broad way mnde inte tke plnce. Three French soldiers of 
heroic conrage tlien rusheil ouf of the rnnks, monnteri the 
brencii, 1 ooked into the town, and having t h a  iii broarl day- 
lig11t ascerEaiiied tlle ~ h h e  of affdrs, discliarged their muskets 
in token of fincma, and whEi matcldess fortune retired unhwt 
to their comdes .  Tlie colnnins of assault immdintely 
assemñiled The troops, animatecl by &e presence of IJey, 
and excited by the example of  tlie three men who had so 
gfillantly preved the breach, were impatient for the sipd, 
and a few mommts wouIrl have sent them N n g  into the 
midst ot the city, wlicn tht? wlrite flag maudd~nly \~.a,vod on tho 
rmmpart, !lb ~enemble governor was seen sbnding done 
on th0 mine, sisnifyiiig by lii& pturerr tht he desired to 
capitulate : he had ~tricken manfully wliile reason warranted 
hope, and it wps no dishonour to & ~vhite liaim that he 
surrendered when resistance could only lead to massacre antl 
devastation. Thus Ciudad Rodrip  fell. 
Six months had now elapsed shcc the f imch,  resurni~g 
tIic plan o'? conqncat intemptcd by the Anstrian wnr md by 
the opcrntions of  ir Ait111lr 'IYeRCRley, hhad retnkcn thc offcn- 
~ive .  Brittle a h  lirattle they lid gained, fortress after 
fortress tliey bad taken? and sent the Spanish forces broken 
md scattered to seek for refirge in the most obscure parta: 
soIid mishnce tliere was none, and tbe only hope of deliver- 
ance for the F e n i d a  r w t d  upon the British general. 
How be realized that bope sball be related in the next boek. 
Meanwhile, tbe reader ~Itould bear in mind that tlie mnlti- 
farious aetions related in thc foregoing chapters, mcre wntem- 
pomneoua, antl that ha Iias been lea, m it were, roiinrl the 
rntlrgin of a lake whose turbulent w a h  were foaming and 
dosliing on evey eicle. Tedioue to read, and trifling innny of 
tlle ~rcumstances mnst appear, yet the whole fomri what hris 
leen cdIed the Xpanish rnilitary policy: and wlthout accu- 
mte notions on that head, it would be impossible to appre- 
ciate the copacity of the m m  who like Milton's croxaed 
pl~antam pnved a broad way tlirough their clinotic wnrfare. 
1 have been cliwged willi incompetente to undemtand, and, 
most unjustly, &tli a desire to  unctemte tlie Spanish resÍst- 
ance; but it is for history t o  record foolish as well as glorious 
deeds, that p t e r i t y  may profit from all; and neitber will 1 
mislead thliose who read my work, nor sacrifice the reputa- 
tion of my countrJlls firma to slidow rleclam~tion upon tlre 
unconquernble apirit of independence. To expose tlic srrora 
is not to undemlus tlie fortitulls of a nnlile people. Iii tiieir 
comtanq, in tthe unmampled patience mith mhicli they bore 
the  ills inflicted by a rutliless enemgr and by their o m  aoditi  
governments, tlie Spaniards were tmly noble: but s11~1lI: s ~ y  
that tl~ey merc victorious in their battlcs, or fnithful in tlieir 
compacts-tll& thcy trmtcd their pnsoners ivitli liumnnity- 
thnt their .i untas were lionest or wise-tlieir generals slrilful, 
their soldiers firm? It is but the base trutli, to sny they were 
incapable of defending their country. Every nction, every 
correspondence, cvery proceeding of the six ymrs ivliich the 
mnr lastcd, risc up in support o€ tliis triith; nnd to nRyumo 
that an insurrection so conductd did, or could, Game tlie 
proiügious p w e r  of Napoleon is a mental illusinn. Spain 
baHe liirn! Rer efforta were mtinonpt the vcry smnllest 
causes of llis feilare. Portu,@ has far p t c r  claimq t o  tlirat 
glory. Spnin filrnishcd indeed tlie opportunity; but it wm 
England, Austria, Rumia, or ratlier fortunc, tlint ~truck d o m  
tlint monderful m n .  !JJle English, more powerful, more 
rich, more profuse, perhaps moi-e lirave than tlie ancient 
Romans;-the Englisli, with rp f leet for grandeur ~ u d  mal 
force never matched; witii rin arrny nntI n, general eqnnl to 
any emergoncy, fought as if for tlieir own exisGence, The 
Austrians brought four liundred thousand good troops to 
arrest the conqueror'a progress; the snoms of Rusia destroyed 
tlirce Iiundrcrl tf~oasand of his bcsk itoldicra; nnd wlicn he 
l i d  lost lialf u million o£ vetemiiq iiot one nf w?vliorn rlicrl nn 
Spanisli g~ound, Europe in oilo wst  combi~ation could only 
tear the Peniusula from him by tearing Prance along with it. 
Ttliat wcaluiess thei1, wllat incretlildc ddusion to point to 
Spain, ~ 6 t h  alI hcr follies and Jler never-enrling dcfeats, EN 8 
pr~of  tlmt n peoyle figliting for indcpendence must bc victo- 
rious. She ~vns  invadd because she: ntlliered to the great 
European wistocnicy, She ivas delivered, because E11glland 
enablcd tliat nristocracy t o  triumpli for a mouent over tlie 
principleg of the Frencli revolution. 
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BOOK TRE ELEPENTH* 
PORTUGAL WM now tbe only rmi obhcla to the rmbjection 
of tho Peninsulg and lord Wellington had fmm the moment 
he abandonad Spain medihted upon the defence of thnt 
coantry. Neither the Portupese goveniment nor the Eng- 
lih cabinet nos the English people, nor the Frmch emperor 
i+nd  it could be permanently defended; Wellington alone 
mw his aay  dearly, and when he d i v o d  his operations from 
tlie folly of Spanish rnlem he formed his plan; not moved 
thercto by any vain ambition, but with frxcd hope founded on 
a crrutioua and labariow estimate of dificultiea and rcsources. 
Wheierefore, reverting to the period of hia r e t m t  from Se 
his political and mili* p d i n g s  ~ h l l  be h e d  up t o  the 
nioment when, confident in his &m, unmoved by the force 
of his enemy, the timidity uf ofhe government he served, and 
unahakm by the intripea of malcontents who aecretly md 
openly with mdipant  persevmce tliwarted his desiph be 
commmced bis glorions task. 
A k r  the mtreat to  Bdri jo~ in 1809, he repaired t o  Wle, 
prtly to noptinte with the centra1 junta, upon rnratters tonch- 
i n g  tEie w v  principdly t o  confer witli liis Iimther ere tlie 
latter quitted the Peainsula, Lord Wellecleyys departure m 
caused Iiy the ptak of politia. in England, where a change in 
t,llc ahinistration waa about to take place; a change, sudden 
indeed But noC unexpected, because the ineptitutle of the 
govement m in private acknawlcdged by many o£ its 
mcmbcrs. T h o  failnre of the Wdchercn expcrlition was only 
the s i w I  for a pubIic avowal of jdousies nnd wretched 
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my in Ermpe. M .  Cnnning, the principal reagtta atnte- 
mover of those intrigues, nemetly denouncing 
lord Caatlerengh to his colimgues as a man incnpalile o!? 
conducting the public affair~, exacted fmm them a 
pmmise to dieimigs him. Nevertlidess he per- :;E"$" 
rnitted that nobleman, ignorant of the impuhtion 
on his nbilities, to plnn and conduct the fitting out of the 
most pomerfd armament that ever quittd EngImd: but 
d i e n  108s and ruin m~ited  on the nnhappy WaIcheren ex- 
pedition, BIr. Canning cIaimed the fulfilment of the promise. 
Tlie intrigue thus becoming knom to lord Cnstlereagh, wasi 
by him clinractcrizcd as ' a hreacJ~ af m j  p+ncipb ef g o d  
faith, htl$ pd&c rÚPadpriw&? TFiis m8 followed hy n iIuel, 
snd by the clissoIution of the adminigtrntion. Mr. Perceval 
and lord Liverpool beiig then enipowered to  form another 
cabinet, after R fruitlew neptiation with lord Grey and 
lord Grenville, assumed the lead themselves nnd de red  tlie 
d e p a h c n t  of forcign affaira to lord Wellcslcy ; and contrn'y 
to the general expectation that ~tatesman accepted it. His 
brotlier bd opened t o  him those great viems for tlie defence 
of PortugaI which he aftermarcls so gloriously renlized ; but 
wliich he could never have ttndertnken mith mnfideace unless 
d t h  the sama mntiments, hund by a comrnon intermt, snd 
resolnte to support him w h  the crisis of rlanger arrived. It 
m s  therefore wise and wmmendable tliat lord Welledey 
should sxcrifice som~thing of liis pcrsonn~ prctcnsiona, tu 
f o r m d  projects promising so mucli gIory to Iiis coiintry 
and to  his omn family : the 6rst proceerliaga in parliament 
juatified liis poIicy. 
Previous to  the change En the cabinet, sir Arthnr had been 
crcatcd bxron Doum and viscount TVellington; but thoae 
bonoum, Jtliough me12 desemeti, wcrc confcrrcd as much from 
party aa froin pntriotic feeling; and tlie mger of tlie cipposition 
members Iieing therebg excite4 tbey with f ~ w  exaptiona 
assailed the general personally, snd mXth an wrimony not to 
be jnstified. His rnerits, they said, were nougEit, hrliamen- 
his ~ct iuns silly, preaumptuous, rash; hb cnm- tnry~ebatea. 
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paip me deskng iiot r m d #  buti pnnishment. Yet he 
liad deliverod Portupl, c I d  Galliciei md Eshemadura, 
and forced one hundred thorisand Fmch  veterana to aban- 
don the offensive and mncentrstc about hfdrid l: Lord 
Grey, opposing hi own crurle military notionri ta tlie pracr 
tiaed skiU of sir Artliur, petn1sntJy censured the lafhr's 4s- 
positions at Talavm. Otherfi denietl that he was succesaful 
in that actioa; ehnd Eiome, forgetting they were amenable to 
histoy, proposed to leave hia name out of the vote of tlianks 
to the army! That battle, so skrnIy fought so hardly won, 
thep would bave set aside with resplpect to the commwnder as 
not warranfing admiasion to a peerqe alwags open t o  venai 
orators! The p w q c  of the Donro, 80 pmmptly, so ¿iaring.ly, 
so akilfdly, so successfully exmtpxl, seeming mther tlie resdt 
of inspiration thau of n e t d  judgment, tliey weuld have cast 
amay ns a tliing. of no worth I 
Thie qirit of faction m however not confined to one side: 
tliere m a ministerial pemm, wbo, in 1iEs dread of the o p p  
sition, wrotc to  lord Wcllington, comphining of his inaction, 
and calIing upon him to do something that wwld excite a 
puMic senadion : ' am@~i.lag pmkM Slood w m  $t r d 
sevew rebuke, ~ n d  cessation of al1 friendly intermurse with 
tlie wciter, dipcomed the general's abliorrenm of this detept- 
ahle policy: ht when euch pdom were abroad, lord Wei- 
1esIey'rc acceasion to t11e government was easeatial to the 
success of lord Wellington's pmjects. Tlioae projacts deli- 
vered *he Peninsula, clianged the fate of Europe, and every 
step mde tomrda their accomplishment merita fitkntlon 
from intrinsic i n t e r e  and bemnse his succesa hna hcen ntt.ri- 
butd t o  good forhne nnd tlie atsenuoue snpport he receired 
from the cabinet. Tlie great iniluence of fortune in wer m- 
not be denied, and the duke of WeIIington has J w a y  been 
one of her peculiar favouritee; but it sliall clearly appenr, that 
if lie met with great mccesm he liad previowly anticipated it, 
and upon solid gronnds; t h ~ t  he cabinet did not so much 
mipport him ns it n.ns supporterl by him; that his prudente, 
forekglit, and fiminess were at Imt eficient causes as any 
otliera tliat cm be addnced. 
Wde the cabinet yet unchan& lord Caatlereagh, 
bmught by continua! reversea t o  a more .saber methd of 
planning miiihry aflairs, had demanded Iord 'PYeUingtori's 
opiuion upon tlie expedieecy, the chance of auccesa, and tlie 
cxpensc of defending Pohugal. Thia lettcr reachctl him tlie 
14th of Eepternlier, 1809 ; tut the autject required moiiy pre- 
v i a ~  inquiries and a careful examination of  ths country; nnd 
at that periorl, wny plan for tlie defence of Portugal was neces- 
sarily tu be modified according to the energy or fcclileness of 
tEie Spaniards in Anddweia. Hence it wns not iintll dtcr Iiis 
rctnrn from Scville, R fem daya prcvioiis to thc rlcfcnt nt 
O a a ,  that he repIied to Iord Liverpool, wlio during tiie 
interval hnd sncceeded Cnstlereagh in the wnr department, 
Adverting to tlie actual state of tlie French troops jn tlie 
PeninsuIa, Le observed. thnt unlcss tlie Spaniah ermita met 
witli some p e n t  disaster tlre forrner codd ~&t dJ~m 
LEtter to d an atta& apm Porluycd; nnd if e~cnts bd~i,,, 
should e n d e  them to do so, the f o r w  a€ tbrit ; ~ ~ ; , ~ ~ y q W .  
moment jn tIie latter might defend it. ' But tlie 
Portugil would Le incrmrid; iiot only in liroportion t o  tlie 
additional troops then poured in, but also in ppor t ion  to 
the effect ~vliich such a display of ddItiond strengtli would 
neoessarily have u p n  the spirit of the Spaniada Even in 
that casc, zmta Spin  R?&E &e h cmpwd mtd ren- 
d d  szslimksive, tlie Fmnch would find it difimilt, if not 
impossilile, to ota in  psaession of Portugal, prrovidd Eny- 
land q h j e d  lw m i e s  im defmce of thut cmntry, and tlmt 
t l ~  Portztpa rniliflvry #&e mas m - g a n a  to ?he fd 
&m$ of wIbicJb 3 itm capa& But the nurnl-ier of Britisli forces 
empIoyed eliould not Iie 1r.m thnn k1iirt.y tlionsantl. rffcctive 
men; aithoiigh the Portugese regular ferce, actually enrollecl, 
consisted of thirty-nine theusand infantrg tliree thousantl 
artillery and tluee thousand mvalry, and tlie militia smountd 
t o  forty-fivo thousand, cxclusive of tbe ortlcn~nps.' 
As te tlie expense-' Tlie actual yeerly coatof tlieBritis1i nrmy 
in Portugal, csclusive o i  tlie %re of transpod-vesscls, was nboct 
1,800,000A, being only half a million skrling more than tIiey 
mould cost ii employed in England, Hence the most iru- 
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p ' rhnt  consid~ration was tiie exponse of rsno~ating and s u p  
porting the Portupese militmy and civil servicsa. The 
British government bad dready mbsidized the Portupese 
segency rit the rate nf six hundred thousand pounds ycarIy, 
being the cxpcn~c of h c n t y  thonsand mcn wltich the lntter 
were bound by trmQ t o  plwbco at  tfie service of  thc Fnglish 
oomrnander-in-chief. But tliis w ~ s  fnr from suficient to 
render the Po'ortuguese m y  effieient for the impending con- 
test. The revcnum of Pottngd r a s  betmeen eight and nine 
milIians of clollars, the expensea between f o u k  and fifteen 
millione, Eeaviag a deficimcy of more than ~ i x  millions of 
dollam. Henw, for that yenr, the most pressing only oF ihie 
civil and militay demands liacl h a  pnid and the pulilio debt 
ttnd the aahies of &e publi~ sewnnts w m  in ai-rcnr. The 
arlvnnces rtfredy nade by Great Britnin ammnted to tmo 
millions of rlollars; there remined a deticiency offour rnillions 
of doUars, which, after a eareful inquiry, it appeared could not 
be m d e  gmd by Portugal; and it w&s abvious the ndminis 
fration wonld, when distmsed, gmdually ~ppropriate the 
sulisicfy to snpport tlie civil autliorities to the detriiiient of 
ths military s e h c e .  Nay, almdy money from t h a  English 
military ched hd bcen advanced ta prevent the Portupese 
amiy fmni disbnnding from want of food. 
'It wns impossible to  dimintsh the expenses of the regency, 
and yet the French imasion and the emjgmtion to tbe Brmils 
had eo impoveridied tbe country that it was impossible to 
raise thc Fcvcnuo or to obttrin aoney by lonns. Tlie peoplc 
mcre unnblc tu pay thc tnxcs alrcndy imposed, nnd thc eustoms, 
mhich fomed tlie principal lirnneli of Portuguas rerrenng mere 
rcduced to  notlling by tlie transfer of the Brazilian trade-from 
tlre mother-country t o  Oreat Britain. This transfer, so pm 
fitable to the latter, was ruinous to Portugal, and therefore 
justice rrs weU as policy quired tliat England should afforrl 
p u n i r i r y  nsfiisbncc to the regenv. Witliout it notliing 
could be expecterl from tlie Portupese nrmy. TEic officer~ OS 
that n m y  hd for many yeam done no duty7 pnrtly tliat their 
country having been, with some trifling exceptions, at peace 
nenrly h l f  n centrrry, they hnd continued in thc same garrisons 
and Iived mith their families; nnd t o  thwe advantagea a d d d  
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upan tA&r m -%m and t7te b r d j  ef t h i ~  -y, and 
that 1 wn sanpim 272 m9 eqwta t im  of 60th wlm &id 
i5y tha mampb of BríFish of ima wnck & q s ,  1 hava no Jupe pf 
iykk majtst9 s l d  m w  m'Bdmw Ihe m y  fmna t l ~  
W m i m l a ,  w YOt sJmM be oBIyed b evmate  i 8  by defmt 
Thre i.9 no dDUi5t tlmt thB i d z a l e  c o n a v e s  zidl b tlie 
pasrnhz o ~ Z B H ~  fiy ?/he mmyj p b d L y  w i t M  a ccmfmt; 
rtnd otAw cor~cqwmce8 m% flllowi, afectiw tlic et&e nftlao eumr 
mi d y  in 7Lor¿wgn16ut im AYpain. If tlierefore it should be 
thougbt advisnble norv t o  mithclraw, or if eventudIy the British 
army should be ohliged to withdraw from Portugai, 1 monId 
recommend a comideration of tlie means of cnrrying away 
guch of tlie Portupese militiiry ns should be desirom of emi- 
grating, rather than continue by tlieir means tlie contest in 
tliis country.' 
Such were VirclIin,gtun'~ vjews, liut it must be o b a e d  thdn 
though PcnicbC nnd Sctnvrnl ofcrcd sccure points of rrnbmrk* 
tion in the event of failuro, neitfter were lilcely to come ivithin 
tlie scope of Lis gerations. And hw hope of q i n g  off the 
m y  from Lisbon \wis foundd chiefly upoe admira1 Berke- 
ley's; msurmca that the smbarkation would not take longer 
tlian four houw ; during x-hicli time, even Itliongh the Ieft 
bank of tlitrt rivcr should be occupied by the enemy, the ships 
of war coulrI sustnin the fire and at the same time meep witli 
their omn puis al1 tlie p n d  abovc Pnsso d l i h ,  whicli, 
f m ~ n  t l~s circumstance of its linviiig no mrf, was thought 
prefemhla t o  St. Juliank fer an embnrkation. Dut tlie 
atlmiral's i e m g  as shalI 33e shom hereafter, were erroneoas, 
tlie Aeet oould not rernain in tlie T a p s  for the purpose of an 
embarkation if the enemy mere in poseasion of the left bank 
On tlie receipt of this memoir the rninisters assentd to  the 
tria1, nlthaugli startIed by the number vf twops required; a 
nunilicr whicli tlicy tnily ahemed, would, dter the loss at 
K~ilcl~eren, eiidnnger EngIand in cwc of disnster. Tliey 
iiriilertoolr to p y  ten tliouaand dditionnl Poituguese t r w p ~  
aiid to n d v m c ~  money fer the increased stipends to the 
officers; rind being tbw pledged t o  an annuai sulisidy of 
nenrly onc miliion, they with justice reguired that the Portu- 
p e s e  regency sIiou1d lreep tlie rniiitay establishment whicfl 
re~naincd uilder its oivn diredion in a shtc of ackncy. 
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Thua supported, Wellington proceeded with vigorous intelli- 
genec to  meet thc impenrling contest. Hc cxpectod n, r% 
iiiforcement af five thoumntl infantrg ~nrl a regiment o£ 
cava17 from England, and smaller detachmenta liad a l d y  
rcached him. Uis iirmy was numeric~uy tliirty thousand 
strong; birt thofic ~ctunlly iinder arnta scnrccly amounted to 
tiventy tliousantl, for nine thusand were iii hospital, and 
many iii the ranka ~till  tottered from the effects of pnst ilIness. 
HeadqiUutera and the artillcry ParC were eptalilishcd at 
Viseu; the cnvalry occupicd Golegno, Punhctc, Torres Novas, 
Celorico, and Santnrern; HiIl witli five tIiousand British, and 
a like number of Portugese, remained at Abrnntes; tlie rest 
of the inhutry, one regiment forming the gnrrison of Lisbon 
cxccpted, mas diatributcd along the vallcy o€ thc Jfondcga. 
Wlien lord Weilington w o t e  liis mernoi~ lie expeckd the 
French wauld follow tlie nortliern lme of invasion in prefer- 
ente te tlie southern; that tliey wodd invade Portugal from 
Cnstille ratbcr thnn Andalu~ia Erom La Manclia He TW 
rnistnkcn. Nrapolcon ngnin dircdcd the opcrritions, and tlicy 
were gigantic; every gart of tbe Penin~lula ww destind to 
feel the weight of bis ams simultaneous~y. Fresh tmops 
flwhed ~ 4 t h  their i r e n t  Ciernan victories wcrc crowding into 
Spnin, reiiiforcing tlie c o r p  t o  their riglit nnd left, seouring 
tlie mnin communications, m d  following the footsteps of the 
014 bands as the Iatter were impeIled forwmd in the crtreer of 
invmion. Hence the conque& of AndaIusia so deeply affect'ed 
thc defenoe of Portugnl, tliat on tho 31st of Srannnv, at the 
momcnt Seville waa opening her gates, JPellington demanded 
fresh instructions, reiterating the question, whether Pm-ihqaJ 
dwuld Iie d . f d e d  at al2. But he transmitted also m a guide, 
une of t h o ~  ppowerful statemcnts wliicli hc invariably madc t~ 
the ministers previous to undertaling any peak entteprise: 
statementfi sliowing tlie bmings of past and present eventri, 
and indicating tlie future with wonderfd accuracy. 
'The cnemy,' Iic mid, ' rrimed at conquering the south, 
lic mould no doulit olituin Seville ~vitli nll its Zettcr to 
reaources; and tlie defeat and diqession of the lordfiw- 
pool, ala Spanisli armiea mould be the consequences of any ;la". 1810, 
action, in wEcb either their imprudente or neces- NsS.  
Y O L  IL B B 
sity or even expedieng migbt engage them, Tbe m i e s  
miglit hewever be lost md the autlioritIes dispersed, yet 
the war of partisms would conthue; Cadiz might possilily 
Iiold o ~ t ,  and the central junta, even exist wi th i  its mlls, but 
it would be without autliority, because tbe French would pos- 
seas al1 tlie provincea This stnte of affnirs lefk Portugal 
untouclied, yet it wns ehiefly to khat country he widied to 
Jmw tLe mninirrtem' attention. Tliey alredy knew ita mili* 
aitution and iesources. If ams couId be ~upplied to tho 
militia, a p s s  foroe of ninety tEiousand men regularly o p n -  
i z d  could be cdcuIated upon, exclusive of the armed popula- 
tion and cif the British amy, Nnch had been done witkia 
the last &e rnonths for tlie enrolment, opnimtion, rtnd 
equipment of this gra t  foiw; yet, much rwnained to be done, 
and with ~ e q  iflsufficieut means, before tlie fifty thousand 
men composing &e militia could possibIy contcnd with the 
enerny: arid ~lthougb this should be eflected, thc whole m y  
would still wnnt tlint conddenee in tliemselrw and in tlieir 
o6cers which is oiily to be aguiwd by iymrlitary experience. 
' When the affdm of Spain shoülrl, as before supposed, be 
brought t e  that paaa t7mt m r'BIPQtGyr rBBi6tmce m l d  c m e ,  ao 
pmn'hZty & of Ae cmtlest that m n t q  Kng wwwd 
m m& a smle as to ufwd a tJmnct! of sucm, aRlmugh tlg 
possessiom of m?& par¿ myAt 66 pm&, Menda'ng u m  tia 
shq t l t  of t b  F 'mh fa W i " g  {t, d tiiat dc.+ w l ~ l o  mkJJ 
phe a h&!m mtlw thum m advwntqc to i% French g- 
m&. Thence arme thie quwtion, ' Will thc eont.innntion of 
thu oonhst in Portugnl afford nny r~adjonatile pnispect of adven- 
tage apinst the commoa enemy or of benefit t o  h e  nlliesl' 
It wss imposaible to ~lclcuiate upon m y  cerbain grounde the 
degree of assistance te be expectetl from the Portuguese troops. 
For tlre regulan everytliing thnt discipline conld efect Iiad 
bew done, and tbey lid Leen srmed md equipped as far as 
the rneans of tlie eounty wwld go. The militia also had 
hcen impro~rd to thc cxtent wliich the c?cpcnsc of keeping 
thcm embodied ivould permit. Thc Prirtugaesc hnd wnfidcncc 
in tlie Britisli nution nnd army; they were loya1 ta tlieir 
prince, detestetl the Frencli p ~ e m e n t ,  and ntere individually 
detemined to do evcrfiliing for tlie canse. Still they were 
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not to he eerkainly calcuIated upon unti1 inured to war, b n s e  
tbe majority af their oficem were of an inferior description 
and inexperienocrl ia military affnira.' Whercfore, r a d d n g  
lo ~ I M  q~yromchiw w b j ~ e ~ o w  of Spain, he demnnded t o  know 
wlietlier, ' títe m y  S d i n g  th grktost  pmr¿ of ?& fwc~ 
tqaimt Pvrtugal, tfat mlz€y E M ~  6s &fm&d m ma.wes 
t h h  to rna.mmik it, ccimykg qff all p m m ,  rn~dawj anc2 
otlaers, for whw ~mmyrn~ memw cmtkZ bs fmd Under 
sny circumatancq the Britbh army coiild be embarked in 
despite of the enemy,' 
Lord We1lin,nton1s viem aa here eqressed furnisli occasion 
to notice m argument which has with equal ignorante and 
mdiee been useir to di spr~ge  sir John Moore, namdy, that he 
said Portuga.1 could not be defended, Tvliereris WeIliagton said 
it mn1d be defended, ~ n d  it wag so. The opinions of both 
were glven in reply to lord Castlereagh. Moore, premising that 
t e  wm not tlien prepnrerl t o  amwer in detnil m question of mch 
magnitude, observed generally, tliat the frontier 
thougli nigged was sn open me and could not be 
defended agai& a superior foree; Gliat Almeida, 
Giiardn, Bclmont, BnrwbcnT, Galorico, and Viscu, niight be ocm- 
pied as temporaq positions t o  check tlie tidvttnco of an enemy 
sud cover tiie embnrkation of dores, &C., mhich couId only be 
made at Lisbon;-that the Portupese in their o m  motmt~ins 
malild bc of  mucli use, and he hoped thcy couId done defenrl 
the Tm.4 os Montes ;-that, if tile FWBCII ~iucceerled ie Spnin, 
it mould be vain to resist them In Portugal, becmm f7ce Zutler 
m a rnildary force, and if it nrere otheinise, from 
the experienoe of Rorip and Vimiero, no relimce wm to be 
placd on tlieir troope.' This opinion, hmtily given in the 
miBt of fisld operationg had refcrence only to tlie d& of 
qfaira mi&ing nt t h t  mmnent, being expressly fonnrled m 
t l ~  miseroihle d i f i m  and ~.npmmidng c h i t c t e ~  of th P w  
tugrceae rn2itu.q~~ Spaim aho beiw supposed compred. 
Evrd TVellington, after two crampnips in thr: countrg;- 
after the terminatiun of the anarchy wliich premiled during sir 
Jolio Gtadock's time;-after immease subsidies had been 
ganted to Portiigal, her nlioIa milital force re-orjinnixerl, anci 
lier regulnr troolis disciplined pnirE antl oficered Ly EngTand;- 
n n 2 
sfter the wrtr in Gerrnanjr hrrd cost Napoleon fifty thousand 
men, the mmpaign in the Peninsnla at  lmst fifty thousand 
more;-in fine, after mature considemtion nnd wlien Spain was 
still tigl~ting~ when Andalusia, Cnhlonin, Nurcia, ValenciaJ 
GaIlicio, and tlte Asturias, were utill unbvded; w l m  Ciudad 
Rodriga and Barlnjos, important post0 with referance to tliis 
question, were still in possession of the Spaniarda 
Letter to 
lo& riveis and prepared for defence-lord WeIiimgton ame 
po0'l Nov. 14* t o  the conclusion, that Portugal ma'gIbt be defended 
lSO3* 18s. 
against tlie enemy then in the Peninsnla, pro- 
vided m mmmw u d i t b d  &&y a& a pmqjzsl& 
l h q  army w m e ~ i s ~ ~  by X m g M ,  ami' t h t  m m& 
cd &oled efwt m m& by tL whoh Poptuywe & 
And wlien hdaliisia fell, he mamed his govern- 
Ibld, Jan. ment, that, dtlmgh cwll mly be q w k d  1810, XSS. from th dmotion cvlad cwdowT of lrFLa Pwtupe~e, 
f l i e i ~  mj c d l l  not w m  tJm h i'14717Zdb rusled Lislion 
R ~ R O  he considered as the only ~srmre point of resistmince; and he 
ocmrpied Visen, Guarda, Almeida, Belmonte, and Celorico, the 
very plam recommended by  ir J. Moore, as temponiry p t s .  
But in dl things concerning this war, there mas between 
&ose pnmals a remarhble similarity of opinion and plan of 
actioa 
Th Fmch,' mid sir J o h  Moore, d f ; r a d  tlw X p n a  
trdeaoma mdject~ ,  6w.f {m 78w&t éraatmcs t h j  wm¿L7Lave Id& 
w w e  ilum a march to d d u e  dh 0auvh-y.' 
f l ~  def& m d  d+msim of the Xpa&7& 4 m'&! 64 
sutl lord Wellin$on, t7ig p m b d L e  consqwmm of my uc¿.imd im 
t!~?biCh &/M 'hp&@ ?L%&Wd~ W t?üHt #?$H- :" d k c g  m y  h d  t ? m  to mgaga 5% otlrniw muy 
¡k loBt, t 7 ~  c s u t h i t i ~  d i p r x d ,  7IItlt l?g aow of 
pwtimm WZZt pobuAly wntiww.'  
And when the d g e  of the swod Wn6, En f 810, as in 1808, 
clescending on the unguarded front of Andttlusis, Vdlington, 
nt tlie first indicatioa of Joseph's rnarch, desiped to make a 
movement similnr in prlnciplle to that executed by 
' ' P ~ a j x  p ):. . Moore on a likc occasian; thntt is, by an imption 
into Cnstillc tu thrcaten thc enemy'a rmr in mi& 
sert, that he shoulrl rcturn from Anda!ueia or s&er his forcea 
in C't1stille to be bentcn. Nor wm he deterred from t l ~ i a  project 
by kiio~viqn thnt frecli troops were entcring Spain. Tlie junta, 
indced, assured him only eigllt thousand men liad relnforceil 
the Frencli, bu* whilc increduloue OF tliis assedion, be lioped 
' fo cffect liis purposc beforc thc reinforcemcnts, whatcver thcy 
rnight Iig could come jnto line. He liad even mntured l i s  
plan, a3 to the direction of tlie marcli, wlien 0 t h  considera 
tions indnced him to reliquish it. And t1icsc shall be 
examined, bemuse Frcnch and Spnnidili writcrci tlicn rand sii~ce, 
Iiave nccuaed birn of looking on ivitlz intliK~reiice, if not witli 
satiafaction at tlie ruin of tlie central junta'ci operations. 
Ris project wm abendoned, lo. Because tlie five tIiousxnd 
men promised from England had not mivecl, bis Iiospitds 
wcw fiill, and lir? coiild not, inclriding HilI's ciivision, liring 
more tlian twenty tliousand Iiritisli soldiera iuto the field. 
HilI, however, coiild not be moved mtliout lenving tlie rear of 
the m y  urposad to tlie Frcnch in the south,-a danger, 
wliicli succesn in Ciiatille would, liy recalling thc lritte~ from 
Andalwia, only inwease. 29  Tlie Portu~tiese troops had 
su ffcretl cmellp during the winter from hngcr and naledness, 
the rcsult of the money scnrciv; to bring them we,lfngton,j 
into linc ~ns to rislr total di~orgnnizntion, de- Coma~wnri- 
ente, MSS. 
~tructive dike of preseiit and future advantag~, 
Tlie Frencli in Castille, consisting o€ the sixtli c o r p  and the 
Groop8 o£ liellerninids go.overnment, were at least tliirty thou- 
mnd drong, crf wliicl~ tmeaty thousand mere in one mass; 
antl tliougli tlie red wero disperseíl Trom Burgos to Aviln, froni 
Znmora to Valladolid, they wuld ensily hwe concenhtecl in 
tima to @ve battle, mcl wouZd have proved too poivcrful. Bow 
mund tliis rcasoning m shall now be sliowa 
Tlie invnsion u€ Xndiil lisia was onl y pnrt of n gcncml more  
menk TVl~en the king forced the Iilorem, Kellemnn rnarclied 
from Salamanca t o  Iririrancla de1 Cashnar and Dejar witli the 
6xth oorps,  thus securing the defiIes Ieading into tlie vdley of 
tlie Taps;  at tlie snnie timc, Ghc ~ccond corp,  coming down 
that vnlfcy, conununimked mith t h  sixtli by tEie poss o l  BaCou, 
and with tlie fiftli by SeradilPo and Caceses. IIence tliree c o ~ p s  
$a&, amounting to fifty thousand mtn, could be concen- 
trated to oppose 7VeIlin~n's ndvance. 3Iorticr'a moveiiicnt 
Erom Sedle wonld not have atopped nt Badajos, if Hili'g force 
bntl been employed in Ca~tille instead of mipporting the Spa- 
niards inEtremadura. But the Fsench combinations were even 
Impeijnl atmnger than they appearetl to WeUington. Not 
Irruster* eight tliousand, aer tlie central junta assertea, h t  
ES8. one hundred thonsand men, rendered diaposable 
by the peaco 4 t h  Austria, and thc cvacuation of Walcheren, 
wcre crmeing or to cross t.he western Pyrenem. The fimt de- 
taclrments reinfmd nll the divisione in the field, the mcceedng 
troops formetl an eigl~th and ninth cwrps ; tlie former, under 
tlie duke of Abrantes was in the plains of ValIarlolid when 
Andalnsia WM invadd, md would, in eonjunction nith 
KeIleman's troops, have overnrbelmed the British anny but 
for tht sapcity, mhich the French with deriaive but nataml 
mger, the Spaniards with ingratitud% hme temed ' X4e se&h 
m& of the E7eglkh st~!ekm.' Truly, it wonld be a, strange 
thing, ta use a British m y ,  witb dl it8 nationd mputation to  
support, as lightly as tliwe Spanish multiturles, collccted in a 
day, dispersed in fin hour, rmswmbled agriin without difficulty, 
incapable of attaining, and cmequently inwpable of loeing 
6ny military reputation. 
U'ELLINGTOK'~ idea of renewing offensivc operations being 
dispelled by the grcatnerrs of the French rcinforcementa, and 
the otlier cirmrmatmces mentioned in tlie foregoiog chnpker, 
lis looked nnly to tEie defence of Portugal, and he was still 
supportd by the ministen; the majority yielding howe~er 
to  lord Wellesley's influence more tlian convictim, and 
throming the responsibility entirely on the general. The deep 
design, the vact combinstiona, by which he proposed to work, 
wcrc b ~ o n d  tho compma of thcir policy; and even now it ia 
emier to admira tlian ta conqirehend Iiis m o d  intrepidity 
md sapcity; for he biid m eenmy with a sliarg sword to 
frght) the follics and feara of weak cabinet~ t o  corred, the 
snarea of unprincipled politich6 to p r d  qainst, and pnblic 
opinion to oppose: failure waa everywhere anticipated, and 
feip penone even thought he aeriously desiped t o  pemevere. 
He l i o w e r  pitted EngImd againat Fmnce in tlis Peninsula, 
and a s w e y  of tlieir rtdative powers will'ghow with what 
prodiious force tliey nislied to tlie shock of arms. 
Rate of th F d - F m n c e ,  victorious abroad, ~ n d  inter- 
nnlly prosperona, couEd with w e  furni~h tbe nwmber of men 
requimd to maintain the struggle in the Peniasnla for many 
ywlrs. Thc utmoat strength o€ the Spninrds had been 
proved, níid if tbc French could expcl tlie British amies, 
clisorder and confusion mighk continue for 8 few years) but 
no effectual residance could be expected; the people, as iu 
tlie war of mccemion, would finally accept tlie cliange of 
dynasty ; the more eaaily thnt Ferdinand'a wortlile~ness wns 
now openly dernondrtbted. For Fiaron Kolli, un rigent em- 
ployed ta moommitnicate with him, being detected, liis pInm wm 
supplicd by the Frendi poPice with a view to ascertuin tlie m1 
iiitentiens of the captive monarc4 who, influenced entirely 
1810.] nOOK XI.-CHAP. 2.
CHAPTER H.
375
WEL l..'l"l)TOl"S i e ti s
b e t ss b "k'rene e s, no
h cumstullce ll h eg ng e u t
he ou lL u fo oo t gll n
orte Ilo rs llllI ever
ce h iction,
wi i l eral.
, s a s
e e oy nd omp~ e e lIull o s
CI\.iliCr e hllll o COlllll clJcllll ll orul ll qJ
an gue L lmJ an nc !ul p
i t, ies s n incts rrect,
s i i l liticians guar ~"il.ins u l
0P)J c e WIIS "c i te ,
w rs s s ri l sign rs
e loweve lllu s uoo ll he l.Juiu
IIUU 11 urve f 1l clnt.i )J il sho l ll
odig U8 h ru h h lU'llIS
St ltM li'rench.-France, n and k ·
a11 us, ul b CUIlC rnish h n c
re l in ula.
~·l'llr . 'J' e s Btr f anillro
ovc<l, u he dl e l 13ri IIrrni
Jis . Ill t. e a )"e ,
ist n
h su <:ess , lly h d lL
t. . si a :Ferdina 's thlesslless WIIS
m strated. B all ag ·
c o com unicat ll c tl h ll lac<: WM
lie h ch (l li t. i l renl
u c tiOll i Ollll. h, , u clI c l
hp personal fear, refused to make tho attempt, and baely 
denounced the mppowd h n  fo +he French government. 
Cadiz and Puhgd were indeed o%stacles, but tbc  strengtli o£ 
tlie former precarious, and the enormons f o m  ibssembled 
t o  suhdue the latter nppcnred sufficient. In war tlicre m 
homever dmya cimmtances, which, thaugh atnmncws to 
tlie milihry rnovemcnts influence t1iem as mucli the wiud 
inffuenceri the sailing o€ a ship, and mougst tbese muct be 
reckoned the conduct of &e intntsive king. 
Joseph wm a man of so amiable a mture, that m n  the 
Spaniards accused liim o£ nothing morm thgn fondness for 
social enjoyment. But he mistook Kiis true dtuation, d e n ,  
resisting Napoleen'e ppoliq, he daimed the hmtrnent of an 
indcpcndent lring; he was a tool, and in Spnin could mly be a 
tool af tho cmpcror's. To hnvo rcfuscd a crown lilcc bis 
brotlier Lucicn, would lave been gseat. To mept oon Iike 
hie lirotlier Lonis, and then resist the hand tlmt kept i t on hii 
head, ñras a fol1y wwhich, wibout ameliorating the conilition 
of the Spaniartla, tliiew fatal obstaclea in Napoleonk patb. 
Joseph desired t o  create a Xpanish party for himgelf by just 
measures; bnt thc siales were cast asirle when the Frcnch 
first entered the Pcninsula; and it wari absurd to e x p d  cwcn 
a gullen ~iihmission, much las attnelirnent from a nation ao 
abused: neither waB it possibIe te  recast public feeling unta 
the people bd psssed throngh the fumce of war. The 
Frencli soldiera wcre in S~iain for wnquest, and without them 
the intmive monarcli could not keep h i s  tlirone. 
Joseph's spani~h ministers mere men who joined him npon 
principie, and bad no renegado zcal in favonr of the French; 
thep wcre ris artlently attached fo tliek onm country aEi any of 
t h s e  wlio diouted far Fedinfind. W ~ c n  SpnnisIi interests 
claslad witli those of the Freocli srmieg and tliat 
kppe"djk 'O* was constantlyt they and the king supported tlie $1. former: rtnd so ptrmnously, that in Paria it was 
thotrght they mould fa11 on tlie emperor's troops; thati civil 
ccntention n e a k e d  tlre military opeiations, and Ieft N a p ~  
leon only the aItemntive of commaniling Fn person, or adapt- 
iag hEs system to cirmmstnncce. A w i ~ s  p o l i q  dms no# 
consist in pnsliing any one point to perfectioq, but in re* 
lnting nnrl bnliancing oppos!niing interests tliat t11e greatest 
Eienefit slinll aceruc from thr: ~ork ing  of nlI : hencc t o  form a 
sound jnd,pent of Napoleon'~ rnersmirea, it  would be necessnry 
to meigh al1 the various intercsts of his political position, 
and there are not sufficient material8 yet before tlie world to 
do tliis correctly: yet we m y  be certain thnt his situation 
with rmpcct both t o  foreign mil dumest.ie policy rcqriird 
extrnoirlirinry mantnagernent. He wns not merely a cantliteror, 
he wae also tlie founder of s politicnl atructure, too mucli 
expoered to stoms from mithout to bear any tamperiog with 
its internd supports. bfoney is caIled tlie sinew of wnr, it is 
nlso the viltal stream o f  pezee, and there is nothing more 
remnrkablle iin ATnpolcon's pelicy t11rin t l ~ e  mro witli wliich ho 
Iiandfed financia1 mntters: lie avoiderl m Iie woulíl the plnpte, 
tliat factitious system of public credit so fntuitously cl~erished 
ia Englnnd. Iie could no€ without fiurting France transmit 
largc quantitim of gold to Spmn, and tlierefore made "the 
wmr mhhin wa~. '  But Josepli's desire for popdtiriv, 
md the feelings of his ministers were alillike opposed to thia 
sgstem, ~ n d  the proceeds of tlis contriliutions were not always 
apappliecl fortlie benefit of the troops; thig demanded a remsdj-; 
yet openly £o declare the king of no consideration would 
have bcen impolitic. T11e emperor took an intermeditita 
coum Be formed 6pLvrEicukur m21itay gozmmmts, '  sucli 
m Nnvarrc, Arnpn, Cataloniri, and Andatusin, in which the 
marslial or general namd governor, possessed liotli tlie civil 
and military power. In sliort, he crmted viceroys as lie hrid 
thxeatened to do when at Madrid; and tl~ough many disad- 
mntnp ntteiirled this arrangcment, it appem to have Iwn 
mise, and consiatcnt with the long reach wliich distinguisliea 
o11 Nrtpolean's mcnsurcs. 
Afany persons, princilialIy French, mger t o  lomr o. p a t  
man to tlieir o~vn IereI, have ssid Iie fornentd quarrels 
betmcen his marsl~als to prevent dznger to liis throne, and 
thece militwy govementa were adopted with tlmt viem. 
Tltis is absurd. Thcir quarrels eere sure to hurt liirn, 
thcir combinntions could iiot do so, ontl tlic militury go- 
venimenta defined tlrcir separato liomers and teiided to pre- 
vent disputes. The disadvantages were, that they offended 
tl~e king, by thwarting his plans for cstabliahirig 
*mai" l 0 v  a nntiomal party-tliat mnny of  t l ~ e  pvcrnora R 2, 8. 
were ivantoniy oppressive, or attentive only ta 
&eir own situntion without re-wding the genera1 objects of 
tlie wsr-tliat h t l i  tlie Spanish ministers and tbe people 
regarded it as a step towards dismernbering Spain, especirtlly 
wit1i xespect to  tbe provincea beyond the Ebro, Indced, the 
annexing those pasts to  h c e ,  if not resolved upon, ww 4 
one time contemplated by the ernperor. On the 
M4morrcs de 0 t h  liand, Josepli wag no general, and Napleon St. IIel&tie. 
~drnitted thltt tbc m a r ~ u d i ~ g  aptcm iiecewrtry to 
oZrtnin supplies, jjoined to tIie guerilln warfnre, hd relaxed dis- 
cipline R R ~  introduced a horrible fieencc while tho militarg 
movemenk \vere fecbly pushed. Hence tlie most efectunl 
rnean8 to obtain resources for tlie troops witli leaet devastation, 
was ta malre the suecess of each ' c q s  $mi%,* nnd tlie repu- 
kation of its commander, dependent ugon the welfare of the 
province in whicli it was figbting. Xome commandem indeed, 
had neither sense nor justice t o  fulfil this expectíttion, but 
others, sucli afi Sonlt antl Sitchet, <lid both tranqiiiIlie fhe 
pcople, nnd provide for thelr troops; rewlts which eoiild 
not Iiiive been nttuinecl under tlie king bscnuse he knew little 
of war, lored pleriñure, waR too easy nnd oliliging ~f dispuPjtion, 
and had a court to form and maintain. GauR and Buchet, 
especially the foriuer, were indeed included by Joseph arnongst 
tliose who ooppressed tbe people and extended the gpint of 
resistanee; but this accusation mas the reault of personal 
enmity. Facts denved from lees interested qnarters, and ther 
final remlts, prove that those officers had a longer m& in 
tlieir policy thnn the king conld undemtand. 
Thcre in yet another view. Napoleon says lie left mmy 
pmvinces of Itnly under the harsh government of Austria, 
that tbo spirit of jetilrrusy miglit bc broken, wlien he judged 
time ripe to re-form one pent  kingdom. Tlie smne policy 
niay be t m e d  in the military governments of Spain. The 
inarsliril's riway, bbeing tlie effspring of war and violente, mas of 
nemsity offenaive; t11e Penianila once subdued, their rule 
would have beea replaced by the gentler govemment of the 
king, rvho would tbua Iiave been reprded as a benefactor. 
Something al80 was necessary t o  sweep away the peculiar pri- 
vileges which many provincefi posseased, and of which fhcy 
were extrernely tenacious, and the iron bnnd of mitr onlp 
could enforcc that eqnality mhich m Jmed at by tlia coneti- 
tution of Rayonno. Neverthelew, tlic first effccta 
vere injuriuus to the Freiicli cause, Fresh con- Jm@''* C o m s ~ n ¿ í -  tributiolis were exacted to suliply the deficiency ente, .ir$$. 
of succours from France ; and t o  avoid these, men 
who would othenvjse h a ~ e  aubmitted traoquilly fl ed from the 
milikary governments. Tlie treatment of tlie partidas dao 
presentecl a difficulty. Xtegardless of the hws of war thern- 
aelves, they claimed t11e rigl~ta of soldiers from tlieir ndver- 
saries, nntl were siipperted by tlie Spanisli governmeut. TItus, 
mlien Xoult, ag mjor-general for the king, p~oclairned that 
military cxecution would Le done on thc bantls in Anddada 
as assassina, the regency answered by s retalioto ry decliiration. 
The junta did this becxuse its folly had nmrly d u c c d  the 
defencc of the countrp to the padidne; Josepli bccniiae the 
latter claimed ivithout xtcting on tlie usqes of wnr, and wem 
by tbeir government encowaged to assassinate. Mina and zll 
the cliiefs put tbeir prisoners to death when it became inconve 
nlent to lreep them ; 8araza even pblielg announced his h g e  of 
being &le to cap ture bfadame Suchet when she m 
pwgnnnt, thnt Iie miglit murtler the rnotlicr snd 
infarit togetlier I Tlis dificultise occurring in 
argument were however overcome in practice, quarter wm seI- 
dom granted on either side. 
Joseph, incensed at flie edict establishiig the militay 
governrnenh, scnt the rnarquis o€ Almcnara to Parig to 
remonstrate, and t o  complain of the Frcnch 
generala, especially Ney and EeUerman ; and lie *pWaix 'O* 5 1. 
~everely and jus~Iy ddemncerI one act of tlie 
latter, narnely, seizing the national archives at Simaneas, by 
which infinite confusion was produeed, and the utmost indig- 
mtion excited, withont tlie alightest benefit political or 
militarg. Another oiijcct of Almcn~m's mission was to ascer- 
ttiiii if there was an hinteion to annex the prproviilces beyond 
tlie Ebro t o  Frnnce, and tlik gave &e to a curious intrigue; 
for his correspondence being intercepted, was brought to $fr. 
Stuart, who, in concert mitk Romana and Cabanes tlie SpanisL 
historian, aimnlating the atyle of Napoleon's atatspapera, 
composed 8 counterfeit senatus consultum and decree for tlie 
annexation: it sas tmi~srnitted t o  Josepli, vho believed it 
real, and his f a m  m d  discontent werc gentIy Encremed. 
Mennwhile liis clistms for moaey wns so extreme that Iiis 
ministers were at tiines actually destitute of food. 
Tliese politiml ntfi1.irs impedcd the action o£ the nrrnics, but 
the intrinsie strcngth of ilie lnttcr wm truly fonniddila. 
IiRclconing tlie Iriug's Fr~ncIl giiardq tlie force in the Penin- 
sula tvas not less tlisn t71i.w J~undred a& m d y  tlu~usrmzd 
mm md tJd021~md 7mm. Of these, forty-eig11:liG thou- 
sund men were in Itospbl, four thousand prisonm, 
Appendtx 17* twenty-nine thonsand detached ; leaving two hun- 5 1. dred and cighty thousand fighting men under 
arms, rendy for bnttle or sicgc: sud tberc wm n frcsh rescrve, 
eiglitecn tlioustind strong, in mnrch to enter Spah. In July 
this prodigiow fom was organiaed and dkkriliuted in the 
following mannerz- 
Am?y nf iAe Lht;istJ1, composd of thc firat, fourtb, and fifth corpq 
under the commanind of Sowlt ....................................... r2,769 
Ann?, of i l ~ e  Cmire, composed of the Ihyd U u a d s  two divi- 
~ i o n s  of i n í a n t ~ ,  and two of cavavalq, mder the personal m- 
mand of trie king ...................................................... 24,187 
Awml of Por!uga/, compoiied of a m.sserve of cavalry anll tlis 
second, sixth, :tnd sightb co , ander the commandofM.wseaa 88,598 
The nintli cmph commnniledT gened h u e t ,  dintribuied by 
divisioiis nlnng thc gmt line oí' communicntion from Vitoria 
to lrnl1dotid ....................................................... 93,811 
A riivision iinrler geneml &m, employed as a rnoveabla colunin 
ta protmt Ihe rear of the amiy of Portugd ..................... I0,BOli 
218,272 
-
Gmmmmbs or Aiwiea in Use 2nd f iw.  'rota! 
stwngh. 
......... 1. CatRlmiia ............ k e n t h  corps Dukoof'hrmtum 55,  G3r 
..... 2. A r a p n  .............. Third corpa ............ Gen. Snchd 83,007 
1 ...... ............... Detwhments and a. 3. Navme din ion  of the  Im- Ctm, Iteille 21,887 perinl Guarda ...... 1 
4. Biscay ................ Dctachments ........... Gen, C&Ui.. 6,570 
5. 01-4 C!mtille. wrn- l Uivisiuns o1 tlie Im- l 
s i  BU&OS, 1 penal G u d s  snd &o. Dorsanne .. l0,SOS 
Arnnk, and So& C~wIry .............. 
6. ~ s l l d o l i c l ,  $o. ..... DeLxhrnents ....... ... Gen. Kellermm 6,474 
7. hsturire ............. One diví~ion ........... Gen. Bonnct ..... 9,898 
.......... TotaI for the güvernrnents .X43,786 
-
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The scheme of opedions embmced three distinct organiza- 
tions. The third and seventh corps were t o  inmde by the 
south unti1 they were connechd 6 t h  Soult in Andalusia 
The amy of Portngal wna to invade by tIie north until it aIso 
wns connccted witIi Sonlt; bnt the nmim o€ the south and 
centre were only to maintain t1ieir actual conquwts, and m 
ocm~ion offerd to ssid the active invasion on tla north and 
south. 
Sta& af Spai~-On Ghe riglit, the anniw of Vaiencia and 
Cntalonia were opposed to  the soutliern invneion. In t he  
centre, tha N~ircian tronps and those mmblet i  nt C d i a  
opposed Soult, but tliey were only forrnirlable by the acsistance 
of the Dritish force un& general Graliznini. On the left, 
Romnnn, mpporkd by the frontier fortremes, maintnined a 
parkisun warfrtre from Albuquerque to Aymonte, yet looksd 
to Hill for succonr nnd to  Portugal for mfiige. In tlie north, 
tlie uni td  forces of Gallicia aiid Asturia were only iifteen 
tliousznd, and Mahi declared lie would retire to Coruña if 
Ronnet advanced beyond the frontiem. Tndeed, the G~lIiciana 
were so hckwarcl, that at a 11ntei: period Coatrsm 
BIetemoir$ of 
was used to sena throiigh tlie count,ry moveahIe ContTrm, 
coInmna nttciidd by executioncr, ta abtnin {J~~~~$t 
remits. Anrl witli dl thie severity, md rnoney 
and nrma continualIp furnished by England, Gallicia never 
mas of any signal service ta  tlie Eritish eperationsi. Btit aa 
livid spots and blotches in the hnman bodg mark the demy 
of vital atrength, 80 in Spain, tlie prtidns stt{ldci~ly and sur- 
prisingly incrcafied ns tlie regulnr armies disappeared. Many 
joined them to  avoid sta;rmtion, others to revenge peculiw 
wrongs, aad the regency formed secret 9erilIa juntas to 
collect storea and provisions for tlie partidas in secure places. 
District pay inspectors and gaymastem, selected by regular 
gcderal oficem, superintended tlie discipline nnd 
payment of fhe b d a ;  particular districts wcw ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ S ,  
cliarged mith the 8ulildies, and every province was 
divided in three portiona, each ta Cnd its qnota of men and 
horses ssparately, but al1 to nct; in m= rvhen circiimstaoces 
dcmitndsd thcir union; in fine, nll the intcrnttl organixntion of  a 
reg la r  army waa secrctly armycrl, wvhi1e the extertial ffuiin 
mas imeplar and irisurgent. 
At first, tlie burst of hostilig prodnced by these mensures 
inffictd consider~ble loss o!? men, impedcd the Frencli com- 
munications, and ereated p a t  &m: it tieemed a ~ccond 
nprising of the nation. The Murcians, the Grenadan peasants 
and those of Jaen, waged war from thc e&ern motintains of 
Andalusia Pranquisctto and PaFarcn beset tlie neighbourhood 
of Ciudntl Real and Toledo in Iw Mancha; El Principe, 
Eaornil, Temprnno, and Juan Abril, keeping tlie circuit of tlie 
Cmpentino mountains from tlie Sornosicira to dvila, descended 
sometima on tha side of New, sometimes on the side ot OId 
kt i l l e ,  sometimes in Estremndura; they carried off ama11 
French posts even close to the capital, and slew tlie govemor 
of Regovia at the ~ c r y  p t e s  af tliat town. Duran witli two 
thousancl men, and the Empecindo with fwelve liundred 
cmalry ard infwnty, kept the hills abovc Gnadalrixars as far 
n4 Cuenca, mrl ventureil sometimes to give bnktle in tlie plrsin. 
Espoz y Mina was alwaps formidable ili Navame; Loliga nnd 
Campillo, Iiaving more tlian tmo thousand men, harassed Biscrrp 
and the neigliliourliood o£ Vitoria; md the communication 
betweea tfiesc great bands and the Empecinado, was mainhined 
by Amor, llerino, and the F ia r  Xapia> klie two firat aching 
&out B q o g  the tiiirrl in the moun~Gn2ins abov-e hxia. In the 
AsSurins, Esaiidron liung npon tlie flnnlcs mcl rear of Bonnet, 
between Snntrtnder nnd Ovido,  acting in concert with &m- 
pillo on one. sirle md Porlier on the other : md tliis last chief, 
sometimes throwing Iiirnself into the mounhins liordering 
Gnllicia sometimes sailing from Coruña, wnstantly troubled 
the Asturim by his enterpises. 33nt tliougli al1 these banh 
merc vexrttious, few werc rcnlIy fermidnblc. To curb thm, 
tlie Frencli furtifietl *eir poRtfi oE communicntion rtntl corro- 
mponrlence, and slem numbeirr, most of tliem rolibers wlio 
pillaged tlieir own oountryrne11: enonghhawever has been suid 
upan tliia subject, 
Although reiluced to  this imguIar wsrfare in Old Xpain, 
the regency, witll inconceivnhle folly and injustice, were alien- 
ating the affections of tlieir colonies and provoking civil TVW, 
ns if tlic terrible stniggle ili the Peninnula were not anficient 
for the ruin of tlieir country. Natiounl indep~ndciice wns 
~vit l i  tLetn suliorcliiiate to the eontinuauce o€ opprcssion in 
SoutIi rlmerica, and money, arms, and troops, were wit ldrnm 
from the PenlnsnIa ko mbdue the swalled rebllions coIonists. 
Nor wag any reflection made on the inconsistency, of expectinp 
Napoleon's hosts to be beaten close to their own doom by 
grrerilln operations, and y& atternpting, with a few divisions, 
to cmñh wliole Dation~ ncting in tlie tamo mnnner at tliree 
tliwm~d miles' d i s h c e .  
EngM.-The ministemy polig resol-d itcelf into Ehree 
principal points : lo. Fostering public inclination for tlie war ; 
2 O .  Purnishing rnoney for the expenses; 34 Recruiting tbe 
army. For tlic Inct rtn a& pn~sed in tha crtrly pert af 1809, 
offcred elevcn guineas bounty to men passing from tlie militia 
to the line, and ten guineaa €o recnrits for the militia: tliis 
fumisld &out twenty-four tliousand men in the year. The 
other pointa were not BO easily disposed of. The opposition h 
parliament was powerful, eloqnent, m¿l not very acrripuloue; 
tlie desperab sh i f t~  of the nijnistors wwere inded  justly attaclrsd, 
but toudiing the contest in Portugal, faction was apparent. 
TkresforLl's report as to the nnmbers and efficiency of the native 
foroes was unjustly questiooed; the notion of auccessful resistr 
ance was assnild by argument mrl by rridicule, whereby doubt 
mas widely qwad  in England, and disnffection monderfully 
encauroged in Portugal; nor wns tliis erit tlie smnllest ~uñtriined 
by tke Englisli general. On tlie other side, tha miaisters, 
tru~ting to their rnnjorities in garIiament, reasoned feebly md 
ignorantfy, yet wilfuHIy and Iike men expecting that fortune 
woulrl bcfricnd them tliey knew not why or mherefore. Thcy 
dexlG also morc Iargcly than their ndvemrics in misreprcseiita- 
tions to mislead tlie public mind. Every treasury nelvspaper 
gpoke of battles w i c h  wre never fouglit, plms wliich were 
never arranged, p l w  taken which wcre never attwlíed, vi+ 
toria pined where no miea were. Tbe plxins of tlie Penin- 
sulri, could scarcely contain the innlimernble forcea of &e 
Spaniards and Fortuguese, wliile cowardicc, wwciikne~,krreacliery, 
violenc~, wero the only attributes of tlie eneniy: if n Wtle 
mas expccted his numbera were contemptible, if a victory rvae 
pined liia Iiost was countless. Members of pndiament related 
stariea of the enemy wliicli hatl no foundeition in truth, nnd 
nothing tbnt i n t i i pe  could bring to nid pnrty spirit ond stiflo 
re:ison wns neglecterl, 
But thc greut aud permanerit df icu l t~  was to rttise money. 
! h e  cwntry innndated with bank-not e$, was destitute of gol& 
Napo1eonys continental q s k m  burhhened commerce, the ex- 
ciaanges were continualIy risig against England, and al1 the 
evils which, sooner or leter, Fesvlt from a factitious enmncy 
tvere too pwmptíhle to be Eonpr disrcgardcd. A committce 
rtppointcd to invcstlpte tlio m~ttcr  in the session of 1810, 
m d e  a repoit in mhicla the e d s  of tlie existing system ibnd 
tlm cansea of the depreciation were daborate13~ treated, md 
the necasriity of returning to cash paymenta enforced: the 
authors did not pemive, or s t  Ieast did not notice, the injustice 
and ruin attending full payment in coin of debh contrackd in 
a depreciated paper currency, The celebratea writer, WiIliim 
Cobbett, did not fail, howcver, to point wt this, and subse- 
quent cxpetience has mnfirmed his viem. At fimt the 
government tried to stave off the tiullion questioa, but mn 
findinp they must abnndun the war, or deny t1,lie fucta dducod 
by the committee, they adopted ths Iatter. On tlie motion oE 
Mr. 'FTmittarh tliB houee voted in aubstance that it p m d  note 
and a sliilling mere equd in d n e  to a aolden guinea of M 
weight, although light gntnew were then openly aold at twenty- 
eight shiilin,ns eack Lord Eing, by demanding gold from bia 
tenanta whose Ieases were d m m  before the depreciation of 4 
bank-notes, eqosed thh  insolent absudty; and the vote o€ 
khe Commons, nltliuiigh well calculnted to oonnnce opponcnts 
tlmt no pmposition coiild bc tbo bme or absurd to mcet with 
support in pnrlinment, did not remave the difliculty of raising 
money. No rcsoiirce remainerl except that of the desperate 
spendtlirift, who never intending to pay m e s  not on what 
t e m  Iie supplies his immediate nemsitiea. The peculiar cir- 
eurnstnnees o€ the war had +en EngIrtnd a monapoly of the 
worlíl's commerce by sea, and the rninistem declaring her proti- 
perity to bo unexampled, began a career of rnilitary expense 
tlie Iike o€ wliicli na age or nation had ever belield before: 
yet ~ ~ i t h o u t  one r ~ n a b l c  hopc of ultimate auccess save the 
geniiis of tlieir gcnerd, which they bnt half appreciated, and 
whicIr tlro fird Iirillet mig-ht, extinpiali for evcr. 
S&& ofPortwgal.-In thiu country three psrties were ap. 
parent, Thnt of tlie peopb r e d p  t o  peril body and goods for 
independence. T h t  of the $ddlos, who tlought to pmfil 

lisheJ. in the Enkish newspapers, were re-echoed in Lisboi u 
new: thus a pictnre of aflairs, painted in the most g l a r i ~ ~  
colours oF misrepwentation, was continudly aposed when 
tlie safet j  of tlie comtry depended K p o n  the deTo$etl submis 
sion of tEie peopie. 
IG the latter entl o£. 1809, bIr. Tilliem had becn, fortnnntely 
for the cnuse, rglwed by llr. Wtuitrt, who, disdainiiig the 
ptty jealousies whicli hatl hiBcrto marIreS the intcreourse of 
Zho diplomatists witli tho generais, devoted Iiis powcrful 
undcrstantling and rcsolutc temper to forwarrl tlic view of 
lord WelIington; antl it is untloulitid, tluit tlie drtngerous 
political crisis wtiich Fallowed liis arrival couId not have h e n  
suatstined, if m envoy less firm, less alile, or less willing to 
support thlie commender-in-cliief had bem employed. U'hen 
Das Milias m i p c d ,  hfr, Stumt, %sin& his own +hes, was, 
by m intrigue to be bereafter noticetl, added t o  tIie ragency; 
and witli him three Portupese, nnrndy, Antonio, called the 
Principd huza, the conde de Redonclo, and doctor h'oguiem 
The lust was rs mnn of talent axid discretion, but Bouzii, 
chrUig, reatleu~, iri-iti~llc, indefntignliIe, md n consuminate 
intriguer, crmted tlie utmost dieortler; nlrvmys st?clBrig to 
thivart tlie p r o ~ o t l i ~ ~ ~  uf t11e Bri~isli generals, 1i~ m strenir- 
ou~ly assisted by tlxe pntriarch, mhose violence aad a~inliition 
were no may diminislied, m d  whoae inflaence amo@ tthe 
people was still very wariidemb1e. A powcrful cGa i  TU 
thus formed, wliose oliject mas to obtain the supreme direo- 
tion of the civil and militar? affxirs, aiid to control both 
Wellington and Rcresfod. Thc conde firhíircs, hcnd of tha 
Swxa fnmily, wm prime minister in tfie R r ~ i l s ,  tlie Princip:i 
mtas in the regoncy at Lisbon, the clierdier SOWL wns eu~cy 
at the Britisli ccoart ; and a fourtli af Lile famiiy, don Pedro $e 
b z a ,  was in a, like situstion ncar the Xpauisli rcgcncj. 
Raying iuto otlier'~i b~ncls uuder the guidaiicc uf the 
sulitle Principal, they cuncocted  ve^ dangeroiis iiitriges, aild 
their proceedings were supportd with a higli barid by tIie 
cabinet of Kio Janeiro : lord Wellesley'a energctic iiiterfcrencc 
curtied tha Iatter in.tlcet1, yct thc FILIIILI ccantinud tlicir itindii- 
notions, nntl wliat tlicy diii-ed nrit dternpt by form they sought 
Go attain by rartificc. 
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TWQ of the partics in tlie country desired to keep out tho 
French, btit mith tho fiüelgos it ww n quucttion of intercat not 
of pntriotism. h s  sapcjous tlian tlia clergy, the grent borly 
of which perceiving they muat stand or fa11 with tlie Englislt 
, aimp heartily aided the cause, tlie fidal,~ clung to tbe 
regcncy; and the caballers in tlint borly, being tlie anme 
people thnt hntl oppsed sir RCIY Dolryinple, deriircd not ooly 
to beat tlic erleniy, h i t  tio mtnt~1it;Ii the suvrernncy oC tlie 
aorthero provinces, of mhich they themsclves were the lortls, 
in the administration of the country, and woiild consent to no 
operations militating against this design. To tliis obstade 
wm arlded tlie naturiil inilolence of  tlic pcople, wliicli, fodcred 
by the neglipnce and foars of the regency, renrl~red it most 
d i f i d t  to oribtun tlie exemition of any morks, or the fulfil- 
ment of any agieement in wliieli t h  Portuguese govement  
or the c i d  authorities were conmed. 
Another spring of  political sction was Port~ipcse Iintred of 
Hpnin. It; crented rliiriculties (Iuring tlie inilitilry operrttinns, 
yet had one dmntngo. Vhen tlia Epaniartls ~liowved dislrust 
of the Englisl~, tlle I%rtuguese w m  more dnrled ta  rely on 
Ihe latter, to sliow they had no feeling in comnion mith their 
ncighboiira. NotmitlisZnncling tliis rlialilrc, tlie prineess Cnr- 
lotta, ni fo  to  tlie prince regent nrid s i h r  tu Ferrliuand, 
claimed the succession to tba tlirone of E~iain, in tlie event of 
her brotlier's death or perpetiinl wptivity, anrl tlie immedate 
government o€ the whole Peilinsda ns Iiereditary regent. To 
forward her clai11i was the object of Pedro Souxn's mission to 
Catlis; atitl tlie grent couiicil of C:~qtille, anxious tri ovcrtliruiv 
the Spanish regency, readilg recoynised Iier pretensioiis in vírhie 
of the clecision nf tlie secret Cortes of 1789, wliicir nl>olislied 
t l~e  saliqiie lam of Pliiiip tlie Fifth. Tlic regents would pay no 
~ t b n t i ~ r i  t o tlirrn; birt Soiisn rcneived Fiis intrigue9 d e n  the 
Cortes ns~etnlilcti, niid lvns 1~y corrnpt.ion obtnining from n 
mqjority of ttie itienibors R ñccrct :idíiiowledgueiit ol tlie prin- 
cess's cIahn, ~vlien his progess wras airested by Wellington; 
who jiidged tliat tlie scliemc \votild affect the militnry opera- 
tions in I'ortiiq~l, md tinallg tlie policy of England, if nll 
authority i n  tlic P C ~ I ~ I L F I ~ ~  stionld ccntre in onc fiiniiIy. ~ l t  
fwt he tlioiiglit tri tictinit Citdot,t:ils riglits mi@ be lieileiirid 
c c 2 
if tbe Fmch aucceeded, but soon fiscov~ed the aff& WR, 
mwd at E o  Janeim to e m b a m s s  himself snd Bercdord; 
fai. the Britiah cabinet WM not informed of it, suld the prin. 
to reside &t Madeim, whei.e mounded by the ron- 
trivem &e couId only act undcr their directions. In fin% 
nrrogme deceit, negligente of busine~s, and personal intrjgues, 
were aommon ta thc  Porhguese Spaniah governments; 
md why they did not produce the m e  fatal cffec-h In t b  
one as in the other conntry will be ~ h o m  in tho sncc&,pg 
chaptem 
BOOK XT. - CHAF. S. 
WHEN ,JVe.vellington required tHrrtj thmsand British troops to 
defend Portugd, he hncl referente t o  the number he could 
feed ~ n d  m m a p  with an eaperiend ~ t a f  anrl civil dminia- 
tration, rath~r than to what ,t nnecessq to fight tlie enemy; 
hence he rlechred anocesa would depend npon the exertions 
and devotion of the native forces. Yet, knowiag h m  recent 
expericnco in Spnin, ~vliat yassion~i, prejudiccsi, ranrl nbascs 
would meet liim at ewry turn, be woiild trust neither the 
enthushm of the p p l e ,  nor the promises of their pvernora 
Re lnsisted thst hia autharity aa n a ~ ~ g I + m o Z  of .7'&ugd 
slioukl be independent of the local government, 
and trbsoInta avcr $1 arrangemenh concwnhg *Wendix21* g 9. tlie foroes, whetlrer regulnrsJ miIitiq or arde- 
naqw;' for hia designs wera vwt, and mch aa mn1d only ba 
effected by extraerdinmy means. h e d  with this pomer, 
and the iduence clerived from the mong supplied by Eng- 
land, he fiM forced the rcgeny to tcvive nnd mfom tbe 
ancient m i l i t q  law, by wliicli J1 men were t o  serve in ama. 
Tlien he reqxirerl tht the people should bs commanded t o  
destrop their miiia, remove their boats, break down theii 
bridgcs, lap waste, tlieir fields, abandon their dmellimg, md 
cnrry tlieir property away from tlle line of invnsion; d i l e  he 
uscrl thc rcgulilar troops in such sort, thnt avoiding dccisim 
battles, he should compel the enerny to  keep in mss, and let 
the armcd populntion mit off al1 resource3 not camied in the 
midst of tlie trmps : it mas a design of terrible energy. Yet, 
if tlie French coii1d carry OF obtaia mpplies, ta last until the 
British wme beaten nnrl driven ta cmbnrk, the misernble 
niincd pcople must mlimit mithout further struggles; anr? to 
fentl off tliat cafmity, he sought for a position covering 
Lkbon, neither to be forced nor tunied; and from which 
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be could commnnimte fwely with, ttnd direct the irregular wnr- 
fare. Tlie mountahs filling the tongue of lznd upon wkch 
Lisbon ia situated, fmishcd Shis key-stone t u  the arch o€ 
defenee. Accurate plans of al1 the  positions made under the 
directiom of gir Charles Stnad ie 1799, were, together with 
tlie French colonel Viiiccnt'u, nt hand, nnrl from thuse docu- 
ments tiie original notion of tlie oe;elirfited lines of Torres 
Vedras was derived; but they only contemplated a defmce ta 
be m d e  by an army in rnwement opposing an equd or some- 
what greater force. It was Wellington who first conmived 
the design of tuming those wt mountains into one stnpen- 
dow antl imprcgnablc citadcl, whercin to deposit tlie i d e -  
pendenm of tlie mliole Peninsuln, RcrenRcr ttlm l i n ~  shdl 
be described rninutely; hre  it must; snffice ta say that en- 
trenchmcnts, inudations, and redonbts, semired more than 
five Iiunrlred sqnare miles af mountzinous countq lying 
between the T a p s  md the ocean. Nor was this the most 
gigantic parti oF thc undedal~ing. Wcllington wm n foreigner, 
ill-supported liy Iiis own govement,  ~ n d  IioIding power under 
tliat of Portugal Iiy a precarious tenure ; and he was vehemently 
oppoaed by the Toca1 stuthorities, by tiie ministers, and by the 
nobility. Yct lie undertook to  reforrn the abuses engendered 
by centuries of miiiagoveniment, and mnke a dothful people 
nrke in arms, devnvtato tlicir hn.tls, and follow Lim to bdtlo 
sphst tlie most formihhla power of modern times! 
Fir& he r e v i d  tlie mcient militnry lms, md this, no& 
withstanding tha gecret opposition of tlie regency and tlis 
fidalg-os, so effectually, that tlie retums in 41ay gave four 
liundred md thirty thonmnd men in arms3 fifty thoilsmd 
being rcplar troops, fift y-fi~e thousnnd militia, nnd thc rc- 
mainder ordenancas. This multituclo was l~owever sulrject 
to deductions. Tlie ' capitwu nm,' or cliiefs of districts, 
were remiss in thcir duty, and tlie fidalps evaded service by 
tbe congivance of tlie govemment; the ordenancas wwlly 
awamblcd, fcll far ~ h o r t  of the rcturns, rinri al1 were ill-amed. 
Tlius also it was mith the militia Only thirty-two thousand 
Id mnsketa and bayoneta, deserters mere numerous, and the 
authorities connived at absence under false pretences to snch 
an extent, that scarmly twenty-aiu thowmd ever mmnined 


witli tlieir eoIoiira. Thc regular troops merc moro &cient. 
Tliirty tlini~mnd ivere pniil eqiiipperl nnrl clothed by Englnnd, 
aurl for the inost parb oonmiantleled liy Britisli oficexs; but, 
dcduction made for siek men ancE recruitg, tliose unrler mme 
did not excecd tmenty-foiir tIioasxnd infnnts, tliree thoiisand 
h e  bundred c~v~lry, MCI tlirec tlinuqanrl artillery. Tlie rli5- 
pow;rIble furce w a ~  Ilierefore ouly fifly-sk tliouwnd men, one- 
.half of mhicli mere militia. 
~ i t  tliis period, the Dritisli troops, excluding tlie garriaon cif 
GibraItar, ssomewhat exceeded tiiirty-eigl~t tliousa~d men of al1 
nmis, of wliicli ~ i x  tliai~sand mere in Iiospit,nl or detached, nnd 
above iieveii tliousand in Cadix j for t1iii.t city was prokted  by 
an dlied foi+oe of nearly tlrirty thoumd men, while the n m y  
on whosc exertions tlie fatc! of the Peninsuh rested, wns 
reduccrl to twenty-fivc tlioiisiind Eritish ! Tliis ms Qie rninis- 
tel.$ mrnnganient, rand heme, tlie ordcntlucna being set asirle, 
Weilin&on's actual force did not exceed eigl~iy thoumd 
m n ,  with fonr hundrcd miles of frontier to defend ;a Iong 
Iinc and presenting four p t  íiivisions wliich shali now be 
de~csibed. 
lo. Tlie nortliern Iine of tlie Entre M i d o  and the Tras O9 
Montes, cxtending fiom tlie moutli of tlie 3Iinlio to Miranda 
on tlie Doiiro. 
zO. Tlir. cnstcrn line of tlie Trns os Montes, Following tlie 
cour.se of tlio Douro, fmni Miri~iida to  C ~ t e l  Eodrigorn 
30. Tlie fiontier of Beira, frmoin Catel  Iiorlr!go to hsaminhal 
on tlie Tagus, 
40. T l i c  hlemtejo and Alpnrre frontier, stretching from the 
Tapitia to tlic moiitli of tlic Gundirina. 
Tllese divisions mny be simpfified witli respect to tlieir 
rnilitriiy nslicct. Lislion taken as tlie centre, md the dishnce 
frorn tlienee to Oporto m tLe rafius, a sweep of the compass 
t o  Rasramiiiliril will Grnce tlic fronticr of  Rcirn; nnd tlic spncc 
Iyiiig let,\i*~?cu t1iis arc, tlic Sng~x, niid tlio seorcoarit furnislicd 
tlie niltin body of tlic defcnce. Tl io  soutleni and northern 
pruvinces consirlered as ti-inp, rvere subacrvient to the defcncc 
of tlie m-holc; yet e ~ c l i  hnrI rt sepnrnte tiystem for itself, based 
o11 tlic oiic gcncrril primiplc, tJint tIic coiiiitry shoiild hc mnstctl, 
nud tlie Lest troops opposed to the e n e q  ivitlioui nskiug a 
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decisive action, whiIe the irre,& forces cIosecl ronnd tlie flanlis 
~ n d  rear of tlie invaders. 
Tho northcrn and southern provincea h a n  bccn slrendy 
described, Rriw remnin~ to be notimil, S~pariLted by the 
l'loura from the Entre Minllo and Tras os Nonbea, it cannot 
ice11 be invaded on tliat line, until one or botli of tho~e p m  
vinowr is miidued; but from Castel IGodrigo to Xosaminhal, 
that is from t l ie  Domo tu the Tagus, tlie frontier tonches npon 
Spain, rana to dmcribe fhe confomation of fbe muntry it dE 
be best to enter the camp of the enemy. 
An inwling army thsn, would assemble at Ciudd h d r i g o  
or at Coriq or at both tliorre plwes. In the lattcr ensc tlieir 
communimtion couirI he mnintmined directly ntmm tlle Gntn 
mountains liy tlie p x ~ s  of Perdes, or circuitoirsly by Plnsenciro 
and the pws of Bafios; the disbnce by Perales is however not 
more than two  marche^, and the invatling c o y  wodd tliera 
fore advance simdt.aneously, or unite and force their tray a t  
one peint onIy. The frontier of Beira between the Douro md 
the TnLgus, ivould offcr nn extcnt of ninety rnileii as i r& which 
ta opernh; hiit in tlie centre, tlie Sicrrn de Estrellft, lifting ita 
snowy peaks to tlie cloudg and stretcliing out its giputic iarms, 
seems to grssp and cIaim the whole apace. The snmmit is 
impassable, and sh&g down on either hand, nnumerous 
rivess cleaving decply amidst ravines and bristled idgea, con- 
tinually oppose the progresa of an m y :  neaertbeless, tlie 
invadeiri could pcnetrntc to thc rjght and lcft of this mountnin 
in thc foIlorPing tiircctionst- 
P T ~  Ciudid Ro&p.-19 By t h e  dlg of the Douni,- 
2 O .  By flie d l e y  of the lfondego.-39 By the valley of the 
Zezere. 
Pmm Cok.-19 By CastelIo Bronco and the valley of the 
'J!11g~s.--2~. Ry the mountains of &ibreim Formosa. 
1% the vnIEey of tlie Douro would t ic  a fnnlr rnovernent 
througli an extrcmelp dificuIt conntry; nntl lvould Iielong rmtlicr 
to an invasion of tlie nortliern proi-inces t h n  uf Beira, because 
a fresh liase must be established at Lamego or Oporto liefore 
an rdvmce m l d  be inade against Lisboa 
To gain the vdley of the Mondcga thcre arc Ehi~c mntcti. 
The first passing Iiy Almeidn and CeIoBw, the second hy 

rontc Iiy thc valley of tlie &londego, or tliat of tlic Zcñera For 
these reasons t?g f m t k r  of PwhgaJ mwt be always ykZd 
to ~ c p e n h ~  nurnIm~. 
At thig tima tlie Frencli positions indimted that thc 
t inm o€ invn.nsioii would be by the north of Beira and the 
Alemtejn, wbilc ri, connedng c o y  would move by Cmtello 
Branco upon Abrantes : tlie Iollowing rlispositions were there- 
fore made by Wellington. 
Elrris, Almeida, and Taleaya on the first line of fortmses, 
Penicli6, Abrantes, and Setuvd, on tbe second h e ,  were pr-  
risoned witli natiye troop, part, rcqlzm, part militia 
General 13acccllac h a ~ n g  Silveira and tlie Eritish col onels, 
Tsant and Millcr, under liis orders, ocmpied the provinces 
beynnd the Douro Ritli twenbíine re,wiments of militia, inclnd- 
ing the garrison of TJrilcn~a on the Minho. Tlie coiintry 
Zictmecn T C T I B ~ ~ ~ O ~  nnd tlic Sngus, thnt is to  sny, tlie linea of 
tlie K l p  rind tlm Pon$ mcrc pnrtlerl by t.11e Prirtupese 
ooloneIs Lecor niiil Jolin Vilñon, witli ten regiment,s of militiii, 
c rgimcnt of native cn~airy, and the Lusitnnim legion. In 
tlic Alcmt~jo, iiicluiIing tlie garrjsons, fmr re,girneiitri of 
militia mcre atatione(1, and tliree re,$ment£i lield the fortresses 
af t1ie A:jiarves. Tbere rcmaieeii in rcsewe, twelve regimenta 
of militia, ivliicli werc rlistributed in htremdura on Iioth pides 
uf ehe Tagiis, liut prineipdy about Xctuval. 
Tlic regular l'ortuguese troops, deducting those in gmison 
nt Almcirln Elvna niid Cndiz, WCS-e at Shomnr nnd dbrnntes. 
Tlic Rritisli, orgfinixcd in fivo divi~iona af infantry and one of 
cavdry, were diñtriliutcd as fo1lows:- 
Mcn 
1st Division.. ....................... .Spenuer.. .......... 6,000 Viseu. 
2nd l>isisiun, incli~dii~g t h ~  13th 1 riil  ............. 5,000 1 A b m h  sod Draqonnn ........................ Piirtalcg-re. 
3rd Ilivi'ion.. ..................... ...l' icton ............ 3,000 Celuiicu. . 
4th Uitirrion ........................... ............... 4,000 Ci  II;~~LJ, 
SicJ~t Diviuion ...................... It~bcrt Craufurd, 2,100 I'irihcl. 
The Cavdiy .......................... &ton ............ B ~ l l ~ y  of 3~0n0 1>*otltiw. 
Tliirs the Mngs of tlic dcfcncc mere cornposetl solely of 
miiitia nnrI orilerinnp, and tlie )&ole of tiic ~cgulnr force 
mns in tlie centre. TIie Portupese at Tlioimr, and t h ~  four 
Dritisli di.lisions of infantry postcd at Viseu, Guarda, Pinhef, 
and Celurico, formed a body of thirty-eiglit thous~nd, tlie 
pcnter pnrt of wliicli coultl in two mnrclics bc iinited, cithcr rtt 
Guarda or Iiceween that position ancl tlie Doure. On tha 
oiher side IIc-rcsford and Hill could in as short a period unite 
by tlie Iioat-bridge of ,4bmtes, ancl thus tliirty-two tlioiisand 
men wauld ha concciitrntctl on tlic line rif thc Tngils. If the 
eiiemy atteinpted tlie pmsnge 01 the Elga, drrect Crom Coria, 
or by a flauk movement from E~trcrnad~irn across thc TWsI 
13eresfod coiilcl succoitr the militia by moving over the 
Sobrch  Pormosa t o  Cnbgtcllo 13ritnco : Hiil ralso oould reach 
thnt place sooncr t1im inynicr, in consequence oI sn arrange- 
ment mliich me& particular attenticia. 
From Abrantes to Caskllo Ernnco is oiier difficult rnoun- 
tnins, anrl to  rcpnir tlic roads mould l i n ~ c  bccn morc uxful to 
the enemy t l in~i  to tlie allias, ns facilitating a Fiassage for 
superior numliers to  penetrate by tlie sliortcst lime to Lisbon. 
WeIIington, tlicrefore, after tliroming boat-bridges over the 
Tngus and the Zezere antl fortiyng A.brantes, opened a com- 
municntion bctwccn tiic lattr:~ place and Cnstcllo U m c o  hy 
tlie lert han; af tlie Tngus ; it pn~scd tliiwiigli to tlis 
deñie of Villia Veilia, wwliere by a flying bridge tEie river w\.as 
rsmossetl, and f r o n  thence a good r o d  led t o  Cnstello 
Brnnce. Villix Vcllis wus prodigioiidilp stroiig for dcfcnce; 
anil tliougli tlin rn;~rcli by Nian \vas n e d y  tlie sama distancs 
as Iiy the 0 t h  Iiauk ol the Tagas, timc rws gniiicil, because 
tlie eagineers hil re-cousiructed tlie road. TLus aU the 
obstnclcs t o  invasion on thc north bank remainctl, and yet Hill 
m l d  rcrteli Cnstelio Hranco kicforc Rcynicr. SIic ViIhn Vcllin 
wny sul~scqiicntly snpplicd tlic loss of n latcrnl conitnunici~- 
tion by Alcantara and Perales, ~vhicli. moiild liavelicen iidopted 
if Trnjan's bridge 11ad nut Iicen dcstroyd. Tlie F i ~ n c h  nIso, 
in dcfrti~lt of tlint dircct linc bctmeea Estremadnrn tlnd tlie 
Ciudatl Fmilrigo countn; werc t l~ro~m iipon t1io circuitoiis ronil 
of Almartraz a d  Daños; nnd it n.as in allusion to tliis incon- 
veniente on tiotli sides, that eacli wcre silid t o  L~ncnt over the 
nriUs of Alcrintarz. 
Notwitlicttinrling tlii fmility of wncentration, Welliqtoii 
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to tlie valley of tlie hlondego; and to insure Uiis, the rond 
from Belmonte toivar(1s Thomar by the mlley of tlie Zezem 
was purposely broken, besides lieing watchecl by troops; while 
tliat from Thomar by Espinal to the Ponte de Xurcella, cal1e.d 
thc rnilihry roxrl, mas r e p n i d  mil widened. Thua the inner 
nnd ñliarter line was rendered eaey for the allies, the outward 
antl longer Iine rlificult for the euemy; rand t o  secure quick 
reports, tclegraph \vere esSb1ished frorn Lisben to Elvas, to 
Abrantea, bi~taiid to Almeich 
A spme between Guarda and the Douro, ril~ozit liirty miIcs, 
opening into tlie mlley of tlie Mondego remains to be exa- 
mined. Across this line of invasion, the Apada, Coa, and 
Pinel, ntn in dmwt parallel diredione from the Sierra de 
Francia nnd Sicm dc F:strclla into the Douw; nnd nl1 with 
tliis peculinrity, that in nppmacliing the Douro tlieir channels 
deepen into profound and gloomy chamns, mith few brirlges. 
But tlie principd obshcles were tbe fortrecsw of Ciudad 
Rodriga and Almeida, botli to be taken before an invarling 
amy could estnbli~li a solid b ~ e  of iiitwsion. After their fnll 
the lines of the Donro and of tlie Mondego woald be operi. If 
t l ~e  French adopted tlie seeontl, tliree roads Ied by Guarda, 
Alverca, and Trancoso, npon Celorico, where they wonld have 
to choose bctwccn tlic riglit and thc lcft bank of tlio rivcr for 
furtlier advance. By the left bank they must mnrch lsetweea 
the Monclep river and the EatrelIa mountain t o  the Alva, 
which fa113 into tbe Rfondego, anrl behind which the allid 
amy had a position rrf sarprising strtn$lj. If they rnnrcRer1 
by tFie right, o£ tlie Mondego upon Caimbrn, tliere ivere otlier 
obstacles, to be heraafter noticed; but, in either m e  Welling- 
ton hxving Zm%rior lims of c m m i e a t b ,  coouId, as long as 
the Belmontc road was sealed, concentrate in time beliind the 
Alvn or in front of Caimbm. Thc Alcmtcjo was tlicicforc tlre 
weak point, and i t telioved Hill to imtcIi Ggilnntly and act 
decisively in oppoation to the mwements of hynier. Tlie 
Iatter, hming the Iead, miglt by rapid marches join the sixtIi 
and eiglitli c o r p  bcforc Rill wm mare of bis clcsign, nnd 
tlius overrvl~elrn tlic Corws on the Mondego; or by drawing 
him across the Txptr, furnitih opportunity for w mrps from 
Andalwia to penetrate by the sonthern bank of that river. 
f lme dispo~itions had rcfcrence onIy t o  the enemy's BCtl~nl 
aituation, and to B gumrner inrasioa; in tLe wintor seaaon 
&e rivers and torrents being fulE and the roads deteriorated, 
the defence would bave bem diflerent. Fewer troops would 
then auffiee to  p a r d  tlie Tagus; and as the Zezere nver rind 
the Xobreim Formosa mountain would be nearly irnp-ble, 
a greater nnmher of tlie nllied troops coald bc colIccted shut 
Guarda, nnd R, more stubborn resistnncc made on tlie nortliern 
line, Every prolialile movern~nt kwing tlius previously con- 
sidered, Wellingion tmsted to hh owa qnickness and ths 
~alour oi  the British soldiem to bume unforeseen stmkas 
during the mtreat ; and once within tlie Lines, the Portupese 
people and the government doing tliejr pnt, he Iooked con- 
fidently to the final result. Re judgcd that Sn a m k d  
country, mith t h i l  regiments of &tia in tlie mountba on 
bis dank md rear, the cnemy coull not Iong remain before 
tlie Lines, and his rctrcnt wonld be cquivalent to a ~ictory 
for the alIie8. There were liowever mnny hmanrls. Tho 
Englisl~ genernl, wngnine and confident as lie wm, ltnew bow 
m n y  wunter-eombinations were te be expected; Iiow much 
forkune %-as to he dreaded in a contest mith eiglity thousand 
French veterane having a competent commtander. Rence, t o  
Becnre cmbarkntian in tlie cvent of disaster, a third line of 
entrenchmcnts was pmparcd, and twmty-four thousand f ons 
of shipphg were oonatamtly kcpt in thc rivcr to reccive $lis 
Rritisli furces: measure.a were aI~o tnlren to procure a liks 
quantity fur tlie reception of the P o r t u ~ m  troops, md such 
of tlie citizens ns miglit wish to emigi~te. 
How to feed rernaind a question. 
In the Peninsula generallp, the mpplies were a source of 
infinite trouble on both sides; not ns some b a ~ c  soppo~eied, 
because Spnin is inmpabble of  stipplying 1~rge amics. tliere 
wns througliotrt tlic wur aii nhnrlnnce of food in t,Ilnt mnnty; 
but it wrtri nnevenly ditriliutctl, dificult to  gct nt, and tlie 
people, even wlien friericlly, iiot to he depnded upon for con- 
trncta. Some pJcccs were exlinusterf, otli~rs ov~rflonin,rr, the 
diñiculty vas t o  tmnsporb provisions, and there tlie alIies had 
a great adrantagc ; tileir convoys could pass unmoIested, 
wlierew the Frcneli nilwnys ~cquircd strong guaids, first to 
colloet food and then to  bnng it np. Tn Poitugnl thcre wns 
homver reid deficicncy, even for tlic connurnption oE tEis 
people. h the timc advanced, scxrceIy any Eootl for mrin or 
be&, Borne cattle and straw from tlie northern provincea 
emepted, ~ B S  to be obhined in that country: tlie ~vhole 
mtion mnq ~f l&9t in a manncr fcd by Rnglsnrl. Evci-y part 
of tlle worjd nccessible to sliips and moncy rcndered mili- 
servient ta the craving~ of tliis insatinMe ~vnr, yct tliere was 
often a painful dot~ltfd struggle agninct tmine. At a dis- 
tance fmm tlic sea, that nurse of British nrniicg, tlic rncans of 
transport riccessnrily rcgulntctl t1ic extelit of tlio suplily; nntl 
as mlieel-carriage was scnrce rind b ~ d  in l?ortusl, and the 
roada genedly forbade its uae, t h e  onIy resource was matcr- 
carringe to a certnin distan% and n f k m a d s  Iiensts of burthen. 
Líslion hlirnntes mid Rclcm Castlc on tlic Tngrs, Fiylc- 
ras nnd Rniva de Pena Covs on tlie Mondqo, @orto nnd 
Lamego on the Doaro, w m  the principal depi~ts. Ths mngn- 
i n m  of oonsuinption were etitablislied at  Viseu, Cel~rico~ 
Contlcixri, Leiria. T1iomarz and dlrnei(Tpi(Tpi From thosc points, 
four hnnrlrerl misertitile Iiulloclr-mra nntl nbout twclve khoir- 
sand Iiired muIes, orgiinizerl ir i  brig- lea of sisty eacli, con- 
veyed the neceesnry nparlike stores arid provisioits to tlie 
troop~; when additional siiceour could be olitnincd it mas 
.enply seixed; but. tliis m ~ s  the ordinttry nmount of transpnrt,, 
and nll t3ie m n p i n e s  in ndvnnce oí Lislion wcrc so liniitcrl 
and nrranged, as to Le easily carried off or destropl in 
retreating liefore tlie enemy could seiüc tliern. Amidst cu 
many dfficuIties, such intrimte combi n ntions, Welliiigton's 
sitiintion was not one in wliicli a ge.encrrt1 ccould alwp. 
Fiwm tIiis military ~ n ¿ i  political cxposition it rippcnrs t h n t  
tlie uiifwoura~le circumsta~ccs for Frnnce were, tlie nlisence 
of tlie cmperor,-t1ie erroneous tietips of thc kmg,-the 
sivalrp of the mnrslixl~,-tlie impedilncnts to corresponrf- 
erice,-tlic ncecssity of frcqiicntly diepcrsing frorn tlic mant of 
mngnzirim,-tlie iniqiiib af tlic cniisc,-tho ilisgud of tlic 
French oficcrs, wlro, sl~oilctl by x raliid course of victories on 
the cuntinent, could iiot ~intiently endure ic service, rrplete 
with personal rlringepc nbove tlic odinnry rnisliaps of war, antl 
promising littIc iiltinmtc rcmnrd. I'Q~ tlic English, tbe quiclr- 
mds were-tbe rnemoy of former fnilnres on the cwti- 
nen$-the finaneiai dmin,-a powerfiil oppositioa, pressining 
ministers m timid and selfish, that the general dared not ri& 
s single bngsrle lest a disnster should cause a cabinet panic 
whicli lord Welleeley'a vigous modd be nnablc t o  stcm,the 
intrigue3 of tlie Souza party, and the compeUing the Por- 
tuguese to devastate their country for the sake of  rlcf~nding r 
R~rqmm c a m .  Finnlly, the bnbbling of thc Rnglirrli n e w  
pnpem, fwm whose coliimns the enmy conshtIy drew the 
moet certain information of the #tren@ and sihuation of the 
-Y- 
France bd dso pmession of nearlrly aU the fortified towns 
of the Peninsula; and while her enormous army threatened 
to crash every opponent in the field, &e orered a constitu- 
tion, and called X;o the people tliat it yas but a change of 
ona Frcnch dpaqty for anothcr. The church attarkd from 
her tonch, but thc edtimtcd cfnsm did not slirinlr lees from 
the RÍitisli gnvernment's ltnown ho~tility to dE freo insti- 
tntions. Wiat tlien rernained Eor Englnnd to cralmilate uponP 
Tlke extreme hatred of the people to the inmders, ariahg 
from the escesseg and oppressions of the mies,-the cliances 
af mother continental war,-the complete dominion of the 
ocean with al1 it.s attendant advantages, - t l e  recrniting 
throngh the militia, which waa in fa& a conscription wiGh two 
l i  in tbe chain instcad of one; iastly, tlie ardour of t11e 
troops to measure themselves with thc canqncrom of Europe 
und raigc R rivnl ta tlio Frcncli mnpcror. And liere, as 
general Foy hns Iieen at Borne pnins to mimcpresent tlie 
&ara&r of tlie Britirili troopfi, sliall be set down what rnaag 
p d  experience gkee $he right to g g  2 nearer the trutli 
t h n  his clrams. 
That the Bdtish infautry rroidier is more robust than the 
soldier of any other nation can aearcely be doubted by those 
who, in 1815, obeicrved his p e r f u l  frnme, distinguished amidst 
the uniteiI amies of Europe; and notwitlistnnding I i i s  hnlii- 
tual excees in driulcing, he sustibins fatigue nnd wet nnd tlie 
extremes of oold a d  hext with incredible vipur. When 
complefely disciplind, xnd three Far6 are requiied t o  accom- 
plish this, liis port is lofty and liis movemenb frcej the wliolo 
worlrl cannot produce a nol>Eer qecimen of military bearing : 
nor ie the mind unworthy of the outmd n a m  He d o e ~  not 
indeed possess that premimptuous vimity which would Iead 
him to  dictate to  liiri commandew, or evcn to cenEiure real mors, 
dtliougli he m y  peroeive them; but ho is obsemnt and quick 
t o  comprehend B¿s odem, full of resources under &fficnlties, 
ealm and resolute in danger, and more thm usualIy obedient 
md carefnl of his officem in rnoments of imminent peril. It 
has been r iasded that liis undeninbh firmnesc in btittlo ia the 
remlt of a phlegmatic comtitution nninspired by moral feeling. 
Never WM a more stupid calumny uttered ! Napoleon's tsoops 
fought in bright fields where everg helrnet carrglit Borne beama 
of glory, but tlie Rliei~h soldicr conquered under the cold ahitrfe 
of a r i s h m q .  No honours awaited his daring, no dmpatclz 
gave his n m e  to the applanses of bis c o u n t ~ e n ,  his life of 
dnnger and Iiardship was uncheered by hope, Es death unno- 
ticed. Did liis Iieart aink thercfore? Did he nok endnra witli 
surpassing fortitnde the sorest of ills, suatain tlie most terrible 
wsaults in battIe unmoved, overtluow Paith incredibIe energy 
every opponent, and ai al1 timeri prove, that while no physical 
miIihy qmlification WM wanting, the fount of honour was 
dso fui1 and fresli witiiin him! The rc.suIt of n hundred 
battIes and the d t e d  testimony of impartid writera of differeii t 
nations have gi~ea the first place amongst the European in- 
fantry to the British: bnt in a, compiaon between the traops 
of Frmoe and England, it would bc unjust not t o  admit that 
t!ie aivalry of the f~rmw stand8 higher in tI ie estimation of 
tlie ~t-orll, 
CRAPTER IV. 
R J B U M ~  t h  thread of mili* mentaf it k newwry to  go 
baek to th commencement of the yeru; becaurre the British 
opemtions on t he  frantier of Beim were conneckd, although 
not conducid ia nctud mncert, with tho~e of the Spauiartls; 
and here it is right to notioe the conduct of Miguel Bhv4 tht 
arave geaerons and diainterested Bpanlard, through whom thh 
connexion was kept np. Attached t o  f i e  Dritigh head-quarkers 
aa the military correspondent of thc junta, he was too qp 
cioutl not ta perceive the neoezlsity of aedonsly aeconding the 
English genemi, bet in the manner of doing it he never forgot 
the dignity of Iiis own coimtry; nnd as he wns too h k  and 
honest for intrigues, hin intercourse was alwaya lionoumbIe to 
himseií and dmnhgeouri to  both nations. 
It wilI be remembed tht  while Hey menacd Ciudad 
Rodrip in Febrnrrry, Mortier thmtened Badajoe md Hil 
advanced from Abrantes to Portaiegre. WeUington imrnedi- 
atcly r e i n f o d  the l h e  bctwccn PmheF and &arda, and aint his 
light division ncroas the Coa to watcl~ the enemy's motions. The 
Fortugueae regency WM al-ed and demanded 
*mfix 2rl more Britiah troopa. Wellington replied that the i l. 
nnmben fixed by the treaty were as mudi as he 
oould feed; and he took the oocasion to point out that the mea- 
euree a@ to touching the native troops were not exmted 
with vigour or impnrtiality-that the wliccl transport antl otlicr 
msidnce required by the British drdy in the conntry liad 
not been supplied. These matkrs he nrgentIy advised them to 
mend before they asked for Iarger armie. The regeng then 
hoping to render him unpopular aaid he might puni~h tho 
deelnultem liimself; but ILB repIied t h t  he ndvised aev~re 
measum, yet would not be d e  a deapotic chastiser of the 
people; when the actual lawa were auficient to c n f m  
obedienca He h d  dher matters t o  attend to; for Ney being 
thcn nmr Ciudd Roclrigo, Mcmet a+, Plnwncia, l i s  pom- 
tion mari embamsing. They rnight push between Eill 
and Limself, or even betwem him and Lisbon, because the 
t egen l  liad neglected the works on the mili* red, md 
thus -de the distance to tha Tag.18 nine. marches instead of 
fonr. He hnd no sure informntion, nnd could only match 
Mermet, nnd be r e d y  te withdmw from the frontier; liut 
d e n  del Parqne's movement from Gata to Bdsijos occupied 
Mermet> when Junot commenced t h e  siege of Astorga, and the 
military road wag improved, his position amended. He then 
broaglit rip the Portupese army to Coa and Viseii, and ordered 
8ie militin md ortierinn~a of thc northem provincea to ooncen- 
trate at Braga in defence of the h OE Montes. Gudad 
Rodrip being horrever seriously menaced iri April, a brigade 
of hmvy caralry was ~ e n t  o Belmonk) and head-quarters 
transfemd to Celorico, in the design oof hriking snddenly with 
ths whole a m y  at the Frnck purc and mepaines in Sala 
manca;-a daring projed, but resnquiahed when it was di% 
covered tlmt as Ke1leman and Junot oouId reinforce the 
troaps on tlie Tome8 the whole would be too strong: henee 
in May, te wccaur Ciudad Rodrigo if occotwon offered, b m e  
the only object extmneous t o  the defenw of PortugaL 
Biit alwnp TVeIlin&on l i d  to shggle  with tlie folIy of liis 
governrnent; he was ptinted of money fmm Eqltbnd, and tlie ' 
resource8 of I'ortuffd were not brouglt fowlird; suirceJy 
m l d  he maintain his actual position, and Ghe regency treated 
his rernonstmnces lightly, exactly imitating the conduct of tlie 
supreme jnnta of Spain during the  Talavem w p a i g n .  Wherc- 
fore, ivriting sharply he told them 'thcir proceed- 
i n p  were e v ~ l v e  lund frivolous ; tliat the nrmy t[pd''x 
could ncither move forward w r  remain witliont 
food; tliat the time was one which would not d m i t  of idle or 
hoilow proceedings, or partiality, or neglect of public for 
private interests; Uiat thc rcaources were in the mnntry, coulrI 
be dra~ ia  fortli, and must be so, if tlie nssishncc of Englnnd 
m desired; fuidly, that punhhent sliould follow disobedi- 
enw, and to be effectual must begin nith tlie liigher cl~stbsses.' 
Then, isauing ri prucluination, he poiuted out the duties and 
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the omissions of ma$trates and people, and by this vigomns 
interference procured some immediate ~elief or his troop8. 
Before this Cranfurd had commenoed Eiome remarkable opera- 
tions beyond the Coa with the  liglit divfsion, composed of 
tliree rcgirnent.~ singularly 5tkd for diicuIt serrice. Long 
nnd cartfiilly disciplined by sir John Moore, t h ~ y  mme h thc 
field witli such n knowledge of ams, tlint six yem af d a r e  
could not detect a Aaw in tbeir system, nor wer0 they ever 
avermatched in coumge or skill. Witli +hese solciiem mitch 
mi@ be dared, h t  whiIe the Frencli mre  on the Ague~la 
Cmuhrd miglit pws, yet could noG keep beyond the Coa 
without cavalry ; wlierefore he invited CoPe to take the line 
of t h 3  river in mipport while he admced to the Agueiia. 
Cole rcfused to quit Gunrda, tho koy o€ nll t.he positions, nnd 
Wellington appmed of hh decision; but the I b a  of tlie Coa 
waa essentid to  the succouring of Ciudad Rodriga, md there- 
fore Craufurd m s  neinforced with the &rm&n hussars, two bab 
blions of Portupese qadores, and Roa's tmap of home 
artillery. Picton alao waa moved up to Pinhel, and he and 
Cole mere +a support the light divisiun if callad npon. 
Cranfud Imving now funr thonsrtnd men and six gnna, 
about tlie midde of Mmli  lined tlis A p d m  with hiB Irussars 
from Escalhon on lis omi lefb, to  Li'ama Frias on his right, 
a didance of twenty-fiw m i h .  Eis infanty occupied the 
villages between Almeida and the lower Agueda; the artillery 
entered Fort Cooception, anrl the cacadores wre held in 
reserve. The French were then extended from San Feliccs 
baclt ta Salamancm nnd Ledesmn, and ns tliey thua left the 
paos of Pemles oyen, Cnmm who was at Coria could alm act 
in concert witli Craufurd. The Iine of the Aperla was Iong, 
hut fm Wavas Frias te the Doam it was mndered unfordable 
by hemy rains; and only four brid,~ crossed it on that 
extent. One !vas at bravas Frim, another a leape below iit 
Villar, one at Ciudad Rodrigo, and one sit Xnn Felices, called 
tlie h r h ~  del Rierco. n o  two fimt w m  d i d ~ n t ,  md, the 
hu~sam being alert, the infantry mere mre of time t o  conoen- 
trate around Almeida b~fore m enemy cmld from thenee reach 
them. Oiidad Rodrigo commanded its omn bridge. That of 
San Felices waa mar, and the French troopa close to it, but 
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the channel of the river was so profmd that 8 few rifle conz- 
panies seemed safñcient to bar the pwsage. This disposition 
waa good wBiIe the Agueda was Aooded, but thaE n ~ e r  was 
mpriciou~ ofken fnlling mnny feet in a night witliout appment 
murre. m e n  forrfabla Craufurd ooncentrated his diviaion, yet 
to do so de l?  required from the treopa a pramptitude ~ n t l  
int;elIjgence the Like o£ which have seIdom heen knoírn. Xeven 
minutes auficed to get under wrms in the night, a quarker of 
fin IIOUP, night or &y, t o  gathcr thcm in order of h t t l e  nt  
the d m  posta, with baggage laaded d aasemliIed at a con- 
vmient distnnce in the rear: and this not upon s concerkd 
signd and as a trial, bnt al1 timm c e r a  and for many 
montlia consecutively. 
Xcarcely h d  the Iine of the A p e d a  been taken, when geneml 
Ferey, a bola oíñoer, desiring to  create a fe= of Frencli enter- 
p k ,  and thinking to mrp'rise the Jivision, collected sK hun- 
dred grenadiers close t o  the bridge of Barba de Puerco, wliere 
he waited until tlie moon rising behintl him east long 8h~loiw 
from the rockg deepening tlie darkness in the chasm. Then 
silently he pussed the narrow bridge, and mith incredible speed 
asoending the opposite sidq bayonethed tlie sentriq muid fell 
upon the piqnet 60 fieroeIy that friends and enemies went 
fighting into the viltage of Barba del Puerco whilc the 6rst 
shout m cltrll echoing in the gulf below. So suddenmas the 
attaek, so p t  the confusion, t l ~ t  he Britisli companies 
muld not form, and ewh soldier encounted the nearest 
enemy, fighting hantl to hand, while their colonel, Sydney 
Beckwith, conspicuew by bis lofty M u r e  and dañng actions, 
a rnaa capable of rallying a mhde army in flight, exhorting, 
ahouting, nged rall forward until the enemy was pushed over 
the edge o€ the ravine in retmk. Tliis combat, fought on tlie 
19tb, ~ihowed that the Frencli might be liemded wliile the 
Apeda wm flooded; but the whole m y  was sorely straitc 
ened for money, and Craufurd, unable to  feed bis rüvision, 
gaw: the relns to hia ficry tempcr and seized some chmch pltite 
t o  purchaee com, a rash act whieh hc m forccd t o  redrcss; 
yet it conviuced the priests t11at tbe distress was not feignerl, 
and they proeured some supplies. 
Ney m we h e  seen appronclied Ciudad Robigo a smoncl 
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time in Aprii, and Wellington moved to CeIoriw. C t a m  
wbo had come ta Pemles, behg menaced by Kellerman t h  
descended to Ituero on the Azaq  and conneceed his left with 
Craufwd's right,-the line of retreat for both being by tbe 
bridge of Seceira on the Coa to GIuarda. In this etah tha 
deserkm for the b t  time ceased to  speak of the empemr'~ 
commmdíng in pemon, and rnentioned Massena aei general in 
cliief They al1 sajd serioua opcmtiom would aoon Mimmence, 
hut no aura inforrnation was obtaind, and ari the Apeda 
continned in flood, Craufard d n t a i n d  his position unti1 the 
end of May. Then carne radvice from hcEre85 Bemasti that 
the French battery train was in motion; and on the Xet  of 
June, Ney, as we before s&id, descended h m ~  the biih with 
fifty thmantl men, and threw his bridge8 o w  the Agreda. 
Tliis conccntmtion of tha Rench on the Agreda enabled 
Welliigton to b w  down militia regirnenta from 
Brapnza to the lower Dwro? wnd he wukl now bring provi- 
sionei up that river as far rw Lamego, 
On the 8th, fonr thomand French cavalry m s e d  the 
Aguda, and Cmufurd conccntrated his foroes at Gallegos 
and Eqejrs. Carr~m then wupied a mod hhind the la.& 
namd villqe; and, so e x b r d i n q  waa his preeumption nnd 
absurdiq, that he choee this moment, when ESpain wns avat- 
whelmed, and the eye could warcely oommand the intermin- 
able lines of Frwich in his immediate h n t ,  t o  invite Ney tc 
desert! Nothing eould be more eritEd however than Cara 
rera's snd Craufurd's position. From the Agnede, to the Cm 
t h e  connt y, although studded with wooda and ~ c ~ o p e d  inh 
hollom, was quita open for cavdry and a r t i l b ,  and them 
were at le& sir thousrand hoaemen and fiRy gana within an 
hour'a marcti of bis position. His right waa at Espeja, where 
thick woods in h n t  rendered it bpossible to dlseover an 
enemy until dese apon the villrtge, h i l e  wide plaina behind 
alrnost preolutled a retreat befora the multitude of Freach 
cavaiy and artillery. The confluente o£ the h a v a  with the 
Bpda  oEered indeed xiome se&Q t o  his left, because the 
channcl of the former river there h~ a c h m ,  and tbe 
p n d  mse high and rugged at esch side of thc bridga of 
llmialvn, trro miles in front of & I l e p .  Nevertlieless, aa 
the enemy's banlr vas highest, it waa necessary t o  keep pasts 
beyond the Asava to obtain a good prospect, and the bridge 
of MwiaIm wuld be t m e d  by a ford below the conflaence of 
the s trem.  
On the 10th the Agu& becrsme fordable in al! parts, but 
Cranfnrd seeing tbe enemy wa~l mising redoubta t o  secure his 
Iower bridge, and makmg otlier preparntions for the siega, 
di11 maintained lis dangema position. He h a  enceumged 
the gmkon of Ciudad Rodrip, and protected the villages 
between the Aeam and the Coa fiom the enemy's foraging 
partiea 
The 18th, the eighth corps waa neen t o  take post at 5m 
Felim and other points, and al1 the vilhgw, from the Sierra 
de Francb t o  tlie Douro, were occupied by the Fmnch ; the 
23rd, Julian hnchez broke out of Ciuhd and galloped into 
Ganegos; the SBth, the Freach batteries opened, their 
mmlry cloaed npoa the k m ,  and Grawfusd withdrew hia 
O U ~ ~ O N ~ K  
The SBth, it was knom tbat the gamison had bst ano 
handm! and dfty killed, anil five hundrd wountled. 
me 2 9th, a Spaniard, passing the fiencli posts, bmght 
Carrera a note from the govemor oantainiq &ese nards: ' O 
m& I q o l  lusgol kueqol w semrrw mi% p h , '  "h ! 
come now! now? now ! to the mccour of thG pIwtce.' 
Un the 1s t  of July, Horraati repentod hia Iuega ! lnego E 
luego! ndding por ultimo vea!' for t,he lest time. 
WelIinghn Btill watehing for tin opprhmity to relieve the 
place now r e i n f a d  Crauiurd witb the 14th and 16th lighfi 
dragww, and trmsferred l& own qnsrters to Alverw, a 
villago Balf m y  betwem Almeih md Celorico. Tbe 
Spanida mpposed he wwld a t t d ,  and Romno c a m  
from Bdrojos to propoee a combined movement for carry- 
ing off the p i s o n .  It ww rs t+ng moment. The EngliFIh 
genml hrtd come frm the hadiana amwedly to secure 
Eodrigo, and bad thus in a mamer pledged himself to jncIude 
ito auccour in hii scheme of operations, The garrison waa 
brave and distmed, the govemor firm and honoumhb. To 
let the pEam fdl without an effort would be n g r k o u s  thing 
and a di~lonour. The Spaniards and Portugueae, alike de 
manded that an attempt should be m d e  t o  raise the siep; 
the fimt as a prmf of good faith, the h t  to keep the war 
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longer fm their conntry : the EngIish troops &o m e  cap 
for the enterprise, md policg seemed to mil for it, lest the 
mrld should deem the promise Eo defend Portugal a hollow 
boast. Neverthele~is Wellingh absolntely refuscd to ~entnw 
even brigrde, nnd thna proved himself a truly great wm- 
mmder and of a ~teitedfast mind. Xt wae not a single m- 
paign. bnt a temible war he had untlertaken. If he lost five 
thowand men, bia gwernrnent wou1d abandon t11e contest; if 
he lost fifteen, he must a b d o n  it bimself. His disposable 
force did not exceed fifty-six thoumd men. Twelve thm- 
sand were with Hill, one-half of the remainder were untried 
and raw; but thig included evcn the Portuguesa camly and 
&EIOB& &ynier ucting in conoert with lbsena, hd 
collected b a t a  ta pws tlie Tegus, and was pointin, tamrds 
Coria; a French colum, defiigned for Edrernadm, warr 
passing tbe aforena, and eight tlioniand Portupese were of 
necassity detached t o  Thomar as a reseme for HiIl. Thus 
not qnite twenty-fivc thousand oombrttants were adab le  to 
ay off a garrison ie tho faco oT sixty thon~and b c h  
veterans. 
Bnt from Gaads, the key of the English positions, to the 
Apeda waa two marcliw; and h m  Cona h Guarda waa 
smm1y more; hence a division muat have remsined at the 
la& place, lest Xlepier, deceiving HiIX, should reach it M: 
the remnining twenty thousand mula only be nscd for an 
open Lattle, or for a surprise. Tlie lmt might be eKected by 
filing in the night over the bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo to 
seize the battering tiain, or t o  dmw off the garrison; that 
movement bowever, could scardy lave heen made unobserved, 
and Mwena'a information was aure; he knem of 
*Pe Romnnds v id  and its obicct two dnp nfter it 
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mrrd. Open liattIe a madrnan only would 
h a ~ e  ventured. The army, passing over a plain in the faae of 
nearIy tlwee times ih o m  numlsers, must bave e?cposed Xts 
flanks to the enemy'a bridge8 on the Apedeb, because the 
fortrm wns situntcd in the Iiottorn of rt deop bend of tha 
&ver and the French were on the convex sido. W l i ~ t  hope 
then to wi thhnd  tLe eight thousand cavalry and eigbty guas 
which would have carne pouring over the bridges on tho 
flanks, and the ñfty tliousmd infmtry which wouZd h n ~ o  
foUowed them to t.he nttack. What muld even a momentary 
sutxess have availed ? Fiva thousnnd undisciplincd mea 
baought off fiom Ciudd Rodrigo, would lmve ill supplied 
the ten or twdve fhousmd good troops Iost iu the Iriattle; 
and the temporary relief of the fortress woald have been a 
pwr compensation for the los3 of Portugal. For mliat mas 
the actual atate of affairs in thnt couutyP-The militia deeert- 
ing in crowds to the iiamest, tlie regoncy in full oppofiition to 
the general, the mmmres for laying l w t e  the country not 
perfected, and the public mind deapondingl The enemy 
woulcl soon ham mited his whoZe fm and admnced to 
retriexe his honour: and how conld hc have been opposedl 
M a s ~ e n ~ ,  b I & ~ ~ C ~ O U B  general, desired the nt;tempt Jioultl be 
made. Ee held back liis Groopq appeard csreIms, antl in hier 
proclwnatioas hunted the English general, saying Lo mas 
a£raid!-that the saiIs were flapping on the ships prepnred t o  
carry him 0%-that he was insensible to militnrg honaar, mi 
~vonld snffer the pIaco +m fd wihliout a sliot, to redeem his 
plighted wod l AIE this aubtlety fdd, lord Wcllington 
abided 1;s o m  time. ' IE thou art a great caphin, Marius, 
come d o m  and fight l If thou art a great captain, SIlo, make 
me oome down and figit !' 
CiudadMrifp stiIl resisted, and tlie French pushed thsir in- 
fanty en to tIie Azam, Cwrers tlien retired to tlie Duns C w s  
river1 and CraufmF, placing Iiis mmlrg at Gallegos, conmnhted 
b i ~  infanhry in t h ~  waod of Almeda, two miles in rear. Fmm 
thense he could faU kack t o  the bridge of Almeida by Srin 
Pedro, or to the bridge of CasteIlo Bóm by Pilla Fomosrt. 
OBstinateIy resolnk however not t o  yield a foot of p o w d  he 
could kccp by art QT force, he dwposed Es troops in single 
ranh on Ohe rising grounda in tlic cvening of tha Zntl, nnd 
nsing some horaemen t o  mise rlust in tlic rear, rnarlc thc infan- 
by pass the height~ slowly, as if O p t  arrny waa ttdvancing 
to auccour the place, The artifice mas successful, sBe PIm, 
lre gained tmo days ; but then the French assembled 
infuntry at &Iuridva on the Azava,, and a squnxlron rif horse 
crossing by t l i d  fod,  plloyed into Gitllcps aníl drove bnck 
tlie piquetx ts; wliereupoti Crauhrd r e t i d  to AIameda, Ieming 
a troop of tlie 16th md one of Germm hussars, 4 t h  tivo 
pns, covered in occupation of a Lill betiind a streamlet with 
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mnrshy bnnks. Soon a bdy of French horriemen C m 8  on at 
is c h q i n g  pce ,  dimini~hing ita fmnt in appro~hing a mali  
bridge, but resolute to pws under the fire of the guns. The 
Qerman captain, hüchenberg, proposed to chwge thoira 
who first came over; tlie Engtish aptain refused, and tbe 
gallant GRrmltn riding with hia sngle troop xgahst the head 
of the sdvoncing columns killed tlie leacling offieers, ovcrthrew 
tlie front mnlr,q, ~ n d  rove the whole back; tlie French then 
m s s d  the ~trearn at other poinks, and a squadron came clow 
ap ip Alameda bnt m driven off by a volley from the Portu- 
gueae cayadoreg, and the pursuit ceased. Craufurd took a 
frwh post with bis infantry and guns, in a wood near Port 
Coneeption; hi cavalry, reinforc~d by JuIim Sanchez and 
Carrern's divisions, werc dispoaed liighcr up oa thc Duna hns, 
md the French withdrew behiid the Azav% leaving only a 
piqnet at G82lep. 
Their marauding parties however entered the dlagee of 
Barquillos md Villa de Puerco three conriemrtive 
%e Han. 
nights, mnd Cm~~furd plantea an ambusde of 
nine squadronu, aupporting it with dl lery ,  five oompania 
, 
of riBemen, and a battdion of cotpdo~'eg. At dayireak on th 
1 lth, French infantiy were seen at fhe Quinta Bnrlad~ near 
ViUii de PuercoJ clbwlry near Bnrquilloa; the cwiuntry wari open 
and the EngIish hememen could h a ~ e  got behind the fomer; 
hut Craufurcl, alway~ hot-tempered, pushed stmight t h n g h  a 
stane enclosure dificnlt te clear, and t h  disordering his men, 
gaVG the enemy, twa hundred strong, tima to form quam 
behind a rather deep rise of ground, and so hr froni the edge 
as t o  be unseen unbil the ascent was gained. Two riquadrons 
fimt reached the summit and gdloped in upon thi sqtiare, but 
thongh Ghe chergo was pu~hed home it fnilcd; the tF00peiFI 
received the fire of three sides, and in p s i n g  heud tho Freneh 
captain Gnaclie, and his sergeant-mrojor, exhorting the men to 
stand firm and shoot carefnlly. Scaroely was this chatge o ~ e r  
when thc encmy's ca~n1ry came out of Bnrquillos, and the two 
Briti~h ~riunrlrona bnving re-formed, d e  apiinst it end mnde 
twenty-nine men and two officem prisoners, a few Iieing algo 
mounded. Meanmhile coIoneI Talbot, comlng up 6 t h  four 
squadrons of tlie fourteentli dmgoons, bere gnllantly in upon 
captain Guache; but tlie Iatter a,& opeud such a tire, that 
Tslhot birnsoIf and fourtecn mcn went clown clom to the 
bayon&, nnd the staut Frenchman made good Iik retreat. 
Cmufurd then returned to the camp, having hd thirty-two 
tmopem, besidea the colonel, killed or wounded in thh nn- 
fortunate affair. 
That day Ciudad Rodriga ~arrendered, má the Spanish 
b m p ~ ,  gricvd nncI imitated, sepamkd frorn the light division 
and marchd by the p s s  of Perales im rejoin ~omauo. Creu- 
furd now s~sumed a fresli position a mile and a h l f  from 
Almeidg and demanded a relnfarcement of two battalien~ 
Weiiington repfied that he wonld give him two diaons if he 
wdd hold bis ground, bat that he coda not do so ; and know- 
jng thc temper of the man rcpeated hi~l former ordm (mzot to 
&Id b q d  IJw Cm' 
On tlie 21d, the enemfs cavalry qpin admnoed, Fort 
Conoeption was blown up, and Craufurd fe11 back to Almeida, 
apPr&tIy disposed to &ss the Coa, yet notbing m further 
fiom hia thoughts. He had kept a wenk (Iivision for thee 
montha within two houm' mrirch of sixty thousand men, appm 
printing tiie resourna of the plnina entirely to himself; Iint thim 
exploit, only t o  be appraciabd by military mm, did not satisfy 
his feveri~h Grst of diBtinction; he had mfely affronted a 
superior power, and forgetting that LB &y beyond the Coa 
was a matter of mffemnoe noi real strength, be with Iieadstrong 
ambition resolved, in defiance of reason and of the reitersted 
,ordem of his general, to fight on tlie right brink He had four 
thousanrl British infaatry el- h u n d d  camIry nnd six p s  
ia position, oa a h e  oblique to the Coa; the right was on some 
broken ground, the left, resting on m unfinished tower eight 
hnndrerl garda from Almeida, was defendd by the gnns of 
th8b fortm, his cavalry was on the plrtia in front; but bis 
back was on the edge of a mvine fotming the chmnel of the 
Con, antl the bridge, more tban a mile distan4 was in tlie bot- 
tam of the c h m .  
COMBbT OF m C O L  
A stomy night w h d  in the 24th o€ July. n o  troops, 
drenched with min, were iinder arms before dnylight, expcct- 
ing to  retire, when Borne pisto1 ~hota in ftont, folIowed by an 
oder for the cavalrp resema and the gunu t o  advance, gave 
notice of the enemy's apprmeh. T h e  motning clesred ruid 
twenty-fonr thousand Freneh infantry $ve thousand cavdry 
and thjrty pisces of artillev were observed in rnarch beyond 
tha Turones. Thc British line was immediately contmcted 
and brought nntler tlie cclge of t h  rnvine, but Key, observing 
CraufurtI'a false disposition, carne down with the stoop of an 
e@;-four tlionsand hommen and s pomerful artillery 
swept &e plain, the aliied camIry gaTe back, and Loison's 
infantry, ninning up at a charg-ing pace, marle towardti the 
entre md left of the position. 
%'hile the fiench were thus pouring onmard, eeveml ill- 
judged changa were m d e  on the English side. Part of the 
troops were acivunced, athers d m  back; ~ n d  the forty-thid 
iegiment wm placed witliin sn enclwure of soIid masonry, ten 
feet high, situatd on the Ieft u£ the road, half-msket &ot 
down the ravine and having but cine narrow outlet. The 
firing in Emnt s o m  became hesvy, the cavalry, the artilIery md 
the ca;dores, pwsed t h e  enclosure in retxeat and tbe sharp 
c h g  of the rifles waEi henrd along the cdgc of the plain above; 
a few mornents later and the imprisonetl rcgiment would hawl 
been gurrounded without ri hope of esmpe; bu€ here, m in 
e x  y otlier part of the fieId, the quickness and knowledge of 
the battalion aficers remedied the fa& of the general: some 
hrge stones mere loosened, one eudden simultaneous &ort of 
the wliole regiment hnrst the wd1, and the forty-tliird m tbe 
next instant np with tAe rifiemen, There m no room for a 
line, no time for anytliing Eiut battle. Every captnin carried 
off hie mmpany as an independ~nt body, nnd jaining as he 
conld with the riflemen md fifhy-second, the whole presented 
a maBa of slrirmiehers, aeting In small parties and under no 
reguhr commancl, yet each confident ia the courage and disci- 
pline of tthosc on his riglit and left, nnd aU beping together 
with surprismg vigow. 
It is ndleas to describe tha first burst of French soldiers, 
it is wdl known with whnt gagaUantry tbe oficers tead, with 
mhnt vehemente the troopti foJlom, and with what a stom o£ 
fire they wasto a field ai battle. A€ this momenh, hnving 
advantage of ground and numbeq they mere breaking ayer 
the edge of the ravine, whila their guna rmged don8 the 
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aummit pourcd down grape ~hot,  and their linssam gallopinp 
over tlts glacis of Almsida drove domn the r o d  sabring 
everything in their wny. Ney sent f i ~ e  o5cers in succesaion 
to desire tlie wliob of the French cavaly rthould follow the 
hnss~rs and cut off thc English fmm tlie bridge; nnd, so 
m i x d  were friendri and enemies, tltat enly a few giins from tlie 
fortress &red open; no co-g could hav0 avavailed against 
mch overwhelming numbem ; but hiontbrnn enjoyed m inde- 
pendent comm%nd, and as the attack W ~ B  made withont &las- 
s c d s  knowlodgc be wonld not stir. TIien tho Britiah 
regirneatq mjtli singular intelligence and discipline, extricnted 
themelves fron tlieir peri1ous sitiiatioa, Falling bmk sloivly, 
~topping and fighting wllen oppodunity offered, they m d e  
their way down tlia mvine tangled m it mas ritli vinegards, 
in deapite of their enemies, who mere yet so fierce md eagcr, 
thnt eevn the Iioraemen rocle in amongst tlio endosures, 
striking at the soldiers aa they mountd tlie walIs or scrambled 
over tlie rocks. 
As tbe retreating troops approached the river, the gmund 
becnrne more open; and the lcft wing, hnrdcst preaml, a.nd 
hwing the shorteat clistance, arrivd wliile tlie Iiritlgs was 
quite erowded witli artillery and mmIry, and t h ~  rigM wing 
wets still distant. Majar M'Leod of the fortpthird, perceiving 
the danger, then mrallied four companies of his regiment on a hill 
covering the line of passage; lic was joined by aome of the 
riflenien, and at the samc time tlie brigade-major h m n  
pated two oompnnies on nnotlier Iiill tri tlie Icft, flrtnlring thc 
r o d .  Tliese posts were maintabed to covcr tlie filing. of tha 
right ming omr tl ie bridge, yet the Fiench, gathehg iil great 
nurnbem, made a serions msh and forced the compnies baclc 
before the bridge eould be denred, mtnd while a p r t  of tbe 
fifty-second wm ~titill a comirlcrahle ditance Com it: Tlic 
crisis ww imminent, but M'Lewl, a youug mnn endowed ivi tli 
a natural genius for mr, imrnedi~tely turned l is  borse round, 
called on the troops to foUov, and mving hi8 cap, rode Gtli 
rs &out towads the enemy. The suddenness of tlie thing 
and tlie animating action of t h e  man, produced the effect he 
designcd; a mob of aoldiers nished after liim, clieeri~g and 
clwging as if s wliole army lid becn at thcir bsclrs; the 
enemy's skirmisliers, astonislierl at this unexpected rnovcment, 
skopped ~hmt, and befm they couId remm fmm tkeir m- 
pise  the fifty-second h d  parised the river : RIZeod followed 
at i m md griined the other side &out a disaster. It was 
a finc exploit l 
As ths infmtry passed the bridge they pIsnted tbema~lves 
Ln loose order an the side of the mountain, tlie artillery drew 
np on the mmmit. me cavaly was disposed on a11 
the rods  to the right, l o  watch some fords two miles above, 
and to ohwrve the bridge of Castello B6m; for it was fo be 
apprehended, tli& wliile Ney attacked in front, Sunot would 
pnss rit those place! with the eighth corps, and so get betwcen 
tlia light division and &lorico: tho river wns howcver rising 
faet, and it v m  impospible to retreat farther nntil nightfal?. 
Soon the French skimbbm, swarming on the rigLt bank, 
opened s biting fue, which wae retuined as bitterly ; tlie artil- 
lery on both sides played m o s s  the ravine, the sounda wew 
mpmtcd by numbcrlcss echoes, snd the make, rishg slowly, 
molved itself into an immense arcli ~panning tlie wliole 
olirtsrn and sparklirtg with the wbirling h e s  of the flying 
ahells. Fmt and thickly the French gathered behind the high 
rocks and a drapon rnw seen to t y  the dep% of tlie dream 
ubove bridge, but shots from the fifty-second lrilled hom 
and man, and tlic carenaaea doating d o m  betwccn the Iioatile 
Iiands sliowd that the river Tvaa u~foril~blo. Slie rnonotonous 
tones of B Frmch drum W8re then heastl, t l~e liead of a noble 
oolumn darkened the lang narrow bridge, a dnimmer and 
an &cer in a splendid unifom leaped together to the front, 
md the whole mhed on mith loud cries. At itrst the deptb 
of the ravine deceived tbe English soldien' aim, snd two- 
tliinls of t,hc pmsngc WOA won ere a dlot liad lirouglit down an 
enemy; but a fcw pace# onmrds the lino of dmtli was traced 
ttnd tlie whole of t1ie leding Fmnch gection fe11 as one man! 
The column stili pressed formnrd3 y& could not pass that ter- 
rible Iinc, the 1cilId nnd worinded rolled together until the 
Iicnp Tose nwrly evcn with the parnpct, nnd thc living mass 
bdiind melted away ratlter than grtve Fiack. 
Then loudly rose tlie Biitisli shout, but it ww confidently 
aaswered, and in hdf sn bour, a second coIurnn more numero& 
than tlie first q a i n  cmwderl tlie bridge. This time however 
won the French m s  was toin, shathred, dispersd or slajn: 
ten OF twelve men only.succeeded in crossing and took shelter 
nnder the ruclra at ths brink of the river. Tlio mkirmisliing 
was then renemed, and a French surgeon, coming down t o  tlie 
very foot of the bridge, waved Iiia bantlkereliief Jince and 
commenced dressing the wounded under the hottest fire : nor 
waa thia bmve rnan's touching ~ p p l  rinlieeded, eoery musket 
turnetl from &m, althougli hiti ski11 undauiited wuntrymen 
were prepdng for a third attempt. And this lrst eflort w 
~ m n  mde, but rvith fcwer numliers antl less energ, for tlie 
imposaibiiity of forcing the passage was now quite apparent. 
Neaerthelesa, tlie mmbat was unnemarily mntinucd. By 
the French, as n point of lionour, to cover £he escape of thosc 
mho had pasried tlie bridge; by the Eoglish, from ignorance of 
their object. One of tlie enemy's gunfi JYW dismantled, a 
field-magweine exploded, and many continued to  fa11 on h t h  
sidcs until about four o'clock, whcn a hen-iy rain causing a 
rnomentt~rj cessation of fire, tha men nmongpt thc mcks 
returned unmolested to tlieir ewn side, and ths fight ceased. 
Craufurd retired in the night behind the Pinhel river. 
Forty-four Portuguese, two hundred md seventy-tmo 
British, including twcnty-eiglit officers,   ve re killed, wounded, 
or taken, and it wns ut first siipposed tIiat lieukciinnt Duwson 
and half si company oC tlie fifby-second, wliicli had been poated 
in the unfinislied tower were also captured; but mith p a t  
intelligence he p s e d  all the enemy's pos& ia t.he night, 
cmsed the Coa at a di~itant ford., and rejoined Iii.l reg&&. 
Ncy Iost a thousand men, and the slaiighter at the bridge was 
fearful to beliold. Massenn clairncd to Iiave $alcen two pieces 
of artiuery, which wm tmg for the iron guns intended to arm 
the unfinislied tawer near Almeida were lj-ing at the foot of 
the building, and tlius fe11 into liis han&; they bbelonged 
liowcver to thc g h o n ,  not t o  &e Iight division, and tliat 
tlicy mcrc not moiinted and the tower prrisoned was R p& 
negligente. I k d  it been othemise, the Fiencli cttvalry could 
not have c l q d  tlie left of the positien, and the after-invest- 
ment of Almeida itsdf would have been retarded. 
During the figlit general Picton carne up from Pinhd 
alonc; Craufurd askd him for the support of the third 
divjsion, he &use$ and they scparatd aftcr a sha'p altcrca- 
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tion. Rctw wasi m n g .  CraufurSs situation wns one of 
extreme danger; he could not retire, and M a s s m  might 
undonbtedly h ~ e  thrown his reseme& by the bridge of CM- 
tello B6m, npon the right dank af the division, and destroped 
it betmeen the Coa and the Pinhel rivere. &ton and &&u- 
fnra wcrc, 'however, not formed by mtnw t.o a& codially 
together. The atern countcntsnoe, robust hmc, saturnina 
complexion, cnwtic speech, antI nustere demennour of the 
h ~ t ,  promi~ed little sympatliy with the short thiek figure, 
dark flasliing eyes, quick movements rtnd fiery temper of tlie 
second: nor did they oAen meet mithout e quarrel Never- 
theless, they had mnny pdntri 3 resemblance in their cham 
ters and fortunes. Both were inclined to  harshness, and rigid 
in commnnd; both prone t o  di~obedienoe, yet exaeting entire 
sulimission from inferiors. They were aii1ce ambitious and 
craving of glory. Botli possessed mili- talentg wem enter- 
prising and intrepid; yet neither were remarkahie foi skiii in 
ZiandKq troops under fire. This dso they hsbd in commm, 
that after distinguisherl aerPices, they perished in arms, 6ght 
ing gnllfintly; nnd being celebratad as gcncrda o i  division 
wliila living Iinve since their denth been injndiciously qokm 
of ea rivalling their g ~ e a t  lmder in war. 
n a t  they were officem of mark and g r e h i o n  b nnqnw 
tionable. Craufurd more so than Hcton, because the Iatter 
never liad a separate command, md his opportunities were 
necesriarily more circmscribed; but t o  compare either to 
Wcllington d i p l a p  ignomce o£ the men nnd af tbe a& t h q  
professecl. If t h g  liad even mprehmded ths p r o f o d  
military and political combinations he was Chen conducting, 
tlie one would h v e  cmfully avoided fighting on tbe Coa; 
the oflier, far Erom refasing, would have eqerly proíiered bis 
m1pporL 
JUSTTFICATORY PECES, 
@ k b r  to the Anthor dnca the publication o€ the First Volame.] 
the very hndsome manner in whicli p n  hrrve me- 
tioned my mme, In Tour account of the battIe of Talavem, it 
may appear e ~ t r a o ~ n a r y  that 1 should trouble you with ihis 
letter; h t  my silence miglit be interpret~d into the wish of 
talring praise to myself wliich 1 do not deserve. 
The wlrole of your aecount of the charge made bg p e r a l  
Anson'a brigade is mibshntialIy cortuxt; you h v e  @ven the 
reason for it, and the result; but there are two points, in the 
detaiS whicli are i w u r a t e .  The iemt decting the arman 
liussnm; tlia other respecting myself. 
Tlie Gemanñ, on t,he Ieft af tlie twenty-thirrl, could not 
reacli Bie Fronch mlumns, from the impracticnbility of tha 
ravine rvhere tliey chíarged; tlUn I aacertnined, by personal 
ahcrvation, thc follomirig day; the o b k l e  m q  mitc1i leas 
serious wherc the twcnty-tliird rittackcd, Iimded by gcneml 
Anson and colonel Seymour. The mountain tomen$ mhicli 
gradrially decreased za it descended into thc phin, about 
thirty yards in fmnt of the enemy, and tlie tmentgr-tliird, 
tliough much broken in passing tKs obstacle, charged up to 
the columns, md was repulsad, no rally could be rrttempted; 
but the right ~quadron, under captain I)raIce, having an easier 
pwsage of the ravine, and no French column immediately in 
froiit, passed through the intemals, and cawed much confu- 
sion, wliich, together with the delay occasioned by tlie charge, 
premted the rnasses of infantry which were in readiness on 
tlie French right flank, from JoliUng in the genmal itttaek on 
our line. 
You wjvil perceivo that this account, which T beiieve to b 
tlie exact truth, d w  not, in the atigllte& i l e p e ,  affect the 
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mumq of y m  description of the moment;  but, if 1 am 
correct, it proves that the h n a  were ohliged t o  Iinlt by an 
inaupersble dimculty, and tlint I liad no particiilnr mcrit in tlie 
exccution of tIie clinrge of the twenty-tliirrl, 
Believe me, very sincerely yoam, 
Z&, Dec. 3 4  182 9. F. F Q ~ O H B Y .  
RmkjJwt, FB A&, 1808. 
19 Les évhemensi inattendus du gién6ral Dupont mnt une 
preuve de pIns que le su&s de la guem dépend de le pru- 
dence, de la bonne conduite, et da i'cxpeLiencc du gEnEd. 
2 O .  A la ueule lecture du rapport du colonel d'AfFry, on avoit 
divine bus les Bvbemens; aprks une perte aussi considérabIe, 
on ne peut $$re suqris que le roi et Ies géneraux jugent con. 
venable de conmntrer SarmEe et d ' 6 m e r  RTadrid. 
En examinmt avec attention, non les rnpport~i mensongera 
des individus qui parlent dans Jeur sens, mais les fiits te11 
qu'il~ se gont paasezi, on est convaincu; premieremen4 que le 
gEn6ral Castaños n'avoit pas plus de vingt-cinq milie hommes 
de troupe de l i pe  et de quinze mille paysans; un j o u r  on sera 
h mame de vhrifier ce crai sera avancé ici. ISecondement,'que 
si le finha1 Dupont Iea ent attqu&s, ou #e ht battú a7ec tout 
son corpa r h i ,  iI les eut complEtement défaita. 
30. On pense qu'on aura tout le tema d'évacuer Icec blesa6s de 
Madrid qui mivent Aranda; il f utlra wcuper awai long- 
tems qn'il sern pnsgihle les hauteurs de Buit~ago, afin do donner 
le temps au rnnr6ctiril Ressieres, <?e revenir de son rnouvement 
de Gallice; qu'il faut reorgnniser la province ile Eurgoq lea 
trois Hiseayeq et In ptovincc dc Navarrc; elles comprcndmnt 
fncilcment qne, dans ce rnoment plus que jnmnis, ellm doivcnt 
restcr fidEIes et sc bien conriuire sous peine d'ctre trait&es llvee 
toutc ln rigucur de la pcrre. 
4O. On pense que hm8e doit etre divide en troi~i corpei. h 
C ~ E  @mipul, ou de centre, oh comniande le rof, qu'on por- 
teroit L 30,000 hommes campé % Aranda; le corps (le droite, 
du mar6clid Eesieres, d'environ 15 mille hommes f&mt fnce 
h ce qui pourroit arriver de Gllice ou ¿l'Est.rernmdure, occupant 
lSrnlldalid par une divi~ion, qant une riutre division interm6- 
diairc avec le wrps di1 centre, et une troisieme dirision de plus 
sur sa droite, selon les circomtunces; enfin le corpe da ~ ~ ~ Z L C I A S ,  
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ou ci'Arragon, destine B. mrrintenir la Navnme et le paya en6ron- 
nant, ocmipant T~og~oííu et Tudela, et liant m droite en corps 
du centre, une di~ision qui au besoin renforceroit ce corps 
et devra rrinllitenir 8oris par un corp8 volnnt. 
JA corps du centre, et le oorp  de droite doivent s'appuyer 
sur Burgos, et le corps d"Amgon doit avoir son appui sur 
Pumpelune. 
50. Pwr orgmiser le corps du centre clan8 ce bnt, oq croit 
qu'oa doit te renforcer de la briptle du 1 4 m r  et  4 4 m C  de l ip i i ,  
200 chev~ux et 8 p i h  de canon, qu'on tircroit dn corps derant 
SaraOpse; de la bripde du ~Enérnl Noutan compode rlu 4"' 
legere, 15mc  IegGre, du bataillon de Pariu, et de liuit piecea de 
canon; da la liripde commandée par Ie mar8chal Key, et qni 
est clEjb k uno inarcho en avi~iit de Bqonne, coinlios6a du 43mC, 
et du 5 lmC de ligne, du 3Grn (le cliiisseurg et de G piGces de 
cnnon; enfin de 4 escdrons de niarclie de droauns et  rl'iine 
rfigimcnt Polonni~ dc In gartlc; on r6uiuroit le SmC lintaillon 
nux deux premiers, de ~ U U S  les rcgimens d'infnntErie, ct  on 
m6leroit Ics jerrnes ~oIrlatR nnx nncicns. 
- On 6vnlirc &environ dix millo hoinmcs de rcnfort que m. 
m i t  le corps rlu ccntre, qni seroit alom compos6: savoir dm 
38,000 qui le formeni b pressent . . . . . . . . . . . .  18,000 
Di1 rcnfert ávaluá t i  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10,000 
Le dhtachement ciu d&$t du 4"' legbre, T P e  1cgkre. 
14mC, 44me, 43m', et  51'" de ligne, le 2"' et 18'"' 1cgh-e r+ 
i oindront insensiblement et porteront. ce corps b 30,000 iommes. 
Cea trente mille hommes rie ~nuroient are en meillenrm 
mahs, que soua Ies ordres clu rnriréchal Ney, hormis une r6scrve 
de 4 4: 5 inille liommes destinEs 3 la ,wde du mi, et que le mi 
consemeroit aup& de ss pemonne et fcroit m n d e r  avec Te 
gBiiéra1 Xaligny, ou avcc le g&nélral Savary quwnd il le jugerait 
nEcessaira 
Le corps du centre se tiendrait 1 la huteur cl'Aranda, se8 
communications bien asmirées avec le rnarir6diaI Beaaieres k 
Valladolid, des tEka  de pont bien átablies h Amnda et a Vd- 
ladrilid. Ce corps se riourrim par Burgos, ct clevrn non seule- 
ment m~intenir  la tmnqiiillitú dans cette proviiice, insis ciicora 
murer  ses coinmuiiicutioiis avec le corp  de Snrngosse cpii QCCII- 
pera Turleln et Lvgroíio, 
Le corps 1111 mni.6chnl Ressihres, fort dc q~ i in~e  mille Iiiimnics, 
clevrnoccuper Vnllnrlolid en fnisant fnce k cc qit i nrrivcrn tfEsti-c- 
mnrliire ct dc Ctt~tille, nyant ses trriis tlivisionq cn Eclirllonri, 
et se nourrissant de la. lirovince de Vullndulid, Placentia, et 
Leon. 
E E 2 
On envcrra le mtbróchd Moncq ponr commender le c o r p ~  
dn f;énléral Verdier, et on chargeera Ie maréchal dn commande- 
ment de Ia Biscaye et de bus lefl d&res. 
On estime qu'on peut retlrer du camp ~ o n s  Saragosse Ie 
14"' et 441"" de ligne, 200 chewiux, e t  8 pibces de canon, le 
reste doit &tre formé en troia divisiong, et destine li. maintenir 
la Navnrw. La gosition de L o p ñ o  est trop pss ,  iP faut 
occuper au moins jusqu'b, Tudela pour soumettre la Ravarrq 
et tout co qui Liougeroit. Dam l'orrlre offcnsif, deux divisione 
pmivent se portcr en mnruhe forcúe sur ~'nmfic. 
69 T I  ne fnut point faire une pterre timide, ni ~onffrir aucun 
rns~cmliIement nrmC 1 deux marches d'aucun corps d'm-r~b. 
Si i'ennemi fl'rrpproclie, il ne faut point se laiseer ddconrager 
par ce qui s'est pass.4, se confier dan8 sa ~upériorit6, marcher ii 
lui et le battre. Eennemi prendra lui nbme probalilernent 
une mmlie tres cirmnspecte: iI y sera reduit du moment qu'it 
aura eu quelque exarnpXe. 
Dam cette situation de choses, tontes les fois qn'on smit 
s&rieiisemmt attaqué par Pennemi, on poum lui OppO6er 1s 
corps du rai, qui doit toi~joiirs Otre ememble, et les deux'tiers 
du corps dn modc1inI 13essiCres. Ca maréchd doit toujours 
tenir un fiera de son corps, une demi journbe, un tiers b une 
journée du corps du centre, et un tiers sur 1s droite, suimnt 
 le^ circonstanceq &galementJ un tiers du c o q s  du gGnEra1 
Verdics doi t pe  tenir iL la gauchn du roi, pour 1c jaintlrc: r;i ccln 
Etoit n6cessnire, de sorte qiie bna un juur le roi puiase rhnir 
40 raille homrnes. 
7'. 11 faut d6bnter pas dcs coupsi d'Ecklt, qui rElZvent le 
moral du ~ o l d a t  et qui fassent comprendre B l'liabitant qu'il 
doit rester tranquille; un des p m i e r s  coupai le plus iinportant 
h porter, et qui seroit ntile pour rélEver l'ol~iniou. et compenser 
S6vacuation de W r i d ,  seroit que la brigde du 14mC et 44mC 
qu'on r~ppelIe de Snragosse, &idee d'une detacliement du c o r p  
du centre, soumette Xoria, le d&sann~, e t le fasse rester tran- 
quille. Attnquer et culbuter tout ce qui se présentera doit 
étre l'instruction gBnérale, donnde au mar6chnl Bessihea, au 
mai6clial Xy, et an gi"6raE Verrlier, de sorte qu'h une 
iuarclre, ou k une marche et dmie du mrps Frnnois, il n'y 
ait aucun rnssemblcinent d'insurgfis; on ect Sopinion que ai  
l'xvaiit garíle du g6nBrnl C~estalios davance sur l'Aranda e t  
d6passe les inontagnes c l e  Buitra~o, ii faut, w e c  tout CB q:i'on 
~Buiiira dans un jour, marclier a lui sims lui donner le tenis Je 
s'y Etnlilir ~Erieusement, le culbi~tter, le jctter au delti des 
montagnei?, et si I'afitire est dhcisive, se reporter sur Madrid 
L'euue~ui doit etisaycr de d6loger l'ariuae Flaiiyaise de cette 
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posjkion, pnr trois points, ptrr la GnIlice et SEstremadure, par 
la droite d'Araiida, et enfin par Ies rassembleniens des pro. 
yinces J ' h g o n ,  de Ydence, et autres de Castille. Toutes 
c s  comliin&sons soiit dificile~i l'ranemi, et s i  on dissipe ces 
ra~semlilemcna B mcsure. qu'ils ae formenint sur toiis les points 
et qu'on les tienne k distante d'une ou deux marches du can- 
tonnernent Francois; si dternativement les Fr'rancois prmnent 
l'offensive, tant6t it Peur droite, en renforpnt Ic mar6chd 
Bessiares, pendnnt qrie le centre se tiendra dans ttne lionne 
position derriGre la ri+re, et Z'abri de toute uttqite; tnntBt 
au centre avec le corps du xoi, les deux tiem du corps [le 
droite, et un tiers du corps de ghuche, I'ennemi sera bientGt 
obligg k la plus grande circonspection. 
8". On auroit pu aussi canserver Madrid ea xenforqant le 
corps gui s'y troiive, du 14mc et de ligne, de IR brigde 
du g611óiiéral Huiiton, de celle du gén8ral Le Fc'cbm, gui en 
dernier Iieu a 6tB renvoy6e au maréclxtl Bessieres, et enrir du 
renfort qu'am&ne le martclial Ney. On auroit ninsi reiiford 
le corps d s  EIarlrid do plus de 14 mille Iiommes, ct il est 
doukux que I'ennerni eut vouIn se mesurer avec des forces 
aussi conñirlEmliPes et  dcxpo~er it une pcrte cenhine. 
9'. Si dc fortca rnisons obligoicnt ti'ávncuer Arandrt on 
perdrait l'cspcir de fitnblir ses communicntions nvcc lc Por- 
tugal. Dnns le cas (ih nri bi!nemcnt qttcIconque portcroit 
óviicuer lc Duero ck it 86 mncentrcr sur h r g o s  ponr sc r6unir 
la avec Ie maréelid Bcq~iei-es, le c o r p  dtt gEn6rnl VerrFicr peiit 
comrnuniqiicr par TRbrc, et nvoir toujoiirr; son mouveinent 
id016 pour maintcnir la Navme, contenir l'Rrragun, toris lcs 
rassemblemens de ce c8t6, e t  protéger la routc priiicipale. 
Pcndant mt intervallc des reuforh journaliem arrivcront B 
l'armée, jusqu'9 ce qu'enfin les divisions de la p n d e  armke 
qui sont en marche, soient mr les Pyrenges. 
On a recommand6 de teus teuis le petit fort de Pancomo. 
II est nmssaire de i'occuper, méme qtinnd on ne gartlcroit prts 
18 Iipe de rEbre, c'est une vedette d'autant plus utile qiiielle 
domine IR plaine, et seroit un obstade si jamais l'ennemi s'en 
emparoit." 
10". h troisiemc position que se prEsente 5 Ikmge, c'est 
la 8 ~ t ~ c i . X  ii hmpelnne, et la d r o h  sur TTittorin, rnai~itennnt 
ainsi SQ ~ommunicrttions apee lea place3 importantes de 8t. 
Sehatien et do Ptunpeluna ku reste tciut,es ces notes 
peuvent difficilement ttse de quelque utitit6$ les Evkrremens 
Vob in F?vpoFeon'~ own hand.] On ne doit pna oublier qu'en ~ppro. 
chant de Pmce t o u t  favorise la desedon. 
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modiGent nécasairement lea dispogitione, tout dgpend d'ailleure 
de snisir un moment, 
llo, IXBsurnL Le premiei but est de ge maintmir B 
Xadrid si cela & possible. 
Le second, de maintenir sea wmmunimtions avec le Por- 
tug l  en occi~pant le ligns du Duero. 
Id traisikme, de wnuerver l'Ebre, 
h quntribme, de c o n w r  ses cornrnunicahionfi avec Pam- 
pelune et &. &liastien nfin que le grande mm6c a&vant, on 
puim m PCU de km3 culbutcr e t  an4antir hiis l a  fivolt8s. 
I.a Gm. BERT~AND. 
Roehfwt, S A&, 1808. 
D n m ' s  proceedings nt Cordoba, as relaterl in my first 
volume, Iiave been commented upon in s recent publicntion, 
entitled, ' Awn& oS bite Pmisidlacr Campaigw..' 
Ul~an the autliori ty of general Foy, tJie author =se& that 
Corrlolia wna staclccrl, rdls it ' a yrntuibm d~rn.1~; and ' iara 
inI~21-rm hk7mjJ' and no doubt, taking for fiction the ~toriea 
nf Ag~thoclcs, Mnrilis, Sylln, and n thousnnd other~, gra~ely 
affrms, tht, capady a& &y m rmly 'untlec.4; thnt 
h p m t  eoas a fool, and tEint flalpdean. did not ~ ' m n  him in 
a dwqwn) bnt tliat Iie must havc ' d~ag& m a mkerabla 
& *o& io miwd m m  a& h a i d '  
Gnfortunately for tlie ripplicatlon of thjs n u w q  philo- 
sopby, Dupont, althwgh R bad offic~r~ wwas a man of acknow- 
ledged tdents, and becnme minister of war at the resteration 
of the Bowbons, a penod dxecl by the author of ' the Ami&,' 
as t l ~  wa of yo& gmmment {fi A.a~oe. 
1 rejected Fofs authority, I g t ,  because his work, unfinished 
and postliumous, discovered more of the orntor than tlie im- 
partid historian, and he was politically opposed to Diipont. 
Socondly, bemuge he was not m eye-witness, md hi relation, 
at nriance with tlie oQ&l jmd of D ~ p t ' s  qj~watimu, 
1w.s rilso o o n t d i d  hy the testimony of a, B&hJb general of 
hamn hhik d mcumq, who ubtccid k b  infm1~1tk-n m 
t l ~  spol  a fm mcnati~ suhagzcmt to  ths evmd. 
' Sorne time after the victorv. m& eaa~ rie&red nilImerxb8 
I I  U foTEmddm 'un& pain qf &~i: knd tk chom mpanies  naain- 
Icsind the pol~ . ' -Journal  of  Operations. 
CwJda w noipillaged, behg one o£ tbe few placa wbere 
the F m d  m weE ~tdwd-htter from s Brikish general 
t o colonel Napier. 
On this point therefore 1 am dmr; but the anthor of the 
6Aa~rds,' afker eontrasting my account with Fog'a, thus pro- 
ceeds, ' It is only necemry to drl, that the preoeding &ate- 
ment ia given by colonel Napier w i b t  any g z l d h  qf 
&b$dy.'  
A less wncine miter rnight have thoughi it right to add 
that, rix +nuntf~ pre-30~8 t o  the puLIication of the AnnaEs,' 
colonel hlpier, hearing that some of lils statements rsppeared 
incanclusive to  the autbor of  that work, I i e c w  tlme was m 
ptatim of a d w i t y ,  tramdtted t h r o q l ~  a comman fi-iend, 
an assurance that he had authority for everg ~tatement md 
woulrl willingly $..ni& autiw m'th m y  or d gf &m; 
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S& J. CBadocb to ¿+ir XR, %km, @orlo, Bmm6er 8, 1808, 
'1 preefi this memure' (to movc t h ~  legion from Oporto to Villa 
Real) 'upon your adoption, for many reasom, h. &c.; Iiut tI~e 
mnrc o ~ ~ ~ c i n l ) ~  that it will givc m irnpiilso to rnilitary prepare- 
tion in gcnaral, and tend to  eradicate the wotim tliat, s i w  the 
aiamuiiola af Pnrtagal Ay tb Frcnch, IIke p q e t  of ffi Jutacm 
WOY i x  at un d.' 
8ir J: CradocK fo siv beiín M-; DecmJim 9,1808. 
'1 have p s ~ e d  tho adoption of anch m r m m  a8 appcnrcd 
mo~t  likely to  wuioe some mtim of daayer, antE the necessity of 
nctivity and onorm.' 
S i ~ d :  íhdock  lo lord CmtlereqJs, Decensber 14,1808, Gh 
"Ih iiiwtioti o€ tho repncy wlss appamt at Oporto ta a 
lamentable depee ; and, though 1 saw general Bernadim k i r e ,  
I codd not gain from him angr inforrnation aa to ilre shte or 
numliera of the Portnguese troops, wlicre the;p were stationed, 
or wlia mmaiideri tliem, I ~pprehond, fmm his coiiversation, 
tliat ths general olíiccrs mre al1 of r un! niitliorih; anrl t l int cvcn 
aeniority liad not its usad efíict. $e eonolttded lis obrcnations 
te mo with tlic ~ b o n g  cqrcñrion, ' Y'liat, Porn tAe mamatila 
gf Portugal Eiy the Jwnch, the nafim Fiad thougI~t uEl war af 
m c d . '  ' 
f l i ~  d: Cradock to sir JoAa Mmi Deember 28,1808. 
%fr. Villicra and mysdf havc b0t.h c o n m d  upon the aBao- 
bk nmssiS lo armtse and mimate the Port4cp1e lo s m  s m e  
of titeir Betuola'oa,' 
C o l m l  X m I 8  to GT X J.&ciE, Zlvas, D e m h  30,18Q8. 
t o  he eqreased. Their 
claracter : a t h d s t ,  and, 
'From the fatally defencdeaa state in which the two northern 
vincea are hft, it aill reqnire rtt leaat eight daya (1 speak K m  nothority) to prepare anphuip iike adoquntc moms af 
defence.' 
'Ita fomation was pmposed bythcchevalierde Bmza.-mepar, 
allowances, md clotlling were settlerl by tlie chevalier de Souza. 
The former regdated, aa 1 understood, npon the scaIe of incremd 
pap w h i d  t&eplouisional gouennienl of Cpmio lod adaptedfw 
aF tlGe troqps t h q  mere in p~ogmss af hp'~19. 
* J have oonsiderabIe doubt i€ ever they' (tho 
incorporated, with effect and condiation, with 
Porhqucsc amny.'-'Thcy are vicwed with e x t r m  j e a h j  
the vcyeiay; a& tAe commadittg ogicws of tb Porluguese 
hmttat;m p.c.ri~ted, w i i ~ w ~ ~ u l l y ,  tdAe alkmky of aolmtoas 
their rs@nents €o mtm into f l ~  letjm." 
' The Lnriitanisn legion continnea to givB m i d e d l e  u n e d  
nees, from its peculiar atato, under prosent circumstancea! 
' Should a retreat be dopted, sir Ibbert w d d  not retire to 
@orto. It & tb gm-t qf a mob, qf which h has Ad Bu 
m?& e q w k w e . '  
' 1 am sorq to  siate tliat 1 fin& as far aa my lunited obeem~ 
tion mchee, tho Portngneso army, and evcry otber mili- con- 
wrn, in t h  mrst possibb state.' 
'1 am wure that &e atate of tbe Portagaerre m y  Ls qui* 
mimderstmd jn Endand ; ami! tñai a wEknm iv plmd aym 
tt fur the dflmee of ti'ce cmntrgi tAat M dire.el withmilt fmnduflm 
TheY (Portupieae) ' ministers will avow &a to you nfkr ten 
minutcs' convcrsntion.'-' Evcn of thc rednecd numbcra of thcir 
men enrolle& (not amounting to trenty thmand, at &e ver1 
higheetit compntrttion,) to mako anflhing out of them , 'f 1 ' 1s neces- 
sary Co recur to first principies, md givo them o$cws, a m ,  
clothiag, accouiremen&s, Borscx, &c. ; and 1 nced not my that 
money ia ~ a n t i n g  to effcct this ; and tho ministers positively 
derlaiw tht  11ioy Iiave none; and Iliat no colleelion oT tlicir 
forcrs can take place, much lesti a movernmt to the frontier, 
witliont a supply.'-' JX. For'as, secretary to tlio govement,  ia 
snsrcr to a strong quouiion dom me, atnRd thnt ti&? arn?y haoe 
not in possesswrs tm tfsousand Jireíocks$t fw use.' 
BBT J, C r n h k  to lord CicdheagA, Decenafim 24,18I)8. 
* 1 &m cxorting mpe l f  to brtng to meoiuat ' ths mpp,smrE 
Portngnese zrmy .' '-' Your lordsliip raill erceive thnt 1 talk of 
the ~ e g u l o ~ s  aa f i t  wwe a reyulur fm; {ut 1 should be guilty 
of Q deceit, that midit lrnd to bd conriecluenccti, íf J did not 
fxirly state tkat 1 coroactive tlam to  Is qf no monaent at tlair 
tiw.9.' 
Bir J Cradock tb Nr. Elliera, J a n w a ~  8,1809. 
'1 am ready t o  go to the utmost Perp of  prurlence ; Zint M?. 
Pwre, ~h he t a l h  of Pwtxguesa t r o q s  attd arrungemmimts, 
mdly (as 1 believa you will allorr) fait Ldtw Ees clmteaux.' 
Mggw-gmeral C o t h  to &P J. &dock, A+2'li1809, 
' 1 este& y inapected the Portnguesr! c~ndq.'-Tbis cavaLy 
ia ndrrned, aod t o t e  unfit for any so* of simios: 
fl i~ J.Oradock to  lord Cmtlaeagid, Wh~rqi  U. 
'It a p e m  that a report hae reaehed yow Iordship that a 
min~cription for liorsee in this country kad been attended with 
E" nt effcct, and thnt &ve tliree ihuusand h d  bccn collected. t is, indeed, a mñtter of aerious cencern that mch seriwis mi+ 
repre8rnlrntiom sliould be trnmmitted ; for il itr a weii-knonn f& 
tliat many of the P o r t u p e ~ e  repmenta of cavdry are tuitAmct 
Jwi-m; snd, if 1 m to pureue Ihe sub'ect, thck batEaEms tf 
i v fmf ty  are om-half maim't orms or c/drinn! Rut tlie totnl 
want of al1 means ot'roguIattions for aubaistenco foms so Seplor- 
nhlhlo n vicw, in tlic cvcnt of m-opcrntion, thnt the r r d t ,  in rny 
opinion, cannot be ntknded mth success. It i s ,  RDIUMIEP~ hit 
j z ~ C i c e  i!n say, t h i  tlac dhpo&fioa of thc Yor tvp~se  s e m  mll- 
i n r l i d  amd f(ca"thfu1 C t l ~  cmmmm cause; alkd t h t  n u e y  
&&enti, soUky may &e fwmd w d e r  more favourahle ciwum- 
stances. 
Cradock tu XT. h, Feba%lay 27,1809. 
' I fcar thnt yoiir cxccllcncy is lcrI to m t d i n  n moro f m r -  
able notion o f  the e G a c  of the 3-ortupese arm thm, in any 
~Liapr. it is ciititlcd La. % sliort, my oyinion is i i a t  tliey wnot 
everythm that constitutes a respectabk force, except &out ten 
thoi~and %udish nrms. I bolievo they hare no otliors. hlmy 
of tkcir cuvalry mgimmts are without Icorsea, mithoat muiords, 
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@lo&, &c. f l t e i ~  6atfaZims m e  ~ o t  c lo t l~d;  a&, m tb mb& 
mce, l J l y  l& nt frw parterir wpom tlw vi Eilaqc~ q u f i m  tluj am 
sfaliowd. TQ tnke the ficcld with effect, or an nsaurance of food. 
aeems to me out of Ilie qiic>stion. Pince tl ie fml moment of my 
amival, 1 ~islied ia procure tlie arlvance of a smdl Porfapese 
force ta Alcantara; hut i t  hw becn jmgossilile. Jt i a  a matter 
of aerions lamentation that auclimiarepresentatiwa of tlie Porhm 
gueso force ahoulrl go l~ome, or roah yourexcellency.' 
'No rdianco whatcver can hn plamd npon tha Purtnguose 
tmop in their present 8 t h .  I f l s m i d  that tRe w3o.k cere red$ 
i?a mdny or reiioit, J belime 1 . p J c  pma i r  Bm$ibrd's smfi- 
w t s .  They wf'l l  not 6s ; m a & d  by tA&r m o $ c ~ ,  alua 
t k q  dOymt # t?Lyp7maai 
S ~ c n o a  F.-Coanucr OF TEE RBQEITCY-T~EBTXEXT OB 
Fm~ca  PRIBONE~S. 
S+ d: Qahck. to MP. PaIIks, Jantcuy 26,1809. 
'1 buva hithorta dircctod that t fhe~o prisonme shanld he 
snb~isted at our chargc, but I h.ve no autbority in this meaanre; 
thcy are in 76 rn11MIBt dqIwahh $EaE#, nnd r a d y  are a dhg~.aco t o  
all co~cemed! 
Sg, 3: Cmdkck to NT. EUiers, g e h m y  5,1809. 
' It is absolntel necesaargr that the regency shodd give in an 
answer aliout tlie Lencli risoners. The iihole i s  an anauthrizetE 
heav  ohsrge, for orwbich v e  my T ~ P T ~  ; ,md 1 see no ond 
to ths casi ; and, added to t%, tha~err aihiatiar SE a rcjkition *mi 
Js?cmanity.' 
Sxcnoa V.-N~LE~T,  Q ~ L I C I T P ,  m !hmmm, 
GoEomI Km& t o  rk 5; W o c k ,  .Ehaa, B m f i e ~  17.
*Idme, on which the v q  existenoe of Elras depenb, bas 
not liefn auppiied with provisiona as I h e  been hnght to  
eepect. 
Colond Emmia l'o s81' 6. Chdock, Elvm, Dccm6m 25. 
T h e  ~ e a t  importante of this fort' (Ldyppe) ' ia weli k n o a  
to tha I'orhpese; and, thererore, they aro jealms, ndwith- 
&mdlng tlie miserable condition of their troopa, md total inca- 
pacity to defend tlie f&, if athcked." 
Sir r7; Cradmk i% Xr. Villiws, h b w  26,1808. 
' 53s promhes d a p m ~ f ? y  sati@actq lmltlBpage of i!Ae 
Porf~~gu~f ie  gwrmmaat wr, in my opinion, by no rncans mil icicnt 
to meet the case. Iwaxt  t o  MO Borne ste B actuaII;p taken before 
my mind i. dooidod thnt the nation d &fnnd itsoiE.'-. Iodeed, 
1 am told, on good authority, eliat tAe governmmt are afmid to 
allw tAe peqple t o  m.'-' The moment 1 aee anp materiala to 
work u on, i t  will be my most anxiouñ rluty to give evsry cffe'e~t, 
&c.'-c\ut, nndei the present i>imtiuity o d  indiferencc, it 
i a ,  &c." 
Rqwk ofcoloneZ Donkim (pwtw-rnllstm y w a Z )  t o  & 
JaBm Cradock, Jfurcli. 21. 
' 1 cannot, huwever, order oñicers of my deprtrtment to check 
this Irragulnrity' (forcing quarLers) 'iabcla il m>anatea soleljr 
i i a  fhe neglecb Q I  ths pvr l tyxese  civil wcagistrates; far froops 
wdl nol o F y  orders, whch exposa &cm wantody ta great 
priv-ationa, 
ig;, Joh Cnadoek to Nr. Pi3Eim, -Mar& 25, 
" I v e  repe~tetedly q e d  t h i~  anbject' qmrter!rs of troops) 'to i;ar tlic strongc~t manncr, ut, as yon perceive, %~?:2;t. I 
Sir Johu O ~ u ~ k  fo h d CdTsrcugJL, IMmd 17. 
'Whatcver sriita tlxe momentaq purpose, upon the morrt 
mperficisl vicw, seema to be tho guide in tlio Poibtupese 
councils. mtimate objccts, which, in tlie coiirse of h g n ,  rnust 
arrive, are nevw brought inta tlie ealcidation.' 
fiado& fo Bwhleg: Jan- 17. 
'The regency saerna to declino iPing any specific directiona 
relntivc to tlic guns io fort St. .Tufinn and tlio Rver bntbrica, 
and, ahuve all, not to  wGte anything; bnt they are rery d h g  
to acqi~iesce in anylliing we shltli do, only amio;e tliat, on a 
future day, it sial2 uppear to  t e  oup act, mt tJwir8. 
Bdmirul Bmkely i o  & 6. C~arlock, FoZrnay 19,1809. 
'1 imagine Mr. Villiere haa tranemitted a copy of tlie exkm 
ordinliry note éient h by tha reGencg; in wliicli tb eomplain 
d the ooodoet of tho nrtillory oliieer a h o  disrnrinllc?tlkc Jiucio 
fort, anrl intimate tlieir intention o£ sending for al1 tlic giiiis 
and powdcr from furk 9t. Julim; ~ u d  ndd r[laiiy parlicdars, y 
, 
nord a# tlicy are su~ipiciow.'-'Rhetlier tlie ltlnguage of tliia 
nute nibiacs fmm duplicilg, or any ulhr  cauae, it is cqii:illy to be 
resisted; and, tliercf'ore, I h v o  titated aomc facts ivliic:i mtiy be 
rotoried upon tliem, md d i c h  wiil not place h e i r  conrlu~t~ in the 
rnmlfa*)ourali$point of v k  toouwds &t/w their oran soe'ereip w 
Grcat Britain. 
Rxtmct f r m  m o tcial zote, dmwn i~p hy riv Jolals C~adock, 
..&m, Fclruary 20,18UO. 
'It m told me h o  or k e e  times, by 3Tr. Viliiers, that 
M. For,jns, or some othcr mcmher of tlie regcnr:~, hnrl esprcsscd 
extreme soliaitude about the forts on tlie T w s ,  &c.'-' 1 always 
urgrrl hfr. Villirm to et ti-om 11. Forjri~, or ony otlirr memlier, 
a dodnration af vhat %ey KUhed, that re mi. m l l t  esactly oonform 
fo it; fm they seemed to be ~lnxious tO go lie~md whak we shonld 
venture to popose. Mr. Villicm,  ter sonle time, told me th& 
the Porhgiiese p v m m o n t  were %nmtMllhrg fopl doim m p  
thinq wpprrn pupw, or $ve m~ specific hshction; but tlieg 
wodd willingiy leave al1 the nnrinpment to us.'-'llfEer thc 
aliove! statemcnt, ñ.lich I declare, upon my Iiononr, fo be tlie 
scenrirk rlcscrjption of  wliat 1 i ~ s  pwed,  1 miist oxprcss my 
snrpsise, and e:ren indignation, at tlie protest now made bp tlie 
rqcncy: and when it is considcmd tliut tlic Bugio fori i~ oftcn 
inaccescible for a week togetlier, thirr pmt of their complaint ia 
riliameful to tho hi~I.liest rlegree. T h v  general o&& is, h~wo- 
mw, to te kis~ingu~~icit." 
SECTION VL-AHABCHY 1s PORTOBAL. 
E&+ 6. CvalZock l o  Tmd Cmflereayh, F d m q  20, 2809. 
' T w t h n  parts.-Ii may be dificnlt to manqe nny monep 
trnn~rtctione ín Oporto, fcr tlie poptilnco in tlint t o m  Iinve been 
mffe~ed to  lsecome tho rnastertl; and it T a s  only by an exchange 
of public and privdo property that th corrtmissariat monoy has 
been late1y ~ecured.' 
S ~ T  J. C&k. to  Mr. EEZiei-8, P e h a y ,  1809. 
'To gr~tify a mob, the 0 t h  day, al; Uporto, a guara of the 
a i e t h  regin~ent PI~I~B giren up, and disarmed Iiy barcm Ebed 
CaHain BrothertatB le sir 6. CradmkI March 17, 1809, 
Laweego. 
C0nsiderin.g illie tumults, nntl thc stnic of cf fc~cacenc~ of
the public mind, and the tilind fury of tlie populace-it KilE 
noitlicr hc 80 ~i~cf l t l  no? rRRfo to remitin nmongat tlicm,' 
Sb J. Crabck to M Cmtbeagh, BIuwii 26,1809. 
'T ie  diaposition is gmd, bi~t hc p~occrdings aro thoue of an 
nngovernable mob, expo~ed to  the etd @ts tf d m ' p i y  p 
m."-'I confinc mjself to the nortli of P o h p l  and Oporto, 
for the mme excessee have not taken place at t;liia aide the 
Doum; but the psinciplees of iuauborrlination, 1 slioulrl fear, ~ o u l d  
prevail.'-' Xf the conhsion and annrchp tliat prernil at Oporto 
d p r m i t  ia defence, some exertion may be expected'- 'h.  
munilron lins hccn nbundnntlg mpplicd, Zut 110 punis'fy temtld 
me& ths ronmnqtim expended in the  m a n w  it Auas IJW a*# tb 
Ti-as os dfontea ; an aitempt to lava wliicli wns, 1 believo, the 
owasion of 'Bernadim Freire'a death.' 
J.  C~adock to l o ~ d  Cmtlereoyh, N a ~ c i i  50, IROS. 
'me annrcliy h t  revails rit Oporto must, 1 fcur, render 
WT exwtim unmail%le fordefenoc; and such is thc ungarern- 
ahle atpirit of tlie populace, i h d  i b  i~ u e y  d;flicult io #<M/ wlint 
p a ~ t  f h y  *n$t tukt r'f the prowcdiay~ uf tke British did ~ i u t  
suit t b i p  nimba.' 
fl5 J. C m h k  t o  XY. Fym, XarcA 29. 
a Oporto nnd al1 ih conwma, with the bishop, nomlnallp, nt 
i t ~  ]iead, ia in the liands of a mild uqovernable po u l m ,  t h f  
nw nivea* mnnniticd t* most crirrl czecarcs. P ~oar  ths 
same epirit exista in ~ h a t  ia cdleir thc Portuguesa arrny,' 
Sir J. C d c k  to  NT. F~ere, Jmuw 29, Gatm, 
dWithout a British forca in E ~ b o n ,  the nntherity of thb 
regancy wouid paas awsy, md the scenes of Oporto ~ o d d  tebke 
pInce here.' 
Bq& qf c q f u i a  L a w m ,  Janm y 3 4  I A a h  
'ht niqht, my aemant retnrning from the post-oEce was 
attacltsd by a parly oF Portuguese pilte-men, licaded by ons of 
thir  own oficers, who severely woncded tlie horse in tn-oplawa, 
and slighiitl in a e ~ e r d  places, and oliliged Lm, the servaut, to 
piii birnselJunder Wie proteotion of &e guard rt the ton-majofa 
office, ta aave h i ~  m life; the outrage waa wmmitted ífithout 
tlre sliglitest promation.' 
Gmwal Lmgwwth ta ab J, &Qdock, Fe+ 1, XislhML, 
'TLie orderly wlth t h e  e n e d  orders, on bis kay to 6t. 
Jnlianh, WM atoppod by a %ortnguiso aa joant md tarnb men 
Rith pies;  the se 'emt forced t he odedy  to deliver the Ietter 
mntnining tlio o~?e r~ ,  brako it opan, rerd tlio mnicu@, snd 
rehrrned the enclosed receipt; the same guard stopped eriptnin 
Clives, Itoyal Grenndiers, and lieutenanta Bearman md Liners; 
tlicae officers werc in fiill nniform.' 
GimeraZ $dagas m&l Bepmt, Fefiricu'jr 3. 
'Mr. Uabor, deputy-pumeyor, md &fr. M'Csrty, interpieb, 
bath Britisli mbjects, mioed tliis day from Oporto, went t~ 
11Tonrc's Eiobl, wlioro klley lvere arretiteit and broiight to tho 
minister of police. $fr. t sher w n ~  in Lis British nnifirm.' 
Sir J. C&k t o  I d  C w t h g A ,  Januwj SO. 
' Some nnplearimt incidents have lately occumd on the pwh 
of th Portiiyesc armed inllabitnnts of Lislion t o n ~ d s  Er~tish 
Indi~duds, Iiut I cmnot crpiirtdc myscEf tlint thcy havc pro- 
ceeded from nny h e d  w$ dispoailioii.-' Tlii Briliah army iwa 
not, in ,]y instnnce, depnhd fram tlic most rcgiilnr discipline, 
and cunthuea to mruiifest tlie peatest  temper and moderatiw.'- 
"le excesscs on tho prart of the Portii~mesc oommence by au 
w~ironfmlEedpursue'f m'fhout my authority fmna tlie police, a 
a71 ptrsons wlmw Ilq euas 10 cal{ IcIcrench~nneia, aud, in t e v  ?! Pindiaenminate carccr, t eeg ofZea aftuck mmy foreignm, un$ 
~oill  wot evwi. atstizi?z fmm tkose in OUT mwice. Tliose permrrs 
~ e r k  r r f ~ ~ ~ q c  Zm. OW. p~rd-mvm,  m d  tllougll t l ~ c  p~iiardg nnd 
patrolcn Iiarc positive orders not to interfere under any r e k d  P with ti10 plicc, yet it ia very dilXeult to srnvther the fee Ings of 

T h i ~  ou wili 6ay is a pleaning shta  to be in: howover, we r must nce it, and E: hope for the best resnlt, and 1 am ~anguine 
enough to look for such. Colonel Trant will shortly huve a 
retty atrmg corlps, if the re,rrimntts contime thus ta vo1~0.twr 
f *P  w 
¡tí+. EIEha t o  wk J.  CradoeiE, F~h-mwy 15. 
" ~shonld almost doubt whther the British siibj~eta m l d  6s 
left h safity iz fi~Iim.' 
' X bolieve it is certaiin that wa c ~ ~ i n o t  depend n y n  the aBtivity 
of the Portngnese pvernment uyoq tkia had, (intelligence,) 
'either na to prompfitude w aecurlty. 
'Xxperiemce hra s b  ?&w ufiw.$ i m p o s d b  it Ps lo 
m c t  inteUigmce b e ;  an enemy may be nitbio foor m l:." 
dap' march of this city befora it is h m n ,  nnless he atkcks on 
ilic vory lino onr troopa occiipy.' 
E ~ P  J.Cradock t o  Nr. bj Mare16 29. 
' It i s  ainplar kow imp~rfmtly all inteEliwnw, thoa h of mch 
irnportant erontp, i-caohos this,, nnd r o  hnro not ho!, í'or t n o  
daya, any acoonnt from Oporto. 
Sir J.  C~adocb lo toP8 G d h g h ,  Mawh 26. 
'Yc~terday the chevalier de Cnatro atnhd, from anthoritg, a 
mwement on tlie art of tlie Prench, quite dSerent h m  a 
d i m t  ~ q w t  from $e junta of Badnjo~.' 
No. IL 
4Tpon fhs actud approach of tlie enemy townrds Liabon kt 
~ u c h  strength as map render furtlier resistance incffecttid, ;-"m 
w+Z1 tako enrc thnt rncnaiires mny be tnken in dnc t,imc, for mtEi- 
drawhg both tlie British army and snr7~ Po~fztgetese as m g  be 
dp~drciw Of u m m p a y i a g  6t.'-LTlie Britiah udmird will be 
directed to take effectual measnres, uith your nsnistance, for 
dcpriving the enemy of J1 th8 reaources, more especiaily those 
of a naval deacriptian, wLich the Tagii~ contnins. Hrerything 
of R aaml and rnilitary description, thut caanot be bmugkt a- a ~ .  
mud, in thc Inst crtrcmity, bc! drstroycu 
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' 1 m to sigdfy his majeatg'a lemre that, in the event of 
nog appliontion being made to you !rom the regenay of Portupl, 
on the subject of the occupation of the f0&38e~ with ha 
inajesi.y's troops, you do r$m the mlhjed $0 iif~. Villkd, ~ 1 1 0  
has received instniction, &c., md oa wi14 not make angr alterri. 
ti.. a. to tho modo prcamihod &: garriaoning tLe fortresscs 
ecitlamci d i w d i m s f m  Mr, ~ l l i ~ s .  
Bxtra&fTmn d r n m  t i~ ~ n s t k g a  d~ 
J. CradocE, wifh tgonmiarrr &reto. 
Qum~, A ~ ~ E R .  
cmhat may be the &uation %e reIatians with the go. 
of my command P' vernrnent of Portngal will be 
arranged when &Ir. ViUierm 
mives,' 
' 3n wh& Kght is tbe form ' Dittc~.' 
d e r  my command to be con- 
sidered ?' &o. &. 
' Xay an Portuguesa bab '!be taking Pohgmetm bat- 
talions ba g i e d  for Boglish talions iota lngl ish  pny will, ir 
P ~ Y  p' adopted, be manapd thmgk 
n f ~ .  Kllems.' 
"If a.nJr want; of provisions ' Tbo pncral mertsures of 
s h d d  appear in Portngal. may snpplying Portugal wiwith pr+ 
1 be d o w e d  to adopt meusurea visions will be ~ e J w e d  tti 
Inconjunctionwith the regency, Yilliwa.' 
for otithing supply 7' 
' If any Poriagueae co a ' MF. 'V;BUb# &U 6ti &b 
ean bs pt into anch fmwr~x- r i ied  io enter npon the dir- 
ness as to  be iit to enter Spnin, enssion of tLs mbjeot ñith 
and thep shmld be d1ing to tho r e p n y ,  availing h e i f  
'oin sir J. Moora, lare tliey to of your assiswce,' &c. 
bc pnt on British payP' 
No. TIL. 
JUSTIFICATORY EXTRhCTB FROM SIR J. C W O C K ' S  PAPmS 
'Sm excellenc is  a w m ~  of the eghanated &te of thie, 
mtq. The diddties anoounterod by sir J. Bfaore aere  
of the moet apriona n n b e ,  wen before the sourecs of ~upply 
were so much dmined as they now are.' 
' 1 hnve been obliged to send oficers of ths artillery and com- 
missariat departmmt to Giliralkm to attempt the su ply a f  
Iiomes frm tlia Uarbarg ooaot; and su& i s  oor a c d  anot. 
tliat the proper movement of cven the force RE hwe is nenrly 
impracticable.' 
BP J. Grudock lo lmd Casthayh,  M m h  26. 
The mans of hansport m ao confinod tht 1 mnat nok 
espose q t h g  ta 105s; snd t t e  artillery mnat be preserved 
with the grsatwt eare, for 1 mnnot eqni more than two 
brigades oF six-ponndera, aod one iiglit lr i&e of three- 
poundm, the Inttcr bcing of a vcry inferior description.' 
'The p~scarioua tenure of this mtui b British troopa l i a ~  
Uitherto preeluded the possibility of esE8giisLg BU& m ad~m- 
tngcous contrnct for tlic puhlic xa, in morc pcrmancnt casea, might 
necessnrily be expected: we han litarally bcen supplied from hand 
to montli.' 
Colonel Ro8e fo sir J. Crardock, XmL SO. 
'It ia neceas for me to add that every exertion ham baeri, 
madc to mpply?o ~ I l m y w i t h  arsn, nncl rnnlos by the depiity- 
c~mmissary-general; from thc exliauatsd statc of the country, 
and thc dcmrind~ upon i t  fortho Yorhigticac nmny, no more tlinn 
two brigades havo been furnished witli tlioae antmals, aud fkenc 
aro rn~ich tcm slight Sor tlio gcnerd service of  tlie mtillery.' - 
'&m the first moment; af my arriva1 in t lh country, un- 
ceasing exertion Las been employed to iirchme mind romire 
thorn' (horscs md mdm) ' nt sny priee o r t y  sny rncnos,gut Ihn 
adequak supply for even the former amnll numlier of ihe British 
army could not be oblained. I hvedao m d e  repeated repwsen- 
tntians to Engliand.' 
' 1 ñant oiglit hundred horses and a d e a  for the ommon con- 
veyance of prorieion and th equipment of tlie artiue-p,' 
Some of the persona employcd to  provi& cattle for the troops 
have retumed mtliout effecting tlieir mission. Sliis disappint-  
ment  miiat hc attributerl ta the movcmcnt~ of tIic rncrnp in tbc 
north, from whence our supply 118s hitherto h e n  obtained.' 
F ~2 
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Bir J: Qlrdock: to m w s h l  Bm&rE, ~~, Ap'I 18. 
'Ton can F ~ r m  no adequak idea of the diíñmlq to prami~e 
suppliea. The snhjcct of fotage for thc cavnIv Iteepq me in alum 
wlhout intemisaon, and thera is ne certatnty for a single ddq. 
Ths comtyv appcam to be witliout the abiliCgto f m k h  atmw.'- 
' In short, the suppI is just for the day md barely sdicient,' 
-' K hnio bcggen oP~r. VYilliors t o  diiiro tho raEen- nonld 
send a persoa, in ~pccial anthority, to this district to fumish snp. 
plieq iF they rtra to be found. 1 shdl aot liko ths Freuori, arid 
make requisition, with thls diferente, that F e  itra ready to pagr 
for evorgtliing to thc utmost.' 
&dock t a  Bwh1 y# C a h ,  ApriZl7. 
' Snch l a  the dearth of supply in this part of fhe conntryy and 
even in advance aa fm as we cwld gn, that, unleea victnalleta are 
~mit (os Romc other nrrangemcrrt to  tbe u m  effcct) to Penirhé 
and $t. Xfirtinlio Bar, me eannot maintzin onr poition. T e  
cnnnot advnnoo, for nfi onr mearta of tmnaport are gone bmk ta 
Lisboa; and even in a retreat the cav* c d d  not be fed'- 
' If there i~ insmoUntable risk in send the ~ictuafier~ tu
Paniohé, I reqneat p o r  doclarntion to this %wt; for I muat, in 
that ccae, retire the m y  t o  a strttion dose to  Liabon, to be fed from 
tlience.' 
Cvckdock to RZtier~, ApiE 17. 
' !Fbs letter i s  plainly to stab tlat. d e s 8  soms victndem m 
sent, even a t  a risk, to Penichr! and St. Mmtinho Bay, we mnn? 
maintain onr position, and rnnst rebeat.'-' If the wticles are m 
FPC must hnvc tliem, and nIl mrcrnony must be dis- p:ea",tK. TU. emmy T O U ~ ~  h n ~ e  t h m  aitkont paying for 
t h m :  we mmt e q n d y  oxnct nnd pay.' 
C r a h k  to B@d, Aprs'l20. 
NI the recommendatione yon point out npon h iha&tance iu 
be derived from the coast Lave been long b c e  &d upon to the 
u'nnost of rny cxe~tion; bnt tha ditficnltics started by the admird 
and the commissary were so p a ? ,  that I cannot sayI have mueb 
dcpendenca npon immadiate aid. 
&mal Cdton l o  W o c k ,  ApriE 21. 
' 3 wish 1 could onoe soe the cavalry topthep; ht 1 mnch 
f e ~ r  thak before thab happena they mil! Lo ver muohoutof oondi- 
tion. The fonrteenth Lave alread fdlen o$~ery moch, owinp 
t o  the frequent n-mh of slraw noU deir being supplied with Indirn 
corn, d i c h  t h e ~  Rill not ea*: nddd to thesc circnmtnucerr, tha 
commissary obliges tlie cavalry to carry (on the horses) three 
dnys' forngo.' 
G. A a h m  t o  MY, Xazalings, 5?remwpcWiamBm8, F e h q  2&. 
'It having becn mpmented fo the lords commisaionm of his 
m a j e s l ' s  treasury tliat the troops at Gsbon ase esp~fic*n~ing the 
rrcatest hardsliips from tlre wiaiit of shoea, 1 hnve recoived their 
b o i d s ~ ~ s n  ~ommaniis,~ &o. h. 
'1 tntat tliaf the importrrnee of the subject wiii plead my a+- 
msr for tliua rcpentiiig rny represcntntions of tlic aretchcd st i t tc 
o€ tlic clothing and the great cfats in partidar of  h3 majcsty's 
troops scr~ing in this country. 
'Sir John Craüock wiU be dire~ted t o  comply aPith any mqni- 
&ion you make for horses for Tour q n s ,  or iing othep species of 
snppIy tLe serrice may, rrom time t o  time, requira.' 
No. IV. 
SECTIOX 1.-MISCELL~EOUS. 
CapEa%'n Mwgan, W f a n h n  Legh, to  &P J. J.&ckF 
I i . ~ h n ,  J a ~ g  19, 1809. 
* 1 lef t  s i r  B. Wilson vcry critically ~ituzted, occupying a nsñ 
m «ie Agua&, sir nobert is rrliaiiy unaii,iprted; Us Uaa &en 
&sed by coloncl h d  tu fa11 bsek; nnd, from his information, 
he iqiries t h t  sir J o h  Moore is wioidrawing hs troop~ 
tlmugh Gallicin. On the 0 t h  hand, he Ii~s rereirecl positil~e 
o r h s  from yua* to  defilerí tL Jimfiers, and pressing letters to 
that cftcct from tlio bisriop ot' Oporto.' 
Sir 3. &adocE t u  Emd CaptlmqB, Jalsuay 30. 
'Tho  regenc md tbe  Iiisbop of Oporto are not pleaaed ut Es' 
 ir 11. i ~ i ~ s o n r g  quihing tiio bouods OE Portilgnl; 
B t t o  do Di&, MweR 6. 
' I hd I e h  fmm sir 11. Wilson, from Ciudad &trigo, 
(24th Frbniary,) wlimcin ho snys, that mimy PrcncE~ P P ~ S O ~ C T B  
state their expectatious that the French nrmy rrill rctirc beliind 
thc Eliro. Sir 1EoZicd's own pursunsiun is flmt lJm EZ.en.c/~ tuill 
retire abtoyetlaw from &ain,' 
Ssclmos n. 
General C m m  lo Sir J. Cradock, Zamego, Jmlsary 16, 
'1 havo collrcted ~everal dctnchments of reco~ered men be- 
lon@,g Go sir J. IiIaore's m y ,  whom 1 founJ acnttered iir all 
dirmtinne, wifllout ~ C C C R R R ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  nnd Romc ot' thcin corninittin 
evory porsible erecas tlirt muid rcndcr thc nnmo of a ~lritir! 
soldicr odious to tho nalion.' 
.- - 
* %te by Sir J. Cradock. Thia is not a corsect ttLxtement, but +te 
B e  contrary; it must h v e  kii Wie Iiialiop. 
' !i"here me abont one hunhd and twenty persone mnhed on 
board the R&m, whose condnct has rendered them B diapace 
t o  t l ie  my.' 
S E ~ O X  m. 
Captab Brotlmtm lo 6; &dock, Oimha, Emd-Qw&rs 
qf R m m ,  T e h m r y  21 
' !be  mar+ of h a m  seema to t h i i  that the geriona h+ 
tmfim of ihe m 8'1 fa &mab fmm Galhkia d logdb ;  md 
e ~ e n  thnt he wi~%d mueh diifioulty in d r i e e t i n  i i m r c v  I 
must confess that I om not so aanpime; aod f jniige ti& 
thc p s e n t  re t ropde  movement from the Minlio i s  more with 
aii intwt to advance from Orenao on Mantalepe, and in t h i ~  
direction. 
Captuifi BmtAwtm t o  si? 3: C~adock, MarcB. 
' 1 dill believe %mmhadintention fo fa11 bwk on Chaves, artd 
johhimselftothePortupeseamy. DP*~bro.gpsidhwwIB 
t l e d  by the m f r i d l y  d u c t  of *he Poptugme, and ia cor- 
dial co-operation mas not to be expected; ht that be ahould 
BP &pite altop;ctl~cr ia w h t  I neitlicr rmld e q c c t  nOF oonccive. d snddenly informed me of hia rosolotion to retreat to Bragenpa 
ñ o  ]inri jmt rcccivcd n Idter from Silveira, which he also m- 
srvered to that o f e c t  md whieh created no smdl  aarprise, ae a 
plan of aperations liad already been acttled betwcen them.' 
Najw Ectm Arepa~cBJU to J. Cmdoek, C l p d o ,  Mwch 16, 
'Gisnmal Silveira has onl one regiment with him; and his 
m d u a  has been aocb, that tge people hsre lo* d mcdenee in 
him, nnd considcr him a trnitor. 1 mcrcIy mcntion this +a your 
emellcncy as the opinion of tbe public. . . . . The maquis 
of Riomands army is rctreating ta O ~ R ,  in Gallicia, and is, I 
fear, in a mtched cmdition. The opinion entertnined of him 
is fnr from good.' 
Mr. comUsay Bop f o  MT. mmmiwaq Rawlings, Almdd~ 
Jarnrmy 13. 
a Sir John Noore, with his mmv, ans retreating, d ten 
tliousand mon h d  deserted h &a marquis of %mana, and 
were pillaging thc countrg.' 
XP. Cmimg t o  M+. h, dama y 23, 
ara to have been milde Iiy &e S aniasds, either 
to ' * O ~ ~ " V  second the ritish - o erations, or eren to de!end Bemol, ar 
a r e  the naval mesns (rLtever thiy may be) in t h t  harboor? 
Lord CmtItrmgJs #o .naa~aArsl Bm#o.fd, F~bmaqt 15. 
'The Partupese govepnment having solicikd that a British 
general & c ~ r  sltould he a poointed to command and organize 
t heir army, his majestg hm Len grra0rously picascd to seleit jou 
for t b  importmt trust.' 
No. V. 
(N.B. Tbe Italiq are not in thi  original.) 
Mi-. Fmw ta &vJol%n &dock, &ville, Mmh I& 
0nr hope of offenaive operationa in Ar on is so mnch dimi- 
niahed by tlie dcfcnt of general Hdro,a, %at 1 ashould muoh 
doubt whethes any ieinforcement, such m a e  wald nos  send 
tliere, would enalile us fo atkmpf tliem with the prmpact af a 
d e p e  of success, BU& asmight mpensilte for the ~nconvcnience 
linljle to arke from tlie de1 ñng-ement o f  calcuiationa wliich may 
hnvc bcmi formed at homc.'-' Un tha othcr Iinnd, thcrr: secms 
reasion to  a rehmd, that general S d t  may at last, in conae- 
quence of E r e s k t a n u ~  he has eaperieneed. &rsl f7m iiir 
aiiacmwttalila p j e c t  cif mf&y P h f i g ~ I  a& occupjing Gnl- 
licia. His rcturn would, of c m e ,  add largely to tlie dis- 
posnblc bled movrnb~e force of thr. cnrmy, wliilc it  wonld not 
incrense oura by a n ~  force of that descriptron.'-'In this view of 
tlie su.ject there are two pomta for thr: tmployment of a British 
fom; cine, h?] maL<n.g a PUBJL tO &ve t /m  enenay fmm Salm 
manca and l l ~  m:yJLIIowirbdq I m s ,  wliile Ihe dsturians ~iould 
mnke ~n effort on tkeir aido t o  oem y JAeon and Astorgn, thtis 
re-eshiblishg the communiostim LtKeen the nurthern aod 
southern provjnce. 'l'ho rither, by movin from thp bridge of 
&antara &ng the narthern bank d the fw~,  in c o m e d  with 
general Cue~va. to attaek aud &ve tho enmy fim Toledo, 
and m e p t e n t l y  fm Afad&d. Tn tha httcr dtmnntivc, tho 
Britisli could Lave tho aclvantage of acting in m c e r t  with a dis- 
ci lincd m y .  They monltl, li kewitic, hero immerlinkly thc i++ 
ofmp reinforeement from the army of general Soult. wp in 
him to ahiindon CTnllicir for ths arka uf masing aouthwarrnn! 
these morementsi would not tend in the ssmt: d e g m  ta draw him 
from liis resent position, in whicli, for so many reasonu, i d  is 
acaimalc f e  h ~ l d  emrka It would, I should irnnginc, at the 
aame time, eover Andalusia, and the pojnta of tlie grenkst intcr- 
e ~ t  mrl importnnee in tllis provinm, more efcccctually than ths 
a m e  force employcd in any other rnanner.' 
Mr. Prm to  B<T Johm CPadock, MawA 22. 
'The fortieth remains bere: nnder the pretient &rmmatances 
could net tliink of tlieir removal, unlesa tu moet a Bxitinh f o m  
from Ehas." 
H5. B m  ta s.ir A. Wellesley, &ilk, Nq 4. 
Fkhmted frorn hrliamentary Papers, 1880. 
' Ae it m my ob,jeot t e  obhiin a divsr&m &a La Nuwh ar 
tAeprice of co-qerat im on yonr put, and the impreasion which 
they (&e janta) received from colond Aiava'g report waa thi 
your Uitention m, after defeating or driG.g 8onlt i n h  Gnliicin 
ta oome dmn upon Eatremadnra to athck eneral Pictor, 1 
WM under some di~advsntqy,  inaomnoh as tf ey imagined tlat 
&e int which 1 wanted to make a condition m already con- 
cede$ 
BXTRACTS BEíATXTE TQ CADIZ. 
Fir J fo Hr. EZlbs, Jamay 16, 
'!be h o p s  fram England for Gadiz ma or may not arrive, 
st least n e  msy expect delay; bnt Itlink & mbject of  sendinp 
a forco from tliis requires immediate delibertltion i~nd se~lemont .  
ared to npprapriate for this riervice a n ~  number that 
may ImfT e cerned roper under eiating ciruum~tmces. It i s  only 
iipon the o l i l i o i  pwt of the whjejart 1 can bare aop hesitsnon, 
and whalfer Ihs S ~nniards wUi receive the foroe ss they oiight. 
TUe orden fmm hnF~Nid are to send it if ths supremi junta 
shail make tlie requisition. The quedion ia, whether we s l i d  
anticip~tito tbe demand or notP' 
E ~ T  J ,  Cradock. to MP. F m ,  Jamm y 29. 
' !Phh meaaum (aending t m q s  to Gadio) ia cerkairiiy one of con- 
midernbb res on~ibility to &ose concerned; ht upon ita do - 
t i a  ", ~ A e r a ,  admira1 B e r k e h  and myself, could nd ni1 
Lcsitate, aftGr tha desputchca that were commnnicntcd to us, 8s 
addresseid to ya, as well as tliosa directed to oursel~es~ whieh 
plnced Cadiz in so mminent a poirit af uicw, upon thc unfavour- 
ab~e temimtion o! the o m p m  in the north S ain 
fume in Porta& ia ne&enod t o  o depeo, ex eciolPy ii~n'E2 
regimentg, that d u o e s  it to  almost nothing; %ot 1 may lmk to 
the arrival of the force of fiva thousand men, annonnced ta be 
on tkeir way ; and if it is intended to mainktin Portugal, it v id  
be 6ut fajr te  replace tlie preaent detacliment h m  them.' 
iS%p J. Crdock lo g 4  Xuckede,  Mamh 9. 
'1 yestedy m i v e d  ordern from h majesb'e ernmant b 
p a s ,  iu the most orpeditious manner, the immx*e return of 
the forcea under yom command to the Tap . '  
rS&P John C&k lo h d  CmtEereqh, Mwch 9. 
' Y m  Iordsbi will find, b &e present commnnicatimi, f hat 
mnjm- neral Jwkekenne, at t % e oxprcas dcaire and nduioo o€ Jfr. 
~>W,%IS mba.lly le& Cadix aith his ahola force, (the foitieth 
re&ent, fmm Sevillo, w f l  be unlted,) mil proceeded te Tnrc 
RoW unleeis yonr lordship's orders m y  have overtaken mnjor- 
general Sherbmoke, who pasaed thi8 port four days ago (witbout 
any mnnication).  I t  may be premmed thnt he wiil follow 
the aitmo murse, npon the same motives that influenced general 
Mackeneie; and a$ prment a new acene of operations is entered 
upon in that part of Spain.' 
No. TII. 
NARRATIVE OF THE PEOGEEDINCfS OF K150n-GENERAL 
U C K E N E E ' S  DETACHMEKT FROM LBUON 'SO CiWlZ. 
'I'he detaehment sailed Erom Llsbon on the 2nd Febrn 1809* 
md mirad in Cadir harbour on the StU, st ni&. Yimmo-  
dirthly waitd on rear-admira1 Pnrvi~, nnd from hirn 1 lcnrnt 
them are some diiñcultiesi stsrted by tlie marquis 'Cpillcl (tho com- 
missioner from th central junta,  as meU as a menlier of it) to 
onr landing and oceupying Cxdia. 1 then waited on sir Georga 
Smit t ,  on shore! wliere tliis ht~iligence mas, iu some degi~ecl 
confirmen; liut; sir Gcoge  still e rrsscd an srcpcetntion tlint tlic 
objeetians aodd  bo got orer. ?hese objeetions liad bccn, i t 
aeernti, brit lntcly ~tnrtcd. Kext rnorning 1 snw Mr. Charlcs 
Stuarb, who wna actlng under a diplomatic antliority from Mi. 
Prcrc, md h d  a confcrcnce with him nnd sir G. SrniUi, when I 
eqluined the natnre of my ordera, and it mas detemi~ved to 
wnit on tilo inmquis VLllel. Nr. S tunrt explaiiled to  tlia margnis 
that tth object of my eaming was to offcr our assishoe lu the 
occupation and defence of C d z ,  and Pn making the necessary 
prcp~irntions for ~iicli an wont.; that wc worn only tho ndvmcc of 
s Iarger coipa coming frmn England, to act from khiia side q R i n s t  
tko commori encmy. Tllo marquis heeitated, and, nfter Eome 
6 eeches of mmpliment, aaid liis authority did not esterid so fnr; test 1, mwh wrtil foi instructions E m  the central government; 
nnd, in the mertn tiinr, snid hc coitld permit our Innding a t  port 
St. Mary's. Shis 1 declined as an unnecessarv losa of limo, nnd 
contrnry B my ardors; and it wna tlicn ngrcrd to wnit For tho 
dccision of tlie central 'unta fmm ScPiNc. I thereupon mote to 
Nr. Frcro. nnd sent &ni a iopg of my instrueiioos from air J. 
Cradock. 
The decihn of the junta was received on fhe 8th: d I 
mccivcd a lcttcr from Mr. Frere, which ut m snd, Sor the 
momcnt. to our hope oE oeiopying Cacliz. %le renson asaigned 
by th 'unta wae of  I t o  moat ilimy nalure, vix. 'Tliat thoy had 
ordcrcd kao of thoir own bnthlions to ooeupy Cadk;' a measura 
wlúcli was evidently tke tl~ought of Ihe moment, md a mere 
prctcxt. 
Although 1 cannot presume to j n d ~ e  of the d political con- 
sequcnoes which might nrise f m  ñuch a mcnsnre, as nlluded to by 
1%. Frere. get 1 h d  every reason to beliere, as wcll from tho 
opinion of sir G. Srnilli, as of a11 otbers ~onversunt in tlis senti- 
menta of tho pcoplc of Cadiz, that our landiiig and occupying the 
$ h e  w d d  be a verg opalar measnrs. 343. Frere'a 10th 
eapressed a great disiro &at ae s h d d  not ap ear to Uave made R . an offer thnt was refused; and was dcairom t nt wc alroold not 
Xmmediatcly de art, but that we sliodd land and occnry the can- 
tonmente &m$ t o  un, On consulting nith sir G. Smith nnd nlr. 
Gtuarb, thia a pearsd to be conbar to the gounds on which we 
h d  aet out; Rit ns wc nere cqunty d&ons not ta nppem nr 
variance with the Spanish mernment, r e  mped to submit to 
Yr. Frm, ahcther it  wonfd nat bo botter For tho troops to 
remain for tlie present in their kan , as we Id aiready 
stíítod thnt wo nora in eqaitation of%cp immcdintrb jainad 
by a force from England, the acene of whose qerations nns 
unccrtain; ond onr rcrnnining in the harbouiur nnder tliia idcn 
m l d  answer every purpose ,Mi. &re proposed by a l a n d q .  
1 l i d ,  bcsidcs, somp militnv objcctions to n landing; for, 
without reckoning ith~ uncertainty of an embarkakion from Port 
St. +Waryb, 1 knew how dilatory al1 pioceedinge aro in Rpnin. 
That if wewere once plnced in the scattered cantonmcnb proposed, 
iind ñe  Iiarl a suclden cnll for emharkation, ulieve a weck would 
have been lost in effecting it; and from former experience, the 
effects of a certain dworder would, probably, lmva th rom alnrgo 
number of our men into the hospitals. It i s  further e ~ d e n t  t l i a t  
flio cletmhment wuld not havo beon re-embarked witliout some 
Rtam on the nntional honour. It must hare vc ~oon marched 
into the interior of Sriq, and fius have iurolve 7 ow uountv in 
iis m port, witho~t aring obtained the object for ~ h i c h  it wng 
detaeEed,-the ossension of C d k .  On d meso ooasidcratima 
1 thought it ri&t ,o defe, l d i n g ,  until we shodd Loar Evrtber 
from Mr. &re, to whom both 35~.  S t u d  and myself wrote, nnd 
1 prBEiume ho was sntisficd with tilo rcasons givcn. In nll tliaso 
proceedings I had &e cordial approbation of sir G, Smith, ñho, 
notwitlistnnding unfa~onrablc nypcnrnnwa, aeemed aenguine to 
the Iast that the point woultl be carricd. I thcrefore m o t e  to sir 
J.  Crndork, hy thc Hopo h n ~ *  on tho gth, uticting mhat liad Iie~n 
dono, und that mo should remain in C d z  harbour (ñith Yr. 
h r e ' a  approbaiion) until we rcoeivod orders Yrom him or fmm 
E n ~ h d .  And 1 mote. bv the a m e  convevame. to the m e  
&ed that mor& ; and on the 18tli, 1 received a btter f r o i  Mr. 
3rero, in ahioh f e  secrned +,a Uaue sitered his opinion as te tlis 
pmpriety of our occupying Cadiz, and statin tlmt the only moda 
which nppenrsd to l i m  likely to sucoced in %tnining thc p s i a s -  
siun was my leaving a srnall part of my detachent  thei*, and 
proeeeciing with the rest l o  join Cuesia*~ nrmy; thnt, aa ii forw 
s n R  espected from England for the same piirpose for ~ h i c l i  rny 
detml~ment carne, what 1 lsft Lieliind miglit toliow me on tlieir 
srri~al .  
1 confeshi 1 wae mach disappointed at this pmposal. the whole 
of my dckchment not appeming more thm eqml to tho chrge of 
tke place; but as it kad iiot beenlaid before the junta, 1 mnaidercd 

Colanel Roche wns of inion that thia wodd be acceded to; and 
1, thereforors, des atohe?him, as swn ss posaiblo, aith n ropo4 
to thk effect to gr. Frere. Though two battnlions ooul! not be 
msjdered a ~uficient garriaon, yet, h m  t l io evident popnlarity 
of our tmopa, and tho speedy expectntion of s, reuiforeement from 
E lmd, I tliought it wodd be extremdy proper to make the Y tria , lt dso appemd to me that b~ advancing to Scvilb 1 
should not ron ~nnch risk of involving tlioae tvio battalions in 
any operationa before the amiral of gcnerxl Shcrbrooke, ~ l i i c h  
d d  embarrase LLm in tl ie esecution of the ordem he might 
brin@ from home. 
~ E i s  proposition mrkinlj exceeded anytIring anthorized by 
my instructlons, bnt, 1 trnst, the circnmabpa x-iRiU bc fbuncl to 
warrant it. 
Aftar colonel EacheSe de dure for S e d e ,  enptain KeUy 
retumed fmm thenea, on tE 26th, aith a verbal confidential 
mcssnp f m  Mr. h ~ e ,  sttnting thnt mnrshd Soult waammching 
from Oallicia into Portugal, in t h e e  eolumn~, and that Mr. Frere 
would m i t e  t o  me by cxpress, or 9 next pont. On thc 27tli I 
rcoeived tlijs promised kttcr, enclosrng theco v of aninterceptcd 
lcttcr rmm Soult tu .Tmrpli Buonapnrte; md fir. Re re  rqrisscs 
hia opinion that my dctmhment map now be more usefui in 
Portugal t h  at Cadiz. 
Knowing. aa 1 did befora I Ieft Lisbon, that every pmper atep 
waa t d i n  for eracuating Partugal, in cma of necmsily, nndtliat 
notiung &o tL-nn aucooim fmm home could enabie sir John 
Cradock to hold Lis ground there, it becams more tlian wer 
neceEsorg to mcertain rclictlier hia m y  will be received into 
C d s ,  in case of tlie cvacnation of Portugal. In case thc premnt 
negotintion sneeeeded, I hnd mmged with admira1 Ynmis to 
send a higate with tlie inteliigence to Lisbon immediatel If 
i t  filile.8, ovorything na. in rcndinors to snil wilh I l i o  detioLent 
thitlier ; for, a l t h g h  ttlm maistance J ehould bring might not be 
siifl;eicnt of itself to malrcany nlteration in tlicrcsolntion~ nlrcndy 
talien, yet, ifreinforcements arrired fiom Englmd, we should be 
a 11-elmme addition. 
O n  tlie rnorning of the 2nd of Mmh I m i v e d  s letter from 
eolonel &cl~e, dated Pebniarg 28, stating t h ~ t  my proposition 
had uot yet been deeided on, but t.l~at it would be taken into 
msidmtion that: day. ILe expresaed much apprekenaion of a 
part in the Frcnch inbrest  
~ ' 1 s  moming of the 3rd lm8ing =sed  withoot an lctter fmm 
MI Frorc or colonel Raoho, oa 1 Kad hcen ossnrcd tl ie lnttor 
f abould receive, at furtlieat by + post oE that m&g, I 
despatched motliar courier, drcading sorna mcidcnt. In the 
aflernoon, horrevcr, 1 received n. lon and important letter h m  
Mr. Frere, frmn r h i o l i  I oonolndof t i ie  negotiation had failed 
(nlthongh hho did nnt snp so in trrma); nnd R lettcr 3: rwcivcd 
ahortly a h r d s  from colonel Roclle confirmed thiis fnilnre. E. 
lircrc R lcttc~ cntorcd rcry rniniikly into tFic stntn uf tlic Spanieh 
and Ii'rmch armiss; meniioned the faaura of Soult's attempt to 

No. VIIL 
COllMEMUATXONS KlTiI MXNISTER%NEGLFLT 
OF PORTUGAL. 
'Pon nre aware, $ my despatch, No. 4, of the 24th a'¿ De- 
cember, enclo~ing copies, &c. &e. th t ,  i m  fL went of the evaclce- 
t b n  of Pdayn l ,  &y the f m e  zcnder sir J. Cradock's eommand, 
(a* mmt rmhed fhe m polidh Fy tha ~ r n a c t i a p  i~ 
Gallicia.' 
Zord Ca-stZmagA to &T J. J,QdwE, F e b w y  B. 
Admiml BmkeLq to &r J. Oraakck, &&muy 6. 
' The period of the British army's atay in thia plaw a ~ d n g  
00 &aw ~ Q T  to ihmlm'm.' 
Snc~~orí  II.
f% J.  &dock lo colm8 Qawd, Januumj 3- 
' The arrisons of EITM md Almeida have enpged my moat 
seRoua t%oughts.'-< Dut, as they were occupied by the oommand 
of Iris majesly'a mirhtera, nnd we ~emainwitEmt a m g f i ~ h  idm- 
tims wndm t b p m m t  mitical cimnwtaaces.' 
' & J. C d o c k  getwal RicJLwol Skwarf, Jan- 10. 
'1 fcot w h t  a risk I run in thus lcaving LXBbon defenceless, 
Iiut I o b e y  iAa m@nd rnderB fgoummi.' 
Sir J. W o c k  t o  general R;ckurd Stmd, Jmuuy 12. 
We are dill withwct avA,v in&wct&ons wAutew~frcnin ~ ~ l a n d !  
' Thongh wc cannot say rcBm it mny tnke place, and it t~hall be 
deferred to the last moment, im R q e s  oflmring fm BnyZand, 
yet I bdieve it to be our dnty to prepare ercryhhg for tho 
event of itn embarkation.' 
1 lament fe say tiutt there appeara nothing befm us bnt t h ~  
xeso~ution to w m a k  in Portwgal to  £he last pqw mmmt, 
awaiting &afrmn Xnglad.' 
X2r J. C'radock to Mr. Fm, J a n w  19. 
T i t h  m fooree inferior ilnd 21-eomped, aa it irr, we m 
ddmined f n  vemain to  fk lo& prqm mm&, in the hpw  
qf receiving w h s  f r m  3nykand.' 
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' The orderi we daily expect may be eitlier for imediaa'e m- 
Lwkalim, o r  t o  wminfaim Portuya1.'-' X nm ereuadrd wo have 
bot this one aiah, wliich ia tu aot fm the e re i t  of our oonntrg, 
and cndeavoiir, undcr tho want of all i n f o m f k n ,  -io dk~iuer 
w7mt *ay be tAs ot jecl  of th  gwmnm~t we sme. '  
f i  J. Eradock to g m a E  Mackemk, E c w  26. 
' Since &e 14th of J a n q  we ars widltout i m W h  f m  
E~gbd . '  
SEGTIOK m. 
Siv J. Crradod ta Mr. EEZks, J r a ~ q  15.
' What appeam to be my dnq  is to keep the fixed idea t h t  the 
a- ix PwhgoL shoss ld m a i m  to  t h  last momenl." 
#ir J: &&ck to Xr. EEZk, F ~ ~ r y  15. 
'1 am jwt favoured nith yonr wmmnnícation abont the dan- 
geroua effeda likely to bo prodnmd by the meame of with- 
drawing the t r q s  fiom Lisbon to aecupy the miIitary position 
of O y m ,  Pmso d'hcoa, &B. 1 fenr ( than~h tlio contrnry wna 
intended to be expredy stated} that on are Ied inta the Idea 
that tlie porition in lucslion a n s  oo& inkndcd for ernbsrka- 
tion. hfy avowed deaign wm to await (in FL militarp post suited 
t o  ow force) or&m froin Endand, or tu deferid oiirsolvea with 
reolionnblc pmprct of snccras agnin~t nny nttcmpt from i,lio 
enemy, or cpen from thence to  mako a forwwd movemcnt, 
ahonld fuhirc evcnh Ir& to R U C ~  n prncreding.'-'1Thn;t I must 
object to is to take np a fdse pos~tion, say ~Ucantm, or otlier 
Iieigfits about the iown, wliich wodd only defend A ccrtain posi- 
tion and Ieare tlie rernaininder to the pomr o?" tha encmy, one 
wliieli we must leave n on liis approacIi md seek annotlier bearing 
tbe nppearnncc af  fli& m d  yet noi rociiring our ritr~nt. Thc 
nhole having annonnced tlie intcntion to defend Lisbon, but 
givin u Illat idea upon the appenrance of the enemp: for posi- 
tiona%e to be tiuned on e r e ~ y  side cannot be perswered in 
by m inferior form.'-' My political rcasouing upon this snkject 
waa containeci in tho Iettcr 1 w o t e  the admira], and, 1 mnst 
repeat, it continue~ un~eakened,' &c. - [AFtei your strong 
rcprracntntiona of this morning, I shnll eertainly not pcmvcm; 
and, aa tliere is no instant necerisity for tke measurq will amit  
tlio progreas of events.' 
No. IX. 
STATE AND D ~ T T T I O ~  F THE FORCE TTNDER 
SIR J. CELDOCK, JANUARY 6, 1809, 
EX'lllAOTEll PROY !CEE IIIEAWQUAXTER S T A ~ 9 .  
Diqmable for the Field, 
Qarriawii. drtlllerv, Csvdn.  Infnnffs. 
M .  Men. M-. 
Santamm 68 199 2,492 General Richard Stewart. 
Saccavem 97 XG9 1,450 h e m l  N'Kenzie. 
G M m .  Artllle~g. Cavalrg. IriFantrg. 
31ea 
Almeida 38 ?? 17;i) 
Elvria S3 ... 079 
Opa* ..a 379 
zi~~0~dc~arts3ii  ... 2,652 
- - -  
Total, 386 ... 5,566 
QRpER OF DM"I'L4 M%lT 6. 1809, CALDAS 
Sir J. Cradoch commander-inbchief. 
N~jor-general Sherbrooke, mond in command. 
First line, five brifiades l"8 
Seuoud line, t h  t r ipdm 3,810 
Iieserve, one brigade 1,558 
Cnvalry 800 
ETATE OF TBE ARniY VNaER SIR A. WELLESLIX, PgRn 23 
Headquarh, hyria.  
Underarma. Blck. C m m &  EffWIm. 
Mm. Dlm. Mia. Meb. 
ArtilIey 641 68 403 937 
hvalry  1,439 13 418 1,870 
Infnntry 16,539 1,937 314 15,790 
- - -- 
Total, 18,419 2,038 1,140 '21,597 
- - - - 
61b. 31h. Dowitsora. 
N u m h  of guna, 20 6 4 Total, 30 
Artülery. Csvulry. bfantrg. Wag$on t d m  Total rank andülo. 
Men. 3 1 ~ ~ .  ~ e a .  W tti. Mcn. 
' 1.418 3.074 18.510 230 21.22? 
Total prewnb under amis~ 20,653 
drtlllery. Cadrg. iniaiitry. W w  W n .  Total rmk and me. 
Men. Yen. f i n .  
406 26,995 
De&,, 1 HWbi 3,216 
Commands 1,396 
80 Piecwi of Art'üiery, - 
Total p e n t  mdw amis. 22,355 
-
B P t í b y .  Cnvalrg. LnPantry. Wwiggmitrala. T&&lrsnlrmd%e. 
Wtn. Han. l e o .  
1,584 $4 2qiis4 39s 36,110 
DDdvct 1 Hospital 4,827 
C o m d s  1,596 
-
Totsl pment under m 28,887 
Deduct regimentri on mwch 9,141 
30 Piecm of Artii iq.  - 
]Real pment under armq 19,848 
H&+m, W j o s .  
A r h i .  Cnvalry. 1nfanh-f. Kagson trntn. T o i d  mnk ami ma. 
Tbm. Yen. Mm. Mm. NCL 
1,947 8,$;3 z e , ~ o ~  389 85,018 
3n hospital 8,827 Deduct t o d  ahmt 11,353 
Commad and rni.wiig- Z.14 - 
Total preswt mder arma, 23,606 
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&val at I~eyria, O p o h  offored n proñpert of holding out till m 
could reacli it, and that Victor continud liis eouthern wnie ot 
Cueata, he vonld get ao distant from ns, as t o  permit t 1 e zrmy, 
piialiing frum T ~ y r i n  to Oporto, withot~t npprriiension fmm tha 
a i v  of Tictor, who, by tlic time lie could poasib1y hcnr of  our 
movcmcnt, noiild Lio in tlio Picrrn Morcna. w11ii:li would clearlp 
show tLat E a  principal object, and from which he did not seern 
williug t o  ba diverted, was e i t h  the dcstruetion o€ Cuesta's 
nmg, te enter more securely into Portiignl, or to pnsh to Scaillr; 
but, at al1 e~enta, he wodd be too  distnnt to  give us apprelicn- 
tiiona of nny siiqrine upon t h i ~  enpitnl, 11.q wc hnvc dnily informa- 
tim of his movements, ancl rrhicli woulrt enalile ns, wliliercver ve 
wsre in Por'ortugnl, evon t o  r e d  it boforc Iiim. If, liowevor, bhe 
final m-o emtion of these tifo m j e s  i e  intended for tlie con- 
que& of  ttis hnfiom, anc~ that ,cm,, ,es mt ,,id &hit of I I ~  
nmy from Gallinn and tliat f m  Sdnmanen sullirient, thcn Iio 
will mti~fy hirnself, unti1 V i h r  is sea+ ta act with liim, in tho 
poascssion of tilo oountry beyond ilio Douro. wherc he w~11 
refresh md re8t Eiia troopa, re-equip t l im,  and othcrmise 
them, to be ready for the projected mopcration,-whi yovide s t  tlie 
nrmy from Sftlliimmca nib, probnbiy, B R ~ ~ S ~ V  itself ~ i l h  tlie 
capture of Ciudad Rodr i~o  and Almeida. and ac t  and rnit iu 
co~unction aith Sault, toth ivnititig till Vicior liae settled his 
present objects, and tlien di co-openting. 
It is for our excellency t o  judp, under tho actual ckcum- 
~hnoes, oi d r  propri~ty o€ thia rno~ement owards Oporto, not 
only for the British troop~, but, also, of tlioae of clip allies, as,Fy 
my inslmctions, 1 mnst conaider you FIS commantling t11c ullicd 
amics: nnd the time i s  noñ. certitinly amived, for ~vlinl; dorts 
tliey c a n  ri~tllru Iieing comlined: undoulitedlv, tlieir being cm- 
ployed in sepmate projeets will ennse caeh fdfing scpwfitcly, anrI 
withu t  advantíy:e to the commrin cause. 
L monld, homev~r, cecrtinly, mdcr prcscnt circnmstancca, be 
m d l i n g  to send the few troops 1 codd 8 p m  from the army, 
bvtrocil the Tagri~ md tlie Mondego, to Oporto, M, unsiipprtod 
by British, 1 fciw it wodd be Iosing so many men, tlint on a 
fziture occasion, witli meli siipport mn;p weigh :h the scale ; and 
indecd, tha very insuhordinatc atnte of thv troops, of wlucli I 
1r;trc just r~eeived a sceond rqort  and eomplaint, from general 
Iriranda, wodd ron do^ it li4h1y imwiso to scnd llirrn to a Iawn 
in t,hc atate fhsk O orto noa 1s. w h m  t h  brst dispoard troops, 
ercrpt a p a t  bo& rent  tlieie, if they sero not drbniieled to  
insiiliorrlinntion, woiild be borne dom by the mtiltitudc; nnd it 
is to be feared t h t  d a t e v e r  Portupem troops cnter thc tom 
will fa11 wilh it, na i1ie tarnprbr of tlie pcoplc ~irercrik the possi- 
bili of rven my prepnririltims for r~irtrrrst, in cnsp of miafnrhinc, 
to t 7 ie oiitñard nnil wrgr cxtcnrled lines of  defeucc. ñai-jng 
stilted so muck, 1 must lcave thc queation to yoiir cxccilen~y, &c. 
1 hare the Lonour, &c. 
m. C. D a n e s ~ o n ~ .  
J i ~ h ~ ,  Murcln 29, ISIM. 
DEAE STB,-1 have the honour fo ackno~ledqe, at the eurliest 
moment, your wwllency's bttm of thiis eemning 
eopy of t h e  request from tbe regene , h. thnt i 13"bOz;r"m0: 
the British troops to the suooour o f~porto ,  at tLis moment 
mwamd, '@c. 
Cpon a snhject of such imprtance, X experience considmble 
rdief, that thc general vien of approachinq circumatances has 
becn, for a lengtli of time, within nijr reflection, mcl ihat di m3 
reasoning (whate~er it may be) has becn trm~mitted to tlie 
go~~ernment in Englmd, md the art I m norr cnlled npon 
to riet ia riimplp but the exanition orthoae rneamros I Iiave lon 
tliouglit i t  prudent to pursne, and which the present crilical an ! 
iavolved ntah of &kks seema to cdhm and give no reasw to 
alter jn any part. 
It has alrraya appeared, ta ny jndgment, that &e en- has 
but two objccta to attain in thisr kingciom; t t e  ssession of 
Liibon and Oporio. I bclieva it to Iir unhrrsf  ndrnitkd, 
aud I neid not point ont to your diacrimination d e  idnite1 
superior vnlua of tho formcr abovo &e Inttcr. There a r o  wrt 
positive local didvantages athched to O p t o ,  inde~endent of 
ila rcmolti poeition, thn1 no m i l i l q  dispaition, in whicli a smaU 
En lish m m y  is to bear pmt, cm apply. It pplins me, thercfore, 
t o  $ccl h e  obouienee to au ap Iioation from so high an nnthontg 
ti. goTemors of the king80m. It may be tlicir dutg to mnks 
tlie retluesl, tliougli I much doubt if llieir judgmelit goes duii 
aith it; bnt it sppears to be mine not to irrosfer ths snid 
13ritisl force, under mp oommand, (totdly hadequate io sep* 
rnte objects,) from the defence of this part of the Lngdom to 
the wry doubt FUI sucwur of a place: two liuarlred miles ditant, 
and by a morement to ths north with tbis professed view, 
feel myself en aged in a war tliat l w c s  Li~bon m$ the T a p  
d~frncde.. m! iinpmtectd fram the inroada of otiier bodies 
?f the enemy that may be prepared to combine in a general 
invasion. 
1 SU hast~n, therefore, from di general obsemation, to tba 
ex& rasa bcfora as, ond statc, in zb concisc manner, onr mtud 
aituation, lenving to p u r  judpent, how far it may be nccessarg 
to commnnicrttc somc particulm that rclntc ta tlic British army, 
and 1s bcfore the gwernors ancl your exce l lenq  tlie b e ~ t  idens 
I can for tlte em loyment of $he Briti~Ii aurilimy fmoe, in 
mnjunction aith the !ortugueac, ior &e uitimatc p o k d i o n  of 
Portugal under tiiegr,ssure of sll existing airiumstances. 
Itmriybepantc that the enemy,nith aforee fmmaeventew 
t o  tvrenty thousand, a c o n s i d d h  portion uf ñ'liich (it is said 
five thousand) is caralry, i a  dircctly rnrnileing Oporto, thcrc ia 
rmon to believe th t  the division at Snlmnnca, estimatcd from 
nine to twelve thowand, with a powedul force of artiuery, ip 
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vain, rtnd tliat; it aould be left ta tl ie amdi body of Engiiih, 
done, to suetain t h e  whole future ninil~ct. 
1 have noriF only to atate ñlial my inferior j n d p w t  pointa ont ; 
and as the ardnotis situation of eommand is tillotted tome, I must 
t r y  to  execute to the bcst of mp poiwr. 1 sliall. remnin faithful 
to mv ñ r s t  principlcs, and persevere in the dcfence of Lislion and 
the Tagws. 1 invi~e the co-operation of the Portupese force, 
and, iindex yow guidanee and nu-. icions contml, 1 look to r very 
oireñui reocasion oE strength. f arn msuieed  nothing d i  be 
80.s by tbem in dctiohed parties or in sny isolntrd sihistion. 
Tliey ~ i i l l  aequire coaijdsncs b iiumber, and cmulntion will arisr. 
n repid discipline sil1 cnsuc &m tlieir conocaion nith ns, nid 
tlie mliole, animated by your pre9BnC0, d l  #ivc tiie l iest promite 
of  snccess. Until we h n ~ e  crin~ultcd again 1 phdl not sny mlietlitr 
our general poaition slioulrl ha nt, Lurniar, extendinv the who!e 
ri$t to Saernrem, or nny other ~tnt ion more in athnce. dt 
tlus moment 1 hare o* ta express the indinpensalilo circum- 
atrtnce of  some fixed bwis, apon ~rhieli the dlied army will wt, 
and by our united strength i,rv to counteract tho peculiar dis- 
adrmtngcs thnt attend ths defencc of  Porhiga1 fmm p i t i o n s  
tliat canuot he properly embraced, and dwnja leave some part 
exposerl. 
Allorr me to mclnde, with the solcmn expresaion of my mtl 
convirdion, that notliing will givc 80 much chnnrx of o pmpemus 
xesiilt to the arduous scene in wliich ac nrc cnlrn~ed (eit.licr as to 
rcality or riew) as tha knou,lcd:o :o ttlic: cnimy, tlint, Iwfore le 
conquers Portugal, he mnst dcfeat an amg of some mapitudl, 
dctermined l o  fight him, md a~iiitíng his approuch, unlirul,en 
aiid nclt exposed to tiie d a n p  of a false movcment. Sirch a 
conqnr~t  cnnnot ba nn CR.S y oiic, nnd muñt provo, if ho pnrsue it, 
a por~erful diperaion In fmonr of Spnin. 
11 wi l l  gire me the sincarest plertsuro, &c. 
JQEH CEADQCK. 
No. XI. 
' The enemy bng however, on tliia occnsion, pactiscd thme 
arts wliich Frenehmen are BQ eq& in-circdating proclamations 
nnd imidiouslg alimdoning, for o momrnt, tlic-ir usiial ciysfem oT 
terror, plnntler, nnd ttpsolation, treaiiy tRe inltalitante ouitla 
feigned modm*ull'ova anlk kinrin6.ss.' 
Siy J. Cradocfi tu b d  Cmtlereagi, Ap'I 20, 0,809, Cu h. 
'It al60 appeara to be tlle oli'ect of the cnemp to ingratiate 
himaelf with the popdaoe of  dprro,  .y nim feediny tlim 
and pnting othm inau1gene~s.'-'Ilt i s  dso mis that m Por- 
tupese  legion, to consist of s t ; ~  thowamd men, hw been inati- 
tuted.' 
E&actfim Soz~liC~ Of lda l  ZepOPt of fh expedithn ta 
Portajal. 
' D ~ R  quinzo joma, les villos de Brap, Oparia, Bmll4n, 
P%CZW, Pilla & Con&, Povoa de Bunam, Seira, et  Ovar, 
eucent e. rime levra vmm, dca nombreusea cleputationa so ren- 
diient k$orto poiu les remettw su rnarEchal So& et le prier 
de IQ faiiw parvenir L I'empermir. Des rdresses qui renfes* 
milicnt l'rxprcrc~~ion do cc vmii dhirínt eouvrrts dr: plils da trcnto 
mille aignahres da clergd, de lt noblesse, des n6gocimr, et du 
peiip1e.'-' Pendani 60n shjour a Le M. Soult Gt des 
proclamatious et mndit diveni ad?fgr;k i'ndminis trfitition e t  la 
porice de la province &fre X n h  e Do-. 11 nomma au nom 
do I'cmprmiir onx crnploia qiti 6tniont vncnna, rt nprfis avoir rccu 
' la manifcnbtion politiqna des habitans, il organka le gard~ 
national niusi qu'una 1640~~ d cinq batídions.'-' Amne cun- 
triliutlan nefitfrappk; Teies fonds trouvL:s d a ~  les caissw royales 
anftrent ponr fournir auií Iiesoins des troupes, et &me puur 
dmiwr de m w  atm Pov€u..ai~' 
latemepfd Zdtw oj+ th dukc of Dafmuliu'u's fa jcmmI Xa 
M w t i n h ,  oP.em, N~TC?L 2,1809. 
' a'ai r c p  votrc l r t t r e  du 27 Jan, d'approuvc toi~tes Ls ditiposi- 
fiona que vons avez faites. Je voua ai déjk dit que voue pmviez 
disposer ponr le service dea fonda qui aont dsm la eaisse royrile da 
Tuy. h i t e s  cntrer cn d l n  lc plua de suhaiahnw que vous pouh 
rica. S i  de T'albnce on ron8 tiivit de coups ds  cnnm enroyer 
lcum dcii hornh~s. Rientht voua p n r r r a  mettre les chccnux slu 
wed, maia faites lea garder.  dan^ lea e~uipages qui sont j, Tuy, 
il y a rlome mnt pair de saolicrs, de cuir pour un Epl nombre, 
et un pea de drap; vous ponvez en disposer p u r  votre troiipe. 
Tdiez au depGt genha1 tout ce qui appzlrtient nu G O r p 9  n'arni4e 
ct  qiii Ctoit restd en nrrib~e, ainsi vous aiirice bicntbt uno pctita 
arrnbe qui se soutiendm d'elle-m8me e t  faire la polim dans le 
y i n e i  dont miia devos tirm ( 1 ~  quoi v i w ,  aoigncz liicn Ics 
i6pitam et n'envoiez yersonne 8UT R i b i h v i ~  J'esphe que 
sous pen j e  vous aurai orivert une antre conimunication, le pro- 
~ n c c  d'Drenee est cn trhs grande paytie pacifik; j e  mnrelie sur les 
débris du coqs dellomana pour en finir avec eux; ilbi sont du 
cDti! do Montorcy. 6i i i p i . E ~  mttc cxp6órlit.ion il y avoit encore 
en Gallim des troubles, 'e repicndrai arm tout mon mmQc pour h Ics appnisor, et dora mal eur 9 ccux qui 10s uiiroient occn~ioniié: 
j e  jema la paix et la trccnpuz'llit.4, que kt Lbi lans  se livmnt uux 
traeaux ok b ccrtm q n e ,  p'lk miml pl.olegck el p e  la i ~ m p e  
ac rondmLie C k .  2, mutins ct Ira mlinikntim6.t F7anfok et 
B ~ a g m L r  ddiseat Bre .s&i.emmt punik. 11 f~u t  de tems en 
tcms dcs exnmplca. r c  crois que roiia pourriea ~umsspuudro 
avec moi piis des gens du pajps. Mais il fnut: bien leur pajScr ou 
leur pmettre, qn'en arrivant prda de moi ile le s e m t  g& 
rmernent, et prcndre de gages pour repondre de Ieur Gdelith; 
domes da pos nouvellea au g&&ral Marchnnd. Pour l e  m h o .  
moyen dite nn eoiencl. i'Abbeviuo de bien metkce en 6tAt son 
mtiiierie. 
'%b?LlkEAL DUC DE DALMATIR! 
No. XIr. 
SIR AI1THüR T l U J X S L E P  TO SIR d. CRIIDOCX, MES. 
a b o n ,  Ap.223. 
Mr. Tilliers wili bave m f m e d  you oP my d v a l  here yester- 
&y, and o£ tb mcnrrenco of my opinion wiih that wLicli yoa 
appear to entertain in res e& to t l e  further mwements t o  the 
noithwsrd. I ionolude Jnt you riil hare datermined to Lalt 
tllc amy rtt k i s .  T. think tllat, beforc: my furthcr s k  8 nro 
taEen in res ect to  Sonlt, it aould be deliir~blle to corieifw the 
sitontion af Píctor; h m   fa^ h~ i s  enabled t o  make no attnck 
npon Porhgal, and the means of defence of the east af Portugal 
wlzile She I3ritinh will h. ta thc nortltmrrl, md, crentuelly, tho  
mcans of defence of Lisloon and tlie Tagua, in c m  t k a  attack 
ghould be made upon the eountry. 
fl tlierie eubjecta mnat bave been conaidered by on; and, 
leor, io no rery sntisfnotorg iight, as ou n poiu i o  lsrs m a r d  
t o  the noithaard unaillingly : nnd I Joald\c glad to tdk them 
over rritli you. 
In orrler to mnaider of Borne oP them, and to d e  v m i m  
arrangements, whch can be made only here, I h e  requcsted 
marsh3.1 Beresford l;o carne here, 2 he &odd not deem his 
absence from the Portngae~e tmops, in the preaent date, likely 
to be diaadvmtrigeous to tlie ublic service; and 1 h v e  directed 
Iiim to let ~ o u  linm rhetherle aiil come or not. 
It rnight, probably, RIBO be more ngrceablc and cenvmient to 
you fo see rno here than mi& the army; and if this should be 
tho caso, it wdd be sb most convenicnt arrangemcnt to me to 
meet you here. 1 be8 however, that yon will eonsider this pro- 
position only in a riew to yonr own uonrenience md wishea. IE 
p u  shodd, however, chwse to come, I s h d  lia veqv mnch 
ob1iged to gou jf yau will Iiring with yon thc djutant-general 
and qwirtc~mrrster-general, the chief engineer and &e com- 
mmding officor of t l io  artiiiery, and tire c o m i s s q .  
Ewr yonrs, &c. 
~ T H F R  W~ZESLES 
APPEHDIX. 
No. m. 
3& of a letfer fm 4iv Arthlrr Welktly to lord CastL 
wagh, LkZon,  ApT;I 24, leoR. 
'1 mived here on Satnrday, and fonnd tkat Sir John Cxadock 
and eneral Beresford 11iid moved up the country, to tbe nortli- 
war$ with the traopa upder theii command rcs eotirelu; the 
former t u  Leyña, and the Iaiter to ~iiomnr. Sir Q o ~ n  ~ ~ d o c l t ,  
Iion-erer, does not Rppear tc~ hnve entertnined nny dccided jnten- 
tion of moving fmnsd;  on the contrriry, indeed, he rappram, b 
iiis lettcri to Mr. ITillicrn, to Iinua intcndod to go no Rirthcr ti{ 
he &odd hear thrtt TTiictor's mo~ements were decided, and, tlicre- 
forr?, 1 cunsidcr nfbirs in tliis eouni to Lo exaclly in l l ic  stnte 
io ~ b i c h ,  iE I fo~ind them, it a n s  intontion of the Ling's 
minister tliitt 1 sliould assume tlio command; and, accorrlinfily, 1 
pmposc to nssiirne it as soon as 1 shall communirnte with sir John 
Crailoek. 1 have written to him, ancl to general Bei.esfort1, te 
npprisc him thnt 1 conerivo advnntilgeuñ.ill reñult from our mccting 
herc, and 1 e x p t  t h  both here as aoon ns possible. In resi ect 
to tiie cnomy, Snult i r  ali l l  nt Oporio, nrid Iir hsa not piiaha<l>his 
osts to tlie southrard furthcr tliña tlie river Voup. Xle lias 
Qono iotliing in ~ i z s  oa ~ o o t e .  since tiio los8 o i  ~ ~ u v o s ,  of whii;h 
you hare been moat mbnbly apprised; but hc hns some  post^ on 
the riwr Tnrneaa, nfieli iiivicles ihn l  pmvinoe fiam iMiuho, sod 
i t is suppoacd 8ht he wislicu to resewc for hirnself the olition o€ 
retreaiiq tLroi i4  Tras os Montas into Spnin, if lie sl~ould find 
it ncccss:q. ~?rnrrnl  Eilvcirn, Ritli n I 'oh ig~icm corps, is in 
Tras oa Xontes, but 1 am not acquaint~d with its atreneth a 
i ts  com nsition. cflncrnl Lnpiuse, wlio c o m m ~ n d ~  ithe French 
oorps m&, it wis su poscd, d e n  1 loit 1, t ~  ? and, r a s  rnarcliing 
Bom Sdmnncn inta gorbiigdzl, ha. turned oiT to liis Leh, and Iins 
marched along thc Portiiguese frontier t o  ,illcmlnrn, mLeya he 
m ~ e d  tho T h q s ,  and €Lenco he went to Nerirlii, on the &la- 
dinna,  ler re he ia in eommunication with, indrcd I mny Rny, part; 
of tho amy of Tirtor; he lias iin advanced post ~t Mont~,jo, 
nearcr t o  tlie Portuguese fmntier thnn -Mericlx Victor hns ron- 
tinued a t  Medcllin sincc the nction wiih Cuesta; he Ls eitlier for- 
tifyin thst  paat, or mnking on cntrcnchcd r l m p  tlicrc. Ciirstm 
ir a t  t l e r e n a  ooiieiting r foroe qr in .  aiiieii. it i s  said. will 
soon be twentp-iivo thousnnd infonlry and six tliouersnd cnvnlr~,  
a paiat of thcm good troops; J knorr notliing of tlle rnmquis de )m 
&mma, or of nnytliitig lo tlie iiorihwarrl uF Portugal. 1 inlend 
to morc iipon Soutt, as soon ns 1 can mako 3ome iirrangemrnta 
upon wLicli 1 c m  clepend for tlio deferice ol thc Tagu~, eithri* to 
i m p d e  or delay Victor's progresa, in caw Iic dioiilrl cornt* in ml~i Ie  
I am ñbsent. X sliould prefcr m aikck upon Vidor, in concert 
 KM^ Cucstn, if Soult m not in poaycssion o f  n fcrtilt: pro~inca 
of his Kmgdom and nf the fnvo~irile t o r n  of Oporko, ol wliich 
it ia most desirahle t o  deprive him; and if any opcrnt:lon upon 
%etor, oonnectcd Aith C)aeBtnp~ rno~emenfg, did not mquii-e time 
i% concert it, mhich mEy as well be ernployed in dislodging Soult 
from the aorth of Portngd If Soult slionld go, I tbink it mrist 
arlrisable, for man reasons, in vliich I need not enter at pre- 
s e d ,  ta aot upon t t e  deknsire in tlie north aE Ymtug~iI, snd to 
liring tl ie British army to the castcrn fivntim If tlie li ht 
brigade shoiild not Lave lcft Eiiglnnd, rrlien gou reoeire %B 
leller,-1 trr~sl thxt you wiU send Li~crn off wifho~~t 105s of time: 
and 1: reqnest you to  desire the officer commanding tliem t~ 
endeavour ta ge t intelligeuiico, as he wiU go along tlie coast, pm- 
ticidnrly at Areiro asid tLe moiith of  the Mondcge; anil 1 tr.IsIr 
that 110 should stop at tlie latier placo for orttcrs, if Le should 
f i d  tliat the Britiah army is engqcd in aperntions to the no& 
mard, and if he alioulrl not alrendy have received ordms at 
Areiro. The tvientpthird dragoons mi Lt also remive direc- 
tiona t o  a similar piis ort. Tlie hussam, gI ooniludc, Lzrs sailcd P befmo t l i i ~  time. 7T e are much in want of a a f t  here; nov that 
r e  are goin to m r y  on an aptmLion to the no r th~wd  constaiit 
conrogs ailf be neceasary, md the dmid does not appsar io 
have the meam in Lis power of ~upplying dal tliat ia requircd of 
Km. Tbe twenty-fourth regiment h ~ e d  tliis dnv, &c. Plc. 
[Signed) ' h n ~ a u a  T~~ELLB~LET.' 
No. XIP. 
LETTER FRQM SIR ARTBUR WELLL1iESIiEY TO LORD 
CASTLERWGLI. 
Ahlanfm, d u ~ e  82,1809. 
E , ~ P  LORD,-When 1 wrote to  pon l a ~ t  I was in hops thnt I 
~hould have maiclied Iiefore ilUs time, but t h ~  mone 1s not get 
nrrirod. Tlinp are in tileir pmgreas ns tb ~ e r o  aKin I -te 
on tlie Btli .  The Prpncli are o6nüniiing xe i r  retrrut. Sebas- 
timi hae dso fallen I~ack townrd~ 'L'olrdo, nnd Vcnegns has 
ahanced, and Cuesta liad hia head-quartera at  TrusiUo, on Ue 
19tIl. 1 nm apprehcnsive t h n t  yo11 ñill think T hnve dclqed m7 
mmch unnecessarily sinco my arrivd upon the Sws. But ~t 
ñ-as, ind j ~ ,  qllite irnpossihlc ta move aitliout rnonq. Xot  only 
mere the officem and soldiers in fhe greatest distmss, and &e 
m n t  of money the cauw of muny of tlio rlisordrrti of  wliicli I 
Lave had occasion to amplain; but r e  cm no lonpr  ol~tain the 
snpplie~ of ti10 count , or comniaod i t ~  m u r c e s  foi  tke irmis- 
p a ~ t  of our o m  aiip&s oitlicr I>í lrnd or by water. Besidcs 
this, tlre army rec~uired r~st ,  sftcr t l iei i  cxpcdiiion to tlie Fron- 
53-a o f  Gallicia nnrl ~ h o e ~ ,  and to bo furbiohcd up in different 
wnp; nnd 1 was wcll riwnrc tliat, if neccssiLy had not oliligcd 
mc to hnlt n t  tlic prcsrnt niomcnt, I sliould l i n ~ e  1)ccn comprllcd 
tu make a longer halt some timo hencc. To J1 t h i ~  d d ,  tliat, 
for some ümc nftcr I. carne hcre, 1 bdievcd thnt tlrc Yfineh 
were retirin (as appeara by my letkm to yonr lordship,) and 
thnt  1 alioul2 hnve iio npportuni of  atiking n blow ngainst 
"g them, eren if 1 could have marc ed I hope tlmt you will. 
nttcnd to  my rcq~iiñitions for moncy; not only nm 1 in want, bnt 
the Portuguese govcrnment, to xhom Mr. % illiers snys that =e 
owo 6135,Nl.  1 re cnt, tliat l t e  must have $22M,OOO rt montli, 
Erom Xngland, tül l! vñts yon tbnt I cm do nitiiout it;  in 
wLch aum 1 include $40,000 a rnoutli for thc Po-eso 
g o ~ e m e n t ,  to ptrg for tvcnky thousnnd men. Jf tho I'or- 
t u p e s e  y n m e n t  are to rcceive a largcr sum fram Grcat 
JIrítain, t le siim to hc scnt to Purlugal must br: proportionnbly 
inercased. Bevides thia, money must be sent to pay l l i e  Por- 
t q c s i ,  debt arld oiir dehts in Portuud. There are, beaidcn, 
debts of sir John Xloore'8 mmy stiil h e  in Spain, mhicIr. I m 
called i~pon to pay. h shart, we mnst have $125,WO, and 
fitO@000 s montli, rcekoning from the  bcginning of R l q ,  kc, &cm 
(Signed) ARTWE \VXLLBBLEY.' 
No. XV. 
LETTFX FROX LOED WELJiZNPJ"PN TO TRE ñIARQUlS 
WELCESLET. 
Badujot, Odober 30,1809. 
MY h~a , - I  have had &e honoui of receiving your execl. 
leng'a despatelr, (marlred 1.) oí' the I7tli instant, ooiitaining a 
nipp of yonr note to M. de Ga~trny, of tile 8th of September, nnd 
a copy ol Lis note, in answer to your ~xcellency~ of the 3rd 
of Octolicr. 
I am not snrprieied that M. do Gnray ahouid endeavour to 
nttriliiitc! tu tlia irrcylnritics of  tlic R n ~ l i ~ h  commisaarint the 
defieienciea of supplíes and mems of transport experi~nced by 
tlic Britisli nrtnv in its lalo 8ervico jn Spnin; 1 am not diu ioaed 
t o  jwtify tbe L lis11 iommiss~riat ~ h r c  thcy dererve dame; 
bul I mist t l i n f  il but judiie ta lhem to dcolare tliah iho 
Rritish nrmy is indebted to ttcir exertioaa for the senntp surpliea 
it rcceired. 
I h  some of the ststements conhined in M. de Garay'~ note 
it would appear tliat tho Drilish zrmy hnd sufered no distress 
during tlic 3ntc acrPrce; otlim have a kendcncy to  pove that 
great didistress WM s d r e d ,  at a very early period, by botli armiea; 
1iartieul:trlp tho quotation of u Icttcr from gciicrnl Cncata, of t h  
1 s t  of August, in  annwer to a complaint wliicli 1 Iim ~ u p p s e d  to 
lia\-e mide, thnt thc Spnnish tmops und thir p r i ~ o n m . ~  wcre 
Iictter aupplied tlmn the Uritish srmy. The answer to al1 tliest? 
statemenlv is u rcfcrent~: to the fnrt tlint the nrmy s u f f ~ r ~ d  grrn t  
distre~s for want of pi-ovi~ions, foraqe, nnd meana of e uipment; 
aud, nlilioii~h t l ia l  distress might Iirue been agFnuni$, it muld 
riot hnve Iiecn occasioned, by t l i e  inespmiencc or irre,dnrity of 
tl ie Englisli commissariat . 
I know nothing of tlie ordem wliich N. de G a m ~  &ten wem 
sent by the gorernment to t h e  diferent provincial juntma, b 
provide pmiaions and means of trmport for tFie Drhisli arm 
on its prnrnge tlirough the diffmnt townn in thc proainces. IVf 
su& orders were aent, it waa obviou8 tl iat &e central juuta, as a . 
government, Iitive no power or influence over the  provincial 
jnntna and niag-istratea, to whom tlieir ordws were addressed, as 
tlicy pprodnccd no cffcct; and the ~ u ~ p l i e s ,  mch m tlicy wcm, 
vera procured only the requisit~ons aad exertions of the 
XXIgli~h commissnries. Riit it 18 olivions, f m  M. do Gnmy's 
account of tliese orders, that the central junta liad tak.en a very 
erroneons view of tlie operations to be w i e d  on by the army, 
and of the provision to bc made for the troops whib engqcd in 
thosc opcrritions. Tho govcrnment prwidrd, lip thcir ordem, 
for the troopa only wliile en their passqc tlimugh ttle towns; 
rclying nipon tlieir immedinto ancecsa, and making no prouicion 
for the collection o€ one bocly, of not les8 than fikp thousand 
men, cven for one d q .  At the snmc timc thnt thcv were p i l i q  
of thjs unpardonable omiasion, which aralyzed dl onr efforts, 
t h q  rrndcrcd thot sucoias doubtlul, !y ooiintrrmnndin tho 
oraes gircn to genernl Venegns by general Cuesta, rnfthue 
nxposing tho eombincd nrrnirs to n cncrril nction witli t ho  
eriemfs wneentnteil force. Tbe c&ct d «reir ordors aill 
appear more Fully i i l  tlio folowiug dotai1:- 
As aoon aa tlie lime of my operations in Sp& WM deeided, 1 
senl s commisslii-y to Ciudad Itodrigo, Co endeavm to r o m  
rniilcs to nttrod dia  rtrmy, in eoneert aith don Lozano daa%orrei, 
thne city m d  ils neighbourhood being tlrc p k s  in rrliich the 
nrmp commnnded by tho late sir S o h  Moore hrüi been most 
lar& supplied. M. de Gnray expresses the astonisliment; of 
tlie gowrnmeiit tbat the Britist army ahould hnve entered 8pnin 
anprocided with tbo meaiis ok' transporb3 notwitlishnding that a 
fer  pa~n,mpha preecdin~ t l i i a  exprrssh of &~t.stanislimcni, he 
informs Tour excrllency, in the namc of the goveroment, that 
thcy lid given ortlcra te tlie províneinl juntas of Rndnjos nna 
CastilIe (at Ciudad Hodrigo) and tlie mrystratcs, to proride and 
~i ipply  ua nitli thi! rnenna wliich, of cmrimo, t l i ~ y  must h n ~ o  
becu avrare that v e  nhould reqnfre. No army can carry w ib 
operationli if unprovided witli rneans of trantnpporl; und tho 
British amy aas, from circumstancea, partidarly in rmt at  
thal  moment. 
Themenneiofkan rt,commonl~nsedinPortugd,m&, 
drwn by Lidlaukp, n"& we m&ieF wihmk  p a i  diatrers, to 
move more thnn twelve milea in s day, a clistnnce much ahorter 
t h  that which tha atate  oF the countrg in wliicli the army was 
to enrry on o-prations in Spain, and tbc nnture of tlie country, 
w d d  oblige the army to march. The nmber of casta which n o  
hnd bccn ublo to brin from Portugnl r a s  not ~itficicnt o  dram 
our nmmunitim. tam ,re nme to cmy rov1 ~ i o n ~ .  
Harinn Eailed in proiuring a( Ciudd ~ o g i ~ o  and in the 
neighbourho~d, the rneans o£ tmnsport whicl~ 1 requhed, I m o t o  
to general O'Donogitue, on the 16th of July, a Iehr in which 
after stating our wants and the failure of the rountr in sup lying 
thcrn, I gnue noticc thnt if tlia acro not snpplicB~ ahourd dia- 
* contime my oo-apiration nitt general Coeata. after 1 sliould 
linvc crformed my part in tbo first operatiun ivhicli R-e had con- 
certel ~ i n . ,  tile remoad of the enemy h r n  tlie AlbercLe; aod, 
if not mpplied aa 1 required, 1 ~liould wentuall withdrnw frorn 
Spain alcogether. Fmm tliia letter of tl ia 1&1i Jiilg, it vil1 
appear that I called ror tlie ~nppliea, and gave notice that 1 
sliould withdrnw from Spnin if thcy w m  not furriishcd, not only 
long previoue b the retreat acrorts the T q u s  on the 4th of 
Aunust. but @ven arevious to tl ie commencement of the oum- 
tio;i's of the campaiñn. 
R'otwitlistandin~ ihat; thia letter of the 16th oP Jnlv m eom- 
municatcrl to tlin'hentral jantn, both by Mr. Fmro h d  penerd 
Cuesta, the British amy has, to this day, rcceived no aasiatance 
of thiiis dcscription from Spain, cxceptirig twenty carta, wliích 
joined at Malda, ten an thc 30th of August, and ten on the 2nd 
of Septemlier; andabout t h e e  Lundrod mules of abont five huu- 
drcd whicbh wero hired at ñejnr, rrnd joincd at  o, stihscrlucnt 
eriod. None of the mnles stated to h a ~ e  bbce hird and 
aospatohod to  thc army from Scvillo, m by Igca ar Ccr-nllos. or 
tlie h a  bri~adea of forty ea&, or the humea, kave ever joined 
tEie British army; and I coticludo ttiat they tire 1~1th tke Spuiisli 
i~rm of Eatremndnrn, as are the remuinder of the (one hiintlrcrl) 
ten {rigcdcs of czi+s nliioh aere intended m d  are mmkd for 
the liritish army. But none of tliese mnles or earts, su peaing 
t h  to have beea sent from Seviiie for onr use, reacheg~etre. 
rnulurra ti11 nftor the Slat of August, the day on rrliiclz, aftcr 
weekd notiee, 1 was otiliged to aeparate from the Spzuieh mmy. 
11 is not tme, tliereforei, that mrip resolution to witlirlruw from 
Spain, as &en mrried into exemition, waa ' audden,' or ongllt t a  
h a ~ e  surprised the overnment: nor does it appear to lza~c been 
prriiaua fmm ahnt  f~s sinec np rarcrl in thia pnrt of Spnin. 1 I oyht ,  probably, on the 1Gt of  July, b bave determined to 
ampend nll operntions ti11 tho arm uliould br: siipplic~i with the 
menos reqoirpd; but hauing, on tE 11th of July, aettled with 
eneral C u e s b  a lan of operations to be carriecl into execntion & the m i e s  unxor the eommsnd of general Yenegm, general 
Cuesta, aad m self, respectively, 1 did not tliink it ioper to dis- 
nppoint generJ Cu~sta .  I bolieved thnt gonerd d n p l n a  aould 
have cmied into esecution that part of the lan of operations 
nllolted lo Iiis urmg, nltho h I aus aftoranr!s dionppointrd in 
tiizt eapectztion; and I pr-%cd that the Britiih s m y  shoüid 
surer inconvenienco thitn tht generol Vcnegm' eorps should La 
e oaed alone to tha attaclc of the e m  . and, above nll. 1 was 
in?uced to hope that I ~Lauld be supplie%.. 
Jfecortlingly, 1 marched, an the 3irtli of Jnly, from Plaaencirt, 
the solrliers c a ~ i n g  on their backs tlieir provisiws fa tlie 21at, 
on wliirh dxy a juaction sns forrncd ~ i t h  gencral Cuesta's amy; 
and, fxom t h t  day t o  the 24th of Bnguet, thc troops or &ir 
horses did no* receive ane regnlar ratio~ 'i!he irregnlari 
dcficicncy, M h  in qualiv nnd qnantity, woro 80 grent %" t nt I 
considercd it n matter of jaatice to the troops to  remit t o  them, 
driring thnt period, Mf of tha sum uannlly stopped fmm tlieir 
pay for rations. 
~ I A  fornee for tbe horaca wnri picknd up for fiem $ their ridera wllerever they could 5nd it, and *ras pernF1y w eat w 
ryo ,  ~ h i c l i  nre conaidewd unw11oletiome food; imd h e  conae- 
quence ras  tliat, escluaivo of the losa by engagin with th 
enerny, ths  army lod, m the short. psriod of fiue wekis, nnot leas 
thm one thousand f i ~ e  hnndred horeies. 
1 have no knosledp oE wliat passed between gmerd Cnests 
and don Lozano des lorrea and the intendent of proriaions of 
the Spmish army, I never saw tlie latter gentleman oxcepting 
h i c e ;  the. firat tim on the S?nd of Snlp, when lie waited npon 
me to claim, for the S anish l i a s u i y ,  sixtoen thoasand rations of 
brmd aliich lid bc«i %mught iinto Tda~rra,  and Uad been mt 
t o  mv quarters, and which wcre delirered over to l i i ,  notñith* 
~ t a n d i n ~  thnt tlic Rritish troo a wcre in wrint; nnd tlirt srcond 
time, on tiic 25th of July, w\en hhe rraited opon me, also a t  
Tnlaverrt, to rlcaire thnt the ovcna of thnt t o n  might be dcli- 
vered over for the me o£ the Spanish m y ,  thev ha\& moved 
to St. Ollsllr, and tho RritiiL arm bobg sdll nt !falarera. 
Thi2is requert, alUch r a s  not eompliedisitli, i i  an arample of the 
prekrenm which ~ a r i  g i ~ e n  to t h  Britisli txoops ahile tlisywere 
m Spnin. 
Tho ordere stated +m havs been given by *e central €Q the 
rovincid juntffs and magistrates, were not more effectoal in 
procuring provjsions &tan in procuring mcans of transporta In 
$.he intervnl betmeen tLo 16tli nnd 2lst of July, thc Biihh 
commissarics l ad  mnde m h c t s  vith t3ie mqistrates in the 
different rillages of tlie Vera de Plmenciñ, a country abounding 
in wnourcea o f  evrq description, for the deliverp at Salavera, 
on diffcwnt diiys lwforc thc 24th of ,T\~iiIy, oí' h o  liundred md 
fih tliousand rations of prorisions. Thcse contracts ñere not 
pcrfomed; the British army wna cwscq~icnt~ly iinnble to movo 
m piirsuit of the enemy d e n  he retired on that tllly; and, 1 
conuludc, thltt &o Frencli m y  h a ~ e  sinm mlisiated on Iliose 
TeBOUTCeA. 
Tha British m y  nerer rewivecl my sdt meat, nor any of th 
rice or other articles stakd to have bem sent from Sevillo for 
th~ir use, exwpting to mnke u h e  miseralile ration by ig ahieh 
the mcn wcre onlg preventcd f rom stnrving during tlie perioa 
to whicii 1 hrive adverted; nor was it atteniied L the troop 
of bi~cuit bdcm. nor did it onjoy nny of Ihe n&nntages of 
t h i r  Ialims, nor vas tLc snpposed magazine of four liunrlred 
tlioiisnn(I pounrls af binciiit cvcr formad. Tllefie nrc notorioiis 
f:icta, which cannot be disputed, o€ the tmth of whicli e v q  
officer and ~oldicr in thu army can 'tieur testimony. I ri~siire 
gour exrelleng, that not onl hre tlle supplies fumished to 
ths -y vndei my oommanii teon prid for alienerer tLe billa 
for thm c d d  be got in, but the old debtei dne to tho in. 
habitimta for wpplic~ furnjahed to tha army nnder the com- 
mand of the late sir Jolin Mmre, h a ~ e  lieen disclinrged; and 
1 hnva rcpcnkdlp drsired the  Spani~Ii agenta, and othc~-0 ncting 
with the army, and Zhe different junta with which I have com- 
miinimtad, tri Iet tho pco lc Lnow t h t  nll demnnds upon tlie 
Briti& po~rrnment, d i o !  be sulistantirted, wodd be 
&scliarged. 
J b ~ g  to refnr yanr excclI~nq to  my dcapatcliee of the 21st of 
dngiwt, No. 12, for m accomt of the state of tlie magazine at 
Triixillo, on the 20th af A w s t .  Of thc ~ t o t o  of aupplics n.d 
proeiona at that periad, lieutenant-colonel1Vatera liad, by my 
desrc, made an arrangement witli Ihe  Spanisli commissariat for 
tlie dipision of the magazine a t  Tnixillo between tho two nrmies; 
and he ns wdl as 1 wns satisfied witk the principie and detail of 
tlint nmngcmcnt. Riit; íf thc Uritish arm r ~ w l ~ r d  only onc- 
tiiird of  a ration on the 18th oi August, ang ooly oii-hall of a 
ration on the 19tl1, nat of brwd, biit ef flour; i f  t l ia 1loi.ses of 
rhe m p  received nothmg ; and if the s t a k  of tlie magazine at 
!l?rdlo ~ & 9  BU&, at tlmt tima, m ta Lold out no Iiope, not of 
impro~yement, (for it wns too I nk  to mnit for im rol-crnenh) but 
of a, fdl and regular ~nppiy of provirions an! forage af di 
dcacripliona, 1 waa justiiietl in withdrwiilg from Sptlin. In 
point of fact, the rnagmine at Traxillo, wkich, nnder the  arranp 
ment made by lieubnant-colonel Waiera, was to bs thc  ole 
source of the aupply to both armics, did not contílin, on tlie 20th 
of Aqiist,  a aufIlcicncy to snpply ona d a f ~  demand npon it. 
But it i~ snid that M. de Calvo romiaed und erigngcd to 
~upp1p the British amy; npon w h ~ g  I Lave oniy to abaerss 
that 1 Irad ius2ed h o  long to tlie proniises oT lhe Spanianish 
agents, and thnt 1 Lad particular reasoii for want of eon.(rdcnco 
i i ~  M. de Calvo; as, a l  the moment he wati assuriog ino tliut the 
Hriiish nrmp ~liould have nll tlie provi~ions the coirntv roiild 
afford, i n  refcrence to, and to tlle exclusion of tlie Spanist 
arrny) I ha$ in my pmiiaaion an ordor fmm hm, (of ivUiii your 
exceliency Las a copy,) addressed to the magistrates of Gnacln. 
lupc, djreoting him io ~ e n d  to the hd-qumler~ uf the Syauislr 
nrmy provisions whieh a Jtritiah eommisaary Iintl ordmed t o  be 
rcpared and aent to the mqazines at l l u i i l o ,  to Se r3irided 
!ctwecn both amies, in coniermity t o  tila n p e r n e n t  oiitcrcd 
into with the Spanih commissariea by lieutenrsnt-colonel 
Watm, 
ds the &te of the magazine at i t x i l l o  u-as the imntediate 
oawe (as far as the wmt of provisiona went) oF my witlidrañing 
from Spnin, 1 lseg t o  observe to yotir excelieniv that I waa not 
mjstaken in my opinion of its inauflicioncy; as, i? 1 m not mjp- 
intnrmrd, gencral Efiia's mmp suff'ered the grent~st rlistmrcs9 in 
tIic nefghbourhood Gf 'k?~xii.lo, even after tliat part OT tlie eountry 
slnd thc mqnxinea hnd hecn rclir.ved from ilis Iiurllien of sitp 
p&g tlie Uritish army. 
In respcct to tkc conducl of tke operations in 6painby the 
üpanish g e n d  oiñcer& many tkinp were ame of wliich 1 did 
not approre; 8ome contrary b my expectations, and some con. 
"Y to  powitive apeements. de Gmy h stated that the ordera of tho m q u i s  de 
&mana wcre framed in mformity with snggestiens &m 
m m h d  Beresford; md thence be infers that the opemtions of 
that corps nere ap m\-ed of by me. 
The mirguis desomani  wna ~ t i l l  at Oarnfia on «ie Btb, and 1 
belime as lata as tlio 9th of Aupst; and tlie m i e a  af Estre. 
mndura mtired n m m  *he T a ~ a  on *Le 4th o f  Aupst. This 
referente to dates &ows t l ial tlierc was, and could have been no 
connexion in t h ~  operations of those d i f w n t  b e s .  In fnct, I 
knew nothinq of tlie mnrquis of Xomana'a o ; andtiilI 
heard, on tlie 3rd of i h p t ,  thnt rnarshr?!;? mrps had 
paased tlirou h Qie mountaha of  Estrmadnrs, at Baiios, and 
wna at NJ Mobora, 1 did not believe thzt that part of tlis 
enemy's m l i d  quitted Astorga, or tliat Ilis marquia uas 
nt liberty, ortad it in hia poaer to uit GaUMs. 
MarUal Ileresford.~ oorpa KM ooieited upon the f m n t k  af 
Portugal in thc rnd of Jnly, rincipdlv for thc pnrpoee of forming 
the troopa; and it nas hopc% he vould keep in check t le  enemfs 
corps under Soult, mhirh was at Znmora, nnd tlireatened Por&- 
gal; that he would act a8 a wrps of obamation jn t l int  qaarter, 
twid on t l io  lcft of tlic Rriti~h m y ;  nnd 1 pnrticulnrly rc- 
ueshd marsbal Bercsford to attend ta the Puerto de Perales. 
;\nt 1 nosar intondrrl, nnd nnver Ucld oiitany hopr t o  tUe Spnniali 
o5cers that the COVB nnder marshai Beresford eonld effcct any 
opcrntioii nt tlint period of the cmpnign, nnd nevcr WM u pnrl~ 
to auy mmgcmcnt of a -  operation in which that corps ms b be 
conccrncd. 
In the caries in which memurea rere cmied on in a m m e r  of 
whirh 1: did not approrc, w whirh 1 did not expect, or contrarp 
to the po~itive apement, tlioaevho aebd mtrary to my opinion 
may have been riglil; but slill tLey ackd ín a rnamer of nliich 
they rere aware I did not approve : and h e  wsert,ion in the note, 
that ihe onmalions wem carried on wiih mv wncmnee.  is un- 
folindcd. * 
1 eupected, from the commnnic&.tioas 1 liad with ened 
bea ta ,  throngh sir Robert \Vilson and colonel Raehe, tf at the 
Puerto de Baiios would h a ~ e  been effectually oceupied and se. 
mired ; md, nt nli menta, tht tlie troo s nppomted to p d  tliat 
point, npon wLicli 1 was amre  that al y thc operations, na7, the 
~cmrifn, of fhc army depended, monlcl not hnvo rdircd withont 
Gring a shot. 
1 t mm n p c d ,  b ~ b c c n  gencrd h e d a  nnd mo, on thc ll& of 
JnTy, that general Penegas, who was ander hia mmmand, should 
mnmh hy l'rmhlequc, Oeniia, Pucrtr Liurño~, to ,4r anda, nom 
Madrid ; ahere he waa t o  he on tlie B n d  and 23rd o f ~ u l ~ , a h e n  
tlie cornbined m i e a  diould Iio itt Talavera, and Escola. TLi0 
apement wan aot erformed. and thc conaequencc of its non- 
porformmui (whioh%d been foreseen) o c m e d  ; vis., tht the 
vmbined armiea were engaged d t h  the enemy'a mneentrated 
force. X have h e d  that tlia cama of the non-performance of 
thia ;iyrremmt FM tlmt thc central jnntahrid countcrmnnded thc 
onlm ~ L i c l i  general V e n s p  Lad received from ncral Cuesta; 
o ir l i idi  oountermmd they g m  m no notic,. y~l~dl mnke no 
observation npon this proeeerling, exmpt thñt the plan of opera- 
tiona, as agreed upon with me, rras not mrisd into exemitiou, lig 
general Venegna, in thia tnstnncc. 
Xt m-aa agrced, by ~cneral Cuesta, on the 2nd of Anp.oA that 
vhen 1 mr~r:Iicd qn lns t  Soult on tlis 3rd, he wodd remnin at 
Talavera. Thk apement waa broken when he withdrew h m  
Talavera, in niy opinion ~t'itliout suficient caum. h t l  il  ís also 
my opiiiion that Le ought not to lime witLhwn, pdculwly 
coiiaideiin tliat Le liad the cliarge of rny hospital, witliont my 
conm-nt. 5 do not mnriivs f i i n t  i f  g r n m i  Ciiistn bad rcrnnineri 
at Salayera, it would have rnacle anj difference in the result of 
tlie campaip. %%en Boult aJded tkrty-four tiimurilid t o  the 
niimliers ~ I r e d y  opposed to thecombined armies in E~trcmadnril, 
Zlie enemy was k m  stron~ for un; anrI it vas- neoessary tliat ve 
slioiild rrGirc ncroaa the ?a m. Uut if general Ctirsti~ liad lieJd 
t l e  gost of Tdaipem, nceorLp to npreoment, I ahould h a ~ c  heen 
nbIo to  rcmovc my ho ihl. or, a t  lcnst, to Bnow thc cxnct situa- 
tion of p w r ~  i nd indJ l e f t  tlimc; md I think thrt dLer diana- 
rantnees rnighl; h e  tieeii avoided in the retreat. 
Mrllcn nd~erting to this part of the subjed, 1 cañnot avoid to 
obserre npon tlie arnbi~ul+ of l impqe  nsed in the note ree- 
trprrttng tlic ~qsistnncc ntforrled by gcncrnl Ciicatn to rmnot-e the 
Iiospitnl from Titltirera. That aa~istance aniouxited ta four carts 
on the 411i of Aurfual, at Oropeen. In tlio suhsequcnl remoral 
of the wounded, and of the mcn ~ubscq~lrntly tnkcn aick, r e  
Iiad nhaolntely no asaistanw from tlle 8panisIi anny or tlie 
country. Wo were obligcccd to 1 ~ y  d o m  our nmmnnition, whicli 
was ddivercd o ~ e r  to ille Spaiiish amy, aod to unload thr: 
tri~nsiirc, anrl emplo the carh in i l ~ c  rcmovnl of thc i~oiindrad 
and sirlr. At ~nLYi{o, in pnrticul.m, asaistnncc abich eould hnne 
Iieen LiXfurtled was iritlilield, on Lhe 2hnd md 23rd ofdugual, 
31. de Culw and don Lo~ano  de Toi~es lieingln the town. 
In resgect to tlie refusal to malre rnowments rccommeuded by 
me, Iam af opinion k1;liat if gcncrnl 13nssaeonrt hsd bcen drtwlird 
torrards PIasencin on tlic 30th of J*, mhen 1 recommcndrd 
tlint movemrnt, n n c l  if thc troo R l i ~ l  dono their duty, Soutt 
aoi,ld 1i;irc boen stopped at the ketar, at least for a sdrient  
Irnrili of time to ennble meto secure I he  pnasage oi' tlie S a ~ u s  at. 
Alrnnrna; nnd Iicrr: n ~ n i n  the lioapitd woulrl hxve lieen snred. 
He uFas not dctaclicd, I~owever, ti11 the 2nd; md tlien 1 untlcr- 
stoocl, rrom M. rtc Gnmy's note, t h t  it waa general Cuetrtfi'a 
opinion thak t l ~ c  movement was ufieleaa. 
It coiild not hnve besn con~idered as nseIessby  enm mal Cuesta 
on the 30tI1, becanse the pposition for makin a de tachent  
Lom ~ U P  rornbiupd armios anginatod wiih hrnse% on tUat d i  
nnd it could not have been considered w uscIess eren on ti: 
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morning of the 2nd, aa, ti11 the ovaning d tha t  &y, m did n& 
receive 111kliigence of tlie arrivd of S d t  at Plasencia. A re- 
ference to tho dnte of t h ~  period at which the general cmi~idmd 
tkis detmliment as useIcaa wodd Iiave been desirable. 
1 cannot nccount for the ~urprisc s t n t n l  to hnvt: been felt by 
general Cuesta upon fin@ the British itrm at Oro esa on the 
moming af t hc 4th of' ilugiist. Tha nrmy lnd Icft hllarom on 
the moniing o€ tlie 3rd and hdmarched to Oropesa, ak leapee, 
or twonQ-four miles, on thnt cIa7; which S wnccivo a mfficicnt 
distanee for a body of men whieh had Iiaen starving for man 
days b h c .  Tilo accouots r o c e i d ,  on the cvoning aI the 3rd: 
of the enem7'a p ~ i t j o n  at Kavd Moral md of his atrength, and 
oF g~ncrd Cuee;tn M ~nkndcd mnrch on thnt c~cning, lravrng my 
hospital tn itta Cite, were suilicicnt to induce me tu pawe nndoon- 
~ i d c r  OUT aitunbion, and, nt Icnat, notto mnvo beforo dm l i ~ h t  on the 
4th ; shoriiy aftor rhieh time, pnerai cuesta m+eBat ~ r o p e s b  
U on considcring our ~iituation at thnt time, it: wsa crident to 
me tint t l ~  comhined m i e s  must retire ncross tlie Tays, y ~ d  
tht cvrry momcnt's clclny must exposctliem to tbc risk cif being 
cut otifrom their only remaining point of retreat. d battle, even 
if it hhnrl hcen siiccetisriil, could not liavc improvod onr ~itamtion; 
two Iiattles, m probably thr~e, must hare b ~ e n  fonght and gained 
beforc our aifficultieir, resulting from tlic incrcued stretqth of  tlio 
enemy in Estremadura, eould be removed. 1 did not considcr tlie 
Rriti~h m y ,  nt le:irit, equal to sucli rm cxcrtion at thnt momcnt. 
It i s  nnneceesary to m d e  any obsemafion apon the Spanish 
amy; Iiut tho ocmmnwa P;t Awohiqo, n fcw d n p  aftarwumla, 
showed that tbey wcre not equal to any p a t  contest. 
N. de Oara complains of tEie dleriition in tlie line of onr 
operations. anBof the siidden changpi in the direotion of OUT 
marches, ta wt.lii011 he aitribtites tlie deficiency of our anpplics, 
d i c h ,  in this part of tlie note, he is disposed fo h i t  that tho 
Brilish m y  experienced. I know of bui; one alteration in tlle 
plan af o mtiona and in the diredon of the msrch, wliich sw 
occmione! by tha oi~oomstmoes to which I h ~ e  just reyerred. 
1V1ien inteiligence was fimt received of the ñfii~.-al aftlie enemy 
at Plascncia, and of tlie retreat, withoirt resistance, of t h e  mrpa 
appoiiited to grrard the Aiwto de IKios, mp intention m to 
move towarda blnsencia, to attack the eiierny's carpa ñhich had 
pnsard tliroiigli t l io  Puerto. 'Thnt i n h t i o n  WIU altercd ody 
wlwn 1 lierard o£ tlie numlims of mhich thnt corps cwaisted; and 
wlicn I foiintl tlrtit, hy gc%ncrd Cueatn'ir mrivcment fmm TnIilvern, 
the rear of the army was not semire, t h t  tlie only retreat wns 
lidde to be cut 06 and h i t  tlro cncmy hlul it iathcirporrcr, aod 
at iheir o tion, to j o h  or to attnck ns in separate iiodies. 
It ooullnot be altriliutod lo me, Ilial tlui I w ~ e  roinfarcemont 
m doweri  to enter Eskemndura, or that we had not earlier 
intelligenca of tlieir a,pproacli. 
The Puerto da Uaiios nas  ñhandmed, witliout ft.ing a sliot, by 
the Bpanish troo s sent tliore to pwrl it; and thc junta ofCn~tiIle, 
if thoy h i v  of %o collcction of tilo rnomy'o t r o q s  at Ynlomancs, 
sent no nutice af it; and no noiice wna in fmt recoived, ti11 the 
ncconnh amived thaf thc enemy had ordered rationa at Fuente 
Boble and Los iSantoa; nnd tliq arri~eed on the foowinfi day. 
But when the cncmy d v c d  rtt finval Mord,  in Rstrcmndum, in 
snch strength, and tlie ost of Tda~era  Tris abandoned, the cen- 
t r r i  'unta irdi h d  it Qifioult l o  mnvrois Uua eountry and tha 
norli thnt it aes not exprdient ta dtcr thc plan of mir aporntions 
m d tlie direction o£ our mmh. 
Uut this alteration, instcad of agpmting thc dcficieny of onr 
snp liea, ought to have alleviated our distresscs, if ang meawres 
hncjhcon nd<ipted nt Sevilio lo su plgliio British army, in aonse- 
queme oP niy letter of the 16th julp. Thr altr.r&ion nrea from 
the ofFensive to the defensivs: the rnarcli wns retropade; and if 
nny aiipplic~ had bocn rcparcd nnrl scnt, the arm miiat hnva S met tlieui on tl ie roa$ and m s t  h a ~ e  recei~ecl t iem aooner. 
Accortlingly, wc did mcct aiippIica on tho rond, h~ittlicy wwrrc foc 
the Spanish m ; and although onr troops sere atarving at the 
time. ihey were fmardcd, uiitoucliad, ta their hstinatioo. 
I hnvc sent to  mmhal Ber~sford a oopy of that pnrt of M, de 
Garay's note d i c h  refera t o  thc supplies fm'ortiie Portusese armg 
a n d ~ r  l i is  crimmnnd, iipon whirh Iio mil1 mnkc I i i ~  nh~cmttions,  
wliieli 1 pro ose to f m d  ta yanr excelleng. I sliall here, 
threfora, o& repeat thnt tlie aaut of magrxines, md tiic aprliiy 
md clisinclinntion of the magistrates and people in Spnin to fmish 
nupplies for the amies, even for ryment,  were the cause8 that 
tlie IJortugocso nrmy, M wrll ns t o British wmy, ~iiffcrcd grcnt 
distress from want, while rithin the Spnnish fiontier. 
TiU tLe e d a ,  of whicli I tlunk I litave reaaon to complain, are 
micdicd,  liIl 1 shnll uce mncnzinc~ cstrt~~liñhrcl liir tlic ~iippl of 
the armioa, and s regular system rdo itod for keeping them d e d ,  
nnd m r m y ,  .pon rhoss erortiona ? c m  &pend, ournmanded by 
d c e r s  capxble andwilling to carry into execntion tlie o erntiona 
~ h i &  may hue  beeii p1nnned by mutual sgreement, 1 cmnot 
mtcr npon nny syatem oT m-apcration Rith tltc Spnnieli armi~s, 
1 da not ttink it necessary nom to cnter i d o  ñn calmilationa to 
shor Lhn frll of NI. de Gsmy's cnloulaiians o f t l~o  rclotire nu- 
rnerienl s h c n z  of ths dies ,  and of  tlie cncrny, io tlie Pcnuiuda; 
iE the faEIacy wna not so great, ae I am ccrtniu it is, 1 sliould be 
of the RrimC opinion, rcsperting tlic csprrliency of co-opcrnting 
Prith the Epanish trmtroops. 13ut if the Britidi aiid the Portiignese 
armies h u i d  no t  activeiy co-operale u iih 111em, thep will nt lcast 
do tliem no fnjnry; and if M. de Garnp ia not mistaken, X 
believe he is, in La cdmlations of numliers; and if the Spanish 
armics are in tl siate oC eiliciency in v liicli I l i q  aro rc~ircuented 
t o  be, and wl~icli they onplit to be, to invito onr co-operntion, tha 
deficiency of thir -8ix t h s a n d  men, wliicb tlie Britisli and Por- 
tupese nrmics mig ": ~t add to tltcir numbcrs, can bc no ol!jcction to 
tlicir rindertaking, immediately, the gerntions rliieh 31. rlc Garay 
is aT ol.iinioii ~rpould g i u ~  to hin couutrymeu the enrly posseesion of 
tIiose Iilcssings for irhich &?y are contending. X Iinw tlic Iionour 
to bc, h. 1 Signed) JYELLLXCTOH. 
R H Y  
Cmp, A w p t  17,1809. 
Sra,-1 beg le~vc  to rcport to  ym thnt thc prtics scnt out by 
the officem of my dkision, yestsrday, to procure Sorrnge, were, 
i n  moro iastmees than one, opposed by the Ypanimls, The 
followin cipeumsttcncm h v e  been made known t o  m, md E 
take the%berty aP repesting them for your o a c e h i y * ~  infoimb 
tion. 
MF aewmts were sent abont thxee l e w s  on the -o 
road, in order to get foraff.0 for me; anli afier gath~riog t h e  
mnle loda, a party of Spanish soldiera, coneiating of five or six, 
carne up to thtm wiih tlieir hiwords drawn, and oliliged ihem 10 
kave tlia mrn they liad collected. 3Tp s e m t s  told me, that 
Zhe eime ptlrtyfmed two slioiti hri-ards other Brilish mun emplogred 
m getting forage. The assistant-mmmismry of my diIJioa like- 
m e  tikites to  me, that tlie men 1iB sent out for fu rqe  m-era fired 
at by the Spaniards. 
1 llave the honm to ha, &a. 
(Siped) R. HILL, major-general. 
J ¿ c ~ m j . o ,  Augusf 16, IW. 
Sra,-1 beg Ieme to inform von that I have just received inti- 
mations of some Spaniards fired a t  aome of t h c  
for taking some foinge. As there i s  no for e *en tu gm,bl 
cnmmisanm, I a is l i  u> know what I am to"41g in mdrr to got 
some for tlie horaes. 
(Signed) E. STOSFORD, ~ e m n  bsgado of &. 
SECTlON L-GENERAL STATE OF T E 5  FFCEWCH fin 
IN TAR PENINSULA, 
Ring Jowph commanding, 1st Oct. 1809. 
Srcrrildnmar. Defathd d8mt. Bmra* 
Reo. B m i .  mae. Horiei. Hoipttai. Prhmom. 'E? C*R~IJ. hwht i  
180,814 as,osi 10,407 a, ioa 46.10s 4,144 aa7,sao 23,198 8,OGP 
Deduct fir tlis yvmmentn ... 10,407 8,lGS 
- -
Real totd .. ...... .9'26,94Z 28nOsl 
- - 
15th Jdy, 1810. 
Rnmlrndcrramk hiwhd d k t .  x&k B m .  
Man. H m i .  Mes. Hmam. Roapital. Piiwin* Mca. C m l ~ .  Dravbi 
a73,ioa ee,sss %s,4ez 7,846 r 7 , i o ~  4,916 a49,ori 41,s.r~ la,aar 
In march to join 
6,121 Y88 . . . . . .  656 ... 6,757 '186 
- - - A - - -  -
97ri,52& ~ a , o . r s  ze.rsa 7,ws 47,7aa 4,015 aas,laa eo.oi8 
------- -
15th A~igat, 1810. 
27n.639 67,oBS 26,#40 6,017 46,988 6,596 a51,061 41.448 18,RB+ 
............................ Xn aiarchto j oh  ,,.,...,... 1.057 683 611 
---
... Totd Rfkctive 3n Spain 358.9 18 42,127 17,I4 8 
T m p a  dwtincd br Spnln, qunrtercd on tile 
... .................. Smntier ....................... . 16,008 1,447 
--- 
G r a n d W  ............... 889,024 48,574. 17,145 
---
Arote.-By tbis sta6e it appears tliat d1owance b e i  m& for c w d t i ~ ,  
tbe reihrcernenb for Spain, in consequence of tlie peace wiih Austri% 
were mt letia th.m one hundred aud fifty thousand men. 
15th Jan. 1811. 
p * g m t r ~ n s n a w .  Dñadd. d b m ~  Ef~tiw. H a  
Man. Hmm. Mba. Honei. HospliaL Mm. rn4i-y. DmughG 
295,227 68,462 17,780 4,114 48,881 861,858 41,189 15.9S7 
Illiew A t e a  ghow a decrease of nearly thirty thoasand men in three 
montliii. During tlliu peperi Dde slege of Badajos, the retreat of lfassena, 
the liattles of the Uebora, h o & i ,  and Fuentes Onoro took place. 
Ilence, if the deatlis in hoxpital be dded fa tlic losses mstained in tiiosa 
operationa we ~hli 6nd tliat, at the period of its grexteat activity, the 
gueriih p t e m  waa mora llararrting than deatmctivo to  the Prench 
amy . 
SECTIOK =-STATE OP THE ARHP OF PORTUGAL. 
Apd, 1810.-Head-puarter, b e s .  Blasaena, Frince of Ebag,  
comrnanding. 
U * m .  Xin.rld. Awp. m m  Efuilm Bwm. 
Mcn. l i o i i m  Men. Iloracs Meo. Pei. Mm. Cm. Dianghr 
2ndeqad1annh 18.~72 4,449 1,119 132 i,rioa 7 91.126 3,510 1.061 
6th dilui ....... 33,759 10,159 486 1 IU 6,U:G 349 a9,ti30 3,140 8,129 
8th ditto ........ 2oJ14h 7,1110 25 .. Sj:liti 9 34,1.$5 5,312 1,jSK 
TotriIiieti~e army R0,176 21,G'itl 1,640 242 1Z,B3O 4.55 Pl,[it;l I5,mP 444R 
Imprinlgunrds.. l i , a U  9.WU 174 15 3 . IHJH7 2,H31 :iM 
Pmvinca o l  61. 
. ...... ) 13,161 752 .. 1,n.i 377 ia,sw Isa 
Piuriiice n i  vnlIdD1la , , ) 4" M le4 .. G"46 6,lX .. 1% 
Mm. H m a .  =en. Boaes. Mm. Mtu, Mm. Cm. Ilmn~ht, 
Btab mujor et 
.. gcnba,nrmc .) 229 241 . . . . . . . .  229 941 
4ndmrpRe.pier 16,903 2,Wl 999 8 P l  1,337 Q 19,91 2,IR6 96G 
6th do. Fev.. .... 2YGA3 6.121 1.924 964 1.940 $57 SLOGl 2.152 4.233 
8th do. ~ u k o t  .... 20,¡82 4,298 . 7 30 5.642 75 a6;431 2,142 $116 
Reservo of ca- 
ralw, M o n t l  dJ76 4,851 246 l M 9  DB .. 5,tl'I 6,040 .. 
brnn ........ J 
TatalacUreamiy 71,313 11,668 2,469 1,414 lB,Old 474 86847 11,761 7,815 
Total actlwarmy W,i'ciG 16,8G2 6,lB ki19 14,119 808 &,9W 10$15 7,168 
6th Gowm- 
ment, Valla- dolid+ I)iui- 19,693 P,W6 G99 80 1,776 641 15,107 2,931 191 
sion rlewnn . 
Aturra4 et 9t. 
1 
Aridir.Bcmet) 12,918 .. M 15 1,618 107 1.1886 4S4 .. 
T ~ ! ~ ~ d ~ ~ .  ) 9 1 s  W,%7 8,118 2,164 17,485 1,E4 11b,19 14,180 7,%8 
9th carpa, 
Droiiet, 19,144 2,436 24 .. 3,147 .. 89,313 2,496 .. 
Cmnto DErlon 1 
Oenerdtotat .... 110.4% 21.343 8,1% 2,154 20,612 1,050 I#J,304 16,616 7$$ 
A m y  of Portugal, 27th Sepbmber, 1810. The 9th corpi tm #e 15th 
Ootober. 
The reserve of m*, and the artüiery of aiege toe 
i a t  bptember ody. 
............ ~ndeor$ 16,5;3 2,921 aavr 8st 2,aili 21,1S6 ],sí2 1.w 
............ 6th ditto.. =;lo$ P,~¡K I , ~ O H  6nn a,.iin an,nsn E,i:in 1,548 
R t l i  ditia. ............. IH,AfI7 2,938 fiG3 140 4,GM W,128 8,017 1,011 
.... Reserve of  c a v a l ~  4.146 4.822 1.13 031 157 .>.4 11 4.9 17 2iG 
niea. Horma. I o n .  Hora* Meii. Neo. Cmniryq Dmqgbt. 
Mocle'u ülrlu2an 9 
. . . .  .. .. ....... li ions ) 4 , 3 i 8  150 9 6,W7 
. . . .  .. .. .. Bcudclct's do. 19 do. 5,718 451 8,616 8,815 
Lt. cnvulr); Souit, 1% 
erlirnrlioni .. ,. +, . + )  1,146 893 583 63'1 231 1 , m  1.530 
Artl''cr~ 1,291 I,IBI 62 9 89 1,425 118 1,018 giiisrrs .......... 
............ ToW 12,316 2,114 i,l% M6 4.515 18,207 1.m9 i.Oi8 
S i t h  c q a ,  Thomhr. 
Y~pchan& 11 bat 
.. ldiuna .......... ) 4,981 e8 629 .. 1,191 6@7 
.. .. . . . . .  Momct's, Il do. ...... 6,852 743 1,017 8,101 
. . . .  Loisorl, 12 do, ........ 4.589 .. I.M7 .. 3 . l l  8.917 
Llpiit cuvelry, La- 
m ,,*,, erloadmne) 6s GSI ~ 6 s  $63 117 ],ase 1,814 .. 
Ariillery nnd en@- 1,769 1a18 
neer6,ZK cmpania) 47 78 IG5 1,981 52 1,898 
-- . . 
Eighth corpq Poma 
Clauwl, Il biittnlions.. 1Mi1 I R  A84 .. 33R9 R,W7 la .. 
Soligmc. 14 do. ...... 4,997 .. 1,933 .. 9,337 10,31& . . . .  
st. Croix" sdraigoons, 1Z wd mm,, . , . .  ) t,ou 6% me 239 1 1  7 .. 
Ar~SlIerg aatl enheam 1,106 8Yd 81 4 398 1,592 151 7ll 
On loaw.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2C4 . . . .  
3fontbrun, Onrem. 
Begerw ef c8vsFry 
1,486 1,468 170 4,538 4837 
ertilEcry. ......... 
Artillcry, engineets, 
. . . .  UiJ 2,090 814 
n m y  ............ 
Einth corpg Liria 
'lapdO' bst-) 7,863 11 1 9  .. 182 8,714 .. 
toIlori8, AImcida. 
Coninlixn tnlionq te i r i a  I'. lA) 7~592 27 I47 . I,P99 9,339 B f  
.... 
Pmimic" .rv*lry ' IR98 1,691 60 ü? 114 1.872 l,W qiin~Jrons at To&. 1 
Aet11lc1y znd C I ~ ~ .  
iicen, C i i i h i  Ro- 670 464 ,. 78 742 .. 464 
dngo ............ t
TOW ............ i7,sea %om a76 iag %u7 iv~ial 2,149 
N~'ots.~%lamamcs conrrtitnted rt gove~nment cnnbining tlie bwns  of  
kiha de Toi.rnes4 Pcn~mnrln, rind hl,lnmxnca, in wl~icli were d c p ~ i t e d  
the inck men, stmgglcm, cqiiipngcs, wnrl rlcpbts, of thc rvrq of Portupl. 
The total amauntiiig to &SS4 incn nnd 1,ILl4 homti. 
*ii. Horma 
C f w i d  tdal of tbe a m j  of Pwtuga1 in €ha 
porTition of b t a m  ................................ 441n 9,661 
................ Ninth mrps ......................... .. 1'1,823 2,095 
miaRamiR Detu&& B M  XJnUitu. ümn 
Nsu Bmtm Mm. IIwin. Men. Nra. 
Ya. Hmai. a b a ~  BMI. Im. Bien. 
Pootar- Almelda R 
. . . . . .  .. i . . . .  ........ triiw.{ Roddgo..} 938 88 1,a5 . . . .  .. BOWP artillerg 410 429 83 c5a 49s g z  Artillery of thotriiin 9,181. 2,318 '131 %44! ZJiB ............ . . . . . .  2 9 Workrnen 259 25 .. . . . .  ............ Eiip1nei.n 1,448 60 140 1,623 . . . .  4" JTiiibry oquipage ...... 598 897 b0 897 
Note,-ln the h p d  mlIs there waa no A t e  of the -y of Podngd 
for May. Two diviaions of the aiath corps, directerl to be addd t o  tlia 
amiy of Portugal, are included ia the s h b  for April, and the prince of 
Esling rws empowened to ditribute the cavdry M he p h d ,  propided 
the brigmbde d gene& Fomier, from tha ninth mrpq waa kept In the 
reserve. The debched men w m  in the g-ment af Solamanca. On 
the ltrt of June, however, the ormy of Portugal is r e h e d  as, p a n t  
un& a m  64,518 men, 7,263 horses, and 4,620 men dehhsd.. Hence, 
I have ~&imated tlw n u m h  of f i~hting men md offrwcs, hcTutling the 
pmt, mhen the artificers, engineera, &c. ara deducted. 
Nolele-Sinw the a h e  was pablished, Jllassanaas le t tm in Beimas' 
Sournala of Sieges, hnve sppeared; he dls his m y  only 35,000 of al1 
amn ; because ClÑuaeF's division WIUJ detached ta k e g  up the oom- 
rnunicntion between Ciad~d Rodnp aria Snlrmianm ; thc whole p r m t  
must however have been stmnger, if Bmih~' troop he rwkond ; yet 
1 have certxinly set the wdry tno high-thm wuld not have been 
more than fw thonsand in the- field. 
APPENDIX. 4 1.8 
Udm-. D d d  XoipilibP$Trrh~. iima 
b1.r. ami. ñata. Homr m n .  ilrn. Ci~s lr i .  lknnrht, 
1st dJarinarg .. .... 55,802 12,092 5,114 1,994 G , 4 l f  61,788 10,8FS 3,223 
15th oelirs.. ... . .. .. 7:i,I33 13,124 3,915 1,336 il,420 9fl,4M l2,lSG 2,304 
Ilwluct the t m p i  
' 1 9 1  1 ,  . .. .. 13,3113 1,220 899 
mPth . . . . . . . , . . 1 
R2!$$2:w"3 63,216 1 ],MIS 3,1115 [ , m  11,420 7 7 , ~ ~  lo,wri t.sn5 
' v&rnsia Ilrlickr. 
Mcn. E&#. Ucu. R o r ~ t x  
18,768 6,158 5,035 610 
16 Decembre, 1810, lo duo de Dalmatie va E& le pihge de Badajm, 
avec tout le 5m0 corps dkm&e, 5 regiments de awnlerie, fomnnt 2.600 
chcwux priu d m  lc~l 1*m et t ime carpa d'nmCe mus lcs ordres dc g & n b r d  
Lntour &uliourg, 900 hmnmea du 63mC regiment de lige, 2 compxpica 
d'mtillerie légbrc, 4 compqpica dc wpeura, 1 compagnia da miumra, 
et trois m d r o n a  de mmlerie Eqagnol. 
W e r  m. Iklorhd. iimp8al. Ff& Rema 
Mm. rima. Mtn. nmna bltn. 31m. CmiZtg. T n i ~  
15th Febmarg, 1011 .8ü,a7$ lag6 1 3 1  Ii 1,254 2 & 4 3  1.4ii  I,a7Z 
BcinBmmcnt h} 
mnmh íirm thn 775 .. .. 1 4 3  ?t,!lS2 712 13 
üowmmenh .. .. 
Total ...... ..fJ,781 t,ll 1,331 681 1,997 29,409 8,207 1,035 
No&.-A reinforcement of more than m e  thoumnd men likewim 
joined the fift,h corp~ whiie in front of Dadajoa. 
APPENDIK 
W d t r m ,  8*k. DU=rAe& 
Mra. Mcn. Men. 
.................. (?amlry 4 regirnents I, 525 274 542 
Infanti-~~ 41 Iiattdiona ............... 20,700 8,PbO 3,214 
hrhiiery ..............................-.- 1,378 144 1,156 
-- 
............ Sotalofdsme 23,603 9,298 4,912 
--- 
......... awis ...... 24 Briti~h, 18 Portupese Total 42 
.Fol.?.-There s ~ e  no wpanrte retmns af Ebe snny m g p d  in tbe 
battle of Fueutes Onoro. Ilence, the above ia onIy an approximntion to 
the nurnbers o£ nritish xnd German troops; but if the I ' r > r t i i ~ e s s  and 
the partida of Julian Sanchca he ñdderl, the whole nuniber in lins will 
be about tli~y-fiw tbmrrnd rnen of all mma. 
No. XVm. 
SECTIOH 1.
' Nmember 30,1809. 
'1 cndoae copim and extractei of a corres ondenca whicli I 
had ~11th ATr. Pmre m tlio auhjert of ty~o oo-opemlion of 
the British army sith the co A of the diike of blbuguerque ~ind 
the duka del Par ue in tlis of ili~ersion. 
Ad~erting to &e o inioo ahich 1 Uaic ~ v e n  t o hia majesty's 
ministers nnd the amgnssndor at. Serille, it wiil not be siippsed 
t ha t  I could have encourapcd tlio advnnco of  pencral Arclxnen. 
or codd have held out t& prospect of any c&operatiun by 
Iiritisk army. 
' Tlic fimt ofllcinl infomntion which I had from tlio govrrn- 
ment of the movement of general Areisaga was on tlie 18th, t.he 
d q  beforc bis defcat, and I gave the anansirer on the 19th regara- 
ing the plan offrrliich 1 now rnclosc s c o p ~ .  
' 1 was at Seville, liovei.er, when the general commwccd hia 
mar& i'mm tl ie Sierra Morena, and in more i han one conversa- 
tion witli tho Spnnislt niiniatcrs nnd mcmbcrs of  tlic juntn, 1 
communicated to  tliem my con~iction that general Areixaqa m l d  
be defcatcd. Tlio cxpectntion, hoaevcr, of tiuccess jrom tliis 
Inrge nmy,  atnted to conuist of f&y tliousnnd rnen, mas ao 
genernl and so sanguiile that the possibility of disappointment 
Tna not cvcn eontcmplnted, and nccordingly Tour lordaliip aiil 
5nd that, on the 10th ody, the goremrncnt begnn t o  tliink if 
neceasary to enclearour to mabe a divmion in favour o€ general 
brekqa? and it ia probable t h t  il waa tlioaght Fb make th di~erEiion only in conaeqnence of the .di of the 
 general'^ o m  ho os, aflor lii h t  trial wibh the ennniy on the 
night of the l02 iastant.'-r 1 am miow to moss the Sqxs 
witli thc British m y  nnd to stntion it an tlie £rontiera of Old 
Gastille, fiom thid-hg tLat the point in which I cm be of most 
n ~ o  in prcvrntin~ tlzc oncmy from cffcrting nny impodmt oh'mt, 
md which best msmra for my futurc opcrntions in tUe d e d n c ~  
of Port.ugnl. wit l i  t l i i~  ncw* 1 hnre rc: ue~te,d NT, Rere f.o 
urge tiie gmrnment (o reinfmce the !uke d'lybuqner nena 
corps, in order to aecuro thc passage of tUo loacr art o! thc 
T a p .  Aod, althoo h the state of the seawnwou& m d e r  it 
deairnble thnt I dianfl m U c  tiic mo~omcnt nt m cnrly oriod, I 
da not propoae ta make it tiil I shnll i e s  most cle* tgo eonm 
iiences of that: defeat, and some ymspect that thc eity of S e d e  
be eecnre after I sball mo~e.  
S~cmon D. 
' h l w  7,1909, 
I- I h d  nrpd thc 8pmiah govcrnmcnt to nnpent  
tlie army of the duke a'fiugnt.rqne to h e n t y  thonsmd mm, in 
order t l t l i t  it mipht oeeup~, in a sufficient manncr, tho pnssago, of 
tlie T a p  at Alrnarm and the passea throqh the  mountains 
lending fmm Arxohis e tu Tnixillo, in which position tlicy wodd 
]U\m covered efeotoJlytly«ie rorinoe of Estramadura, during the 
Taintor nt loar+,. nnd would Rnvo ofordod tima and Irisiira for 
preparatima for farther oppwiition to thc memy. itnd 1 dclayed 
the movement, wlijcli 1 hi~ve lon been deairow OF makin te 
«ie northard of the Tqm, til? the reinforcementr ~ 0 ~ 1 % .  be 
~ w i t  o the duke d*Alhiiquer uc rrhich I 1 i ~ d  lntcly recom- 
mended sliodd be dram f m  &o -y of the duke del Parqoe. 
Diiring tlic di~cusionri u on t!io uirbject, tilo gu~crnmcnt llave 
eiren ordera to the duke SpiUbLLbuquerque to retire with his eorp<i 
ilichind the Guadiana, to a position wliioh he cmnol mahbin, 
f i n a  leaving open tlie mad into Estrendura, md incurring tlie 
risk af ihr: los# of that provbw W ~ ~ ~ B Y W  ih enemy clioose to 
talce posseasion of  it." 
SECTEOK III. 
' d a z w ~  31,1810. 
- There ia no doubt, tbat, if tlrB enemy k sinforcc- 
ments have not o t  cnkrcd Spain, d m0 not eonsidcrably 
aduuiced aithin tKe spanish frontiw~, a, qmntion whieh they 
hnvc iindertrtnlrcn iu ans of Eomc risk, and 1 hnvc maturely con- 
sidered of tlie me- of making a. dicerriion in fnvour of the 
dlies,  whichmight obligc ttlio cncmy to nedncc hia foree in Andw 
luaia, md would expose him fo risk md loss in this qnm-ter. But 
thc circumRtunc:cs, wliicl~ nm drtniled in tho onclwcd mpy of a 
lctter to Mr. Fvere, llave obliged mote ~e f ra in  from attemptin 
tl~iti operration at presenl. X have not, Iiowavcr, given up 
tlioughts o€ it, and 1 proposa b c q  it into executiori hemaftcr, 
if cimumshcea will permit.' 
B x c ~ ~ o a  JT. 
' bmumry 12,1811. 
'Xy f m e r  de9ptch wili have informod p u r  lorddiip tLat 1 
was npp~ehwsive thnt the Spnnish tsoopa in Xatremadnm mould 
not mnke an serious opposition t o  the progreas w k h  it s a s  
my opinian +,:e cncmy aoiild ntiompt to mnka in thnt prorino~ ; 
bnt as they lid been &ected to destroythe bridp.es on the Cnia- 
dinnh ut Merida md hfeilolih. md prupar~liona liad besn 
oraercd for tliab pnrpom, nnd to defenrl tlic paesnge of tlie Gun- 
diana, as long as maa practicable, I ~ a a  in lropea that tLo enemg 
woiild liaw lieen dplayed nt lea& for some driya hi:fort: lie ~11.liould 
be alIowed to yaea that river. But I have been dianppointed in 
tliat e~pcctatinn, and the bwn nnnd brid o of Mcrld:i nppcnr to 
have been &ven up to an advaoccd guarf of cnvalry.' 
~EOTIOB V. 
Janwaq 19, 18U. 
" At the moment &en tb enemy entered Estremnrlurn from 
Seville general U d e a t e m s  received an order from tlic rrFncy, 
dabbd the 21st Decernber last, directin him t o  proce~d witb tlie 
troaps imdor l i i i  mrnmond intn tho Bnndda do AirMo. Tiio 
foree in Estremadnrn mas thua dlminished by one-linlf, and the 
romnind~r are condered jlisulIicienE to atlempt tho reiiof of tlie 
t roo s in Oliv~nzn.' 
' 9 0  eircurwhiees nhioh I Laue abme relatea aill ahoa your 
lord~liip tlint tlic militnry uPtcm af the Spnnisli nation is not 
much improced, md tliat it icc not very e w  to combine or r e p  
lute opcr:itiunii nith ~ w r p s  80 jll-orbrauised, in po~i~cs~ion of so 
littlc iniclligcncc, m d  upon whost rictions so littlc relimce utn 
1ic placctl. T i  will scarcelp Lo creditcd t h t  tlie íirst inteDi ence 
rhirbh ~rnmnl  Hrndirnlid mrcircd nf tlio nsscmhb o! the 
eneq's  troops al Sei-ille v-aa from l imce; md if q conibinn- 
iion iviw tlirm nl:irlu, i!itlior forrrlrcnt oi rlerence, it wns retidcred 
i i se le~ ,  or destroyed by tlic orcicio fmm tlie rcgency, to dctacli 
gcn~ral Unllefi~eros ililo tlio Condado de Nielila. mliich acre 
dated h e  22st o£ Jleccmber, the dny on urliich SoiiTt: lirokc 




' The vadous erents of tho m m11 Bave shom your lorclwhip 
tlid no cnlr.irliition can Le mndc on tha rcñiilt of sny opcratirin in 
wliicli tlic Spanisli troops are engawed. Bid if thc same niimbe~ 
of Irowps o f  iiriy o thcr iistion (icii tSousmd) wcre t o  be ~ni~iloyetl  
on this opcrasion, (thc oprniiig tlie comnunicntion witli Bnilnjos,) 
I slronld Iiavc no doubt of tlieir siiccess, or of thcir abiitv ta 
prevcnt t11e Frcncll from nttncking B:dgoa willitllo forceti & c l ~  
tliey L ~ T C  n m  employed on th8 acwicc.' 
~ B ~ W O P ~  
' T'e&rwlry 9,1811. 
General Mendieabel has not adhered to thei h which waa 
~rdered the late marqois de la Eomana, d i o %  provided for 
tlie weunty of tlie communktition witli Elvas before ths troop 
slioiiId be t h r m  to fh left of the Guadiw.  1 don't beliere 
Cliat the ~tmnqth rif the oncmy, ou eithcr tiido af the Guadirtna, 
is rtccurately known, buti if tkey shouid be in strength on the 
right of thnt rrjvcr, it ia to bo np rchendcd tlimt thc wliole o f  
the tmopa d l  be aliut up io ~a%ajos, md 1 Iisre reaion t o  
bclieve tlint t.Ls lace is mitire17 unprorided with pm.pisions, 
notwithamding tht the siege of it Laa been expeoted for the 
last year." 
SECTIO~ V1II. 
' PeSwmy 23,1811. 
Blthongh eqerience has tanght me tu place no reliance upon 
Zhe cff'cct a€ thc exertions of thc Spanish troopg, nohithstnnd- 
iirg the frequent instances of tlirir braveq, I ~c~nowletlg-e that 
this recent diaaskr Iiaa rlisa poiiitcd nnd kdnirvrd mc miidi. The 
109s of this nrmT and its pro6zilile eonsevences, the fsil of Bada- 
joa, hme miite%ally dtfred the situntion of thc alliea ia. tliia 
part of the Feninrinla, md it wiU not be an easy Luk 2sk pplm 
thrm in fhc sihintion in which they rrere, mnrh leas in thnt in 
wlich. they would hitve bepn, if tlic r n i s f o h e  had not ocenrred. 
1 nm concmed to ndd to th is  mclancholy historv, thnt the  yo^* 
tn ese brigde of c a ~ d r y  did not belime much 'tietter tlian tLe 
otEr hoops. Brignddior.ganrral Mndden did ererykhino in his 
gower to induce them to  char~e, bnt in vain.'-' Tbe o crations 
of tiie gttonlln ooniinuo th~migliout Pe interior; nn4 1 h n ~ o  
prwfa that tlio political bostility of tlie people of Spain t 0 ~ a i . d ~  
tlic cnemy is incrensing rathrr thnn diminihing. Uiit I hnre 
not et hemd of any measuro bang dopted ta supply the regdar 
fun& to pag and oipport an nimy, or to raiso one.' 
SECTION E. 
Xamh 21, 1811, 
'It ( C m  o Mayor) hd becn givcn ovw to tho clrnrgc of tlie 
mar4pis of aomrm, at bis requost, l a ~ t  ~ e m .  Bnt, Irteir, tlie 
Spaniah gurrimn hud hwn first ~cnlrcnch nnd tlwn :nit/idmwn, 
h a manner not rery satisfactnry 'm me, nor consistent. ~ 4 t h  thc 
, lionouraliEc cngqcmcnts to drf'cnd tEio plnca into wliicli tlio 
marquirr entered d e n  it ww dcli~ercd orcr to hia charge. 1 am 
informud, I~owcver, that rntiralial Beaeibras Iim iecllected st 
Zamora about seren tliousand men, composed principdy of tLo 
irnperid giiard, nnd of troops taIren froin al1 Ilir: gnrrisons in 
Castillo. T I e  thus threakns an attack upon Gallicia, in rhicll 
proviiico there are, 1 undorstand, ~ixteen tliousund niwi mdcr 
general Mahi; but, from al1 I bar, I mi apprelicnsirn that tlint 
geuerd ñ111 mdre no clefiica, aud t h t  Gullieia ni11 fidI in to tLu 
Landa of tb enemy. 
Sscrxoff X. 
cNq 7,1811. 
' Your brdship will have observed, in my tecenl reporta of  the 
sfate of  the Portnpese force, that their nnmbers aro mnch 
rednced, and 1 don't know wkat rneasure to recontinctid wliich 
~ i l l  have tlie e f cc t  o f  restoring them. Aü mensiircs rccom: 
mendad to the existiilg govornment in Portagd are eitfier rejeeted, 
or nrc ncglrctcd, or arr: so exrxutcd ns to ht: nf no u ~ c  whntcccr; 
md the m t e n a n w  which the prince regent of Portugal has 
give? ta tlic governme of t l i e  lunfidom, n,~rlio have unifody 
manifested ehis spirjt of opposition to evergihing r o p c d  for 
tlie inoreaae of Uie resouroas d the goverrirnoni. m! tlie mei io -  
ration o f  tileir military 8 strm, muyt tend to nggsavntc t h c ~ e  
edr .  The radical defoot,toth in Spain md Porhgd, is aant ot 
money to ca on thr odinnrg opwntiona of  tlir: go~ornmcnb, 
moch more t z r f r q  the expenees o€ meh a aar as thatin ahieh 
iño nrt? cngragod.' 
'1 h e  not received tbB consmt of Caabfios aud Blrike to 
tha phn af ca-operation which I proyosed for the siege of 
Rndnjoa; nnd 1 bave been obliged to m t e  t o  marslixl Bereaford 
t o  desire him te clelg the siege till they will positively promise 
to nrl. na thcroin yceificd, or ti11 'I can go to liim nith arcinforce- 
ment Erom lience. 
' Depend upon i t that Poitn ahodd be tlie fomd~tion of all 
g m  opemkions in the Penim UP a, o f wh€ever nature tlie may be, 
upon nliieh point 1 hare nover altered my opinion. d t h v  m e  
t o  lio olibnsivc, and Spain isto be tlio tlicah-r of t,liern, poiir com- 
mander mnst be in a sitaation to be entirely inde endent of all 
Spanish authorities; by whioli menns done he w ~ l  !v onrbled lo 
draw some resoureea fmm thc muntry, and some nssiatnncc h m  
tlie Spani~h armies.' 
tSnmorI xL 
Edr& of u. Mfer fmm MY. 8fwart 1 .  l o ~ d  TTPC~?PJ~Q, rclatiuc 
to  Dispute8 mae'th tHe Pah'arclr m d  iSozrza. 
' &pl,  8, 1810. 
'1 coda h a n  horno nl1 thk with pntience, if not nccompaniod 
n dired proposal that tke h e t  md traunports ehonld qiait the 
, thnt the regwcy sbould send sn order to marsiid Bares- 
foX disrnisr hia qliivter-mnstcr-gel nnd militni~ srcrrin~g, 
fol lo~ed by a reflection on the persona composing the famiip oii 
Il int oficer, m11 by b 1 . a  to hs sume tupose re~pecting tl ie 
Porhlguese who are etksehed to Lord \~*e lbn~bn . '  
SECTIQR m. 
hita fm J.  Nume to majw-y-al Af'Km$e, mmmzdiug 
in I'urt~~~aE, 
' Salnmmca, 29th A7mena8er, 1808. 
P*~,-Tlir: mmici  o€ Spain, riomrnxndcd Iip ~rncrnl~  Cnstnño~ 
and Blnke, the oiia in Iiiscery asid tlie othcr in brqon ,  have 
been beaten and diaperaed. renders my junction with a i i  
David Uaird's corps impmctlcnlile, bnt if W wcre, 1 cannot hope, 
wikh the Dritirili done, to witlistand the formidable force ~ h i e l i  
Franee has hronglit again~t thia mnntry; an$ there is nothm;: 
elso now in S sin to mako liead yainst it. 
x have orEPCred sir ~ a ~ d  ~airi i to fiü w on ~ot.niis, re- 
emlsarlr, and m e d  io  tlie Tws: 1 rnyself, with the corpa 
whic11 mmhe$ Bom Lisboa, menn to retira by Ciudad Hodrigo 
or Ameida, xnd, by iylci~~ii igp sudi osi~ions as a h ,  endeavour 
to defend, fm a time, T ~ I P  fmntier of$omipnl, and iorer Lisboa 
But, looking fommd tliat this cannot. he done for auy cansider. 
ablc h e  againat superior numbers, it becomes necesaary for me 
t o  give you ihis notita, Ihat vou map emliark the storcs oi the 
army, kccping on ~hore a8 fittle as possible that map impede a 
re-embarlcdirin of tlie whole m y  both now wilh you aud that 
whieh 1 am bringing. 
%Te shal l h a ~ c  grcnt difieuitiea on the frontiw for sithsiatenw ; 
donel Muna mote on tbiB ~ubject O eolonel Donkin ves& 
dnya that m p$ca rnipht be aent  Lr ns to Abrantca and Cgiimbr 
h c  are &enay st Oporto, and more r n q  ba sent. I Uare 
ilcsired sir 1). Xnird, if he has vith lzum n. vich~allcr, of smdl 
draft of water, t o  send ber t h .  On the suli'ect of provisions 
tho uimmi~snry-~ncral will write moro in &,triil. nnd I hopo 
you will nw our influence witlr the overnment of Portugal to 
sccuro 3. aiBena wriatance. It wilF bo rieht to  conaidcr Rtb 
tlie Pmtngiieae officers and engineera dr i t  points ma be h e -  
diaketely st,~oiiglhcned nnd are most dcfinsibie, mdniat oso ~ o o  
can make of h e  troo s with vou to su port me in my defence of 
tlir fiontim, nnd I RRaii h o b g l d  to %par ~ r o m  
s o b j ~ t .  I oannot yct determine the Lino I sd0&??.?;; 
onrrnlly ii aiil un Alrnrida, Guardn, Bcimonto, Hnrwnl, ~ r k i c o ,  
Ciocu. The Pmtugiiese, on their m mauniains, cm be of 
rniid!li me, and 1 shodd Iioge, at ann rnte, fliut thcy defmd 
the T m  os Montes. Nr. ~ c n n e &  aill probalily arite ta Plr. 
EmIcinn, who now had hettcr r ~ m a i n  at Thbon;  birt, if hs 
does not write to hi, tlik, together ñith mloiiel Itlnmv's letter 
to eoloncl Uonhn, will be ~uílicient for yon and Mr. Ekkine to 
take means for iiecirring to us not only a supply of bismit md 
R B ! ~  provisioii~, bat thc mpplics of thr: counti-g Por onr~rlvcs and 
horsca, &c. In d e r  to alwm as little as possible, it m q  be 
ñnid thnt moro h o p a  nrc cxpectnrl Rnm Rnglnntl, t o  join 11s 
through Podugd: tlria dl do at first, but grndually the tmth 
ri-ill, of wiimc, he known. 1 mi in p a t  wnnt of money, asid 
noAhing else mil1 secure the aid af the connty. 
1 bsve tlio honour t o  he, h. 
J. Mooa~. 
Y.8, nlvas shonld be pro~sioncd. 
No, XXX 
ESTUC'IS FROII THE CORRESPOMEENCE Ol? VARIOm 
PERsO?JS nxLhTIYE TO C r n I Z ,  ms. 
BBCTIOR 1. 
Xxtrisd ofa G f f e r f m  MP. C. R. V q h n ,  S m f a  y 
hga t iun  at Cadiz, to  X r .  C. Slirart. 
'Jfurcrn t3,lSlO. 
" rrecivcd yonr Icttcr of 22nd Fobrunry. I t  was inderd timo 
tbat a litklc common sense sliould be sulistittited in that country 
(Porlu~al) for that supreine liumlsng witli rrliich the Portupese 
hure liithtrto been treatfd.' 
a Wlien the FrencL possed fAe Jform, 20th Jsnuary, the 
mprsnio juuh oitdcrs for the rovincid jnntaa to ?,Y""" 
Jir t 7 ~  dtfe:r,,w qf ti18 p m n i m ,  ni~t?~ei.mitted Ilir &no i han of 
lhs forfs commandf*g dhe &a o Cadiz; at thc same time thc 
'unta stole away from Sev' J e f or Isla do Leon. %mana and 
!tlni-fliolomew Prorr icrnnined till P l i l i  d a n u u ~ ,  Serillr Iicing in 
commotion. dernauding tLnt  the Ruprcme junta ahould te 
aliolialiad. Monti'o ~iud Palilafox releoscd From prison, and tlia 
forrncr aent nn ordcr to ilomnna to np rnr brforc tlia rc~ololii- 
tionary junta. IIe R B ~  dosirid t o  tale tfio oominnnd of Sodlc; 
rtccordinK to B. fiere's nccount a movl perdous post, us tlis 
apnplc 11nd no arma. TVhy ww $Lis fact not lcnuwn afier tlle 
efcat of OcakP And ~ 1 ~ y  nlw wcre tlie immense abres o f  
c m o n ,  ammunition, h. &c., accumulutod tit 5cvdlet not moved 
to Cndiz? Eornann, to nvoid the defcnce of SeriIle, j io t  nppointed 
to briug d o n  del Paqireh amy to tlie defence o£ tlie city, nnd 
the euple nppointed it mililttry j unltl, riamely, Gmt&os, Mon- 
,o,$,,,, m, ,,m. 
'Pri,re ~ e t  otr for Grtrliz, and at Xeres found the prem'dtmt, 
w i ce -p r~~den t ,  nd Corncl, irnprieoried tip order oC t l ~e  people of 
Scviile. J a n ~ ~ n l  26th, the authority ot tho sil 
Seviiio w.8 diszvo~ed at Gadir, nnd a junta of ~::ejZk:f 
and on tlia :Wth tlie Ruprenio junta nsucrnblod lo nomiri:itu a 
regcnc.y, nam~lp, Castaiios, Escano, Savnedra, bisliop of Orense, 
and ~ardital)a!, a deputy to tho Cortes receutly mived from 
Mcxiro. 3rrl, Cndiñ st~vcd from being surpriucd by the lr'rcnch 
liy thc arrivd of Aibuqoerque. 4th. The Prcncli appeared nt 
t h  liridqe of Zwo.'-*I nevor felt uo iittlo hopo of Spanish 
indcpcndcncc na n t  tIiis mmcnt .  It ia not tlir: rnpid ~ T ~ C C  of 
thc French into Andalitsia th t  makes mc despnir, Iint Ike 
man.rier in which fRg k a w  ¿km rweiried fiy tIhepwp/g, Seville, 
Cordoha, dncn, Grrnnrln, anrt Malngn ~urrendrred to them 
mithout hing a shot, by the inhabitants, Joseph Raonapwb 
* %S refers ta Mr. Canning's aystem ol dipIomaay* 
f0L 11, I I 
ptndionsly endearmring to rafit from thk diapirited si% ofthe 
pco lo to canoiüatc thcm. !Vh~'hree Hiousaod Spanisrds, well pnid, 
welPdotli.d, and n e l l  fed, al n i l  mml d o i q  duty ot hi ib  
in i i s  s m i c e ;   hile npon this lnat spot of pound that xemain~~ 
a goaemment Las been establiehed professing i n d d  to act upon 
very diFerent principios to  tZic lnst, Iiut n-ithout hving ~ e t  
accomplished one sinde nct b t  can tend to procure t h m  the 
confidente ofthe pegle; pmtected by a 8panish fom, wretcli. 
edfy clo$,hed, tlieir pay in arrear an immense amomt, and by 
no meane weIl fcd. We non hear af discipIining m amy, but 
rery littla has been dona toaarde it ~ i n r o  tke nrrival of tLe 
troops in the Sota. Depend npon it Cadiz mwt 6s defended by 
tb Engli~h.' 
Gwmon 11. 
XP. C.B. B.augh to Mr. C. &uw$, 
' CadBzY ii4mcL 28,1810, 
'The umel between the das of AIbuqnergus and the junta 
haa  anda.  The doke ia ping to England on n special miaaion, 
aud Wluttinglmu roposes to go witli Lim. Depena npon it 
they aiii do t U o i r  eest  t o  get ont to South Amones. Bvt the 
duke i a  so weak a m aun, EO Iiasiq, and so much the diipe of others, 
thht 1 w o t  think it prurlent t o  give him anp asaistmce in such 
T ~ ~ w B :  
SECTIOX m. 
.Mr. C. B. YaesgBm t o  Mr. C. Shd .  
to hsfore di the prisoners liad been able to ~t ashm. To mmB 
this is a moet dinggting event in mar; lhere were &O elmen 
oñicers' wives on board!' 
General Gm7iam i% Xv. Slaa&. 
Hay 18,1810. 
'Ton hear of  thc cscape of a p a t  number of French 
ofieers by the pontmn, fhey were confined in going adra in a 
galo the other night.'-'She Spmiards nro rery lmgry, and 
re@ dht i ' R k  laulk m s  r o t  8d m f w bgme l i e  p+soner& got 
0% ~ h . 9 .  3 nm afrnid onr 1 ts h d  into her, but I Kaa 
kad to hear that our aficer o!%;"& at I W a l e s ,  who had the 
(:are of tlie nppor liatterios, (whers Iho only two g m ~  of tlie fort 
that could be brongllt to benr on the hulk were,) xefuaed to fiie 
on tlia poor devils, m a q  of [km most cnjwtLy cofiJ;md sEnce tb 
haale of BayIm !' 
HV. ymgfiala ta M?: &d. 
' Jmlae 2,1810. 
'Anothcr p o n k n  vcnt on ahorc a f e ~ r  d q s  ngo, on the 
French sido of the lig. It was t h  hospital.&ip, and so severe 

parties codng in on the and gwges. Instead of deepening 
the ditclies md conaheting good redoubh at. every seven hm. 
dred gards, tlua ia: what they p ose, dthongh wo ofm to  per- 
fim the laboor fm i e m .  0n%arren spot they fi a p e e  to 
onr worlting; but of ahat service i 8  one roduubt, if nnwpported 
by a collateral dcfence, and jf a genf!~d syshm ia not &tended 
toP TVe lravsnow bwen here theemonths, randaltlionghthey h v e  
been constantly urged ta constnict raorncthing at that ~ e ~ k  tongue 
of low land, 81. Petri, still nothiig of jmportance k Iiegun npon, 
nor do I ima,&e they Tnll ayee to ñny work af strensh at that 
point. I rim dmost rn despulr of seoi~i tliia place atron~ly for- 
tified, ao aa to resist an m y  of fmm fi$ to one hundred thou- 
aand men, which 3. am eonvinced it i s  capable oE'-' lt-e Jiave 
now one thousand three hnndred l a b w r s  of the line and eigh 
carpentms, but, for ihe la tter, the iimber we are snpplied ~ i t  "E 
from our aIIy ia ao bad that &ese artifieera produce not m m  
t h n  one-Efth or one-sixtli what they wm1d be capalde of if the 
material8 were good. To judge from their wndnct it is impsiblo 
to suppose Iliem determined to oppose svigoronn reai~tance even 
in La Isla, and I have no idea of there ever being a siege o€ 
Cadio it8elE'-' OE our s o v ~ n  subaltenis of engineers, two are gene- 
rally ili: WB m obligd, thcfore ,  t o  get ~ssi~tance from tlie 
h e .  wnae nenca ia t h L  Ihe work is neilher so wen nor so 
B eediip execute!. We o11g11t t. have mmv moro (enyhena]. 
I! i a  not emnomy in the rernments; and Gth lord WeUington 
they h i ~ e  hardly any wit!fthe -y.' 
'The enemy's forcs wns mpposed to be diminished, Bnt no 
advantqe conld be taken of it, on accomi of the inefficient: &te 
of ths Symish troops," 
Q e a l  k l a a m ,  dIaaeh 26,1810. 
' !Che isle of Eeon required for its defence a larger f o m  t h  
h d  hecn an~ignsd. Itti tcnnro wax, in tho thcn shtiats of tho 
defencea, very pre&us.' 
n r ,  isio. 
#General Blalre, appointed ta cwimand the Spanish forma, 
intmrlnt*Áxi BOmC d e p e  of nckiviivity and m-aperation, inwhicb the 
Spaniards had beon very deficient.' 
esa nade bythe enemv at M e m  a s m e d  a 
~hartidcr, whiic tho Spnniards p r r ~ i ~ t ~ d  in 
neglectcd fo fortify the moat vul*erable pointa 
APPENDIX. 
- de far an the sxcrtious of tlio Britiah en ineera and 
aoldierr nnder mr oommaod have been conccrnod, I %ave ewry 
rcwon to lio satiufied. I can by no memtr tiay the mine oE tlia 
Spnnitirds, for, bc~idcs the reluctniico d t l i  whicli Boinc of the 
rnost; essentid measures of the defence ~ e r c  a,merl to, otu eople I: mero not pormitted to carry into 'cxccution tlic plan for t o cn- 
t r e n c h e n t  of  the lefh part o£ thc Cortndwa di: 8t. Feriiando 
untii aftex mnch delay and verp mipleasaiit conteste.' 
No. XX. 
2% d u h  fl Santa P& fo th kimj, P k s ,  June 20,1810. 
' WilI your rnrajosly bclicvo thnt Romo poiiticirtna of paria b v e  
arrived at snJ.ing, tlzat in S p i n  there is prepming a new revolu- 
"O"' '9 dmgurous Cor ilie French; nrid tl~cy assert thnt tlie Spnninrc s nttaclicci to yonr rnnjestv will r i ~ c  u ~ ~ I I E ~  tliem. Let 
your majesty conaider if ever ivaa hcard a more absurd c l i i m a  
and how pm,'urlicial it mighl be l o  us if il succeeded in iiinjng 
auy mdit. !I hope that siioh an idrn niil not bc ba~ioved$~  nny 
pcyson of jndgmeuh, and ilut it wiU aoon subsirle, lieing ~ o i d  of
probability .' 
SECTION 11. 
v a t i o n  from t t e  Sprsnish.] 
flceplmher 21, 1810. 
' The hpolitio vidente o€ tlie m i l i t q  pvernom hna attacked 
not odp men, and fields, and animals, but even tlio most sacrecl 
t h i n p  11ii $he nation, m tho mrmorinls ond tlio nctions of familics, 
in whose preser~ation those only are interested ta whom tliey 
telong, and Erom whicli strangers cannol: reap h e  lcnst fruii. 
In  t l i i a  clnss nm thc gcncrnl nrcliivra of  tlir kiiimlom, rnlIcd tfie 
a r ~ h i ~ e a  of %mancas, irhich arc found in the prohce  of Vd&- 
doliil; lhe o i  eruor, Kelierman, has talren possession oE lhem.'- 
' l'liogo ni*r!ii;cs. fmm ~ I I E  timo of tlicir institiiiioii, for ccnturics 
ast, have wntaincd tbo trcaties of tlie Iíin~s ~ince  the wcre 2 &noa,n in CastUlc; also, nnoicnt. nianurrriyts uf I l i a  kin red of 
tUe princes, tbe descents nnd titlc~ of f imi l i es~ lcndingr  in the 
tributiala, deciaions of Uo Cortcs; u1 short, tliat i s  publicly 
intrmsting l o  tlie Iiistory of  the nation, nud privatcly lo indivi- 
dd.' 
S ~ c n o ñ  ILT. 
Dk &aniaW wcrdmy @&te l o  t i e  duke of Santa PB, 
Xadrid, &pfmEim 12, 1818. 
'-Si 1'Andnlu~ie n'e'eat pnN cntihrcmrnt pncifiEc; si la junte de Cadiz existe cncom, et si  les dnglaiiis p exercent l e ~ r  
I'atillc influence, an cleit l'nttribuer en gmndc pnrtie aitu maclii- 
nations, et anx trames ourdies' par la junta, et  l'Angl~terre un 
rnoment 05 p h n t  B leur connaiasmc~ le decr~t du 8 f cbvrier, 
ni ktablit des gonvcrnemena militabes dans le Uavarre, la 
SiscRje , i ' hngon ,  e t  Ia Catalognc. Qnelques pouvcrnenrs 
Franpisea ayarit traits ces provinces mmms s i  enes Blaient 
alisolument d6taclbes de la monarclie.' 
=- Mnis cembien n'eat il pas dementi par lia eonduile (le 
mrtains pnwrnem qni paraissent s'obstiner k pro1on~c:~r l'insur- 
rection dbEspnpo pliilOt: qu'n In soumctbre! Cnr danx lusiriirq p .; endroits on ne sc conknk pas cl'csclure tonfe idke (le 'autorito 
dn roi, en fni~ant dministrcr lu, justicc nu nom dc Y~mlicrciir, 
mais ce ni est pire, on a e x i ~ B  que les tribunnux pivils dc Tailli- 
dolid et  %e Prilencia retwbssent serment de AdclitE c t  d'obcisnnce 
L aa msjeatd imperikPe oomme si la nation Espagoole n'avoit pzs 
da mi.' 
B~cmoa IV. 
Nmm'aFfiile tde dake of &fa +E& a& marga& af & m a r a  
t u  tlia plzra7 tc~  of Tapas, 
[Translation from the Spanieh.] 
' Par%s, Sepfder 16, 1810. 
'- T h e  demes of lUs majsstv the empsror are ilis Rame 
for dl the generala, Thc rince d EsLing, aho hns travei~ed al1 
ths pmvinoes to the bor%ers of  Portugal, wlio sppears to  be 
foming immense mngmines, and has moch greatcr neoessities 
thm the g o v o r s  of proviuees, has applied to h e  Spanisli pre- 
fect~,  who Lave made the arrangements, and supplied Km mith 
even m m  tlim he required; aií2 Ih ~ p e a k ~  h favour of tho 
Span i sh rp i+  for the prince of Esling receivea tlie blcasings oE 
tlio inlia itnnis of the piovinces tlimogh mhich his troops paas. 
Siich i s  thc cffcct of good arder nnd himanity amongst n, prople 
a l io  know the d e s  of juatice, and that war demantls sncrthes, 
but '~h Will not auEer dilapidations and nsclcgs vcxations.' 
Ii y a. aiix mois que l'on ne noas paie point, et n o u ~  perissons.' 
g- Avant bier j'écrivia b Alinsnam Ini peignanl m& sita- 
ation et le priant de m'accorder qneIque mgent par rivre; de 
me secourir, si non c o m e  minisire, du moina cmnnio ami. Hier 
je  restai kois heurcs dans son antieliambre cap6rant un i6ponse, 
je le via e&n e t  eUe fut qn'il n'aivait rim.' 
d -  ltien que In fnim m'attcnd nujonrd'hui' 
No. xii 
~ E C T I O N  1, 
' C e l h ,  Muy 11,1810. 
' - 1 o b m  th t  tlie mhister don Mig-uel I?qvas con- 
aidera tha inconvcnience, on onvbidi I liad the tioriour of nddreas- 
ing you, as of omlinary occurreuce, and be entertnins no doubt 
tliat inconvenioncea o f  this description not induce me to 
dcsist from mnlring the mwernents which I mi~l i t  think tho 
defence o€ tlie country woiild require. It freqi~ently happens 
thal an m y  in opernlion cannot prooure tEie nuniberol cari-iqes 
~ h i c h  it requirea, eitl~er from tlie unwillinpcss of thc inliatiit- 
slnts to supplv them, or f m  tlie dcficicncy of tEie numl)er of 
cari-iages iii tLe coiintfy. Uut  i t  hna rx~elg ha iencd that san 
nrmy, thus unprondod whh onrriqcs, Uw boen o\\iged to en 
cratims Li a couniq in wliich tiierc is litcrally no 1-03 
3iirli ,  ir tiioro nns ~aod, tliero is no moncy to iirrhiuo 
it; and, irhene~er tLat I i r s  bcen tlie csse. tlie ormy &ts bcen 
obligcd to witlitlraw te the moyuiiiea w1ljcI1 tho country Lad 
rcfused or been unable b remove to the army. l'liis ia precisely 
the case of tlie aIlied m i e s  in this part of tlie connty; and 
liowevcr trífling tlic difficii l~ mny Ilo dccmcd by tlic rogrncy 
and the ministera, 3: consider a starving army to  be ao uaeless ir* 
any situatioii, tliat 1 aliilll ccrtainly i iot  pretcnd to Lold a posi- 
tion ar So mnke uny movcment in m)iicli thc food of tlic troopa is 
not secured. 1 have no doubt of thc nliility or tlie d l i n p e s s  of 
tlio counhy ta do al1 that CRU bo ruquircd oT llicrn, if tlio aultio- 
rity of tlie government is properlg esertcrl to force individiials to 
attend to their public duties ratlier thn  to tlieir private interests 
in this timo DE trial. 1 havo writkn 1 h i ~  samo ticiititiient l o  tho 
govcmment ao frequently, that tliey must be ria Gireti of reding 
it as I am of m i t i i ~  it. But if they expect that individunla of 
tho iower ordcr~ nm to rclinquisii tiie pursnit of tlieir private 
interelrts and btiaincss ta scrve tlie pnblic, and mean to ptinisli 
tliem for an oomission in ttitr importnnt duty, they must beqin 
with «io hi7K lr cr cluvsea of socicty. Tlicy miist be forced to per- 
f o m  their tlnty, and no nme,  howcvcr iIlustrions, and no pro- 
tection, Iiowevcr powcrful, ~liould sliie2tl Froia niiiriliment tliose 
rrho ncglrot tho pcrfonnnooo of thcir dub tri tfc pulilic in tlicae 
times. Unlcse tliese measurea are strictly ancl k v a r i a 9  fel- 
lowcd, it is vain lo expect anp scrlous or conliuued cmrlion in 
the counhy, and the rczcncy oiiglit to he Awnrc, from tlic uenti- 
ments of liia majcaty'~ go~wument, sliiclr I linve eomrnunicated to 
tlicm, tltaC the cont inuarice of l~ is  mqjesty'a assistanco dcpouds not 
on tlte nliilit or tlieinclinntion, hut oii the iftiinl t=flcctunl encrt.ions 
oE tlie p w y i  of Fortugzl in tlioir o- cause. I linrc tliougl~t it 
propor to troulile you so inticli at Iennlli upon t l i i~  sul~ject, in criiisc- 
qiicrice of tlie 1igh:ht rnaiinci. in nliich thc difliciiltirs rrliich 1 lid 
ehte ted to e i s t  wcre noticed by ilIomieur de Forjas. I have to 
mntion, huwever, that, h i c e  I mote to ya, altboagh there 
exist several cawes of  mmplaint of differenl kmda, and tllnt 
some e- les p ~ í ~ s t  be made, we bave received such assiatance P a4 has enn ilcd mo to continua till tlris timo in onr positiom, and 
I hope to be ablo to contime aa 10% ae mtty be neceaeq. 1 
concur entirely in tlie mencinre of upliointing a specid cornrni~" 
#ion to attcnd the head-quarters of tlic Portueeae army, md 1 
hope that it will be dopted nithout delay. I cneloso R proda- 
mation a-liich I have issucd, wbich 1 hqe will have some effect. 
Zt drscribea ncnrly the crimm, m rathcr the omiusions, of which 
the pmple may be p d l g  in reqect to  the tran ort of the amy ; T these mily be m follow :-M, refusing to snpp 7 carta, hoats, or 
beasta of burthen, whm required; 2ndly-, ~efushg ia remom 
tlieir articles or animala out of the reach of tho rnem g; 3rd. 
disolidience of the ordem of tlie magictrate So pmcee to and 
xcmnfn ~t nny ñtation with mmi~~cs, Iionts, h.; 4tl1, dcscrtion 
from the service either with or without cilrriagea, &c.; 5th, em- 
Sezzlclemen~ of  rovi~iom or stores wbich they r n y  be employed 
to hansport. $ 1 ~  heoimea or omiosions of the infer~or m q i ~ t r ~ t e s  
mny be elassed M follows-la& diaobedicnec oP the orrlere of 
their snperiom; 2nd, inactiPitg in the esemtim of tliem; 3rd, 
rceeiving bribes, to exmae certain peraona from t h e  execution of 
requisitions upon tkern.' 
SECTZOH a, 
E d  Weelliytm tu M. Xoyoya8. 
' Guuvea, &piemaba 6,1810. 
MOST T L L ~ ~ T U I O U ~  SIB,-~ have icccimd yoar l~tter of the 
1st of this rn~nth.  informlng me that you had p~aced before the 
gavement of this kingdom my daspatch of the 27th of Auguet, 
amouncinc the melmc holy and tme-z ected newa of the loss oE 
Almcidn, nnd thni thc p~c~nirnent h 8  l i m c d  aith aoma tbnb 
nn accident unforeseen Iiad preventcd my moving to suwonr the 
place, hoping, at tlie sume time, tliat the dcpreesioii of Ilie 
people, caused by unch an event, will soon vanish, by the yaiek 
md p e &  succcuatrs whicli they expect with c e r t h t  from ilie 
effortn of tbe -y. I h r ~ e  alresd rnade h o m  to t%e govern- 
mont of the kiuzdm talt tUe folfol Almoida aas nnoipcoted 
bv me, anrF that I deplored i t ~  losa nnd that of my hopes, con- 
&dering it likely to dopwss and dflict &o people of tiiis hng -  
dom. It was by no means my intention, bowerer, in that letter, 
t o  state wliethcir it had or hnd not beon my intention to have 
auccoured the place, and I now request tbe  permission oE the 
government of the Kngdom to aay thzt, rnuch as I wish to 
remove tho impresnion ñIiich thia misfortnne haa j a~ t l y  matle 
on tlie public, I do not piopme to alter the spstem d plan oI 
operationa whieh Iiave been rlhrmined, aftcr tlic most ~erioiis 
ddiberation, a8 best adequate t o  fwther the general cause of 
tlie allics, and, canse iicntly, Portugal. I requcst tlie govern- 
ment to believe that! am not inseircible to tlie valuc of thcir 
confidonce as weU na tLat of t h e  putlio; M, also, h t  1 m 
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higlily inhrested in r e m i n g  the nnxiotv of ilic puT4ic upon tlie 
late misfortnne ; but 1 shonld forget my duty to m sove~e ip ,  to 
the r i m e  mgcnt. and to «ic canse in general, if ?alioiild pomit  
?hlk oli~mmir ar pnnic to inci~iro mo to elinn~c, in thc arnslleat 
egree, thc systein and plan pf opmtionn rrl~icli 1 have ndopted, 
nftcr matiiro con~iderntion, and nhich daily cxporj~nee sholvs l o  
be the only one Uely to prodiice a good end 
(Signstl) W X Z L I N ~ ~ N :  
Sncrro~ III. 
' Gízmea, Gephl;w 7, 1810. 
'- Tn mder to pnt m end at once to theae miserable 
intripee, beg ihat yon wiIl inform the pTernmenG that IwilE 
mt stuy in tlie c o u n t ~ ,  and that 1 will eidaise the king's qvern- 
ment to mithdraw the assistnnco mliicli his mnjrsty nffnrds thcm, 
if they interfcre in any manner with the a intment of rnarahal 
Borc~ford's . t e  for whioh he U raaponaiec or aith tiie oyera- 
tions of the amy, or with any of tlie pointa whicli, with tlie 
original arrangements witli mmhd EEeresrord, sare referred 
exrlitaivdy to !lis rnanagemcnt. 1 propose, niso, te reporG ta Iiis 
mjesty's gwrnment, and refer to their conaideration, ahat 
alops ought to bo taken, if tho Portupese governmcnt refneo or 
deIay to d o p t  the c i~ i l  and political arrangements recommended 
by me, and corre onding witli tlic rnilitur+y ooprrtions wllích 1 
orn q m g  on. %lic prepnratory mensuros for tlie dcstruclion 
of, or rather renderin useless tlie m i l l a ,  were snggested bg me 
long qo, aod rnushi Barosford did not rnih t o  pvernment 
upon tlicm t i U  I had reminded him a second time of my rrishes 
01 the subject. I nov beg loave to recommend tLat tlieso pra- 
erntory memurea muy be ridaptcd not only in tlic country E, T ~ S  ,a M,~c,, iyiug north OE 
Pcdras, as origlnnlly p 0806, hut th t  thcy ~ h d l  bo fortliritli 
sdoptcd in aJI m a 8 o r t m a l .  snd that the magisirntea and 
othern may be Leetea to renhr useloas ihe mius, upon reoeir- 
ing ordera fe do so frorn tlic militnrp ofil;ccrrr. 1 hnvc alsenrlg 
ailopted thla measure ~ i t h  snccessr in thia pnrt of tlic muntry, 
and i b  mwt Iw adoptcd jn othcrs in aliich it is probnblo tlint tlie 
enemp may endeavaur to penetrate; and it must be obsious to 
nny person who n-dl roflcct upon the sub,ject, that ít ia only con- 
ñistrnt with dl tlic otlicr meaunres wl~iclr, for tho l n ~ t  tmclvo 
montlis, 1 have reeomrnendcd t o  p~crnment to impede sud 
make riiffidt, and if possilile prevcnt, tlio dvnnce  ml estnlilisli- 
mfnt  of tdir encmy's forre in the countv. S3ut it npprnm tlint 
tlie government have Jately diacoacretl that we are nll mung: 
tliey h v e  l-rccome impntirnt for tlie dcfoat of t l ie enemy, nnd, in 
imitation of tho m ~ t r n l  junta, cnll out for R hattlc zind early 
~~nccws. Ir 1 liad Iiad the pomer 1 would hn~o pr~vented tlio 
Spanish armics fmm attcnding to this cnll; nnd if 1 l i n i ,  tho 
cnuar w d d  nom B a ~ e  becn S&; and, LaWig thc orcr now in 
my linods, I a21 not lose tUc 0n1y chrncc nliii  rrrniiiis or 
saving the eansc, by pying t l i o  smnUest attention te the senae- 
les8 mggeations of ttbe Pmitnguess government. I acknomlcrige 
tliat I ara much hurt at this chanpe of conduct in the govern. 
rnenk; and, as 1 must attrihte it  to the persons receiitl~ intro- 
diiced into the p~ernment, it afforda add~tional reaeion n-ith me 
for disapproving of  thir nomination, and 1 sliall wjte npon the 
subjeet to the prinoe r e p t ,  if I ahould hear any more of this 
conduct. 1 1cai.c: you tn rnmmunicaie &e whole or uny part of 
tliiu lctím that p u  may thiiik pmper to tl*c rcgcncy. 
(Sised) ' W I C L L ~ - G T O ~ . '  
~ECTIQW m. 
' Rio Nuyw, Oclolw 6,1810. 
g- Pon will do mi! thc favoitr to inform thc mgcncy, nnd 
abme al1 the principnl Souza, tlmt his majestgr and tlie prince 
regent hnmng entrngted mc ñitli the eommnnd of tlicír nrmics, 
md likeniss wjth tlle conduct of the r n i l i t a ~  operations, 1 rrilf 
not aiffer tliem, or any body elsc, to intcrfcrc with thcm. That 1 
knoa best where to station my tmps,  and ñhere to m& a dmd 
against the enemy, and I sliall not alter a syetem formed upon 
rnrttnre conaideration, upon anp sirggedion of tlieirs. 1 m 
responuible for what I do, and they ttre not; md I. reeommend 
t o  them to Iook to tlie measurca for wliich they are re~ponaible, 
wbicli 1 long n o mcommended ta them, viñ. ta proride for the 
kan uiility of %isbon, and for tlie food OP the smy and of the 1 pcop e, ~ l r i l e  thc troops rrill bc enwed with the enemy. Aa for 
principal Somtt, 1 beg yon to  te11 him, from me, tliat I have had 
no snt.iñfaction in transarting tlie huainess of this connt aince 
he has been a mem ber of tbo goaernmont; that, beiug e a n r k e d  
in a conwe of militmy nperntions, oi whicki L hope to see tho 
mctlessfd termination, 1 sliall eontiuus to carry them on t o  the 
cnd, hut thnt no lionrc~ on cnrth sbnll. ind~~ce mt: to remain in 8ie 
Peni~mda for onemoment after 1 slialI have obtsined liis mnjesty's 
lcnve to resjgn my c h q e ,  if principal Soma is t o  remfiin eitlier 
a member of tlie govariiment or to continuo at Linlion. Either 
ho must qnit tho cotiiitry or 1 will; nnd, i f  1 shonld bc obli~cd ta
go, 1 shall tdce care tliat tlie world, or Portugal at  lea&, and the 
príncc rcgent s h d  be m d e  ~bcqnainted m-ith rny rmons. l'rorn 
tlie Ltter of tho 3rc1, whicli I have received from Monsicur F 
I lid h o p d  thni  tho gorernmont wns antisfied a i t h  riint 3; 
done, antl intsndcd to do, and tliat, imtead of endeavouring to 
rcnder nll fiirthcr dcfencc fruitlass, h distnrbing the minds of 
the populsee st Lisbon, they aodd l a v i  done thcir dntv by 
d o p t i n ~  mcnsiires to accurc: tlic trnnqiiillity of t h ~  t o m ;  h 1 
mppose that, like 0 t h  weak inclividunls, they arld dnplici* to 
tlicir mcnltncss, nnd thnt tlicir cxprcñirions of ~pprobntion, nnd 
even grrttitudc, wcm intended to conyey EenSUTe. 
' WIELLINQTON. 
' P.3.-AU 1 a s k h m  the Porhipese re ency is trmquillity in 
tho tmm of  h h o n ,  nnd pwri~ions fm tvwir oan troops ri,hila 
tL.y vil1 be e m p l ~ e d  in thia part o€ tlie eountry. 1 Lave but 
little doubt oC sueceBa; bul aa I Lavo fouglit a sufficient iiiimhe~ 
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of battJea to know timk th r e d t  of any one ís not. certiiin, emn 
~ i t b  tlie best arriingemeutti, I nm ttiixious tliat tlie governmelit 
shoiild arlopt prcpiirntory nrrnngcm~nta, nnd tnko oiit of tlio 
enemy's V B ~  those persous and tlieir fainilies d o  vould ~uffcr if 
tLey wcrc to fiill into thcir hnnds.' 
Srrc~ron V. 
Pepo N e p ,  Oclohw 28,1810. 
Ths mttle, and other articlos of supply, vIiic.11 tlie govern- 
mtnt Iwme bcen informed hnve been reinoved from tlic isinnd of 
Lizirias, aro still on tlie island, and most probaMy tlic aecrctnrv 
of stnte, don M. IJoijns, rrho s a n  iit hTlinn~lra yest.sterday, ni11 
Xiaw scen them. 1 shall bn g1nd t o  hear ahetlicr the pvcrnment 
propom to ttnltr: nnv nnd wlint ~ t c p a  t o  piinish tlic mn~istrntcs 
rrlio have disobeyed their ortlers anit h 2 1 ~  decciverl them by EJce 
rcports. Tlic olticers rind soldicrs of tlie militiii, nbaent ironi tlieic 
corps, ase Iial~Ie to pennltira and p~inislimcnta, some of n riril, 
otliers of a n~iIitary nature: first, they nw linhle to a forfeituur of 
nlI ilieir personal pro erQ, iipon jnfomin~ion thnt tlicy arr al~sent 
fiom tlieir eorps iriteoui letive; iccandl j. tliey are linblo to lie 
traiisfciltcd to scrvo as soldieia in tIie reg.ments oT the lino, upon 
tlrc R&mC inforrnntibn; and, Instly, tliq are linble to the prnnities 
of dcscrtion lnfficted by tlie militao tribunals. The two firat are 
pennllics i~li ir~li  dr ciid iilion tlic civil ms~istrate, ~ind 1 slioiild he 
e g1.u ts aavc ReaTa o f  a ~ i e  instanee iii wiiioii tiie rnnpalrntcs 
of Hbon. er io ahioh tlrc gorornrnrnt bnd mlled upon iIie Iiingis- 
trates at Lisbon to r n q  into cxemition tlie 1 s ~  in eitlier of tlicse 
res ecta. T entreat thcm to col1 for tlie nnmes of tlie officers and 
~ol!ii.rs ~bscnlivitliolit lenw from noy one oF ilio Uslion rc-' tiimcnts 
of militia, to cliegrace any one or more af tlie pr inc ip~ l  ilficers, 
in a pulilic manner, for tlieir shmefnl desertion of thcir postn in 
thc Iiour of dnngcr, md to sciao nnd difipoac of tlic ~ h o l c  pro- 
perty of the militia soldicm nbscnt witlioiit leitve, and to aend 
lheau mcn to serva ~ r i t l i  nny of the rro;inienla o€ tlia line. 1 
~ n t r e n t  them to radopt tlieae mrnaiires witlioiit favour or distinc- 
tion of any individu:ils in respcct t o  anp onc rekGment, antl to 
cxrciito tlie l a w ~  bonF$dc upon tlio ~ i i b - r c t ;  and 1 aliall Lo entia- 
fiod o i  tlioir gaod intentions, nnrl shnh helieve Uiat they are 
sincerely desiruus of saving the county ;  but iF rre are to  go on 
es R'C linvc Iiitlicrto, if Grrnt Ijritain is to g v r  lnrge nil iaidics nnd 
to expenci 1r1r~c eums in support of a cause in wliidi tliose mosh 
hkresterl sit lig anrl t&e no part, and Lliose a l  thu h1ied.d of tlio 
govcrnmrnt, mith 1nn.a and P m r s  to fowr tlie ~icoplc to r-irrtion 
m the critica1 circumstnnces iu itliicli tlic coutitry is plncnrl, aro 
amarti of tlie evil Iiut ncslect tlieir dilty und omit to prit llic lnus 
in esecution, 1 rniist Iiclievo tlirir prorofcssions to bc Wsc, tliat 
tlicy look to littic dirty opalarity instcacl oC t o  E ~ Y C  tlieir c o u n t ~ ;  
t l i l  tlioy nro udiiililiiP s p m n f r  to tlicir mnstcr, nnd pononi in 
~ h o m  Lisdlies can plnce 110 confidente. In re~pect  o thc mili- 
t a r ~  lnrv, i t  may bo depended upon th t  it d i  I-ie cnriieíl into 
ssccution, and thnt tlic day ~ i l l  yct comc onwhich thoss militarp 
er~ions who h v e  doseded their duty in thaae crilical timea will 
E B  punished aa tUer deserre. Th pvemors of tiie l~ingdam 
forget tlie innumera ~ l i !  remonstriiricce whicli hnve been fon~arded 
ta them on the defeota in tlie proceedinp of courts martial, which, 
in time8 oC active war, rrender them sud their sentences entirely 
nugalorg. As rtn additioual iustllnco ol these dekcts, I rnerition 
Cliai: oficers of the Olivera regfment of militia, who behared 4 
in tlio &ion with thc encmy ut Vdln Novo, dc Poshoa, in tha 
begurninff of' dqpst last, and a mart martial was immediately 
asaemblcd for tlits trinl, nrc stilt, in the cncl of Oetohcr, undcr 
trful, and the trial wdl, probably, not be conctuded till Christms. 
In likc mnnnw, the miiitary t i n i  of thoae ~ C R C F ~ C ~ E I  of thc militia, 
rift~r ~ ~ c m b l i n g  oficers ancl ~oldiers a€ grcst inconveniente for 
the pnrpose, eannot pwsibb be mncludcd ti11 tI~e period rrill 
gonr: 1)y in whicli any hencíit might lie ~eoured frnrn the i:xamplo 
of the punishmcnt of an ona or number of tlzem. The dc tcct 
in Gio ndrniniihation a f i l ia  rnili~vy Iiru hns been rcpentodly 
inkd out to tlie government, and a remedy for the evil has 
E c n  pmpogcd to ihrm, and iins bcon opproscci of  by the Rneo 
regent. But t h y  will nol adopt j t ;  and i t  would be mnch ! etter 
if zhrre w n ~  no law for tlii. <ovemmant c?f thc mmy than thnt tlia 
e i s  ting lama shodd coni inue without being execiited.- 
WELI~~OTOK.' 
Sncmow VI. 
' October,29, 1810. 
' - ln anmer to  lord Wellalef8 queries re~pecting the 
Portuguesa repncy, my opinion is tlilit tho rrgcncy ooircht to be 
appointed by the pnnee regent, but dwing his pleasure; they 
oiight h havo fiill powcr to nct in crcry possil)lc emc, So mnko 
appointments to oflim, to dismishi from office, to make and alter 
LWR, in short, every o r c r  which the princc liirnaclf could i! possess if he ~ l . e r e  on t e spot. Tbey onght te report, in detail, 
thcir ~oceedings on cvcry mb'cct, and thcir rrasons for tlie 
sdoption of wery measnro. h s  ought to decline to 
roeeiw a y  npplinition from any ofhis offiecrs or siilijrots in 
Portugal nat tran~mit.kd throngli the regular channels oE the 
goveniment here, md onght to adopt no mcnsurc wspccting Por- 
tugal not recomrnended by the regency. Tlic smd,lIcr t l e  numhr  
of pcraona com ~ i n g  tho rrgency tlio better; but my opinion i s  
thst it is not agsabje io reinore sny of tlie pesoni nuw eom 
posing it exccpii~~g principal Sousn, with whom 1 neitlier can 
nor will have nny oiricid inkrcourse. n i e  ntrimch is, in rny 
opinion, a ncw~smy .va. .He %m nc uirod n Eind af popdwity 
mil eonadence tliroiigh tUe country L c 1 1  IIOLIIJ moreasa X ha 
wns remov~d from oitice, and he is the Iíind of man to  do mnch 
rniscluef if ho was not emyiloyed. If we ahonld succeetl in rc- 
monn tha principnl rrliiclr 9n,?~?t be done), I tliink the pntria~ch 
wiU t ate  mrning, an d ñiil behare betiter iu  fntturee I n  rcsyect to 
rni1itnr.y ~prrnt~iotis, thcrt: cm be no intt*rhmiicc on thc pnrt of 
tlie repeney or anybody else, If thcre ia 1 cail no longcr be 
rcapomible. X f  our o m  govement choose to inlerfexe 1Iiem- 
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selvea, m that the p h  re nt; &odd interfe~e~ t h g  have only 
ta pivo me their orden in &l. and I aiti cary them snictly 
into execution, to the  h s t  of my abilities; md 1 AZH be respon- 
sibla for nothingbnt the execution; bnt, ii"I amto be rcsponsi~ilc, 
I must h m  full discrelion rand no interference on the piirt of the 
regpnry or anybody cl~c.  I filioiild lilrr to RCC princiliiit Soiinn's 
detailed instructions for his 'einkscados' on thc left bank o£ tlie 
r l ' i~ i ta .  1f riilcipul Souzn doos riot 60 to England, or some- 
rliere out uF Portiqnl, the oountr aiii be lor t  The time m 
lore in discussiog m a t k t ' ~  wkch ougft to be ereeuted inirnedinteip, 
and in tlie wwng direction given to Me delibernt.ion of tIie govern- 
rnmit, is inconceivahle. The gentlemen destined for the Alemte'o 
ougiit ta hve .  hoen in tbe pmviiinco on tiic o~oning of  t l r  
but, inskad of that, three i-aluable daya of fine wenther K ~ E I  have 
bcon losi, becwss tilo overnment do not clioose! l o  LiTíc ~iai-L in 
oiu m a n p m e n t ~ ,  a ~ % ,  home~i r  md~niablr benetioinl, d l  not 
be mnch iiied b thosewhom itwill affect; dthougli it is certain 
that, aonncr or %w, theac permna rniist snd nill he rnined, Iiy 
leaving behind them di their valualile property, md, as in tlie 
case of tliis parl  of the countv, everything wliiv1i cnn enablo Ilie 
enemy to rcmain in the muntry. Xn muisner to 31. de Forjns' noto 
of ths 22nd, enclosed in yours, (witliout &?te,) I hnve tn say tliat 
l hnow of no cxrriages cm loyed by t11e Britiali nrmy rxceptin 
by the mrnmiss,-ganeraf and none me detnioed that 1 knoaof 
I wish t h d  the Pwrtquese governmenl, or i t , ~  oficers, woulil s i d e  
the riames of those mho have detained eaminges, contrary to m 
repated ordm; or tlm regiment, or ~ L w o  they nra RtationcJ 
but t l i i a  they wiil nercr do. Al1 that we do ~ i t h  the cnrriages js 
to send bmk sick in them. when t h r e  are any, It It not 
answer to mlike an en ngement Ihat tlie wliecl-carriugca from 
Liabon ahall not come &her thao heellas, &Iantnchigue, &c., 
mnuy wticlea reqnired by tlie armv cannot be cai~ ied  by mulea, 
and the cnmiages m~ist  como on mith thcm 3icre. Jn rnriny cnaes 
the Portugirese troeps in particular are ii1 pmvided witli mulea, 
t1iert:foro ibiti must be left to tlie cominisasy-gener~l o f  tl~e 
armv, under z reeommendation ta  Lim, if possible, not to aend 
the Lisbon wheel-carriaps lieyond the places abore-mentioned. 1 
wi~l l ,  in cwry cniic, tliat n rrgulstion rnnrlr: ulioitld ho observcd, 
md thc makers of regirlationa slionld take care nlwaya to frame 
them as that Ihey can bo oliservod,+ whch is tlto renson of m3 
ciitcring ao pnrticnlnrly into this pomt. 
'WELLINQTON: 
SECT~OX m 
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*- I rrm ~ l a d  that the gentlamcn feel my Iettcrs, rrnd 1 
hope that they Rill h a ~ e  tlie effect of inducing tlrem to take some 
dceidad at~pw ns ~ e l l  regnrding tlie prorisinna in tlie Alcmtcjo iui 
tlie desertion of tha militia. me ordennncn, artillerg now be@ 
to desert from the works, ~l thougl i  tliey ara fecl by us rrith 
English rationa and takcn cure of in thc a m e  mnner as our 
own troops. Yonr note, No. -, oF 29th, iu  sfictly h e  In al1 
its pa&, the Rcnch could not hare stnyed Iiere a w e k  if al1 the 
pro\risionrr had been xemovcd, md the length of time they can 
now atay dcpends u on the uuntity remaining of whtlt thep 
Lave found in placos goin whih;% thcre exi.tpd meaaa of remoriog 
~verything, ii" tlic unnti$ Iind bcrn tcn timea grcntcr. Tliey 
are stopped effcctnib; in h n t  di tL-e m d s  are occnpied,, and 
thcy can gct nothrng f m  their renr; biit nlI tlie militnry 
arrangements rhich h a ~ e  been made are useless if they tan 
lind sulisistencc on tlie gromd which thep occupy. For whnt 
1 know to tlie oontram, tLey may be able to mainintain tliejr 
position tiIl tlre nliole hencb amy is Groughh to thcir asaid- 
n ~ c e .  It js he-breuking to contemplate the clianee of fdure 
from m& obstinacy and fdy! '  
' WELX,XB~OIP." 
~BCTIOA m 
' P m  Negro, Armmh 1,1810. 
cI no donbt f3mt the pernment  can roduc~ volumes of 
prtpm,to pruve that thcy gnvo ordors npon tfe screrd snbjeats 
to whicb the enclo~ures relate, ht it would be pery desirable if 
they would Btate whetlrer nny mngistrate or 0 t h  perarrn has 
Leen punished for not obeying tliose orders. The fact i a  f o a t  
tbo governme~~t, after the appoinimont of  principal Soirza ta be 
a membw of  the negency, concei~ed tht  €he rvar conid bo main- 
tained upon the franti~r, contsary to t,he opinion of my self and 
of ereqi rnilitnry oizcer in the muntry, md, instcad of i~ing 
poaitive orders yreparatorg to the eueiit rrhicli aas most ?&el 
to ooc~u, rir., tha t  tl ie allied amy r o u l d  rptira,they qent  mnet 
vdmble time in cliscueshg, withme, &e expediencv of a m e m o  
~ h i c h  was quite imlmct icable, and omitted to g;ve tho orden 
trllich rere necessary Eor tke evacnatiori of tlie countrg beheen 
thc lYagua and the Mondrgo h the inhnhitonts. Tlicn, ahen 
convinoea that rhe army ~onlz retire, thcy h s t  impaaed that 
duty on me, ulthoiigh tlicy must havc known tlint X waa j normt 
of the namea, tlie nature d the oilices, the piac~a o£ a!odo of 
the clifferent msgistrnhs who wew to auperintend thc execution 
of the measure, and, mareover, 1 have but one gentleman in my 
famil7 i o  give me anp. assislanoe in writing Ihe Porlapese 
Ianguage, md they afierwards issued tlie ordere tltemselves, 
atill müking thern referalile to me, without my knowledge or 
consent, and still knowing that I had no menas whater,cr of 
comunicatitrg ~ i t h  tlie conntry, and they issued tliem at the 
r c  pcriod wlrcn tlic encmy wns advnncing from Almeida, If 1 
h a 7  not been able to  stop t l is snemy at Busaco he mnst hwe 
Iieen in his prcscnt ~ituation long bcforo tha ord~r  could h n ~ e  
reaeted those to whom it waa addmssed. Al1 thii concluct wair 
to be attrilntci(1 to  tha samo causo, rr donire tu svoid to ado t 
a measare. rvliich, hoñever ben&cial to the mal interests of tl$ 
criuntry, rrm likely w disturb tlio Eiahits orindolenco and ensa of 
tlic iiilialiitnnts, and fa t l : ro~ tlia odiiim of tlic mcnFmrc iipon me 
and u on tilo Britisli go~.crnment. 1 ava~ed.  iii my proclama- 
tion, t\nt I wos ths nuthor of tLot mesauro, sod t h e  govement  
might hnvc ~hcltcrcd tliemselveu undor tlint nnthoriQ, bntthe 
riuciple of the go-rernment has lately been to scek fm popu- 
%riL ood they rjgill not nid u< auy mesaun., hon-aver I>cooficial 
to t k  real interests of tha  conotry, which may be unpopular 
with tho m0b o i  Liaboa 1 cnnnot r q e o  in tho 'ustice O S  the 
erpresnion of ~ I W  nstonisiment by the sceretary datate that the 
mclrsure ahould h v e  been sxecuted in this part of ths counirlp 
nt nll. T1lc1 samo mcmurc mas rfirricd into complotc axccution 
in upper Beira, notwLtlistnntling tlmt ti10 m g .  was in that qm 
~ n c c ,  and thc mcnns of trnnsport wcro rrquircd for ita scrvicc; 
not a soul rcmaincd, md, excepting at Coimbra, t o  wliich tom 
m pmnnal nirtlioritg and infliicnct: did not rcacli, not nn nrticlo 
o?my descriptionaas lcEt behind; and ali tlie miiis opon the 
Coa and Mundcgo, and thcir depcndcril airerima, wore rcndered 
useless. But tlicre were no disczissions tlierc upon tlie propriety 
of mriinksining the wor npon the fmntier. fie orders were 
g i ~ c n ,  and thc mere obegcd in timc, nnd B c  cnemy si i f~rcd 
accordingly. 1 n t1us - part of tlie country, notwithstnnding tlie 
advanhe of Iiaviiig a plxo  of security to retira to, ilotwitli- 
standing the ad~antwe of wakr-carriage, notwithtandinp that 
thc Tagus m e  forkbTe in many Iaces at the penod d e n  the 
ini~zl~itantn ahouid iinve pnssod teoii proporty +o tho lcft of tlio 
river, and fortunatelp filled at the moment the sncmp appmhed 
i i d  baiikti, Iho inliabitunts Iiuva fled Srom lheir liubilations as 
they would hrcve done luider nny circamstancea, withoiit maiting 
orders from me or from t l ie government; but tlioy llave left 
liel~ind thmn evcrytliing that muld be iiaeful to tlic enemy, md 
could subriist their amy, and al1 the mills untonclied; accod- 
ingly, tliti crieniy atill rctnaiii In our fmnt, no~wi~liat~tridiug tliat 
their oommunication ia  cut off with Spnin and aith eveF otlier 
military hody ; nnd if the provisions ~l i icl i  thcy Iiaw found 
will lnst, of rhich 1 can have na Irnowlcdgc, t.licy mny rernnin 
ti11 thep will $e joined liy the whole Frcnch army in Spain. 
1 belierc thnt in Suntarem and Villa Frnnce nlonu, bolh toivus 
upon the Tqp, and both liaring the advrtntage of rrater- 
carrja e, the enemy found sulisisienca for ilieir army for a 
mnsicfmble length of timi. Thus will appenr the diferenoe 
of u meaaure ado tBd in time, arid tho dclay of it till t l ia last 
morncnt; nod I o$ iriah thot tho oountry 15n.od tho nlllra mny 
not experience thc cv i i  conscquenceB oF tbe ill-fabd propenaity 
oE t h  exísling Portu~aeso mgency te seek popularit . h tlio 
*amo rnanner tlic othcr rneasiirc sinoe rrcornmcnilrx viz.,  tire 
removal o£ the roperty of tlio inlixbiitants of Alemkjo to pIacee 
af soour ib ,  iins [con dolnyrd iiy ewrg menni in tlir poi~cr oí' tlio 
g ~ ~ e r n m e n t ,  and has Leen adopted at 1st rrgainat tlieir inclina- 
tlon: ns usud, t h y  eommenced a discussion n-itli me npon the 
expediency of prcr-enting tl1e enmy from crossing the Tagus; 
tlio tlien sont tlcir civil oficer lo rno k~ receive inslructions, 
anr?aiiimmds tlwy oonrercd to hirn nn instriictian af tho 
, ta ~ l i i c h  1 propose to dram the aitention of Lis 
y n l  hkhneaa thc ~rinct: ~ r ~ c n t  nd of his mnjratp'a govcrn- 
ment. JIis roya1 kghcss  and majeaty's gorernment will 
&en sss in what manner the- eKi~ 9 r y c y  are dinposed to 
co-operate with me. The addit.iona o er of the 30th of 
Oetolicr, mnrked i in tlie enelmuros from M. Forjw, show 
tlie aense, which the regency thomselven entertaincd of the 
insuficienq of iheir erigiunl instuetionil ta the Diaembargador 
Jacinta Paes de Natos. I may have mistaken the ~ ~ s t e m  
of dcfcnce to lie idopted for thix coiintrg, and principal Souza 
and 0 t h  members of tho regcncy rny  be better jndges o!? 
f1ie oapaci eE the troops md uf the operations to bc carried 
on ? m. h this case they ahould desire hi. maje8ty 
t"fl 5l' nce regent to remove me from t h ~  corn~nand oi' the army. nt tliey cannot doubt m7 zed  for the cause in ~ L e h  
ae m engagetl, and thoy know fiat not H rnornent of m7 time, 
nor a f ~ u l t y  of my mind, that is not devoted to mmote it ; nnd 
tlin reoords of t h i ~  gaurmment di slioa whnt f havs done ior 
them and their count If, therefore, theg do not manifPst 
tEiek dissati~faction a x w a n t  of  confidenta in tho memures 
which I zdopt by desiring tliat I should be remo~ed, t h g  aro 
bound, as Iionest men and rnitliful scrrlinta to their rince, t o  c* 
operate nith me by nll mssiii in their poner, a n f  thiis should 
neitllor thwari them by oppwition, nor render them nugatory by 
useless drlnys and discnssions. Ti11 lately 1 h a ~ c  hacl the satis- 
fnction of roceiving iho support and co-opsration of the govern- 
rnrnt; and 1 r~p;n:t that l i i ~  ro d hi~hncas tlrc prinoe rcgent 
should have been indueed to m& s. ohmgc TE& has oporated 
uo materinlly t~ tFir dctrimcnt oF his coplo nnd of thc allica. 
rcnpect to the operstiona on the 1Pfi of t ~ e  TW. I naa 
alwag~ oF opinion ihat ths odenanqa muld bc able l o  prsvent 
the enemy from aending over any of their plnnderbg pasties; 
and I wna nnwilling ia adopt my monanrr: of greatcr sulidity, 
from m knowlcdge, ttliat, ns Non as circurnatanees should render 
i t  e a ien t ,  an iiuy soooont, ta witlidraw the tmops, alucli I 
sho% haha red t to  thc lsft of tbe Titgu*, the ordenanea would 
disperse. She trutli iti t h t ,  noh~itlistauding tlie opinion of some 
of tlie government, every Portupese, into whoae handa a &!e- 
lock is fiaced, does not bocome a aoldier capable of meeting the 
cnemp. Ex erience, which the mcmbers of the g o v m c n t  
Lave not haK, has troght me tlria tiuth, and in wbat mnwier V, 
mnke u ~ c  of tho differrnt deacriptiona of troops in thia coiintry; 
anrl it mula be ver dosirable iC tho government wodd lenve, 
cxfi~si~ely, ta rnwdal Roreaford nnd me, tiie adoption of d 
rnilikq arrangernenta. The conclnct of tLa govemor of Setuval 
is, undoubtedl tho cnnsc of tiie inconveniente now felt oe tlis 
1 o t e  . Ho broqht forasrd u i s  g&son to tiie 
rirer aeinat ordem, and did not  reflect, md poasibly wm not 
arare nri 1 m, that iif B~ey hzd heen attaclred in tinat situntion, 
as they proliably would have beein, they would hzva disperscd; 
and thus Schrvd, as wrll as thc regiment, which was to hnve 
been its ~arrison, ~ m l d  bavc been Iost. I t  was necessary, there- 
fore, at dl evcnta, to prcvent tliat mixfortune, ~ n d  ta  ordcr the 
bwga to retire to Setuval, and the ordenranqa aa mal dispeaed, 


tbe aervices rendered to this nation by his m y  ;whatevcr may 
be the result oE tlis wntBst, n o t l z i  can make mo trelievo t h t  
the Portupcl~ie n~ t ion  wiü ever forget tliem; h t  d i e n  ia nation 
lias atlopteci tlie lino of resi~tance to tlie t w t  untifr ~ I L E  cir- 
ciimstnnws undcr wliieli it wns iinwimorisly ndopttd by thc 
Portii~nese nation in 1609, and ha bcen persevered in, it cmnoG 
be liclicrcrl thnt they iintrnrlcd tmo s&cr none o€ tlic mismjcs of  
war, or t h t  their government mt inconsistentl mith their 
nontirnmk wiiin thcy sxpiibiirla on .the inulilil oJlayiug h s l i  P bnrthcns on t l a  pea le, wbicli were evidcntl or no other m- 
pose tiim to nourisi a mr in tlis hemt of & kingbrn! %he 
patilmr~li n p;irticulnr forgeta 1~1s 01d principlca, Iiis omn actione 
~ L i c h  bava rincipdly inl-vlved Iiis cour~try jn the contcst wlien 
hc tnllii of Eaoonrimiing it, iie~n,iao i t hnr n7 rriiin f r tha tliird 
time, bcen b i o u ~ h t  intu tlie heort of Ilio kinC<lokO blthouqh 
tlie patriarck parlicul:tr~y, and Ihe mri'orily of h e  eliislilrg 
ore~nmcnt irppiorpd of tlie plan ahich ! exylained to tLom in 
gebrua,, 1RIU. mooriling to irlucli it ivaa yiol>~bk t ha l  tUis 
lringdom wo~i4d he mndo thr, ~ c n t  of wni; wliicIi 11ns ~ i n r e  
occurrcd, I dln i t  that his eminence, or aiiy of tl~osc members 
riiay hirly rlisappruvu of tlio campzign md oP tlio conlinuznca 
of the enomy in Portugal. 1 h v e  pointcd out to tlie J.ortu- 
overament, in nioro than ono dcqmtcii, tite difficullics 
n:Zifia rItic!i nttendod nng nttnoi  upnn t i lo rnornp's pnri- 
tion ia tltis c o u n q ,  annd tl ie probable succeea not only to our- 
selves but to our rlllies of riur persevermce in the plan wliieli I 
Iind dopted, and Irnd Iiithorto follorrcd so far mcccssfiilly, a8 
that tlie aiiies have literaliy suetmed no loss of any descrip~ion, 
und this nrmy k, ni this momcnt, more cornpletu thnn ii, was at 
tlic opcning o£ the campaign in April Iwt. i'ho inlialitanls of 
oue part ol tllc country done llave snffered a~id are contiut~~ 
+,o wffer. But witliout entcring into discussions i~liich 1 vr+is!i to 
avoid on this oecnsion, 1: repeat, that if my couusela liad been 
folloil-od tliesa sitlferinps wi.ouli1 aL Icnst Iiavc bren alEo~i:ilcJ, iind 
1 oli~erve tliat iit is the fkirst t ime  1 hayo lieard that the suffcr- 
inge of  a part, and lut  a slndl. art o€ nny nation hsao beon 
doemed o reison for rafueing to nlopt B mename whicl~iili imd br 
its object the dehverancp of tlie 71-hle. Tic patriarch may, 
liowcvcr, disnpprove of Olir: systm I have followed, and 1 coti- 
c e i v ~  tFmt lie 1s fully jiistified in dcsiring he rnnjcsl nnd tlio 
prince rc ont to remova mi: rrom tFie coiniiiaud oi' &ese nrmics. 
I'liis w018d be a rncnsurc consistriit rrith liis formcr conddct in 
this contest, nnder I'he circumstauces of my liaving unfortu- 
nntcly fnllcn in hk oliinion, liut this rnensurr! is ciitircly distiiict 
from t I ~ o  rerusal tu eoncur in laghg tliose burtliona upon thc 
peo lo wluch are ~ B C B S B ~ ~  to carry o11 utd to sccurij the ohjcct 
dt!c nnr. It muat bc oh~ious to Uia oniinonoe, nnd to crcn 
person acquaiated mtli tlie real sitaation of the affair~ of Por- 
tu91, unlcss a. p a t  cffort ia madu to rcnder tlic rcsources inoro 
adeq~mte to tlir! nccessng eqenditiire, al1 plat~s nnd spstems of 
ol~ruliun wi l l  Lo aWío, for tlie Portuguesa m y  niü be ablc LO 
cm on none. Af t h i ~  moment dthongh aii the c q i  are con. 
centrated in the iieidibourliood o f  tlleir magazinea, witli meane 
of transport, easp, by the Taps, the Portuguese troops are fre- 
quenily in waiit of ~ o v i ~ i o n a  hecause tlicre ia no money to pay 
t le expense o f  transporta and d the departments of tlia Portu. 
giiese urrny, ineldirig the Eioepihh, are equdly dostituk of 
funds to enable them to defray khe necessary expenditure, and 
to pcrrorm thrir dlitv. T i c  deiir:ienciee and difficultics have 
errbtcd ever siiice 3: hava known tlic Portuguese army, and it is 
well kiiown t h t  it must Iizvt! been cEisbundc~I more than onoe, iE 
it h d  not been assisted by the pravision~, stores! and funda of 
tho Xritish nrmy. It m y  likcwific ocrirr to h i ~  cmincnce tlint in 
proportion as the eperations o£ tlie amies wonld be more es- 
tended, the cxpensc would increase, and tlio neccfisity for pra- 
riding adeqnate funda to anpport it sould become more urgent, 
nnlcas, indccd, tlic eoursc ot' tlicir opcrntiona sl~onld anniliilnte 
at one blor both a m j  and e. enditure. SIie ohjection then to 
nda t meuswss to irnpm~o rprourcea of tlic gwommcnt, go 
to leoirle tLe qoestion whetlier tha wnr shoiild be cenied on or 
not in nny mnnner. By dcfiíring his mnjcs. xnd Uie prince 
rcgent to remove me from tlie command of tlieir rtrmies, his 
eminonce wauld mdeavoui to  gct rid of a r rson rlcrmed in- 
oapai~le or unrUling to huid tiis dutieg oE gis sihidion. By 
1.jsciinq to iinprore tZie resourcoa of tlie couniry he betrays nn 
alteration o£ opinion respccting the contest, and a desire to 
iorreil ita advaulage~, and lo  give up the independence of h e  
cotintry, and the security of the lives and properties of tlie Por- 
tupose nation. 111 my o Enion tlie pntria~cli is in ~uck a aituñ- 
tion in this coontry that Eo ou. w h t  to bc c d e d  npon, on tke pnrt 
of his maje~t to state dislinolly uoliat lie rneant, by refusing ko 
eoncur in t l l  measures nVirli were neeessary to insrirc the 
fuiida, to enatila Iliis counliy l o  carry on tlio arar; at al1 even ta, 
I reilnest tbat this Iettcr mny be communicatcd ta him in tlie 
repncy, and t h d  n, copy of it niay be fririiarded l o  Lis r o y d  
highnesn t h e  prince regcnt, in order that hia roya1 highness m q  
sre thal I  have! iven liis eminonca iaii oppur~utiilp oC cxplab~iiig 
his motircs eitEr by stating his personal objeetions ta me, or 
tlia dteraiion of liis o i ~ i i o u ~ ,  his ~enliments, u d  I l i ~  m islies, in 
respcct to the indepen&ncc ofhk eountry. 
' I~BELI,YGTOX.' 
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